The least impressive debaters of the Abrahamic religions are Muslims. It is not something to watch and be edified but to endure. There was a debate between Dr. David Wood and Mohammed Hijab on the issue of the Trinity vs Tawhid. Hijab’s case is being debunked claim by claim by multiple sources. I’m going to share criticisms of Hijab and leave it up to the listener.
1. The most annoying thing about listening to Muslim is the fact that accurate representation of other worldviews are impossible and they employ such silly double standards that it is impossible not to choke on the hypocrisy. Take the 3=1 is the trinity statements. That is obviously not what Trinitarians are actually stating. I’ve quoted Hays on this point before:
On the one hand, it may operate with an overly abstract model of the one-over-many by reducing numbered objects (1x; 3y) or numerical relations (1x=3y) to sheer numbers (1=3). But the Trinitarian “equation” doesn’t operate at that level of generality. “One God in three persons” is not reducible to “the number one equals the number three.” Rather, the relation is more like saying that A and B are the same with respect to C.
On the other hand, it may operate with an overly-concrete model of the one-over-many relation by reducing numbered objects to concrete particulars. We use numbers to count discrete units. One unit of x doesn’t equal three units of x. And this is true enough when dealing with spatially discrete objects, like a loaf of bread. But the members of the Trinity have no physical boundaries. They cannot be divided and subdivided into parts less than the whole.
In addition, it is a mistake to press adjectives like “same” and “different” into relations of strict identity and absolute alterity. We use these words more loosely. Am I the same man I was ten years ago? In some respects, yes; in others—no. But it is possible for two objects to sustain a point-by-point correspondence without reducing one to the other. For example, a symmetry sustains an internal one-over-many relation. Of particular interest are enantiomorphic symmetries, such as we find in tessellation, strict counterpoint and crystallography. This type of symmetry sets up a relation that is both equipollent and irreducible. Although A sustains a closed, one-one correspondence to B, A is not reducible to B. One-to-one is not the same thing as one-of-one.
2. Some think the Trinity is paradoxical. Paradoxes aren’t actual contradictions. They are apparent contradictions. Paradoxes are a common occurrence in areas of philosophy, science, logic, and mathematics. We are discussing an Identity problem when discussing the Trinity. As Dr. James Anderson quoting A. P. Martinich shows:
The first, and more straightforward, of these approaches has been presented with admirable clarity by A. P. Martinich. Martinich begins by framing the problem presented by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and quickly dismisses metaphysical solutions such as those offered by modalistic and social trinitarian interpretations: All theologians understand that the central problem involving the mystery of the Trinity is to explain the possibility that there is one God but three persons in God without falling into contradiction. Many, if not most, contemporary theologians who write about the Trinity believe that the key to the solution of this problem lies in adequately analyzing one or more of the concepts of a person, a nature, a substance, or God, or in constructing some new concept, say, that of “persons in community” or “a society of persons.” … Worse, such discussions mislocate the source of the problem, which is that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are somehow identical and yet not identical. As the notion of identity is generally construed, this is incoherent no matter how “person,” “nature,” or what-have-you is analyzed.
James Anderson. Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character and Epistemic Status (Kindle Locations 961-970). Paternoster. Kindle Edition.
The notion of identity has led to many discussions throughout the history of time. Some have denied the existence of change and time based on paradoxes in the notion of identity. Some philosophers deny the idea of absolute identity. Dr. Anderson wouldn’t be “inviting Muslims to believe a contradiction”. He would be inviting them to believe a paradox. Dr. Cornelius Van Til thought that the Trinity was a necessary paradox that granted meaning to all things because the Trinity solved the issue of the “one and the many” or the issue of universals and particulars. We are justified in believing in the Trinity because it is taught in Holy Writ. The ancient Greeks debated the issue of change and identity. They wondered how something could change and yet be the same thing. Issues in the area of identity capture the attention of modern philosophers:
Irving Copi once defined the problem of identity through time by noting that the following two statements both seem true but, on the assumption that there is change, appear to be inconsistent:
- If a changing thing really changes, there can’t literally be one and the same thing before and after the change.
- However, if there isn’t literally one and the same thing before and after the change, then no thing has really undergone any change.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/
Imagine a wooden ship restored by replacing all its planks and beams (and other parts) by new ones. Plutarch reports that such a ship was “… a model for the philosophers with respect to the disputed arguments … some of them saying it remained the same, some of them saying it did not remain the same” (cf. Rea 1995). Hobbes added the catch that the old parts are reassembled to create another ship exactly like the original. Both the restored ship and the reassembled one appear to qualify equally to be the original. In the one case, the original is “remodeled”, in the other, it is reassembled. Yet the two resulting ships are clearly not the same ship.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/
That leaves a whole host of other paradoxes that Muslims ignore that exists in most areas they claim demonstrate their worldview. So, they arbitrarily accept and reject paradoxes at whim. The Christian may think that God is paradoxical because he is the answer to the issue of the “one and the many”. Thus they would have the Trinity as a necessary paradox in order for us to reason about anything. The Christian would also be justified in believing in the words of Holy Writ that the Trinity is the case. So, if Muslims arbitrarily reject the possibility of paradox they have to delve into these issues we see in math, science, logic, and elsewhere.
3. Some think that the idea of numeric identity is a fiction and the identity we need to speak about is relative identity. That the issue with the Trinity is an issue with classical notions of identity. Dr. James Anderson explains it like this:
In general, a relative identity claim always takes the qualified form ‘ A is (or is not) the same Φ as B’, where Φ is a sortal term —that is, a term designating a particular kind of thing. Examples of such claims would include ‘Cicero is the same man as Tully’ and ‘Mars is not the same planet as Venus’.
James Anderson. Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character and Epistemic Status (Kindle Locations 981-984). Paternoster. Kindle Edition.
Vocab Malone:
Blunders Church Fathers on Trinity & Holy Spirit in David Wood Debate
Dr. David Wood:
Mohammed Hijab Admits: Allah Prays for Muhammad!
Mohammed Hijab Goes to Hebrew School
Mohammed Hijab and Allah the Man-God (Part 1)
Mohammed Hijab and Allah the Man-God Part 2
Mohammed Hijab, the Gospel of John, and the Only True God
Sentinel Apologetics:
Mohammed Hijab’s Hebrew Errors (David Wood Debate)
Mohammed Hijab on the Trinity before Nicea
Triablogue:
TheCouncil:
The Council 