God’s Knowledge

Here Jimmy Stephens explains God’s knowledge, answers whether God has beliefs, and explains the role of God’s thoughts.

(Posted on behalf of Jimmy Stephens.)

God’s knowledge is twofold. God knows Himself. This knowledge consists of thoughts about Himself. Such self-attending thoughts have unique characteristics not shared by any other person. God’s thoughts about Himself are as immutable as the Person to whom they refer. God’s thoughts bear a unity; they cannot be divided into atomic propositions. God’s self-oriented thoughts are innate, entailed by what it means to be God. More examples can be given, but it should be apparent that God’s self-knowledge is characterized by his divine perfections in general. Importantly, God’s self-knowledge is Trinitarian. God’s thoughts, their content, object, and context are personal. In thinking of Himself, God represents Himself. The Representer, the Represented, and the Representational are all present in this knowledge transaction. More simply, in His mental self-reference, God is both object and subject without destroying their unity and He is one Knower without destroying the distinctness of the Person knowing (subject) and the Person known (object) and the Person transacting this knowledge (context). While all this needs a great deal of editing and unpacking, the two greatest principles of talk about God’s knowledge are consideration of His divine perfections broadly and consideration of the Trinitarian system of God’s knowledge. Then we must consider God’s free knowledge. “Free” here refers to God’s creational choice, His voluntary decision to have other thoughts, to think about something other than Himself. In the nature of the case, these other-centric thoughts will have to comport to Himself and so have a broadly self-centered track. They will be circular throughout. The idea is that God cannot fail to think of Himself alongside of and to think of Himself through things-not-Himself even as He accurate thinks of things-not-Himself. God’s free knowledge consists in His thoughts on creation which are objects “x-of-God” and so are no more construable apart from God’s self-knowledge than they are possible apart from God’s hand. 

But then there is also a third kind of knowledge of God, the wisdom God created. The lady of Proverbs 8 is the store of Christ’s knowledge, and Christ’s knowledge is humankind’s archetypal thought. What Jesus knows He knows as the Second Adam and as the Son of God, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, and inseparably. This is the wisdom of God brought into human flesh and blood. What is this knowledge? It is the accommodation of God. It is the mediating knowledge designed, adopted by, and learned from God so that finite creatures can apprehend the infinite.
So then, we seem to have a ladder set from God from creation to the blessed Trinitarian communion. First, God’s knowledge is split between natural and free. Above the ladder God resides, perfect in His self-reflection, knowing Himself in a way that exemplifies each of His perfections. The ladder is the free knowledge of God.

Second, the ladder is split. All of it consists of God’s thoughts about creation generally, but out of God’s plan comes God’s accommodated version, sort of the human copy, as it were, of God’s blueprint, no less written by the divine hand. Regenerate man climbs the ladder to worship the God beyond it. Fallen man tries to build his own ladder and reside beyond it, never able to hold it up, always climbing off its foundation, and all the while hopping back to God’s ladder whenever needs must.

What is belief? It has been defined in many ways. Some philosophical definitions of belief are mutually exclusive while others allow for overlap. Some definitions are useful, some ridiculous. From the outset, definitions of belief will fall into two categories: passive and active definitions. All definitions of belief will conceptualize belief as the mental act of an agent or not (usually as more than just a mental act). We can dismiss all later definitions of belief. God is pure act. In Him there is nothing in God waiting to be brought about, acquired, or experienced. God does not become God, does not change, but is “already” all that He is. Put another way, our God is a living God and God’s life is full, neither approaching something as if God ever lacked the conclusion, nor waning as if God needed anything. Whatever God’s “beliefs” could be, they could not be passive at all. Inevitably, we will end up at thoughts. The definition of divine beliefs to be considered is of thoughts that something is true. This can be put a thousand different ways, and it doesn’t matter much. We could say God’s beliefs are ascriptions. We could say they are eternal speech acts. We could say they are commitments to a conceived state of affairs. We could say they are confidences in divine ideas. These are all different ways of construing God’s belief-thoughts.

Let us consider a few objections to this theological notion.

1.) Contingency. Human beliefs are distinct from human thought as genus-species. That is, what distinguishes thought from belief is that “thought” is a broader category. The riches of human cognition offer a panoply of thought content we would not consider beliefs: reminiscing, dreaming, arguing, perception, and so forth. Thought and belief are conceptually distinct. No doubt, all of these imply the presence of beliefs, but dreaming about apples is not itself a belief about apples. To have a dream means more than just having a belief. Moreover, while dreams presuppose beliefs, they do not necessarily grant any. According to modern psychology, humans experience thousands of dreams over the course of our lives that we immediately forget. Likewise, when we attend an experience of nostalgia as part of our consciousness, we are not “practicing” belief, as if that were intelligible to say. In fact, for the great majority of human beliefs, they are a passive affair. They are unconscious attitudes which can be realized as propositional affirmations given the appropriate introspection and properly functioning cognitive faculties.

Already, then, it is a bit strange to consider God’s thought’s “beliefs” when they would be for Him altogether active while they are for us passive in the vast majority. That by itself would not constitute a critique, so much as a reason for analytic wariness. As it turns out, this wariness pays off. For beliefs have a further quality, that of contingency. Beliefs are externally informed; they are dependent on an extramental state of affairs.

Unlike mere thoughts, beliefs, even were they entirely infallible, would still remain contingent. For in believing that something is true, I am seeking to affirm what is already the case. In other words, beliefs are distinct from thoughts in that the object of a belief is, in some regard, independent of the belief. The content of beliefs, construed as active thoughts, contain a statement that presupposes something “out there” about which to state something in the first place.

Objection (1) can be better summarized as a dilemma. Perhaps this works:
P1. Either divine beliefs are indistinguishable from divine thoughts or divine beliefs are distinguished by contingency.
P2. God’s thoughts are non-contingent.
C: Either divine beliefs are indistinguishable from divine thoughts or God does not have beliefs.

This somewhat explains why human beliefs are passive. Namely, our entire life, but especially the theater of the human mind, presupposes the world of God’s creation as the infinite resource of beliefs. We do not create beliefs. We acquire them. We do not decide to have beliefs; we can try to force them, but inevitably we will have to rely on the world and beliefs about it to try and force new ones. Even beliefs about ourselves, even those thought to be incorrigible, Beliefs are unique to creatures because beliefs, even construed as active propositional affirmations, are conceptually tied to and dependent upon externality to help cause and inform them.

Now consider God’s knowledge, God’s thoughts about Himself and the world. God’s natural knowledge does not have a “direction” of contingency. The subject does not precede the object and the object does not precede the subject. God thinks what He is and He is what He thinks; the rational is the real and the real is the rational. There is no way to distinguish thought and belief here (so the word is meaningless at best, confusing at worst). God is His thoughts and His thoughts are God just as they are of God. What about God’s free knowledge? Unlike beliefs, God’s thoughts create the world. God does not believe it is raining when it is as if there were rain about which to have beliefs. Rather, His thought is precisely what causes there to be rain in the first place. The precedence here is exactly the opposite of what we know of human beliefs. Our beliefs constitute mental states about something independent to said mental states, at least to some extent. But God’s “beliefs” have nothing independent of them – all things depend upon them. How bizarre it is to call these creative thoughts “belief.” Now, there is one caveat. God does have beliefs in His condescension. In His immanence, as Emmanuel, God takes on creaturehood without giving up His Godhead. As the economic Trinity, God has beliefs – yes, even the Father and the Spirit, for we see that much in the baptism of Jesus. But what is vital is the presupposition of the ontological Trinity by the economic Trinity. The latter can only have creaturely beliefs because the former lacks them.

2.) Divisibility. Beliefs appear to be inherently propositional, and so, divisible in nature. They are compartmental, atomic – they are particles of thought. I do not mean that beliefs cannot be broken down, that they cannot be simplified, or anything like that. I mean that beliefs differ from concepts in this way, that they are inherently not holistic. Consider the concept of a computer. You might envision one, mentally representing an example. You might have memories coming to mind, ones that involve past sensations, past interactions with computers. Maybe you call to mind facts about computers: that they are the basis of modern technology. You might classify them in your head: computing machine, device, composite object, physicality, etc. However, whatever recalling your concept of a computer entails, your concept of a computer does not constitute mere belief. No doubt, concepts entail beliefs, at least for human cognition. Our concept of a computer entails the belief that there exists material that can be constructed into electronic devices of the name. However, believing that this is the case does not constitute one’s concept of a computer. In other words, beliefs about something do not constitute the concept of that thing. On the contrary, our beliefs presuppose concepts to compose their content. Concepts are mental images. They are classifying representations. Or, to call upon Adam’s first job in the garden, they are namings. Not in the usual sense of the word – I mean that concepts are a “that” relation adopted, conjured, or received by the mind to which the mind gives a name for means of reference and argument. And namings are different than claims. The mental image of a computer is different than mental claims about computers. Concepts are not beliefs.
However, we face a difficulty. In God’s case, there is a synonymity between His free knowledge, His creative thought, and His concept of the universe. God’s knowledge of the universe is conceptual; it is a concept, one God chooses to possess. But concepts are not beliefs. How then can God’s knowledge of the universe constitute a belief?
Again, it appears that the nature of creaturely concepts explains the nature of belief. God has an exhaustive concept of the universe. He knows every universe, every particular, and exhausts their system together in one indivisible mental act. Creatures, however, neither possess this concept nor the means to possess it. We are finite, building a concept of the universe that variously approximates God’s (depending for accuracy on many factors) over our entire lives through, among other things, beliefs. Beliefs, as particles of thought, have this role of helping me build my own derivative concept of God’s original concept. It seems rather intuitive that if I had an exhaustive concept of the universe, I would have no need for particular beliefs. For in my concept would already be contained all possible thought about the universe.
This argument might be formalized as follows:
P1. God’s knowledge consists of concepts. 
P2. Beliefs are not concepts.
P3. All God’s thoughts count as knowledge.
C: God does not have beliefs.

 

 

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