Determinism, Control, and Human Desire

Here is a conversation over the topic of Freewill, the coherence of compatibilism, and issues relevant to such.

Spicy:

Alright, well last note from me then: I dont think intermediate explanations will help. We may be able to appeal to some internal explanations for why people cannot control their depraved desires, but the explanations for those itself will seem to all eventually be external circumstances.

Tommy is born into depravity, because of this, tommy cannot change his desires such that he is no longer depraved. Say we go up to tommy and ask him for an explanation for why he cannot change his desires such that he is no longer depraved. He may give an internal explanation like “I do not want to change my desires such that I am no longer depraved”. That seems like the only internal explanation possible. But it wouldnt matter, since we are appealing to tommy’s desires to explain why his desires cannot change. Its trivial, because if tommy is depraved then of course he has no desire to no longer be depraved, we defined depravity in part in terms of how tommy has no control over changing his desires such that he desires to not be depraved.

Bestchamp:

He may give an internal explanation like “I do not want to change my desires such that I am no longer depraved”. That seems like the only internal explanation possible. But it wouldnt matter, since we are appealing to tommy’s desires to explain why his desires cannot change. Its trivial, because if tommy is depraved then of course he has no desire to no longer be depraved, we defined depravity in part in terms of how tommy has no control over changing his desires such that he desires to not be depraved.

I haven’t defined depravity in this way, rather it is a consequence of Tommy’s depravity that he has no ability to change his desires apart from God’s grace. But it seems entirely plausible that “Tommy wants his desires to remain the same” is a reason why he is left in a depraved state. It just isn’t the only reason.

Spicy:

I don’t think you’ve addressed the issue here.

But it seems entirely plausible that “Tommy wants his desires to remain the same” is a reason why he is left in a depraved state.

As I stated earlier this serves as best as a sort of intermediary explanation. Within the confines of talking to some depraved person, I may note that “tommy has no desire to change his desires such that he is not depraved”. But ofc that is to be expected, since he is depraved by nature/creation. It doesn’t seem to make much sense to me to appeal to a desire of tommy’s to show his own desires are at fault, when the reasons his desires are at fault is because he is already depraved, in order for this to make sense, he would have needed to desire the depraved state before actually being depraved. Even then its questionable how well that solves the issue.

Once we have noted that tommy is depraved, we have already explained that his desires will be directed towards what is wrong, and his desires will be directed towards his desires remaining the same. It is his initial depravity that causes his lack of control over his desires, not the other way around.

Ok. So we have that Tommy’s initial depravity is not explained in terms of his desires, but his continual depravity is in terms of his desires. So his desires that follow his initial depravity explain why he remains depraved. Is this an intermediate explanation because Tommy was initially born depraved? Sure. But since you made the claim, the onus is on you to demonstrate that his initial depravity entails that he lacks control over his desires. If it’s because its an intermediary explanation you need to demonstrate that this is a problem.

Bestchamp:

Sure, this a deterministic set up, so transitivity applies. The fact that Tommy is depraved at some time Tx is entailed by being depraved at the T prior to Tx. When one is in a state of total depravity, there is no internal “work” that can change this. So at tommy’s T1, he is depraved and this is not a state of affairs in his control. Because when one is in a state of depravity they have no control or power to change this, the only way for one to get out of a state of depravity is for something external (namely the grace of God) to change that. The fact of being depraved at any time, entails that I have no power to change this (desires and actions) at any time after unless I am acted upon externally.

Another way of putting this, if tommy lacks control of his desires at T1, and his desires are set up in such a way that he will never internally be able to change his desires. Any later state of depravity is obviously entailed by the initial one. Its like coding an AI, the fact that the robot runs some code x at any time after its initial time is entailed by the fact that its initial code made it so that it could only run this code and would not have the ability to change that.

Bestchamp:

Firstly, I don’t see an issue for moral responsibility with God’s saving grace being necessary for him to leave his depraved state. Christians of many flavors generally hold that God’s grace is a necessary condition for becoming saved. This is also the case for some Christians that hold people are not born in a depraved state.

Furthermore, it seems to me that your response relies heavily on some form of a principle of alternative possibilities. Because you infer that since ceteris paribus Tommy can’t do otherwise than remain in his depraved state because of his initial depravity and his initial depraved state entails that he will have particular desires, he isn’t in control of (or perhaps morally responsible for) those particular desires of his.

So it appears to me that you are relying on premise like “If some agent cannot do otherwise than x because of A (where A = some thing external to the agent’s will), then some agent is not morally responsible for x”. Is this more or less an accurate depiction of a premise your argument relies on?

Spicy:

The issue is that the agent is not responsible for their state of depravity. Thus they don’t have control over their desires, no more than an AI following a complicated code. Nevertheless they are judged and condemned both for their desires, and the actions which are entailments of their desires. Given that we agreed “control over ones desires in the relevant aspects” is necessary for moral responsibility, someone in a depraved state cannot have it. To me it isn’t a whole lot different from someone with a mental illness. I think most of us would want to punish for the safety of society (or “cure”) a mentally ill criminal, but we would definitely realize that this persons cognitive faculties are malformed in such a way that their desires are not in their control, or at least not to the degree that we have control (if indeed we have control). I think most of society agrees that there is a big difference in the moral significance of a mentally ill persons actions and a sane persons actions. In essence TD is telling us that we are all mentally ill, such that we have no control over our desires- yet we are found morally blameworthy for it. Other views of christianity may reject TD, and say that “all humans fall short” based on their own LFW, not their TD. LFW may not be coherent either but it doesn’t struggle with that particular issue. Some may say that God gives his grace to all, and it’s acceptance is contingent on the agents free choice. Some may say that God gives his grace to all and all will inevitably accept this if not immediately, then after corrective view of hell. Now you may still take issues with coherence of these alternatives, the scriptural backing of these alternatives. They do not however have the same struggle with moral responsibility. It is really only the hyper-augustinian tradition that demands agents act outside of their uncontrolled nature.

As for PAP, I would say my argument has more to do with self control. Usually PAP and frankfurt case discuss actions. I am pointing more towards desires. When you first brought up frankfurt cases for desires instead, I replied that even then their desires are based on deeper desires that they did not control. I think its more accurate to say that this is only an issue for those who hold to a view in which your desires are fixed so that future desires cannot change. Someone who holds to LFW might say that having some bad desire at some time does not entail that they will still have some bad desire at some later time even if there is no external pressure. However if you hold to TD you should think this, the need for external pressure for change is built into the consequences of TD.

Bestchamp:

I do not agree that if is TD is true, then the agent has no control over his desires. Also you state the following:

The issue is that the agent is not responsible for their state of depravity. Thus they don’t have control over their desires…

And:

Given that we agreed “control over ones desires in the relevant aspects” is necessary for moral responsibility, someone in a depraved state cannot have it….

The moral responsibility of the agent on TD or Calvinism is the very thing in question here. So the first quote does is no good. You have to argue by using the second one and not both. Otherwise, you’re making a circular argument.
Now it seems to me that you are making this kind of argument:

1. If Calvinism is true, then an agent is created totally depraved. (Premise)
2. If an agent is created totally depraved, then their desires causally entail that said agent wants to remain in their depraved state. (Premise)
3. If that agent’s desires causally entail that said agent wants to remain in their depraved state, then said agent does not have control over their desires in the relevant aspects. (Premise)
4. If said agent does not have control over their desires in the relevant aspects, then said agent is not morally responsible for their desires. (Premise)
5. If Calvinism is true, then said agent is not morally responsible for their desires. (From (1) – (4))

Now, I grant (1), (2), and (4). But what is the defense for (3)?

Spicy:

I do not agree that if is TD is true, then the agent has no control over his desires

That was not exactly the question I asked, I was wondering if you agreed that purely external factors “entailed” continual depravity. For example, if initial depravity entails that at any future time unless externally acted the agent will not have control in the relevant aspects. Then, purely external factors (initial depravity) entail continual depravity. If you don’t think that initial depravity entails this, but nevertheless maintain that all agents will be continually depraved, how will you account for continual depravity?

The moral responsibility of the agent on TD or Calvinism is the very thing in question here. So the first quote does is no good.

My bad, the quote meant to read The issue is that the agent is not responsible for their initial state of depravity. Thus they don’t have control over their desires…

The idea is that they don’t control their initial depravity, and their initial depravity ensures/entails continual depravity. Citing that their own desires are in line with depravity is trivial.

Thank you for formalizing my argument, I think it is largely accurate in representing the issue I am having. I think 3 is very intuitive and I really don’t see how it can be denied imho. Earlier I discussed transitivity, in my view if the causal relationship wrt to desires and TD is an entailing one, then the externality is transitive. To clarify what I mean, if person A pushed person B into person C so that person C falls of a cliff, person A is responsible not B. Even though B is relevant as an instrument, because of transitivity, it is really A that is doing the causal work here. The internal work that happens in B is a direct result of some external work from A. Thus it makes more sense to lay the blame at A. A more relevant example, If A gives a pill to B, so that B flies of the rails and shoots up a school, again it is A that is responsible not B. Even though B had real desires and enacted causal powers, it was a direct entailment of something external. It may be more accurate to say in a certain context “B shot up a school”, but it is more morally accurate to lay the blame on A not B. I think it makes sense to say that B does not have control over his desires, it’s obvious really, B’s desires were controlled by the pill A gave him, not himself.

In other words, if someone is totally depraved initially, and this is an externally imposed circumstance, and this entails future depravity, then the externality of initial depravity transfers to the members which are entailed by it. Which means that the first use of “that agent’s desire” in premise 3 is functionally interchangeable with “external factors”. So premise 3 can read: If external factors causally entail that said agent wants to remain in their depraved state, then said agent does not have control over their desires in the relevant aspects. I think this shows why 3 is definitely true.

Adjusted formalization:
1. If Calvinism is true, then an agent is created totally depraved. (Premise)
2. If an agent is created totally depraved, then external factors causally entail that said agent wants to remain in their depraved state. (Premise)
3. If external factors causally entail that said agent wants to remain in their depraved state, then said agent does not have control over their desires in the relevant aspects. (Premise)
4. If said agent does not have control over their desires in the relevant aspects, then said agent is not morally responsible for their desires. (Premise)
5. If Calvinism is true, then said agent is not morally responsible for their desires. (From (1) – (4))

Necessitarian:

Why does an agent need control over his identitarian desires, which amounts to control over his identity?

Spicy:

It depends on where we derive the guilt from. Is it from the identitarian desires? Do the identitarian desires entail without fail other desires or actions that he is guilty for?

Necessitarian:

I don’t think guilt is imposed on desire per se. Mere desire is inculpable. My tentative position is that people are held accountable for deliberated acts, or intentions.

It just so happens that our deliberations often consent to desires or have desires as their end. For example, we can be held accountable for consenting to Adam’s fall.

However, I’m trying to get you to connect the dots. In what way does control figure into moral responsibility at all?

I anticipate a disagreement not on that it does, but on what it is and how it does.

Spicy:

1) do those desires we are not culpable for, entail intentions and actions?

2) I don’t recall consenting to Adam’s fall. Surely any useful notion of consent will involve a rational deliberation where one comes to a conclusion.

3) I don’t think one can be held responsible for things that couldn’t control. I am not responsible for something my friend does, because he is not in my control. Someone who is severely mentally ill is not responsible for their own actions since they are not in control. You also can’t be responsible for causal entailments of things outside your control. Even if some internal factor is an intermediary member. So if my initial depravity is outside of my control, and it causally entails my future depravity, desires, deliberations, intentions, actions, then I’m not really “in control” of those things either. Which means I can’t be responsible for it.

From our last discussion on this (with Frank) I think you will mostly agree with this, but rather you will say that we consented to our creation/fall.

Necessitarian:

1) Yes

2) I would just moorean shift. It is better reason to think everyone has consented to Adam’s fall that they’re born in sin than that someone can clearly remember consenting. People fail to remember all sorts of things they’ve done.

3.) You’ve not told me what it means to be in control. As far as I’m concerned, the view I’ve variously defended has you in control of the things for which you’re condemned. If you disagree, you should explain where the difference lies in your notion of control.

Bestchamp:

Would you agree that if one accepts TD that they are accepting that the reason an agent has no control over his desires is because of purely external factors that have “entailed” future unchangeable internal factors?
The reason I answered your question in the fashion that I did was because I do not accept what I perceived one of its preconditions to be—namely, that the agent has no control of his desires.

The idea is that they don’t control their initial depravity, and their initial depravity ensures/entails continual depravity. Citing that their own desires are in line with depravity is trivial.
With respect to your defense of (3), I believe that it fails to demonstrate that the premise. You point out that person A pushes person B and as a result person B pushes person C off the cliff. We agree that person B is not in control of the fact that he pushes person C off of the cliff. We also agree that person B is not in control of the fact that he shot up the school.

But I believe that these cases fail to demonstrate that the agent lacks control of his desires under Calvinism. However, I do not come to the conclusion that person B is not in control of pushing person C off the cliff or shooting up the school on the basis of the entailment of his actions per se. Rather, I do so based on the fact that person B does his action against his own will.

Since it hasn’t been demonstrated that the agent’s desires come about against their own will in the “Calvinist case”, I remain unconvinced that the “cliff case” or the “shooting case” show that the agent is not in control of his desires. As a result, I do not accept that the “cliff case” or the “shooting case” provide reasonable support for (3).

Spicy:

The reason I answered your question in the fashion that I did was because I do not accept what I perceived one of its preconditions to be—namely, that the agent has no control of his desires.

Its probably time to do what we should have done earlier. What do you mean by “having control over ones desires”? There was another question unanswered there: how do you account for continual depravity. To me, because initial depravity ensures continual depravity, the sufficient explanation for why some agent is depraved at some time T is i) he was created depraved ii) he has not been externally influenced by God. Given that the sufficient explanation for continual depravity makes no reference to internal factors (only appeals to a certain external one and the lack of another external one), there does not seem to be much room left over for the agent to play a real role in the explanation. It’s unclear in what sense the agent has “control”.

wrt to your objection to my defense of premise 3. The cliff example is not at all meant to be a 1 to 1 analogy with calvinism. It is meant to show transitivity and its implications for moral responsibility. The second example is meant to bring out this intuition in a more relevant example. However, note that in the second example, the person does have desires to shoot up a school. Whats salient is that this desire is a direct causal entailment of something external. The idea is to show that desires you have from external causal entailments are not desires you are responsible for.

The only real difference between the calvinist set up and the person given the pill is that we assume that the person given the pill had his own life, with different wills, and was then “hijacked” so to speak. However, it is not clear how this difference can rescue the dilemma for the calvinist. On calvinism, the person is never actually given their own will, since every semblence of desire, will, action are all direct causal entailments of an external factor. It would be equivalent to giving some person the pill at birth, and I don’t see how that changes anything. There is no room for any agent to have “their own will”. The concept does not appear to make sense on this setup.

Keep in mind. those examples are meant to show that it does not make sense to say an agent has control over his desires, or is morally responsible when his desires and actions are external causal entailments. Interestingly enough, the past will of person B is not relevant. The situation assumes that the external factors come in at some later point in his life, the only difference for the calvinist is that the external factors start from the very beginning. which makes sense since the calvinist view is meant to be a description of the moral state of people from birth to death, while the person B example is looking at a specific act+desire.

Bestchamp:

What do you mean by “having control over ones desires”?

By having “control over one’s desires”, I mean that “someone has the power to affect their desires or are in charge of one’s desires”.

how do you account for continual depravity.

I think there are multiple sufficient reasons to account for continual depravity. As you said, the conjunction of “he was created depraved and he has not been externally influenced by God” is a sufficient reason for his continual depravity. Additionally, “he desires to remain depraved and he has not been externally influenced by God” is also a sufficient reason for his continual depravity. For the compatibilist, there need not be only one sufficient reason to account for his continual depravity. And if the agent is a part of a sufficient reason for their continual depravity, then it seems that there is room for control by the agent.

However, note that in the second example, the person does have desires to shoot up a school. Whats salient is that this desire is a direct causal entailment of something external. The idea is to show that desires you have from external causal entailments are not desires you are responsible for. The only real difference between the calvinist set up and the person given the pill is that we assume that the person given the pill had his own life, with different wills, and was then “hijacked” so to speak.

I believe that it is crucial that in the “pill case”/“shooting case” the person had their own will and life prior to the interjection of person A and the pill. I think there’s a relevant difference between the creation of a will that where no will has existed prior and the alternation of a will where there was a will that had existed prior. The Calvinist case does nothing suffer from the latter, while the other two cases do. In the “pill case” and the “shooting case”, the person’s will is changed against their will that already exists and without the consent of their own will that already exists. In Calvinism, the will is created anew and that’s why it’s their own will. The will is also preserved by the agent. That is why the agent is control. The will of the agent is not changed against their will or without their will’s consent. Changes to their own will happen through their will and not against their will.

Spicy:

Additionally, “he desires to remain depraved and he has not been externally influenced by God” is also a sufficient reason for his continual depravity. For the compatibilist, there need not be only one sufficient reason to account for his continual depravity. And if the agent is a part of a sufficient reason for their continual depravity, then it seems that there is room for control by the agent.

Right, but I still take issue with the agent merely being intermediary. We can apply the same sufficient explanation for why C falls of the cliff. Because Person B pushes him, and nothing stops his fall. This is ofc a sufficient explanation to explain what happens to C. However, does it leave room for B to be in control, or for B to be the morally responsible one? Well only if we don’t look at the bigger picture. The way we framed it now is a tad deceptive, since we ofc know that the only reason B pushes C is because A pushes B. Just as we know that the only reason the agent “desires to remain depraved”, is because he was created initially depraved aka his desire was causally entailed.

The Calvinist case does nothing suffer from the latter

Well firstly, I think the reformulation with the baby instead completely side steps these rebuttals. The baby can hardly be said to have a will of its own. However the intuition is strong here that the will it is given, the desires it has, are externally imposed, and in the sense that there is an agent here- its not the person whp is the baby that is responsible. The baby never really has its own will or control. In a sense, what could have been a truly free creature has been hijacked, even though there was no prior will. That seems to mirror the calvinist case quite well. It’s also worth noting that nobody consented to being created in total depravity. I feel confident in speaking on behalf of humanity that nobody consented to that. In fact im sure if everyone understood calvinist doctrine the unelect would wish they were never born. So the fact that person B in the pill case does not consent and had a prior will is irrelevant. Because there is no consent in the calvinist case, and it can quickly be changed to not involve a prior will.

At the beginning, part of your definition of having control over your desires was “being in charge of your desires”. Could you expound on this a little bit? How can one be in charge of their desires when all their desires are ultimately external causal entailments?

Changes to their own will happen through their will and not against their will.

Again, I find this to be trivial. They do not have “their own will”, they were given a specific will, not to use and shape as their own, but as one that instantly condemns them, and goes on to inhibit their ability to change, and it entails their future desires. wrt to agency, I have to wonder, what is the difference between an AI and a human? Is it only that one has experience and the other doesn’t? On this view; AI are created anew with a fresh will (commands), and everything they do happens through their will and not against their will.

In Response to Necessitarian:

1) can an agent have control over an entailment relationship? For example, if I say “If A obtains then B necessarily follows, and if B obtains C necessarily follows”. Say A obtains, can any agent have control over the situation?

2) Is consent a choice? Like is this a decision we deliberated about and decided to accept?

3) it is surprisingly difficult to define commonly used terms, so I opted for using examples instead. To be fair, your question was “how does control factor into moral responsibility”. To which I tried to illustrate how it was relevant. My thoughts are, you cannot be in control of a causal entailment. If some external process ensures I will have a particular mental state which entails I do something morally wrong, I am not in control of my mental state. My mental state is the entailed product of some external chain. That would be our main difference. The way the Calvinist view is described only allows for the “agent” to bear the consequence of prior external causal entailments. I am not a libertarian either, but since there is no entailing relation, and the libertarian thinks that the agent itself bottoms out the explanation for a given choice, it does not suffer that issue.

Bestchamp:

Just as we know that the only reason the agent “desires to remain depraved”, is because he was created initially depraved aka his desire was causally entailed.

Prove that the only reason why the agent desires to remain depraved is because he is initially deprived without begging the question against Calvinism. I suspect your response to be that the agent’s act of wanting to remain depraved is sufficiently explained or entailed in terms of its initial depravity. My reply is so what? Why can’t intermediate factors be reasons as well?

Well firstly, I think the reformulation with the baby instead completely side steps these rebuttals. The baby can hardly be said to have a will of its own.

Babies do have a will of their own. In order to be analogous to the Calvinist case, it has to be a case of creation.

If you want me to talk about how one can be in charge of their desires when their desires are entailed, my view is somewhat Frankfurtian.

To show that the agent doesn’t have a will on Calvinism, you use the following premise: “if you were given a will, you don’t have a will”. Prove it.

Spicy:

My reply is so what? Why can’t intermediate factors be reasons as well?

I feel I have adequately addressed this via transitivity. For the same reason person B pushing person C is a sufficient explanation but a deceptive one. I think it is accurate to say in the cliff situation that “the only reason C falls of a cliff is because of A’s actions”. So I would mimic that for depravity.

Babies do have a will of their own. In order to be analogous to the Calvinist case, it has to be a case of creation.

Obviously it is impossible to give a perfectly analogous thought experiment without just talking about Calvinism. These are meant to be intuition pumps, and I am attempting to show each time as we get closer to a one to one correspondence how moral responsibility disappears when we have external causal entailment. wrt to babies, I am not sure I completely agree. The kind of will a human baby has is extremely basic. It is well recognized in the scientific literature that newborn babies do not have self awareness, they are not aware of their own emotions, motivations, experience etc. In the sense that they have a will of their own, it’s lesser than that of some non human mammals. It’s probably equal to that of a computer since their will is just pure progamming, there is no introspection, internal dialogue there at all. If this is true, giving a baby such a pill, doesn’t go against their will. It is controversial to say they have a will, its more accurate to say that the pill ensures that they will have a specific kind of will when they grow up that you intended.

If you want me to talk about how one can be in charge of their desires when their desires are entailed, my view is somewhat Frankfurtian.

Unfortunately, I have to admit my ignorance here. Would you mind explaining that

To show that the agent doesn’t have a will on Calvinism, you use the following premise: “if you were given a will, you don’t have a will”. Prove it

Actually what I said was that they do not have “their own will”. I also went on to clarify that their will inhibits them from what typically free will is thought to give. It inhibits their ability to change, and it entails their mental states. I still need an answer on the AI vs human thing. What I am saying is that on this model of will, your will is no more significant than the will that AIs have. So what is the relevant difference that makes one morally responsible? Do AIs have control over their own will/desires?

Bestchamp:

I would deny that the only reason C falls off a cliff is because of A’s actions. This is wrong for a couple of reasons. It is evident from what we know about physics that “B pushes C off a cliff” explains “C falls off a cliff”. Secondly, this kind of reasoning would imply that that there is no such thing as a transitive explanation, which is absurd. I am inclined to believe that you are so concerned with maintaining that B is not morally responsible for pushing C off a cliff that you go too far. I’m glad you don’t hold B morally responsible, but to deny that B’s act of pushing C off a cliff explains why C fell off a cliff is misguided (not to mention it goes against physics). Instead, what you should get from this example is that causal responsibility doesn’t imply moral responsibility, not that the only reason why C falls off a cliff is because of A’s action.

All of this seems to me show that babies have desires, they just aren’t complex desires. Furthermore, I deny moral responsibility in the cases you have described like the “pill case” or the “baby case” because in those cases someone’s already existing desires are changed without their consent or against their will. You deny it because of causal entailment. So when you’re trying to prove (3) on the basis of your criteria and lacks my criteria, it should not be surprising to you that I don’t believe that the Calvinism case is relevantly analogous to those cases.

Unfortunately, I have to admit my ignorance here. Would you mind explaining that

Different compatibilists have different accounts for how they believe one maintains moral responsibility in spite of determinism. I agree with Frankfurt’s account to some degree. We can talk about his account of free will (and other compatibilist accounts of free will) more, but I think it’s better if we focus on (3) first because we’re already talking about a lot.

Then we may need some further communication here. I’m not sure how to proceed if we don’t agree that the agent even has a will because I thought the critique was that the will they had wasn’t under their control in the relevant respects.

I still need an answer on the AI vs human thing. What I am saying is that on this model of will, your will is no more significant than the will that AIs have. So what is the relevant difference that makes one morally responsible? Do AIs have control over their own will/desires?

I think a necessary condition for being morally responsible for an action is personhood. I don’t hold animals to be morally responsible for their actions because they are not persons. So, I’d do the same with AI’s.

Spicy:

Secondly, this kind of reasoning would imply that that there is no such thing as a transitive explanation, which is absurd…

I think this is a slightly weird interpretation of my reasoning. Obviously as the one who has been appealing to transitive explanations this whole time I believe they exist, my contention is that they are not the real explanation. Being intermediary their function is just to transfer something externally given.
Just as person B is just a vessel for A (in both circumstances), the desires of an agent or external causal entailments. I lose understanding of what it means to be in control of a desire if your desires are causal entailments. This segment is closely tied with the following one, I think in other segments we are beginning to narrow down what the relevant differences are regarding moral responsibility and the thought experiments I have brought up. It has to do with how one comes to a desire. You dont think if someone has a desire and their desires are forcibly changed via causal entailment that they are morally responsible, but you do think that if someone is created with a desire via causal entailment that they are morally responsible. I however cannot see how that difference is relevant so you may have to clear that up for me. The difference is that one person has never had their own independent will, but why does that give them MR for desires that are still forced on to them? I really dont understand this at all

The issue we are running into here is that every time the thought expermint inches closer to flat out calvinism you point to the tiny difference as the symmetry breaker, however what you should be doing is pointing out what work this symmetry breaker does to preserver moral responsibility. The desires a newborn has are hardly morally significant first of all, secondly there is no need to think that this pill is acting against their will. They really have no will with regards to their future desires because they are not self aware. The only reason consent would be necessary, is if we thought that an agent needed control over whether or not some external factors would causally entail his own desires. If we thought that- then we would have to say that one consents to being created totally depraved. This is where our conversations would meet jimmy’s position.

_Then we may need some further communication here..

This was more of a rhetorical point. My critique, that the agent doesnt have control over their will in the relevant aspects basically means the same thing as “they dont have their own will”.

I agree, but only because I think “personhood” entails specific traits that make it relevantly different from an AI. What specific traits would make it relevantly different such that its desires and nature could be just as externally imposed, yet there still be a difference in moral responsibility?

In Response to Necessitarian:

1) In order for an agent to have control over an entailment relation/chain, he would need control or access to the first member of the chain correct?

2) So while we were in a state of deliberating and deciding whether or not we would consent to being created totally depraved, were we totally depraved?

3) Your example appears to equivocate “external.” There are external factors of a causal chain, parts of which are also agency. The agential parts are not “external.”

Im not sure I understand this, if the agential parts are not external, then I am not actually equivocating on external. My position has been that externality is transitive. So if the agent’s mental state is a causal entailment, then while it may be internal (since it is literally “in” the agent; being a mental state), the entailing source being external transfers. So the fact that at any time the agent desires to not change his desires so that he is no longer totally depraved is no less external than his initial depravity. To link this to the example I gave, I think its more accurate to think of a mentally ill person’s desires as externally imposed rather than internal.

Necessitarian:

1.) More precisely, he would need control over the whole chain, not just parts. But that’s inconsequential to the notion that he has control over parts.

2.) Yes

3.) “the entailing source being external transfers”
Why?

Unless this is argued, the compatibilist can just reject this at no cost.

Spicy:

1) Well even for any particular parts he needs control over the initial part of the chain, or else he cannot control the later members. If a chain goes A->B->C->D, my access to C means nothing, since D is inevitable. I need access to A to have real control over D.

2) Okay so while we were deciding whether or not to consent to being totally depraved we were already totally depraved. Doesn’t this mean the initial act of creating us totally depraved was without our consent? Since while we decide whether or not to consent we are already TD?

3) This is what I have been discussing with justin at length for some time now. My approach so far has been to provide thought experiments that show this to be intuitive.

Necessitarian:

1.) If I have access to the first link, that’s still not control over the chain. Control over the chain is being able to decide what follows from what at all. Hence, whole vs parts.

2.) Minimally, the object of consent precedes the consent temporally. If that’s what you mean by “without,” sure. That’s not significant.

3.) I think it’s obviously false.

P1. God determines all things.
P2. Humans have moral culpability.
P3. Spicy’s belief contradicts the conjunct of P1 & P2.
C: Spicy’s belief is false.

At that point, you’ll need an exegetical defense that supplants Calvinism.

Spicy:

1) Sure. Either way an agent that does not have access to the initial member or the whole chain cannot have control over later members.

2) I think this model of consent makes consent meaningless. If the consent is done after the act that subsequently makes me inhibited. Then I have consented whilst “under the influence” thus not a valid consent. (as hopefully we all know)

3) -_-

We shouldn’t have to get into theology to see if a model of moral responsibility/free will makes sense. It either does or it doesn’t. If scripture commits you to something incoherent / obviously false then either you are wrong about scripture committing you to that, or scripture is wrong. I prefer to take the former approach.

Necessitarian:

1.) Right. He’s only in control of parts along the chain.

2.) If you like thought experiments, there are numerous examples where consent proceeds after its object. But in the mean time, what reason do we have to take your view that a successive consent is meaningless?

3.) I agree that if a view is incoherent, that is a sufficient reason to think it unbiblical/unfaithful to God’s POV. However, you have not shown a contradiction (either in principle or explicit).

You’ve just appealed to your intuition, which (a) you can have false beliefs about, and (b) is a lesser epistemic resource than Scripture.

This is all getting to what I anticipated is the problem, though, so pardon me if my messages seemed short. The real problem is your view of agency/morality isn’t sourced in Scripture.

Theology is the first place Christians should go to understand a philosophic issue. Contemplating who God is and what He says is enough to answer life’s hardest questions.

Spicy:

1) I like how we start his part with some word of agreement and then proceed to say something the other doesnt agree with haha. In my previous comment I said “an agent that does not have access to the initial member or the whole chain cannot have control over later members”. My argument was If a chain goes A->B->C->D, my access to C means nothing, since D is inevitable. I need access to A to have real control over D. Unless you are suggesting that the agent does have access to A (or did), he does not have control of parts along the chain.

2) Sure, feel free to give one. I will provide a definitional reason to think general consent should come before the act, and why especially in the case of consenting to total depravity it should come before the act.
a) Consent is defined typically as “granting permission for something to happen to you”. After the action that happens to you, what you can do is state your compliance, satisfaction etc with the scenario. What you can’t do is grant permission for something to happen to you, as it has already happened. If consent is required for some act to be done towards you, and you consent after the act, then the act was committed without consent.
b) in the example of total depravity, what is being consented to is is total subjection of will and desires unto what God wants your will and desires to be. If you consent after God has made your will and desires subject to how he wants them to be, then your consent is trivial as he would have included the desire “to accept consent”. This is what I meant by earlier when I said “you are already under the influence, thus the consent is invalid”. For example, if a person drugs another person with a drug that is meant to make open and accepting to most anything, and then he asks for consent, the consent is clearly meaningless.

3) I think christians need to be prepared to accept that scripture under determines certain if not many relevant philosophical views about the nature of God and creation. Showing a contradiction that is unavoidable or a knockdown argument is far too high a bar to set. Any setup that leads to that, upon realising that it leads to a conclusion one does not like will always be meant with an effort however desperate to avoid the conclusion, even if that means stating something most people would find absurd ( like: we consented to being created totally depraved). Its also worth noting that you can have false beliefs about what you believe the Bible says too.

Necessitarian:

If a chain goes A->B->C->D, my access to C means nothing, since D is inevitable

Your access to C is B (or some earlier link), so that’s patently absurd.

You’re making the old mistake of confusing fatalism and compatibilism. That C follows from B does not mean C follows irregardless B. In fact, that’s the case for LFW, not Calvinism.

On LFW, your choices don’t matter because the main events in history are fixed by God no matter what you try to do. On compatibilism, the main events are fixed by God to occur because of what you try to do.

Sure, feel free to give one.

This conversation began in my server before I consented to it. I nevertheless passively okay-d its occurrence after the fact.

After the action that happens to you, what you can do is state your compliance, satisfaction etc with the scenario.

You’re demarcating two senses of the word consent. This here definition is all I need for my POV. All human beings express satisfaction with their sinfulness (as an extension of all human beings practicing satisfaction with who they are in toto).

That is all that’s needed for reflexive culpability.

God has made your will and desires subject to how he wants them to be, then your consent is trivial as he would have included the desire “to accept consent”.

Unless we beg the question against my view, it’s unclear how this follows. At face value, it doesn’t.

if a person drugs another person

This is disanalogous for several reasons. For one, drugs do not create a person. For another, drugs do not present information or desiderata to the will, but inhibit it as a faculty. You’re confusing determination with coercion.

scripture under determines certain if not many relevant philosophical views about the nature of God and creation

If this were true, then the answer is unattainable.

Spicy:

Your access to C is B (or some earlier link), so that’s patently absurd.

Sure, but not sure why that makes my claim absurd since that just agrees with me. If you need access to C for access to D and you ultimately need access to A to have access to any of the later members, then a person who is just one of the later members can’t have control over the entailments since he does not have access to A. My argument does not rest on C following irregardless B. I don’t defend LFW because I also think it is incoherent (though for other reasons, I think if it worked it could allow for MR). I don’t think it follows that because main events in history are fixed that our choices don’t matter. Libertarians and Open theists also have responses to how this can work but I’ll leave it to them to defend that.

. All human beings express satisfaction with their sinfulness (as an extension of all human beings practicing satisfaction with who they are in toto).

It’s best for future reference you don’t refer to it as consent since I don’t think that works with any of the definitions/types of consent that at least I am aware of. WRT to total depravity, with justin we agreed that part of TD was the idea that the agent has no desire to changes his desires in some relevant way such that he is no longer TD. That in other words is “expressing satisfaction with their TD”. Originally the claim was: “agents are morally responsible for their TD because they consent to it”. Lets replace both TD and “consent” with this new way of expressing the exact same thing. “Agents are morally responsible for having no desire to changes his desires in some relevant way such that he is no longer TD because they have no desire to changes his desires in some relevant way such that he is no longer TD. This is what I mean when I say caching out consent this way, particularly with TD is meaningless.(edited)

This is disanalogous for several reasons. For one, drugs do not create a person

Its unclear how this posits a relevant difference.

For another, drugs do not present information or desiderata to the will, but inhibit it as a faculty.

Is being totally depraved not an inhibition? We’ve partially defined it as total inability to do what is right in the relevant aspects. The point of the drug analogy to is to show that consenting after the act is not real consent, especially when the act involves affecting the will in some way so that they will consent. I worry here that you have already accepted certainty on the conclusion of calvinist doctrine, so you will reject any thought experiment/analogy on the grounds that is not a 1-1 correspondance with calvinism until it is, and then you just reject it as question-begging.

Side question: was adam and eve totally depraved?

If this were true, then the answer is unattainable.

how so?

Necessitarian:

and you ultimately need access to A to have access to any of the later members

I think you’re missing my retort. Your access to C is B (or some earlier link). Meaning, you don’t need control over A to have control over C. B is your control over C.

There seems to be an equivocation between whole and part control.

You would need control over A to have holistic control over C which is just an extension of control over the whole chain. But that’s irrelevant to control over C as a part of the set.

I don’t think it follows that because main events in history are fixed that our choices don’t matter.

Our choices do not matter if history is fixed despite them, not because of them. That’s the issue with LFW.

WRT to total depravity

I do not think the issue is reducible to an absence of desiring change. The issue is that people express satisfaction with who they are. This is often called consent when the satisfaction, the “okaying,” is reactionary to someone else’s action, as when one receives a tip.

You can quibble about the word “consent,” but that does little to the concept.

It’s unclear how this posits a relevant difference.

This is just an assertion and can be met with the same, “nuh uh.”

With respect to clarity, drugs do not create a person (viz. their identity and original state) but rather incite impermanent changes indifferent to their current desires, beliefs, and intent. God does create a person and is not indifferent to the creature’s desires, beliefs, and intent in the creating. So no offense, but the difference could not be clearer.

With respect to relevance, your assertion either begs the question against my view or you have some unique argument to bring forth.

Is being totally depraved not an inhibition?

Drugs inhibit the faculty. Sin inhibits its moral use. Exertion of a faculty is not identical to the faculty, as for example my faculty of reason vs my various acts of reasoning. . .

TBC

The point of the drug analogy to is to show that consenting after the act is not real consent

This would only follow if God’s act of creation and the act of drugging someone shares the following property:

inhibits volitional faculties

So you can either argue that God’s act of creation does or we can reject drugs as disanalogous.

I worry here that you have already accepted certainty on the conclusion of calvinist doctrine, so you will reject any thought experiment/analogy on the grounds that is not a 1-1 correspondance with Calvinism until it is, and then you just reject it as question-begging.

That was my point earlier. Thought experiments are (a) not as reliable as exegetical arguments and (b) inevitably hinge on beliefs about Scripture. I think they’re very useful for clarifying a point or adding justification through clarity. But they’re useless as an objection to something like Calvinism.

Supposing you could disprove my strong Edwardsian view of compatibilism through incoherence, all that would do would move me back to compatibilist mysterianism.

And your thought experiments are really aimed at explanatory tension, not contradiction, in the first place.

The Council

Determinism, Control, and Human Desire

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