Necessitarian:
Here is a dilemma that ensues on deism. Is the deist god a transcendent creator? If so, then there are no categories, properties, or principles (nothing) he shares in common with creation by which to know of or about him without revelation. Yet, as the creator of the world, the unknowable god would still be the only one to possess an exhaustive concept of the universe, and so would still be indispensable to epistemology. And so, if the deist god is a transcendent creator, knowledge is impossible.
Is the deist god an immanent creator? If so, then this god participates in categories, classes of properties, and principles which precede him and the universe he creates. But that would mean the deist god is defined by and subject to things apart from himself, that he is just another part of the universe to be accounted for by a higher reality. And so, if the deist god is an immanent creator, he is not a relevant substitute of Christian Theism. That is, an immanence deism does not show how knowledge is possible apart from Christian Theism.
Only the Christian God is transcendent because he is self-existent, immutable, infinite, and possessing a unique, exhaustive knowledge of Himself; and at the same immanent, because the incomprehensible God chooses to condescend, design agents in His image, and reveal Himself to them.
- Formalized:
P1. t-deism or i-deism
P2. If t-deism, then divine ineffability.
P3. If divine ineffability, knowledge is impossible.
P4. If i-deism, then underdetermination.
P5. If underdetermination, autonomy is undemonstrable.
P6. Knowledge is impossible or autonomy is undemonstrable.
P7. Autonomy is demonstrable or CT is true.
C: CT is true.
P1 just lays out the revelation-less nature of deism. Deism cannot resort to revelatory appeal on pain of borrowing from theism. P2 and P3 spell out the problems of a holy, transcendent, self-contained god sans revelation from him. P4 and P5 point out that a deist god who is merely part of the universe to be accounted for cannot succeed in accounting for the preconditions of intelligibility, does not succeed in showing that it is possible to have knowledge apart from Christian revelation, and so cannot demonstrate the possibility of the contrary (viz. possessing existence, knowledge, or living apart from Christian revelation). P7 notes that if autonomy is possible, it must be demonstrable; including, it must be shown that the universe is necessarily lacking of Christian revelation and so lacking of knowledge of the Christian God. Since then deism makes autonomy untenable, it has been shown the impossibility of the contrary, and Christianity is true.
It’s a Framian immanence-transcendence objection. If the deist god is supposed to share Yahweh’s holiness, how can he be known without divine revelation, thus reverting to theism? If the deist god is knowable apart from revelation, then he is not holy (transcendent), and therefore is only part of the universe to be accounted for, not the sole creator of it.
The deist god needs the Christian God’s properties in order for him to be a relevant substitute. But in borrowing the Christian God’s properties, the deist god either fails to really be deist or fails to be a substitute.
That’s where the car factory analogy came in. Even if we lacked the skill or ideas necessary to make a car factory, we still know everything needed to learn about a car factory according to principles unique to neither us nor the car factory. For example, mathematics, principles of engineering, colors, etc., are all ideas by which the car factory is defined and which the car factory does not possess uniquely. But if the car factory depends on reality outside itself – the aforementioned principles and ideas – to be defined and understood, then it is simply part of the universe, not an account of it.
Yahweh, on the other hand, possesses His properties in and of Himself. There is no principle outside of His act of revelation by which to acquire knowledge of him or by which He is defined. He is self-defined because He is self-contained: all truths about Him are grounded in Himself and cannot be shared unless He chooses to condescend.
The god of deism does not impart his likeness in, share his knowledge with, or seek personal relationship with humans. But if we are not made in the likeness of the original source of knowledge, love, and order, then humans would lack any capacity for knowledge, personal relationships, or intelligible experiences of the world. Moreover, if god has not revealed himself and he has no care or plan for humans, then we could neither know of or about god and neither would it matter, since our lives lack any divine value or purpose. It follows that the following ideas would fail to hold if deism is true:
TheSire:
The problem of arbitrariness: The problem is that the deist god has not revealed himself. We do not know the nature of this being. That means we have a basis to think the Deist god is an evil being deceiving us to think we are rational. If he is completely hands-off, then why suppose evolution has provided us a mind to know the world? The fact of the matter is that the deist God could be whimsical and change the universe with no apparent reason why. He could arbitrarily change the laws of nature, laws of logic, laws of mathematics, and laws of morality for no reason.
Secondly, deist God doesn’t provide a basis for ethics. I have argued that God must be as Van Til has said “Absolute Personality” in order to account for obligations and norms. The deist god is an impersonal being that can’t get past the “Is-Ought” problem. That means nothing obligates us to believe that deism is true.
