There was a conversation with a Jewish Classical theist and Jimmy Stephens:

GGK:

The predication

1. God has “Triune” as an essential property.

2. The Son, The Father, The Spirit are not in possession of the property of “Triune”

Conclusion : the predication of God does not obtain in those 3 Hypostases, hence none are really God.

1. God has 3 persons

2. The number of persons is arbitraraly designated.

Conclusion : There is a possible world were the predication of God with the property of “Triune” does not have a positive truth value.

x cannot have more then 1 set of essential properties (more then 1 essence) hence the Divine/Human nature of Jesus entail 2 different persons and it cannot be predicated of The Son.

All of these can be fixed by Mysteranism tho

Jimmy Stephens:

This seems to hinge on the principle that to be God is to have all God-preficates. Is that right?

As a Trinitarian, my response is just to think, “Well the Son is Triune, just in the sense that He’s one of the Members of the Trinity.”

GGK:

triune is such that the being predicated with it, is Tri-personal.

So far i don’t think i want to have that view, this is what distinguishes judaism of the rest is our rationalist take.

Jimmy Stephens:

Right, so it sounds like the principle I stated is the hinge.

If for God to be Triune means for Him to be three persons in one respect, no qualifications, then yes, that’s not compatible with, say, the Son.

For example:

God has 3 persons

That’s not true of the Son.

Or as you put, the Son is not Tri-personal.

But I don’t know why that would be a problem unless the Son is supposed to have all of God’s predicates, without qualification.

GGK:

So if the sufficient requirement in terms of essential properties for God is possessing Triune then whatever lacks it, cannot be called “God”

The contention is not really a metaphysical one, more of a linguistic one

Jimmy Stephens:

Don’t think I understand that. If “has 3 persons” is a sufficient condition of divine essence, then not fulfilling that condition means not being God?

Don’t you mean necessary condition?

GGK:

Yes
Its the same thing btw bro
Sufficient reason for x

Is the same as

Necessary reason for x

I think since both are indicative of what is sufficient/necessary for one to predicate God of x

Jimmy Stephens:

Are you saying in God’s case, there are no predicates that fail to be mutually entailing?

So any sufficient condition is necessary?

GGK:

By mutually entailling you mean co-extensive?

Jimmy Stephens:

Logically, yes

So if, x is a predicate of God, and y is all the predicates of God, x -> y.

GGK:

In this case, i believe all real attributes are mutually entailing, such as omnipotent however not cambridge properties

Jimmy Stephens:

(Ironically, I think Thomists want the essence to be non-mutually entailing with respect to Trinitarian relations.)

Right, so it sounds like I don’t understand your earlier comment.

It’s a sufficient condition of ruling out my brother as the murder suspect that the murderer had brown hair.

It’s not a necessary condition.

Necessary and sufficient conditions are not always coextensive.

Usually, they aren’t.

The only case where they would be, to my mind, is with respect to theology proper – God’s nature.

It’s a sufficient condition of Mormonism’s falsehood that materialism is false.

It’s not a necessary condition. Mormonism could be false because, say, God is Triune, questions of metaphysical substance notwithstanding.

So I’m very confused over your comment:

Its the same thing btw bro

GGK:

What i meant is for God’s nature the properties are co-extensive

I believe in Truthmaker predication

Im a classical theist

I believe all real attributes are co-extensive and only designate the same quiditty throughout all possible worlds

Jimmy Stephens:

Okay, so I think the real point of contention is the principle and the rationalism I suspect undergirds it.

This seems to hinge on the principle that to be God is to have all God-preficates.

I might not be able to state it clearly, but I think the cambridge distinction already presupposes the very sort of distinction you aim to deny in Trinitarianism.

The idea is that God has essential properties – which strictly speaking, aren’t even properties, but I’m speaking for ease of reading – vs cambridge properties.

Okay, in virtue of what is that distinction true about God?

GGK:

Cambridge properties are contingent and i would not use them to refer to G-d if not as a necessitarian

you mean

essentian vs Cambridge?

Jimmy Stephens:

Right

GGK:

it’s needed to operate

for example Creator

this is a Cambridge property obtained after the effect of creation took place

Jimmy Stephens:

But then is God the essence or the essence + cambridge properties?

If you want to say neither, that plays right back into the Trinitarian’s hand.
But if you pick one of those, you end up with no Creator on the one hand, or open theism on the other.

GGK:

By is, if you refer to his real being then he is the former

Jimmy Stephens:

A Trinitarian can use this same way of speaking:

When you say God is Triune, are you speaking of the one essence being shared by three Persons or one Person belonging to a Triune essence?

We’re going to have to decide if God Himself permits us to make distinctions in His predicates. If not, any creationist is in trouble, Jews, Muslims, the works.

GGK:

So when i say triune i refer to the necessary property for G-d. anything that doesn’t have it is not God

Jimmy Stephens:

Right, but what if a necessary property of God theologically articulated is Trinitarianism?

GGK:

assuming so, then The Holy Spirit not having it is not to be predicated with God

Jimmy Stephens:

But what is “not having it?”

If you mean the Holy Spirit possesses the predicate the same way God (without respect to a particular Person) does, then I think that’s where my reductio comes into play.

Because God doesn’t possess Creatorhood the way He possesses Deity.

Whatever would object to the Trinity there would object to creation simpliciter.

But if you agree God can have different kinds of predicates, then the objection fails to show that the distinction between private and shared properties in the Godhead is illegitimate.

E.g., the Son is Jesus. The Father is not. So they cannot both be God. So the argument goes.

But God is not really creator. The Creator is really creator. So they cannot both be God. So the problem is with the argument, not primarily to what it’s aimed at.

Just to be clear – I’m not suggesting the Trinitarian Members or their unique attributes are cambridge properties dependent on creation. I’m just showing that the same logic would backfire on modern Judiasm.

Sorry, about to go to sleep – don’t mean to snowball you, but just in case this is helpful, I’ll leave it here and check back tomorrow when I wake up.

This is why I said right away, I suspect this is a key premise and the real course of disagreement:

This seems to hinge on the principle that to be God is to have all God-predicates.

The key concept here is “have.” The way in which predicates are hadd, on this principle, is in accord with the way a unipersonal referent possesses predicates. But Trinitarians already do not believe God is unipersonal. In other words, Trinitarians already think both (a) that there are predicates uniquely true of God which nevertheless entail each Member of the Trinity, and (b) that there are predicates unique to each Member which nevertheless entail their union in one God.

That distinction breaks the rules of trying to treat predicates of God as having one point of reference as if it were just one person.

In fact, the key problem I would drive is that treating predicates this way actually makes the divine essence impersonal, rather than unipersonal.

The Father becomes a mere instantiation-like outworking of an amoral, arational, etc., substance, very much like Hinduism.

(I always picture the Sonic Adventure boss monster that starts as just ocean water but then happens to take on different shapes. God the Father would be like that – a mere ocean of being that happens to prefer the manifested shape of fatherhood.)

GGK:

I disagree with this, i mean for now as im still studying on the divinr act if it’s within time or from eternity. But either way i would agree if the creative act was from eternity that creator is an eternal predicate, but if it’s from time, it couldn’t be so.

Jimmy Stephens:

Well, I don’t think the timelessness or temporality of God’s creative decree is germane to the charge. I think that’s to miss the point.

The charge is that we creationists affirm with the OT that God is Creator. For you this requires Cambridge properties. That further required God to be capable of nonessential predicates, or more abstractly, of different kinds of predicates.

That’s where the problem arises, because if God can have different kinds of predicates, then it’s unclear why the shared-vs-private kinds distinction Trinitarians use is illegitimate.

But if it were illegitimate just because God can’t have different kinds of predicates, then cambridge properties are out of the question and theism is false.

The charge then is to say that your beef with Trinitarianism isn’t really with Trinitarianism, in the final analysis. It would disprove theism – full stop.

GGK:

It’s necessary for G-d to have such predicates, in every single theist model.

Meaning attributes of the action

I dont see how this saves the trinity, could you draw a similarity?

Jimmy Stephens:

For our conversation here, I’m going to refer to classical theism interchangeably with your view. I don’t mean by that any agreement about what classical theism is historically – just want to put that aside.

On classical theism, God has natural and non-natural properties. There’s controversy about whether the latter is necessary.

On Trinitarianism, God has shared and private properties.

The argument you presented, “God has three persons,” etc., is basically to say that all God’s properties must be mutually entailing without distinction/qualification.

But that means God’s essence would have to entail that, say, God is the God of Jimmy typing on a Monday at 1128 AM.

It means creation in general is an essential attribute of God now.

So distinctions in God’s properties are a non-negotiable for classical theism.

You need them to avoid problems of pantheism, open theism, et al.

So distinctions in God’s properties are a non-negotiable for classical theism.

Sorry, in case that’s unclear, what I mean is that the key premise of your argument is incompatible with classical theism. If classical theism is true, we have, minimally, Cambridge properties vs essential properties of God, and therefore, different kinds of divine properties.

If the key premise of your argument is true, there cannot be different kinds of divine properties. To be God is only to have the essential properties, no more, no less, no qualifications on how they’re possessed. So God can’t have Cambridge properties – that’s at least addition, and may also be qualification about how new properties can be possessed.

So your challenge to Trinitarianism is refuted by your own classical theism (viz. creationism).

GGK:

you can leave extensiveness aside, the issue is, a definition is that which defines a thing (it’s essence) and so, it has a necessary set of properties if God has x as an essential property, whatever doesn’t have x cannot be God.

It’s not necessary it’s just the actuality and it’s only on so, because of contingency.

Nope as creation is from Creator which is a Cambridge property and not an essential one. hence it is not essential for God to be a creator but it is the case.

everything Necessarily has Essential, and contingently possesses Cambridge properties.

including God.

Jimmy Stephens:

The relevant premise, it seems to me, is that God can only have essential and Cambridge properties.

GGK:

what’s the other option your proposing?

Jimmy Stephens:

Not all essential (read: necessary) properties are essential (read: nature properties).

God has properties shared by the Triune members, properties unique to each, and properties unique to the unity of the Godhead – all properties that entail such distinctions.

And I’m moving from “predicate” to “property” just as a matter of habit. I don’t mean anything other than “revealed truth of who God is apart from creation,” or some such.