In reading about the debates in Epistemology you run across terms like Doxastic and Nondoxastic. These usually show up in discussing the issue of justification. These terms are helpful in classifying different positions in this debate and are important for you to know. Doxastic deals with beliefs. You may read or hear it put as the “Doxastic assumption”.
The doxastic assumption (from the Greek doxa, “belief”) refers to the view that the sole factor that justifies a belief for a person is the other beliefs that the person holds.
James Porter Moreland; William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Kindle Locations 2966-2967). Intervarsity Press – A. Kindle Edition.
Until quite recently, it was customarily assumed by epistemologists that the justifiability of a belief is a function exclusively of what beliefs one holds—of one’s “doxastic state”. To say this is to say that if one holds precisely the same beliefs in two possible circumstances, then no matter how those circumstances differ with respect to things other than what one believes, there will be no difference in what beliefs are justified under those circumstances. We will call this the doxastic assumption, and an epistemological theory conforming to this assumption will be called a doxastic theory. The doxastic
assumption is a very natural one, and no one even considered denying it until fairly recently. The rationale for it is something like the following: all our information about the world is encapsulated in beliefs. It seems that in deciding what to believe, we cannot take account of anything except insofar as we have beliefs about it. Consequently, nothing can enter into the determination of epistemic justification except our beliefs. Thus all an epistemological theory can do is tell us how our overall doxastic state determines which of our beliefs can be justified.
Pollock, John L.; Cruz, Joseph. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (pp. 22-23). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
The theories that would fit under this are theories like Foundationalism and Coherentism. If you are familiar with reformed epistemology, then you will know it is a type of foundationalism. The issue of Justification is difficult. Since the Munchhausen’s Trilemma, we have only had 3 options. Either we have an infinite regress of beliefs and justifications, or they are based on circular arguments or start on foundational assumptions. This leaves epistemology in a difficult spot. We aren’t getting into which theory or theories are correct. It was just to introduce the problem.
Nondoxastic theories deny the doxastic assumption. Any reasonable epistemological theory will make the justifiability of a belief a function at least partly of what other beliefs one holds, but nondoxastic theories insist that other considerations also enter into the determination of whether a belief can be justified.
Pollock, John L.; Cruz, Joseph. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (p. 24). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
The former(Doxastic) holds that justification of a belief for S is entirely a function of the other beliefs held by S. On a doxastic view, one justifies his beliefs by relating them (by comparison, deduction, induction, etc.) to other beliefs one holds. On a nondoxastic view, one is not limited to this sort of justification. E.g., on one kind of nondoxastic view, a belief derived “directly” from perception is justified because perception is a legitimate cognitive process, whether or not we have beliefs about the origin of the belief and the legitimacy of perception.
~ Dr. John Frame</a
The theories in this area are Internalism, Externalism, Probabilism, and Reliabilism. These are broad categories because there exists an overlap between these theories. I will try to give you a definition for each position.
1. Internalism-
Roughly, an internalist is one who holds that the sole factors that justify a belief are “internal” or “cognitively accessible” to the believing agent or subject. These factors are various mental states (experiences, sensations, thoughts, beliefs) to which the agent himself has direct access by simply reflecting on or being aware of his own states of consciousness. Justification is grounded in what is internal to the mind of and directly accessible to the believing subject. They are factors the subject can be aware of by simply reflecting upon himself. For example, Ashley’s having a red sensation confers some justification on the belief that there is a red object in front of her and the red sensation itself is internal to her—it is a state of consciousness to which she has direct access. An externalist is one who denies internalism, that is,who affirms that among the factors that justify a belief are those to which the believing subject does not have or does not need to have cognitive access. For example, an externalist could hold that among the things that justify a belief is the causal process that caused the belief to be formed—light waves reflecting off of objects and interacting with the eyes and optic nerve in the right way—even though this causal process is entirely outside of the subject’s awareness. So far, internalism was defined as the view that the sole justifying factors of a belief are those internal to the subject. And this is, indeed, the standard way of defining internalism. However, it is possible to make a distinction between strong and weak internalism.
James Porter Moreland; William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Kindle Locations 1870-1881). Intervarsity Press – A. Kindle Edition.
2.Externalism-
An externalist is one who denies internalism, that is, who affirms that among the factors that justify a belief are those to which the believing subject does not have or does not need to have cognitive access. For example, an externalist could hold that among the things that justify a belief is the causal process that caused the belief to be formed—light waves reflecting off of objects and interacting with the eyes and optic nerve in the right way—even though this causal process is entirely outside of the subject’s awareness.
James Porter Moreland; William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Kindle Locations 1875-1879). Intervarsity Press – A. Kindle Edition.
3.Probabilism-
Probabilism attempts to characterize the justifiedness of a belief in terms of its probability and the probability of related beliefs.
Pollock, John L.; Cruz, Joseph. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (p. 91). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
4.Reliabilism-
Reliabilism seeks instead to characterize the justifiedness of a belief in terms of more general probabilities pertaining not just to the belief in question but to the cognitive processes responsible for the belief.
Pollock, John L.; Cruz, Joseph. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory) (pp. 91-92). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
5. Foundationalism-
Foundationalist theories are distinguished by the notion that all knowledge rests on foundations. More specifically, the foundationalist notes a fundamental division between those beliefs we justifiably accept on the evidential basis of other beliefs (e.g., the belief that the wind is blowing is evidentially based on the belief that the leaves are rustling) versus those we justifiably accept in a basic way, that is, not entirely on the basis of the support that they receive from other beliefs.
James Porter Moreland; William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Kindle Locations 2706-2709). Intervarsity Press – A. Kindle Edition.
6.Coherentism-
According to the coherence theory of justification, also known as coherentism, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably held, just in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system or some variation on these themes.
~ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7. Other Important Definitions:
6. The KK principle-
In its simplest form, the KK principle says that, for any proposition p, if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows it. More complex formulations say that if one knows that p, then one is in a position to know that one knows it, and this is fleshed out in a variety of ways.
The Council 