Dr. John Peckham said:
Some thoughts on indeterminism and Ephesians 1:11 (from pages 168 and 125 of my book Divine Attributes, Baker Academic, 2021). Note the explanation on page 125 that the term often translated “predestined” or “destined” simply means “to decide beforehand,” but an outcome could be decided beforehand unilaterally or in a way that takes into account the free decisions of others. Elsewhere, I argue that the many biblical instances of unfulfilled divine desires indicate that creatures sometimes will otherwise than God actually prefers, indicating that at least some creatures at some times have libertarian free will, minimally defined as the ability to will otherwise than God prefers. This understanding fits well with Ephesians 1:11 if one distinguishes between God’s ideal will (that which God actually prefers from some time onward) and God’s remedial will (God’s will that has already taken into account every other factor, including the free decisions of creatures that sometimes depart from what God actually prefers).
I make a broader argument in this regard, but you’re welcome to disagree. The argument is not just disobedience, but God’s explicit expressions that He does not desire that which such creatures do (e.g., Ps 81:11-14), that such actions go against His desires. I will not go into it here, but I make a case that this presents a significant problem for determinism.
The objection would not carry over to indeterminism (with or without EDF) because the free choices of creatures (in a libertarian sense) are, by definition, not “up to” God. So, it is perfectly consistent for God to express displeasure at any such decisions that depart from his ideal will, whatever one’s model of God’s providence with respect to God’s own decision relative to actualizing this or that world.
The problem is different for the determinist, because they have to account for the expression of God’s unfulfilled desires. I argue that the typical way of accounting for God’s unfulfilled desires does not seem to be consistent with determinism, but unfulfilled divine desires make perfect sense given indeterminism.
I got into a conversation with Dr. John Peckham on the issue of whether Calvinists have a satisfactory explanation of unfulfilled desires. There are some aspects that need some fleshing out.
Proponents of classical theism should keep in mind that Peckham is a critic of classical theology. Classical theists are wont to explain Peckham’s cited passages in terms of anthropomorphism in language. This is one account to take for these passages.
If a person holds to a model produced by thinkers like Oliphint, then they will explain it in terms of “covenantal properties”. On a covenantal account, God takes on creaturely qualities as part of His act of creation. So God may experience unfulfilled desires in terms of these creaturely qualities while His uncreaturely divine nature remains wholly fulfilled in His uncreated desires, such as the desire to feel unfulfilled desires in creation.
What we see is that all three accounts try to uphold the sovereignty of God’s desires. Classical theists explain away unfulfilled desires, while covenantal Calvinists and Arminians try to explain how God has prior or uncreated desires to experience unfulfilled desires.
It seems that Arminians will explain it in terms of sufficient good defenses. God has unfulfilled desires because he has greater reasons to allow these evils to occur for morally sufficient reasons. Some Calvinists take this “sufficient good” account of unfulfilled desires, too. He thinks that these sorts of issues are not decided by God. This seems to me, to lead to a much more difficult issue for libertarians, aseity.
Peckham posits a nuanced objection. He thinks that unfulfilled desires are real, contra classical theists, and they are not sovereignly desired by God, contra covenantal and “sufficient good” accounts. This seems to me, to lead to a much more difficult and pressing matter: aseity.
In his work, Dr. Peckham cites:
As Eleonore Stump explains, “God’s antecedent will is what God would have willed if everything in the world had been up to him alone,” and “God’s consequent will is what God actually does will, given what God’s creatures will.”
John C. Peckham. Divine Attributes (Kindle Locations 4434-4436). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
It seems that this position presents possibilities regarding human choices as something outside God’s determinations. Some type of abstract possibility that isn’t grounded in God, but in LFW agents that God has no say over.
Furthermore, Peckham’s insistence that not all choices are “up to” God straightforwardly contradicts Eph 1:11. Paul describes God’s decree as exhausting all events, including human choices. Peckham’s view forces us into some kind of fatalism where God forces some things to happen around chains of chaotic events forced upon God by humans.
We also have to wonder why God would knowingly create agents that would cause him such displeasure. I assume Dr. Peckham would hold something similar to other Libertarians regarding that God has morally sufficient reasons for these unintended events. So, I can’t see any reason to suppose this works better for Libertarians rather than compatibilists. If not, then Open Theists are lurking in dark places to pounce. God seems to desire that he didn’t make man (Gen 6). What happens when God desires he didn’t act in certain ways (not implying moral failure in these statements)? What view better explains divine regret? It seems that Open Theists should take this to doubt Dr. Peckham’s claim about EDF (exhaustive divine foreknowledge). For if God has truly foreseen the evils of men and his desire that he acted differently, it seems that even divine acts are subject to mistake and error. That doesn’t fit well with EDF. So, it seems we should reject Dr. Peckham’s position.
It seems to be the case for Dr. Peckham that God must have desired this world over alternative timelines that were available to him. That even the things he “doesn’t desire to occur” are themselves desired because God has morally sufficient reasons to choose them over some other world. To put it another way, God chose this story knowing all of its details (given EDF). So, God preferred the story of this world to that of another where everyone is saved or not. It seems to me that God desired the entire timeline (faults included). He intended all events in time/space.
Either God did desire this timeline or he didn’t. If he doesn’t, then we have no reason to suppose everything has a morally sufficient reason nor that God works all things for those that love him. It also would only make sense if he didn’t desire this world, then he also didn’t intend this world. For any reason to doubt that he desired it, is also plausible to suppose he doesn’t intend this world. So, God in some sense was forced with this story. Something must explain why God is stuck with this timeline than some other one. If God isn’t the reason for these faults, then something beyond God is.
(HT Jimmy Stephens for reviewing and adding his thoughts to this)
Recommended:
The Council 