I had some time on my hands over the week to look at a debate on God being immaterial. Our old friend Kwaku debated a Christian pastor. I won’t be reviewing the Christian pastor.
Kwaku starts his statement by appealing to the philosophical works of Webster to acquire definitions of the word immaterial. This is to lead into an argument stating that Christians don’t believe God “exist”. The problem with this is that it wouldn’t be an issue for Christians. His circular definition assumes that anything that exists is material and had an extension in space. If existence meant possessing properties, then this could apply to an immaterial being. R. C. Sproul use to state similar things:
He challenges the audience to provide something that is immaterial other than something that is mental. Well, disembodied minds and God are too good examples of immaterial things that aren’t thoughts. Kwaku concedes that he believes “thoughts” exists. That seems to contradict his point about existence earlier, but ignoring that, we wonder how immaterial thoughts reside in the material nexus of a human mind. What connection do they have? How does a material mind produce immaterial thoughts? Kwaku leaves more questions than he does answers. Furthermore, if immaterial thoughts can “exist” then why can’t other immaterial things?
Kwaku assumes immaterial things can’t cause things in the world, but that lacks any serious argument. That was sandwiched in between him quoting that materialist worship poem.
Kwaku tries to undermine the biblical teaching that God created everything because the Bible speaks from Genesis to Revelation and nothing prior nor after. The problem is that the Bible clearly teaches that everything that isn’t God is created by him. So, if the things beyond this universe exist they’ll fall into creationism or pantheism (creator/creature distinction in the bible):
Kwaku tries to explain passages that state God is not a man. Here Kwaku can’t try to handwave it away by stating something about the ANE. He simply states that God is not a man like the Israelites that he should lie. The issue is that that is an unwarranted assumption on his part. His appeals to the ANE come back to haunt him here as well. The ANE had a very different outlook on humans and deities. They were different kinds of things and when they would mate they would produce semi-divine beings. They recognized that gods were not humans but a different kind of thing. That isn’t to say that those ideas are biblical but I think the Jews recognized a species difference between God and them. In ANE myths, humans lacked intrinsic value and were pawns of the gods.
Kwaku presents an argument from man being made in God’s image. That his image isn’t merely representational and more to do with resemblance. This isn’t a bad argument but it doesn’t prove his position over a classical theist. Some flirt with the idea on the protestant side:
The theophanic angel has a humanoid appearance (e.g. Gen 18), but it can also become luminous (e.g. Exod 3). The “burning bush” is something of a misnomer. The bush was never on fire. It seemed to be on fire due to a montage between the bush and the luminous angel.
Here’s my point: human males resemble God insofar as the theophanic angel resembles human males. In that respect, the image of God could have a visual counterpart. It isn’t necessarily just symbolic. To be made in the image of God could mean (at least in part) to resemble God insofar as humans look like the angel of the Lord. In that respect, there could be physical correspondence insofar as the theophanic angel assumes, or simulates, audiovisual and tactile properties.
It isn’t as if the idea has to refer to the physical side of things. Christ is said to be in the “image of the invisible God” but that hardly should mean that Jesus was invisible. The common perspective may also have a way of explaining this passage:
Perhaps most significant, 5:1–3 likens the image of God in Adam to the image of Adam in Seth. This goes beyond the comment about plants and animals reproducing after their kind, though certainly children share physical characteristics and basic nature (genetically) with their parents. What draws the idol imagery and the child imagery together is the concept that the image of God in people provides them the capacity not only to serve as God’s vice-regents (his representatives containing his essence), but also the capacity to be and act like him. Thus, 5:1–3 is perhaps the most significant for determining how we ought to interpret the image of God. While a baby may be affirmed to be in the image of its father, few can recognize that image. Based on the inherent image and the relationship with the father, the image grows more recognizable as the child matures. This does not essentially take place in a physical way, but rather in the way the child mirrors the attitudes, expressions, and character traits of his or her father. The biblical text, by offering us this explanation, gives us the key that while we are all in the image of God, we likewise have the capacity to become more and more in the image of God; that is, we were created with the potential to mirror divine attributes. We might deduce that reason, conscience, self-awareness, and spiritual discernment are the tools he has provided so that we may accomplish that goal rather than actually defining the image. It is only because God has given us these that we have the capacity to develop the image from its germ form. This is certainly in line with the New Testament perspective, as redemption, sanctification, and eventually glorification all serve as additional factors to refine the image of God in us (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10). In conclusion, the following definition takes account of all of the ancient Near Eastern and biblical evidence concerning the role of the image of God: The image is a physical manifestation of divine (or royal) essence that bears the function of that which it represents; this gives the image-bearer the capacity to reflect the attributes21 of the one represented and act on his behalf. Note the similarity of this idea with New Testament statement concerning Christ being “the image [eikon] of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15). He is a physical representative of God rather than a physical representation of what God looks like. As such he bears the essence of God, reflects his attributes, and acts on his behalf. In the context of Genesis 1, people act on God’s behalf by ruling and subduing.
Walton, John H.. Genesis (The NIV Application Commentary) (p. 131). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
Kwaku doesn’t really seem to have any responses to the critiques of materialism that were presented. For example, the problem of universals arises:
The laws of Logic, Universals, and Mathematics are abstract and not material. These things can’t be grounded in particular physical objects. That would falsify the materialist thesis that Mormonism rests upon.
If we are purely material beings, then why expect that our mind is reliable? If we exist in a causal nexus of material things, why suppose these causal chains are directed at the truth? …
Why suppose nature will have regularities? If Mormonism is true, then the gods simply can change the regularities of nature at will. Especially, if these gods have libertarian freedom. How can gods that are material beings have libertarian freedom? If they are made of flesh and bone, then they are subject to the laws of physics and chemistry. How can the laws of nature originate from the gods? If the gods are dependant on the laws of nature, then the laws of nature do not originate from them.
Further suggestions:
The Council 