I had an exchange with Dr. Braxton Hunter on the issues of determinism, epistemology, and presuppositionalism.

Braxton Hunter:

no. I’m not saying LFW is intuitive (though it is). I’m saying that it’s intuitive to you that on some level an individual has to be able to respond. I’m saying that the only reason one stops with “doesn’t have arms” instead of “is determined not to want to” is in order to save a system. In one case the individual can’t because he doesn’t have arms, and in the other case the person can’t because they’ve been deterministically made not to want to. In both cases the person is prevented by something outside themselves. If it’s intuitive in the former it’s intuitive in the latter. I know you see this. So next time you say, “You’re just begging the question, and assuming it.” I’ll say, like you do with the guy who has no arms.

TheSire:

Wouldn’t a libertarian like yourself also concede that physical ability is a necessary precondition for responsibility? Have you ever asked a paraplegic to stand up and go for a jog? How could you choose otherwise if you can’t properly form intentions? Why couldn’t a compatibilist then reason you aren’t responsible because you can’t do what you want? The debate is about what kinds of abilities are necessary for moral culpability. You don’t think all forms of ability are necessary for responsibility. namely, existentialist think we have the ability to decide what norms and obligations we have. So, you also decide the limits of what abilities are necessary for culpability.

Libertarians can’t demonstrate LFW from the Old and New Testaments. They read their philosophical metaphysical-ethical commitments into the text. It is similar to the way Catholics read the Church Fathers or how Idealist Christians interpret the Bible.

Braxton Hunter:

Seriously, the immature comments you read on Facebook are so different than the adult backs and forth of the classroom. Nevertheless, compatibilism makes a contradictory mess of the Old and New Testament. For instance, God tells Cain, in Genesis Four, if you do well will you not be accepted. This implies that from Cain’s position having received a negative response to his offering, he could make it right. Does he? No. Since God determined Cain’s actions (indirectly if you must), God knew that Cain not only would not, but could not. This means that unless man has LFW, God was deceitful at least, and flat lying at best. By the way, that’s just the first example chronologically from scripture. The totality of the text is a story of libertarian freedom. But leave it to a Calvinist to try and distract from the tough spot their in by changing the subject.

TheSire:

Nice poisoning the well. I’m sure you discuss that in your classroom.
I forgot people of your theological stripe take Genesis as history anymore. You know unhitching and all. So, it seems that you are claiming counterfactual statements imply libertarian freedom. Calvinist philosopher as you probably already know to appeal to the hypothetical can. So, in terms of possible worlds, he could have been obedient. Second, you claim that the story of the text is about libertarian freedom and that is just a claim based off a counterfactual interpreted wrongly. Lastly, you claim that I’m changing the subject but I was only stating to Chris what libertarians do. You are the one that ignored my initial response to attempt to scrounge up any biblical evidence you can muster. More could be said but I think that is sufficient.

Braxton Hunter:

Chris Harris right. I asked you for a difference that is not merely terminological. The difference you gave me is merely terminological. It’s like I’m wearing a shirt that I say is red, and you’re like, “I think of it as blue”, but we’re both talking about the same shirt, and the same color. Terminology.

So next time you tell me I’m not suited to discuss compatibilism because I think it’s the same as hard Determinism, I’d appreciate it if you keep this conversation in mind.

TheSire:

I don’t think epistemology rest on axioms. Presuppositionalist usually accepts a self-attesting authority.

Braxton Hunter:

I’m not getting into epistemology right now. It will muddy the ongoing and already extremely lengthy thread.

TheSire:

You mentioned earlier that you could just continuously ask Chris why to see where the regress stops to find an axiom but I’m just commenting that worldviews aren’t actually comprised of axioms

Braxton Hunter:

I hate to take bair, but how do you escape Descartes’ evil demon.

TheSire:

So, skeptical situations like such are solved by a Christian metaphysics:

http://spirited-tech.com/COG/2018/02/09/cartesian-demons-and-christianity/

Braxton Hunter:

sorry, I’m not going to read an article for research on an FB thread. You have to presuppose the Christian God. You’re presupposing Descartes’ demon isn’t real. Descartes’ tried the same thing, but as his critics have universally said, he can’t be sure that’s not also the evil demon. Okay so I did read your link anyway, and I was right.

TheSire:

Yeah, I think this is fundamentally mistaken. I’m not assuming the Christian religion is true but rather I know it is true via divine revelation. Axioms are arbitrary and really would imply we don’t know anything at all but rather with no justification assumes that we do. A presupposition doesn’t have to be an axiom. In what I’ve provided it isn’t and Descartes started with himself and his infallible intuitions but supposed he received his intuitions from a gracious being but I simply start with the Christian God and his revelation. I don’t take that to be an axiom for the fact that God’s speech is self-justifying. Axioms lack justification.

Braxton Hunter:

Trust me, I get it. I teach it in Contemporary Apologetics 1. But if I were a presuppositionalist I would have to be honest enough with myself to admit that it’s not impossible I’m incorrect. Once you do that, you’re still starting with what you assume to be correct. You’re starting with an axiom. You might be right, but that doesn’t make it not an axiom. Presuppers can simply demand that they do have Cartesian certainty, and I believe some of them believe that, but I think they’re wrong. That’s where the conversation ends. So let’s just skip to that.

TheSire:

I’m not going to grant that I could be wrong about Christianity for the fact to suppose it is possible that I’m incorrect about the Christian God implies that I am necessarily wrong about the Christian God. So, you would just have to assume Christianity is false in order to argue that Christianity is possibly incorrect. Presuppostionalist usually accepts a model with circularity over one comprised of axioms. But if you don’t wanna continue further that is fine.

Braxton Hunter:

Do you see what I mean about the distractions here. I’m not accusing anyone of fatalism. Please stop with the straw men.

Here’s what you’ve agreed to, best I can tell:

Compatibilism is Determinism.

Hard Determinism is mechanically the same as compatibilism.

The difference is that on compatibilism we believe in a form of freedom.

The deterministic sees your choices as experienced as though they are free.

This means that the only differences are two: 1) the terminology, and 2) how you feel about it.

That’s it.

TheSire:

I disagree they are mechanically the same based on the fact that agents are put in situations that comport to their being. In hard determinism, man is incapable of making any moral decisions. So, obviously, the difference is Compatibilism presents a world comprised of morally relevant choices. You’re just once again reasserting the incompatibilist position.

LATER THOUGHT:

This is a later addition because I was looking over older articles and thought Necessitarian put this a good way:

You’re making the old mistake of confusing fatalism and compatibilism. That C follows from B does not mean C follows irregardless B. In fact, that’s the case for LFW, not Calvinism.

On LFW, your choices don’t matter because the main events in history are fixed by God no matter what you try to do. On compatibilism, the main events are fixed by God to occur because of what you try to do.

http://spirited-tech.com/2021/05/17/determinism-control-and-human-desire/

They couldn’t be the same mechanism because in one system facts follows from other facts irrespective of prior facts.

Braxton Hunter:

whether choices are morally charged or not speaks not to the mechanics of how a choice is made. I actually think there’s a big problem with the moral side of this. It’s the reason no compatibilist wants to grant that the mechanics are identical.

TheSire distractions and obfuscations again. SMH. There are two separate discussions going on. Thanks for that by the way. One is on whether compatibilism and hard Determinism are mechanically the same thing. I think we’re seeing that they are. The second is whether that ball of wax represents the true nature of reality. We’re talking about the first right now.

TheSire:

I’m saying even if they are mechanically the same that that would only be an issue if you suppose determinism is incompatible with moral culpability. I think they aren’t the same based on the fact that God is the only agent. That it really seems like God is the only cause. But suppose I’m wrong. That really isn’t that problematic is all I’m stating

Braxton Hunter:

Chris Harris of course LFW is mentioned throughout. But the hypothesis of the book is not, “Why LFW is false.” It has to do with how a compatibilist makes sense of this issue. And the reason you’ll never find a LFW book on the subject is that it doesn’t need to be written. No one denies that an agent with LFW would be responsible. Funny that.

TheSire:

Many philosophers deny an agent with libertarian freedom would be morally relevant[John Frame]. Libertarian freedom isn’t sufficient or necessary for such. Some maintain libertarian freedom is incoherent. I deny an agent with libertarian freedom is culpable.

Chris Harris:

Annette Tyler Burns the question is “why is LFW necessary for moral responsibility?”…. care to actually answer the question?

TheSire:

Remember it’s an axiom. That means it is a position with no justification. You might as well take it axiomatic that freewill is false and determinism(Compatibilism) is true. They reduced moral accountability to subjectivity.

Braxton Hunter:

TheSire, maybe it’s not an axiom. Maybe God revealed it to me with certainty. You can’t prove he didn’t, so I win …. Or …. Something. Presuppositionalism is weird.

TheSire:

So, like a private revelation?

Braxton Hunter:

I’m presenting a hypothetical. But yeah… that’s actually a good question for the presuppers. Honestly.

TheSire:

I find private revelation to just be arbitrary. So, I’ll just respond that God revealed to me that you’re wrong. So, neither one would work. But secondly, Presuppositionalist have a public revelation that teaches in my thoughts a form of determinism. So, I have an objective criterion to show you’re wrong

Braxton Hunter:

that’s my point. And it’s the problem with presup. No falsifiability, and Circular reasoning (which we all do, but presuppers do very very liberally).

TheSire:

That’s my counterpoint. The Bible gives us an objective revelation to know when people are being arbitrary. Secondly, you can’t maintain what you think and hold to sola scriptura. Not all claims of revelation are equally valid is my point. Secondly, we all have access to the fact God has revealed himself in that world and his word. His word is the criterion to demarcate such claims

Braxton Hunter:

right so why don’t we stick to scripture, and leave your presuppers feels out of it.

TheSire:

That’s not a serious response. If you would’ve understood what I said then you would’ve noticed that I said sola scriptura implies presuppositionalism.