This was written by Colton Carlson in response to Leighton’s argument that Calvinism entails fatalism:

I will point out one problem that I heard, and kept hearing, around the 20-30 minute mark, and that is when Flowers attempts to argue that compatibilism essentially entails fatalism, and consistent Calvinism is fatalism. He also goes on to say that compatibilism is essentially (hard) determinism, and reformed scholars would do well to teach this openly without reservation.

The basic hypothetical syllogism could go something like this:

Let C = Compatibilism, CA = Calvinism, D = (hard) Determinism, and F = Fatalism

1. C => D
2. D => F
3. Therefore, C => F.
4. CA => D
2. D => F.
5. Therefore, CA => F.

So the alleged argument attempts to show that compatibilism is really just a sophisticated fatalism, and by extension, so is Calvinism.

These claims are easily refuted.

I would reject (1) and (2). First, why does compatibilism necessarily entail hard determinism? The thesis of compatibilism is only that determinism and responsibility could be true together; they are non-mutually exclusive. That’s it. It says nothing about the truth of determinism nor responsibility. Now, personally, I think most compatibilists DO believe in determinism, but not by virtue OF the truth of compatibilism. That’s a different story and/or argument. Secondly, (2), why does determinism entail fatalism? I will say I am more sympathetic to this premise than (1), but I still don’t see why it needs to. Determinism can be understood to be an empirical truth, whereas fatalism may be seen as a metaphysical one. I just don’t see an argument for the leap there (though, it seems highly intuitive that there may in fact be one).

More importantly, the type of argumentation that Flowers utilizes is similar to analogous language. If that is the case, the relevant difference is that under hard determinism responsibility and “freedom” (interpreted either compatibilistically or libertarianly) doesn’t come into play. In other words, the hard determinist doesn’t care to see whether or not responsibility or freedom (or any variety) is available to the agent. In stark contrast, the compatibilist argues that there IS such a thing as responsibility and/or “freedom” (NOT LFW, however) while determinism still obtains. So the former eradicates responsibility whereas the latter doesn’t. That’s the difference. While both allegedly bring about the means as well as the ends, that doesn’t therefore warrant the conclusion that there isn’t a relevant difference.

One may still argue, as Flowers does, that in compatibilism the future is set, and in fatalism or hard determinism, the future is set, so that means they are all basically the same thing, right? Wrong.

Flowers is pressing the strong claim in that there is no relevant difference between the views. If I show a relevant difference, then that means the two (let’s just take compatibilism and fatalism for now) are not analogous and therefore dissimilar. What is the relevant difference? Responsibility! Fatalism argues that X will happen regardless of what we do. In other words, fatalism doesn’t believe in determined “means” because the “means” (i.e. the responsibility of the agent) is wholly irrelevant; X will happen no matter what (que sera sera). Is this relevantly analogous to compatibilism? Does compatibilism argue this? No. They believe in determined “means” which attempts to preserve secondary causes such as responsibility and freedom (a freedom which is NOT LFW, but a sense of freedom nonetheless). So right there, that is arguably the relevant difference between compatibilism and fatalism. The former holds to determined means whereas the latter eradicates the determined means. That is why they are not equivalent.

In summary, I only see these alleged “inconsistencies” that Flowers discusses as actual inconsistencies IF we see freedom as LFW, and we don’t worry about all the relevant difference between fatalism, determinism, and compatibilism. I am arguing that those relevant differences matter and we should (Calvinists and non-Calvinists alike) pay more attention to them in our conversation. Hard determinism, as well as fatalism, denies freedom (of any variety) and responsibility, yes. If Flowers wants to argue that compatibilism doesn’t have freedom and responsibility, that’s fine. But from the video, the only “freedom” he alludes to is LFW. So when he says “Oh! Your desires under compatibilism are just as determined! You could not have changed your desires! Therefore, debunked! Compatibilism falls prey to hard determinism/fatalism!” That is bogus. Compatibilism DOES NOT argue for LFW, but that is exactly the sense of freedom Flowers has in mind when he argues against compatibilism. So I see this as a complete non sequitur. He hasn’t even engaged the relevant questions.