Over the past six months or so, there has been some discussion within the Council concerning the doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Son. While some of my dear brothers deny the doctrine, I affirm it and intend to defend and clarify it in the coming months as I have the time to do so. To begin, I thought it would be helpful to post a discussion of the topic from a learned reformed scholastic theologian of the 17^th century: Francis Turretin (1623-1687). My hope is that the following excerpt will contribute to the discussion by putting forth not only the actual issue that is being debated, but also positive arguments for the doctrine. Here are the words of brother Turretin at length (for more on the topic, click here): 

TWENTY-NINTH QUESTION: THE ETERNAL GENERATION OF THE SON

 

Was the Son of God begotten of the Father from eternity? We affirm

 

I. The preceding question established the consubstantiality (homoousian) and essential identity of the Son with the Father. This question will demonstrate his personal distinction from him, his ineffable and eternal generation against the blasphemies of anti-Trinitarians.

 

Statement of the question.

 

II. The question is not whether Christ can be said to be begotten of God by the miraculous conception of the Holy Spirit; or whether he can be called the Son of God by a gracious communication of existence, power and divine glory (for this the adversaries readily grant and acknowledge no other cause of his filiation). But the question is whether he was begotten of God from eternity, and whether he may be called Son on account of the secret and ineffable generation from the Father. The Socinians blasphemously deny this; we affirm it.

 

III. But in order that the truth of this eternal generation may be built up better, something must be premised concerning its nature. Not that it can be conceived or explained by us. “For here the voice is silent, the mind fails; not only mine, but even that of angels,” as Ambrose says (Of the Christian Faith 1.10*.64 [NPNF2, 10:212; PL 16.566]). Gregory Nazianzus puts a stop to our curiosity when he wishes it to be reverenced in silence: “The begetting of God is to be honored by silence; the great thing is for you to learn he was begotten” (Theou gennēsis siōpē timasthō, mega soi to mathein hoti gegennētai, On the Son 8 [NPNF2, 7:303; PG 36.84]). The words of Is. 53:8, although having another bearing, may be rightly used here—“Who shall declare his generation?” But only that it may be distinguished from human generation and be explained negatively rather than positively.

 

IV. As all generation indicates a communication of essence on the part of the begetter to the begotten (by which the begotten becomes like the begetter and partakes of the same nature with him), so this wonderful generation is rightly expressed as a communication of essence from the Father (by which the Son possesses indivisibly the same essence with him and is made perfectly like him). Whatever may be the analogy between natural and human generations, and the supernatural and divine, still the latter is not to be measured by the former or to be tried by them because they greatly differ (whether we consider the principle, the mode or the end). For in physical generation, the principle is not only active, but also passive and material; but in the divine it is only active. In the former, a communication is made not of the whole essence, but only of a part which falls and is alienated from the begetter. In the latter, the same numerical essence is communicated without decision and alienation. In the one, the produced is not only distinct but also separate from the begetter because the begetter generates out of himself terminatively. In the other, the begetter generates in himself and not out of himself. Thus the begotten Son (although distinct) still is never divided from him. He is not only of a like (homoiousios), but also of the same essence (homoousios).

 

V. This generation was made without time (achronōs); not in time, but from eternity. Therefore not priority or posteriority of duration can be observed here, although there may be priority of order according to which the Son is from the Father, although not after the Father. (2) Without place (achōristōs) because the Father did not beget out of himself, but in the same essence. Hence the Word (Logos) is said to have been with God, and the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father. (3) Without any passion (apathōs) or change, either in the Father or in the Son, since that he begat denotes no imperfection, but is rather the reception of all perfection. Although, therefore, with respect to the Father generation may well be called active, still it cannot well be called passive with respect to the Son because otherwise the Son could be said to be in the power of the begetter. Nor is there a difficulty in his being said to be begotten; for this, which is spoken after the manner of men (anthrōpopathōs), must be understood worthily of God (theoprepōs) by removing all imperfection. Hence what has place in transient and physical and material generation ought not to be transferred to the hyperphysical, immanent and divine.

 

VI. A person is properly said to generate a person because actions belong to self-existence (suppositorum); but not an essence to generate an essence because what begets and is begotten is necessarily multiplied (and thus the way would be paved to Tritheism). Essence indeed is communicated by generating; yet the generation, as it is originally made from the person, so it terminates on the person.

 

VII. That the Father begets the Son, and the Son is begotten, can both be said in a sound sense: the former with respect to generation considered in itself because the works of the Trinity inwards (such as to beget and to be begotten) are eternal and unceasing. Otherwise, if personal acts had an end, they would also have a beginning, and all mutation in God could not be denied. As therefore in work they are perfect, so in operation they are perpetual. Nor, moreover, can any imperfection of generation be inferred because even in nature there are things which are while in the act of becoming (as the rays of sun). The latter however is said better with respect to us to whom that which is in a state of becoming is imperfect, but that which is in actual being is perfect. Hence Scripture (in accordance with which we must speak) uses the past tense rather than the present (Ps. 2:7; Prov. 8:22–31). The generation therefore may well be said to be terminated by a termination of perfection, not by a termination of duration, as the Scholastics express it. When the Son is said to be always begotten, the perfection of termination is not denied, but only the end of communication.

 

The generation of the Son may be proved from Ps. 2:7.

 

VIII. This generation may be proved: (1) from the remarkable oracle, “Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee” (Ps. 2:7)—which not only the apostles acknowledge to be spoken of the Messiah (Acts 4:25; 13:33; Heb. 1:5), but the Jews themselves (pressed by the force of truth) are compelled to confess. Now he is called the Son of God, not generally, but he who is such by way of eminence (kat’ exochēn) and to the exclusion even of the angels themselves. “For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son” (as the apostle argues, Heb. 1:5). Consequently he is true and eternal God with the Father. For who but God could extend the bounds of his kingdom even to the ends of the earth (Ps. 2:8); break and dash in pieces like a potter’s vessel kings and people (v. 9); whom the kings of the earth ought to kiss (i.e., religiously worship, vv. 11, 12); who has absolute power of life and death? Who, even when his wrath is kindled but a little, can destroy nations and princes; in whom trust is to be placed; and from whom happiness is to be expected, except the true and eternal God? To this Son is ascribed a generation, not temporal and physical, but hyperphysical and eternal—such as can belong to him who is the eternal Son of an eternal Father and so true God with him, by which he is exalted not only above men, but even above the angels themselves. Now, if he could be so called on account of a gracious communication of existence or of glory, this could be attributed not to him alone, but also to others (although in a different degree). Nor is the passage in Acts 13:33 an obstacle, where Paul seems to refer this oracle to the resurrection of Christ. For Ps. 2:7 is adduced by the apostle not so much to prove the resurrection of Christ (which he does, Acts 13:35 from Ps. 16:10), as to prove the fulfillment of the promise given to the fathers concerning the raising up of Christ and the sending of him into the world. These things are not to be opposed, but composed; not that this generation consists in his resurrection, since even from the beginning he was with God (Jn. 1:1), yea even from everlasting (Prov. 8:22), and God speaking from heaven at his baptism testified that he was his Son; but by reason of manifestation (phanerōseōs) and declaration a posteriori because he is made known by it (as Paul interprets when he says that “Christ was declared [horisthenta] to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead,” Rom. 1:4) according to Scripture usage by which things are said to become or to be born when they are manifested (Prov. 17:17). Because, therefore, the resurrection was an irrefragable proof of his divinity and eternal filiation, the Holy Spirit, with the psalmist, could join both together and refer as much to the eternal generation as to its manifestation (which ought to be made in the resurrection). And Paul properly says that the oracle was fulfilled when its truth was exhibited, since by the resurrection the Father has most fully declared that he is really (ontōs) and peculiarly (idiōs) his own Son; even as James says that the oracle concerning the justification of Abraham by faith (“Abraham believed God and it was imputed to him for righteousness,” 2:23) was fulfilled when he offered up his son; not because the justification just then took place through that obligation, but because it was then declared. And so with regard to the word “today” (hodie), which is added not to point out a certain time in which that generation began; but that we may understand that all things are present with God, and that that generation is not successive, but permanent in eternity (viz., in it there is nothing past or future, nor any succession of time, but an indivisible “now” [to nyn] embracing however all the circumstances of time). As, therefore, with God there is no yesterday or tomorrow, but always today, so this filiation being eternal can properly be designated by the today of eternity.

 

IX. Equally vain is the objection that it is such a generation as is the part of a decree (or its effect) and so a merely arbitrary work. “I will declare,” says he, “the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance” (Ps. 2:7, 8). This generation is not set forth as a part of this decree, but only as its foundation upon which the universal kingdom (granted to him) is built. For unless Christ had been the true and eternal Son of God, begotten by him from eternity, he never could have been appointed Mediator and obtain a universal kingdom. Finally, the difficulty is not increased by the fact that these things pertain to David who nevertheless cannot be said to have been begotten by God from eternity. For although this oracle can in some measure pertain to David as the type (by reason of the dignity to which he was exalted), yet for a far different reason would it apply to Christ in whom alone it could receive its perfect fulfillment and to whom especially David in the spirit of prophecy had regard. Thus the same thing is said of Melchizedek and of Christ (Heb. 7:3): that he is without father (apatōr), without mother (amētōr), having neither beginning of days nor end of life. Still no one denies that it is said in a far different sense concerning Christ and Melchizedek. Indeed if the words are carefully weighed, it will plainly appear that although many things in this psalm apply to David, as the type, yet this oracle peculiarly and by way of eminence (exochōs) is proper to Christ. For such things are predicated of him as cannot fall on mortal man. This is often the case in composite oracles. Some things agree both with the type and the antitype and some either with the type alone or with the antitype alone. That this is the case here is apparent from the circumstances of the text.

 

From Prov. 8:22ff.

 

X. Second, the same thing is gathered from the passage in which Wisdom is introduced speaking thus: “Jehovah possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works; before any time, I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth … When he prepared the heavens, I was there … when he appointed the foundations of the earth, I was with him as his delight” (Prov. 8:22–30). No words could more clearly confirm the mystery of which we treat. The eternal Wisdom of the Father says Jehovah possessed him! How? Only by a true generation by which he is said to have been begotten and held as a most cherished delight by the Father; and this not in time, but from eternity (“in the beginning of his way, before his works,” Prov. 8:22). And that no scruple may remain, he adds in Prov. 8:24, 25 that this was before the beginning and foundations of the earth, before there were any depths and mountains (which denotes absolute eternity). Now this wisdom cannot be only some quality or virtue, but must necessarily be a subsisting person because whatever things are attributed to him are personal (as that “he teaches, cries out, calls and constitutes kings,” Prov. 8); “builds her house, kills beasts, prepares a feast, and sends forth her maidens” to call men, and the like (Prov. 9:1–3)—which can belong only to a person. Nor can there be a personification (prosopopoeia) here by which wisdom in general and in the abstract is introduced as speaking; for although prosopopoeia is admissible in amplifications and exaggerations (especially in fables), yet not in short and collected precepts, where the same thing is so often repeated and no intimation of a figurative locution is anywhere given. Otherwise there would be no certainty in Scripture if it were lawful to recur to prosopopoeia everywhere. Nor can a similar example be shown, for that which is adduced from Prov. 9:13 (concerning foolishness introduced as speaking under the image of a simple woman) is far from the point as mere inspection proves, and can best be referred to an adulterous woman and her enticements. That which is drawn from 1 Cor. 13:7 concerning charity (which is said to bear and to believe all things) makes no more for the adversaries because the abstract is put for the concrete—charity for the man possessed of charity (to whom such things belong). So here Wisdom is put in the abstract, not qualitatively, but personally (for him who is endowed with wisdom; who, because he possesses it most perfectly, is called not only Wisdom in the singular, but Wisdoms [chkhmvth], in the plural, according to the Hebrew idiom).

 

XI. Now that this is none other than the Son of God, Christ our Lord, is collected not only from the name itself, Wisdom (by which he is often distinguished in the New Testament, Lk. 7:35; 1 Cor. 1:24), but also from the attributes ascribed to this Wisdom (which most aptly square with him and can belong to no other). For who else can deserve the name of Wisdom and indeed of Wisdoms? Who else calls men to him, teaches the true way of salvation, wishes the law and his precepts to obtain in the church, convicts sinners of foolishness, promises life to those who regard him and denounces final destruction upon the unbelieving? Who else was with God before the world was and was perpetually with him while creating the world? If Jehovah is said to have possessed Wisdom from the beginning, is not the “Word” said “to have been in the beginning” and “to have been with God” (Jn. 1:1)? If it is said to have been a delight to the Father, is not Christ “the beloved Son” (huios agapētos, Mt. 3:17)? If ordained and anointed by the Father, was not Christ foreordained before the foundation of the world and anointed for the mediatorial office (1 Pet. 1:20)? If Wisdom is said to have been brought forth before the hills, was not Christ before all things (Col. 1:17)? If by her kings reign, is not Christ the King of Kings and Lord of Lords (Rev. 19:16)? If Wisdom teaches and cries out, calls and exhorts men to repentance in high and low places, both immediately by herself and immediately by her maidens, do we not read the same of Christ both immediately by himself preaching the gospel and mediately by his servants the apostles whom he sent through the whole world to call men to a participation of his grace?

 

XII. The word chvllthy ought not to be translated “I was created,” as Vatablus (cf. “Annotata ad libros Hagiographos,” in Critici Sacri [1660], 3:4091 on Prov. 8:25) and Pagninus hold, but “I was begotten” (as the Chaldee and the Greeks render it). For the Piel of the word chvll (from the root chvl) denotes not only “to bring forth” (in reference to women), but also “to beget” (with respect to men, according to Buxtorf, Lexicon Hebraicum et Chaldaicum [1646], pp. 198–200). And if elsewhere this verb can be referred to a formation (as Ps. 90:2; Dt. 32:18), it does not follow that it must always be used in the same sense when the thing spoken of cannot suffer it (as here where mention is made of Wisdom begotten before the ages). When the Septuagint translates it “created me” (ektise me), it is either an error for ektēse or ektēsato; or it was so given because among the Greeks the words “to create” (to ktizein) and “to beget” were sometimes used reciprocally for each other (Ps. 90:2; 104:31; Dt. 32:18); or because they did not sufficiently attend to the mind of the Holy Spirit. For the word khnh (used here) is a general term denoting acquisition or possession. In particular, this can be obtained either by creation (as Gen. 14:19) or by generation (Gen. 4:1). The latter signification must be retained here, as is evident: (1) from the other phrases here accumulated “in the beginning of his way,” “before his works,” “before the ages,” “before the foundations of the earth,” which are simply the description of an absolute age; (2) from the word chvll, which is added to explain that possession and which means generation when the Septuagint translates it genna me.

 

3. From Mic. 5:2.

 

XIII. Third, it may be proved from Mic. 5:2 where “his goings forth” are said “to have been from of old, from the days of eternity” (viz., in opposition to his temporal egress from the city of Bethlehem by his birth of a virgin in order to distinguish his temporal egress and generation from the eternal). For he cannot but have been begotten from the essence of the Father whose goings forth are said to have been from the beginning, from the days of eternity. And that this prophecy refers to the Messiah, Jonathan (ben Uzziel) acknowledges (Chaldee Paraphrase) and substitutes in place of mvshl, the word mshych’ (“Messiah”) (cf. Walton, Biblia sacra polyglotta, [1657], 3:74 on Mic. 5:2). The things predicated prove it because he is called ruler in Israel by way of eminence (kat’ exochēn); to him is ascribed the calling of the nations, a pastoral kingdom, the strength of Jehovah, the extension of glory and peace unto all the ends of earth (Mic. 5:4, 5). The various objections brought forward are easily answered. Although the going forth has a broader extension than generation, still it cannot be denied that generation is a going forth. Just as all the sons and posterity are said to go forth from the thigh of the fathers, and often the Son is said to have proceeded and gone forth from the Father (Jn. 13:3; 16:27, 28), so he could not have proceeded from the Father unless by a substantial generation, whose going forth preceded all creation and the production from nothing. If mqdm elsewhere does not signify eternity, it does not follow that it nowhere does because God is said to be mqdm (Hab. 1:12) “from the beginning” (ap’ archēs), “from everlasting”; and God is called qdm, i.e., the eternal God (Dt. 33:27). So here the going forth is said to be from the beginning, i.e., from eternity; and the rather because another phrase is added pertaining to the same thing for emphasis (epitasin)—mymy ‘vlm (“from the days of eternity”). For although ‘vlm and qdm (taken separately) refer to some time, yet when joined (as here) they signify eternity. That is indeed an audacious perversion to refer this to the antiquity of Christ’s family because he sprang from David of Bethlehem, who lived long before. It does not treat of the antiquity of the family of the Ruler, but of the Ruler himself (as not so much in the remote potency for being born, but as having actually existed). Nor is it better to say that he was from the beginning by reason of predestination because it had been decreed from eternity by God that he should some time go forth from the family of David. For the prophet does not speak of the decree concerning the Messiah to be manifested at some time, but of his actual going forth. Otherwise the goings forth of all things might be called eternal, because decreed.

 

4. From the filiation of Christ.

 

XIV. Fourth, it may be proved from the filiation of Christ, which (as most peculiar and perfectly singular) ought necessarily to imply a communication of essence from the Father in the most perfect manner (viz., by generation). Therefore he is not only called “the Son” (ho hyios) by way of eminence (kat’ exochēn) (Heb. 1:5) and “thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God” (Mt. 16:16), but also his own Son—“he that spared not his own Son” (Rom. 8:32); who has his own Father (Jn. 5:18); who begot the Son even from his essence—“the only begotten Son”; and “we beheld the glory of the only begotten” (Jn. 1:14); and “the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father” (Jn. 1:18); and “highly beloved” (Mt. 3:17). Now if he were called Son only on account of a gracious communication of existence and glory (with respect to the human nature, whether in this miraculous conception or in this resurrection and exaltation or in this vocation), he could not be styled either the one or the only begotten Son of God (because such a filiation can belong to others also, if not in the same degree, yet in the same kind). For the angels also are called sons on account of excellency of nature; and magistrates on account of dignity of office; and Adam on account of adoption and regeneration, as well as resurrection. Therefore there must be some other mode of filiation proper and singular to him (which can be no other than by generation), so that by nature he may obtain that which is conferred by grace upon others. This the apostle contends for when he teaches that Christ is so the Son that with respect to him not even the angels are or can be called sons (Heb. 1:5).

 

XV. When Christ is said to have been seen “as the only begotten (hōs monogenēs) of the Father” (Jn. 1:14), the to hōs is not assimilative as if he were only like unto the only begotten. Rather it is expressive of truth (as often elsewhere, 2 Cor. 3:18; Lk. 22:44; 1 Cor. 4:1) because he was truly such. This is inferred even from this, that he is said to have been in the beginning with God; yea, also to be God by whom all things were created. And if Christ has many brethren (Rom. 8:29), he does not cease to be the only begotten by way of eminence (kat’ exochēn) because the generation is evidently dissimilar and totally different in kind: not mystical, but natural; not by an expression of qualities, but by a communication of the essence itself. Isaac is called the only begotten (Heb. 11:17) not simply, but relatively (because alone begotten from free Sarah in lawful wedlock with Abraham and therefore made sole heir). Now although monogenēs and agapētos may be enunciated of the same subject (Gen. 22:2; Mt. 3:17), it does not follow that they are absolutely equivalent. Otherwise whoever are the “well-beloved of God” (agapētoi Theou) might also be called “the only begotten from the Father” (monogeneis para patros) (which is false).

 

XVI. Christ is said to be “the own Son of the Father” not only inasmuch as it is opposed to one of another family, for thus he would not be distinguished from believers who also (in this sense) can be called the own sons of God (since they are not another’s); but inasmuch as it is opposed to an adopted and metaphorical son. Thus he may be called the natural son who is such by the privilege of his nature and not by the grace and benefit of adoption only (in opposition to believers who are adopted sons, Eph. 1:5). Just as the Father is called his own Father (Jn. 5:17), not in a loose way, but in a most proper way (because the Jews, when they heard it, wished to stone him as if he had blaphemed—which they would not have done if he had merely spoken of an adoptive paternity).

 

From Col. 1:5; Heb. 1:3.

 

XVII. Fifth, he is the “image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15) and “the brightness of the Father’s glory and the express image of his person” (apaugasma tēs doxēs, kai charaktēr tēs hypostaseōs autou, Heb. 1:3). For that ought to be a true generation whose end he is, who is the image of the begetter and the character of his person (such as Christ is said to be). Not without reason does Paul here join together apaugasma and charaktēra to denote the truth and perpetuity of the image. It is not only a brightness quickly vanishing, but a mark (character) which once impressed always remains. Nor is the objection of force here, that man is the image of God and yet not begotten from his essence. For an image may be accidental and analogical, consisting in a similarity of virtues (as in man with respect to God, who in this sense is said to be a partaker of the divine nature, 2 Pet. 1:4); or essential and natural (as existing in fathers and their sons, who are of the same nature with them). Such is Christ who is therefore said to be not only like to, but also equal with the Father. Now although Christ is the image of God considered hypostatically (i.e., of the Father and of the same essence with him), it does not follow that he is the image of himself because he can be the image of another (as to the mode of subsisting, who is of the same essence with him). He cannot be the same person with him of whom he is the image, but this does not hinder him from being the same in essence. Although he may even be called the image of God (as God-man [theanthrōpos] and in relation to his mediatorial office) because he perfectly represents to us the Father, so that he who sees him sees also the Father (Jn. 14:9); still the idea of the essential image is not excluded, but supposed. Because inasmuch as he is the Logos, that substantial image glitters in Christ incarnate, and from him (as a mirror) is reflected the most clear image of the divine virtue—hence he is called “God manifested in the flesh” (Theos phanerōtheis en sarki, 1 Tim. 3:16).

 

XVIII. Christ cannot be called the Son of the living God with respect to unction and office (as if the name of Christ and the Son of God were coincident because they are expressly distinguished by the Lord). Nor is Christ said to be the Son of God because he was the Messiah. On the contrary, he is recognized as the Messiah just because he is the Son of God (who alone could be equal to this office). Hence it follows that because these two things are mutually joined together by an indivisible bond, no one can confess Jesus to be the Messiah without at the same time acknowledging him to be the Son of God, and vice versa. For Christ and the Son of God designate the same person, but not the same thing in the same person; for Son expresses the person, Christ the office. Nor ought it to be added that believers are often called the sons of the living God, who nevertheless, no one would say, are coessential with God (Hos. 1:10; Gal. 3:26; Rom. 8:14). For who does not know that the filiation of believers, no one of whom can be called the only begotten (monogenēs) and proper Son of God (to wit, by gratuitous adoption in Christ) differs far from that by which Christ is by way of eminence (kat’exochēn) called the Son of the living God (by antithesis to the son of dying man as something far more excellent). Even as Peter would intimate that he (with the other disciples) regarded him not only as the Son of man (as others considered him, supposing him to be either Elijah or one of the prophets or John the Baptist), but also the Son of that eternal God who always lives and never fails. Therefore as he was of the same nature with his mother as the Son of man, so he necessarily must be also of the same nature with the Father as the Son of the living God.

 

XIX. Although Christ might be called “the brightness of the Father’s glory” (apaugasma tēs doxēs) and the “express image of his person” (charaktēr tēs hypostaseōs) by reason of his mediatorial office and as he is God-man (theanthrōpos) because the Father has most perfectly expressed in him his own image and stamped it, as it were, with his own seal (Jn. 6:27), yet this does not hinder it from being attributed to him as he is the Logos and by reason of the eternal filiation. According to this, he is the “light of light, and God of God” (as the Nicene Council declares) and bears the most express image of the person of the Father in himself (by which he so differs from him according to subsistence as to agree with him according to essence). Indeed that relation (schesis) cannot have place unless these things are supposed because he could not have exhibited to us by incarnation the glory of God and the mark of his person unless he had been such before by an eternal generation.

 

Sources of explanation.

 

XX. Christ is called the “firstborn” in diverse ways: (1) by reason of his temporal nativity when he is called “the firstborn of Mary” (because no one was born of her before him and no one after him); (2) by reason of his resurrection as “the firstborn from the dead” (Col. 1:18), both because he first arose, not so much by priority of time as of causality (because he arose by his own power [Jn. 2:19], while all others rose by the power of Christ) and because he arose to immortal life, never again to die; (3) by reason of authority and dominion, in which sense he is called the “firstborn of every creature” (Col. 1:15) and “among many brethren” (Rom. 8:29) because all the prerogatives of primogenitureship—a kingdom, priesthood, a double portion—most properly belong to him; (4) by reason of his eternal generation when he is called the “first begotten of God” (Heb. 1:6) because begotten by the Father from eternity (pro pasēs ktiseōs monogenōs genētheis, as the Greek Scholia have it). Nor ought the first begotten always to belong to the number of those of whom he is said to be the first begotten, since it often denotes the only begotten, before whom no one was and after whom no one will come. Thus Christ is called the firstborn of every creature, not because he is the first of creatures, but because he was begotten before creatures. Thus we must not understand here a ranking (connumeratio) with creatures, but a going before and a preexistence. For if he is before every creature, he ought not to be reckoned among creatures and so must be eternal.

 

XXI. The Father begat the Son as neither now existing because he would be supposed to have been already before, nor as not yet existing (for so he would not be eternal), but coexisting (because he was with the Father from eternity). Therefore division applies only to physical generation where the begotten passes over from not-being to being. But it cannot be accommodated to this hyperphysical generation, which is an eternal act of the eternal Father (from whom the Son emanates and in whom he remains without any abscission [praecisione] by coexisting). Hence the Son was not properly before generation, nor did he begin to be through generation, but always emanated from the Father by an eternal and internal act (like the rays emanating simultaneously with the sun, only in a more eminent, inexplicable manner). (2) In fine, by generation the divine essence is communicated to the begotten, not that it may exist, but subsist. Thus it is not terminated on the absolute existence, but on the mode of subsisting; nor by it is he constituted God absolutely, but the Son relatively.

 

XXII. Necessary and voluntary may in a measure be distinguished in God as to our manner of conception, yet they are not really opposed. Hence the Father is said to have begotten the Son necessarily and voluntarily; necessarily because he begat by nature, as he is God by nature, but voluntarily, because he begat not by coaction (coacte), but freely; not by an antecedent will, which denotes an act of willing (free outwardly), but by a concomitant, which denotes the natural faculty of willing in God; not by the liberty of indifference, but of spontaneity.

 

XXIII. Although the Son may be said to be begotten by the Father, it does not follow that the Son is the Son of himself because the essence does not generate an essence, but a person (the Father, the Son, who is another one, although not another thing).

 

XXIV. That which is most perfect does not generate a thing differing from itself essentially, but a person differing from itself personally. For the essence of the Father is the essence of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, although to be the Father is not to be the Son, nor to be the Holy Spirit. Hence one thing remains always the most perfect (viz., God), although he is not one person because it is communicable to three self-existences (suppositis), not diverse in essence, but distinguished by characteristic relation.

 

XXV. When the Son is said to be one God with the Father and yet to be a distinct person from him, there is no contradiction. Although he has the same essence (according to which he is said to be one with the Father), yet he has not the same mode of subsisting. If in finite and created things a diverse essence is required for a diverse person, does it not thence follow that this holds good in divine things where the same numerical and singular essence can nevertheless be communicable to more than one (because infinite)?

 

XXVI. Although believers may be said “to be begotten” or “to be born of God” on account of a similarity of virtues (and not by a communication of essence), it does not follow that it can be understood in the same sense of Christ (because the discussion concerns a proper generation by which he is the proper and only begotten Son of God).

 

XXVII. The miraculous conception of Christ can be an argument a posteriori by which his eternal filiation is known, but is not immediately its cause a priori. Thus we must understand the words of the angel to the blessed virgin: “Therefore that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the son of God” (Lk. 1:35). Here the particle dio is a mark of consequence, not of a consequent; of sign why he should be called the Son of God, not of cause. For before his conception, he is said to have existed (Jn. 1:1; Phil. 2:6). Hence he does not say simply “he shall be,” but “he shall be called” (klēthēsetai, i.e., “manifested”).

 

XXVIII. The Son of God is not called Christ because he was sanctified by the Father (Jn. 10:36). He adds other reasons for filiation, both from unity of essence (Jn. 10:30) and from identity of works (Jn. 10:38). He was sanctified (i.e., consecrated to the mediatorial office) because he was the Son (which otherwise he could not have undertaken). Nor is he the Son because beloved (Mt. 3:17), but beloved because he is the Son (as the order of the words teaches).

 

XXIX. While this hyperphysical generation is altogether different from physical and finite generation, the adversaries falsely argue from the latter to the former (as if any change, or imperfection, or priority of nature, or of time could fall on God). Every substantial generation is a change from not-being to being because everyone begotten is posterior to the begetter; he who begets communicates a part of his substance to another, and the begetter is essentially different from the begotten. These and similar things drawn from human generation are improperly transferred to the divine by a change to another kind (metabasin eis allo genos). And if these generations are mutually compared, they are to be considered as coequal. Indeed while whatever of perfection occurs in finite generation is attributed to it (as that the begetter begets a thing similar to himself by communication of essence), whatever denotes any imperfection must be carefully removed from it.

 

XXX. To no purpose do the Scholastics weary themselves in investigating and explaining the mode of this generation, since it is not only ineffable, but also incomprehensible (akatalēptos) to the angels themselves. “It is undecorous to seek,” says Athanasius against Arius, “how the Word is from God, or how he is the brightness of God, or how God begets and what is the mode of his generation. For he is crazy who would attempt such things, since he would essay to interpret in words a thing ineffable and proper to the divine nature and known only to himself and his Son” (Four Discourses Against the Arians 2.36 [NPNF2, 4:367; PG 26.223]). And Hilary: “As the Father is inexpressible in that he is unbegotten; so the Son in that he is the only begotten cannot be expressed because he who is begotten is the image of the unbegotten” (The Trinity 3.18 [FC 25:80; PL 10.86]).

 

XXXI. The similitudes usually employed to explain this mystery (drawn either from the mind, which by understanding itself, excites the idea and image of itself in itself, which always remains in the mind whence it may emanate; or from the sun from which rays simultaneously emanate as it was neither before nor without them) can in some measure serve to illustrate this mystery, and the more because Scripture sometimes alludes to them when it calls the Son of God Logon, “Wisdom,” “the image of God” and “the brightness of the Father’s glory” (apaugasma doxēs). But they cannot set forth a full and accurate determination of the mode of this generation. Hence here (if anywhere) we must be wise with sobriety so that content with the fact (tō hoti) (which is clear in the Scriptures), we should not anxiously busy our thoughts with defining or even searching into the mode (which is altogether incomprehensible), but leave it to God who alone most perfectly knows himself.

 

Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, vol. 1 (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1992–1997), 292–302.