A Catholic has tried to refute my article giving brief reasons to reject Catholicism.
https://spirited-tech.com/2017/09/09/clashing-with-catholicism/
The Catholic Apologist Xico Stated:
There is one divine essence that acts internally and externally only hypostatically. There is no divine act, ad intra or extra, which isn’t made by some of the persons. All external acts are made by all three persons, but all internal actions within the eternal Trinity are made by persons. However, this is always one God acting by persons. We appropriate ‘God’ in relation to the created universe to the Father because He is a se in relation to the other two persons and so it’s fitting to consider the divine nature’s aseity according to the Father. That doesn’t make the other two persons created contingent things that exist by a secondary eternity or something ridiculous like this. The begetting of the Son is an eternal act of the divine nature made by the Father; this act isn’t something that the Father ‘chose’ to do but is necessary to the divine nature. There isn’t a possible world where it doesn’t happen. And hence the relations of paternity and filiation.
The mutual love of the Father towards the Son is a single eternal act of the divine nature made by the Father and the Son. This also is a necessary act. Hence the relations of spiration and procession.
We do not believe, nor is there any reason to believe that spiration is a hypostatic property of the Father. What constitutes or establishes the person of the Father is His Paternity or Fatherhood or his begetting the Son alone, not spiration as he is entailing. And we hold that Paternity is never communicated to the Son, because it’s the Father’s personal and incommunicable property. Spiration, on the other hand, is not a hypostatic property constituting a person, and thus is it to be attributed to the Son.
Now he might be inferring that unbegotten does not constitute the person of the Father either, because unbegotten-ness is the negation of passive generation and does not signify anything positive in the Godhead, it just means there’s something that doesn’t proceed from a source, but never can constitute a person.
If you read take a look at Q. 33 of Summa, On the Person of the Father, He explains the difference between principle and cause.
> I answer that, The word principle signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
> The Greeks use the words cause and principle indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word cause, but only principle. The reason is because principle is a wider term than cause; as cause is more common than element. For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause.
> Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (Q. 13, A. 11), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term cause seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word principle. For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we use the term principle even in things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a line.
– St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Q. 33, De persona Patris
I thought Aquinas, whom I linked and sourced would have answered this. The origin of the Son is the Father, that what it means for the Father to be the principle, note that doesn’t entail priority or causal relarions. Our view is that the persons of the trinity are consubstantial and thus one does not **cause** the other. Think of the persons as relational-qua-objects and the Son exists as a relational-qua-object relative to the Father and from the relationship between the Father and the Son the Holy Spirit proceeds.
> The word “principle” signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
Problem 1: Historical Matters
The amazing thing about this debate is how Catholic hermeneutics display a serious lack of care about their own supposed tradition. That’s because they often don’t think authoritative statements of their faith are connected to the intentions of the authors of those statements. For example, Thomists Catholics or even Reformed Confessional folks will demand for you hold to the creeds and confessions, all the while they don’t hold to the historical meaning of the creeds either. The historical evidence sides with the notion that the processions are causal:
The Creed of Nicaea of 325 states that the Son was “begotten of the Father…begotten, not made.” The Creed makes a distinction between ‘begotten’ on the one hand, and ‘made’ or ‘created’ on the other. The teaching of the Creed is that if the Son is begotten of the Father, He can be of the same essence as the Father. If the Son is made or created, He cannot be of the same essence as the Father. This relation of begottenness is a communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son(Hasker 2013, 223). This is because the Father is the source, or fount, of divinity who causes the Son to be divine.5The Father alone is the self–subsistent divinity by nature; God from no other source than Himself. It is the Son’s derivation from the Father that causes the Son to exist and be divine(cf.Beeley 2012, 70–71).It should be emphasized that the conciliar causal concept of ‘begotten’ at play in this creed is not metaphorical(Anatolios 2011, 190–191). Terms like ‘begotten’ and ‘made’ are both causal, but there is a slight difference that quickly became obscured in these early debates due, in part, to the similar spelling in the Greek. As Alasdair Heron explains, the term ‘begotten’ (Greek: gennetos) in the Creed is intended to denote “that which has a cause or source outside itself.” This causal source could be a something, or in the case of the Trinity, someone. This need not involve the begotten thing coming into existence according to the Nicene theologians. The term ‘created’ or ‘made’ (Greek: genetos), however, is intended to denote “that which has come into being”(Heron 1981, 60–61).So the creedal teaching affirms that the Son is caused to exist by the Father, but in such a way that the Son never came into being. Whereas the Father alone is unbegotten/uncaused (Greek: agenetos/agennetos), and is the source and cause of the Trinity.6This causal concept is not only contained in the Creed of Nicaea, it is also in the Niceno–Constantinopolitan Creed or Nicene Creed of 381. As Christopher Beeley points out, the Nicene Creed that is developed at the Council of
Constantinople in 381 bears a close resemblance to the theology of Gregory of Nazianzus. This is understandable since Gregory was the presiding president of the Council(cf. Beeley 2012, 195–196). In Gregory’s Trinitarian theology, the Father alone is the unoriginated or uncaused being. The Father eternally causes the Son to exist such that the Son is also eternal. Even though the Son is caused to exist, the Son does not begin to exist because the Son is begotten and not created. Since the Son is eternally begotten, the Son is co–eternal with the Father.7Gregory’s theology here is deeply traditional, and goes back at least to the Alexandrian traditions of Origen and Eusebius(cf. Beeley 2012, 23; 90–93). This is the understanding of ‘eternally begotten’ that is agreed upon by the Council of Constantinople, and written into the Nicene Creed. As Stephen Holmes makes clear, the claim is that “the Father is the personal cause of the Son,” and because of this “they share the same nature”(Holmes2012, 113).The second ecumenical council at Constantinople in 381 not only affirms that the Father is the cause of the Son. It also extends this teaching to the Holy Spirit. The Nicaeno–Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 adds that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. The idea here is that ‘proceeds’, like ‘begotten’, does not mean made or created. It is intended to be an affirmation that the Spirit is of the same essence as the Father and Son. ‘Proceeds’ with regard to the Holy Spirit functions metaphysically the same way as ‘begotten’ does. The Holy Spirit is caused to exist in such a way that the Holy Spirit never began to exist, but instead eternally exists.
Trinity, Subordination, and Heresy: A Reply to Mark Edwards by Dr. Ryan Mullins
Problem 2: Ambiguity
Jimmy Stephens points out some of the issues of ambiguity in Xico’s statement:
There is one divine essence that acts internally and externally only hypostatically.
Still trying to figure out what role “only” plays in this sentence.
As written, this sentence could mean 10+ different things.
There is one essence, and it only acts hypostatically in internality and externality?
There is one essence, and it only acts internally and externally hypostatically?
There is one essence, and the only way it’s hypostatic is externally, not internally?
Who knows what we’re supposed to do with “only” here.
There is one essence only hypostatically, and it acts internally and externally?
Just F-
F- for this sentence
English is not this one’s first langauge.
There is no divine act, ad intra or extra, which isn’t made by some of the persons.
This I take to be better written:
For any divine act, it is made by some of the Persons, whether ad intra or extra. (edited)
There is no divine act, ad intra or extra, which isn’t made by some of the persons. All external acts are made by all three persons, but all internal actions within the eternal Trinity are made by persons.
This is bizarre. Is the idea here that God has one will belonging to three Persons ad extra, but multiple wills ad intra?
If not, what is even being talked about by saying a Person makes an act?
What, that a Person acts?
So there are acts that belong to each Person individually, i.e. three wills?
The begetting of the Son is an eternal act of the divine nature made by the Father
This is at best irrelevant because:
(a) God’s act of creating the universe is also eternal on Thomism, traditionally
&
(b) No content has been adduced as to what “beget” means except as a subset of what “create” means
&
(c) All of this faces the skepticism that Thomistic simplicity produces: i.e. formal distinctions.
Jimmy’s objection is further clarified by one of his comments in another place:
If the Father cannot exist without the Son, words like cause, generate, proceed, and so forth, are vacuous. Nothing is being predicated of the Father that does not also hold for the Son.
If the Father is explanatorily, causally, constitutionally, or otherwise prior to the Son, so the Father is more metaphysically basic, then the word is warranted.
Procession is spatial language. If there’s no metaphorical takeaway, like that the Father is ahead of or “already there” in opposition to the Son, then why use the language at all?
Problem 3: Infinite Persons
Another issue is an old Jewish objection regarding infinite persons. I’m sure this Roman Catholic has heard this objection, but I’m not aware of how he might respond to this objection. The objection I’m interested in is what are the reasons to suppose that it is impossible for the Son to generate another person, or why the Father couldn’t generate another Son.
P1. If the Son involuntarily emerges from the Father’s life, then the Father’s life entails the possibility of a Son. (actual -> possible)
P2. If the Son possesses the Father’s life, then the Father’s life possessed by the Son entails the possibility of a Second Son (quadrinity). (communication of numerically one property)
P3. If the Son involuntarily emerges from the Father’s life, then the Father’s life possessed by the Son entails the possibility of a Second Son. (From P1 & P2)
P4. If the Father’s life possessed by the Son entails the possibility of a Second Son, then God is possibly a non-Trinity.
P5. If God is possibly a non-Trinity, Christianity is false.
P6. If the Son involuntarily emerges from the Father’s life, then Christianity is false.
P7. If EG (version “nuh uh, that’s not EG”), then Christianity is false.
Eternal Frustration – The Council (spirited-tech.com)
Problem 4: Any Persons?
There was also a good question of whether this notion of subsistent relations is sufficient to explain what we call ‘persons’:
Can Subsistent Relations be Persons? – The Council (spirited-tech.com)
The better move for the Thomist is to appeal to the relations, not for what distinguishes the persons, but rather how we know they are distinct from one another. If this is the case, then we must wonder as to why this language is needed at all and what the basis for these claims to knowledge are.
Problem 5: Formal Distinctions
There is also an issue for Thomists regarding the doctrine of God that causes skepticism about whether we can know anything about God. If our statements don’t refer to anything in God, then we have no reason to believe our statements accurately reflect God in any matter. For Thomists, Formal Distinctions are located in the human mind. But why suppose they picture God accurately? In fact, we know they wouldn’t because the human minds thinks of God as possessing many attributes, but Thomism presents God as perfectly simple. So, we even know our ideas of God aren’t true.
Absolute Divine Simplicity – The Council (spirited-tech.com)
Problem 6: Predication
This seems to be that the medieval operated on the basic distinction between univocal, equivocal, and analogical. Some Thomists operate on a glorified univocism. That is because the basis for analogical predication presumed some shared content. The theologian Herman Bavinck puts forward a better view:
As a basic definition, Bavinck describes analogical knowledge as “knowledge of a being who is unknowable in himself, yet able to make something of himself known in the being he created.”5 Consistent with this initial statement, Bavinck understands analogy as a function of the causal relationship between God as the Creator and his creatures. In an explanation of the traditional distinction of archetypal and ectypal theology, Bavinck comes to his most elaborate account of analogy. He lists five aspects, which I quote in full:
1. All our knowledge of God is from and through God, grounded in his revelation, that is, in objective reason.2. In order to convey the knowledge of him to his creatures, God has to come down to the level of his creatures and accommodate himself to their powers of comprehension.3. The possibility of this condescension cannot be denied since it is given with creation, that is, with the existence of finite being.4. Our knowledge of God is always only analogical in character, that is, shaped by analogy to what can be discerned of God in his creatures, having as its object not God himself in his unknowable essence, but God in his revelation, his relation to us, in the things that pertain to his nature, in his habitual disposition to his creatures. Accordingly, this knowledge is only a finite image, a faint likeness and creaturely impression of the perfect knowledge that God has of himself.5. Finally, our knowledge of God is nevertheless true, pure, and trustworthy because it has for its archetype God’s self-consciousness, and for its foundation his self-revelation in the cosmos.6
A final qualification of Bavinck’s view of analogy needs to be mentioned. From the brief survey above, it might seem that he locates analogy exclusively in the created effects that have some similarity with God as the ultimate cause. In discussing the divine names, however, Bavinck comes to a different conclusion:
The names do not merely denote God as the cause of things, but furnish, however feebly and inadequately, some inkling of the divine essence. So, referring to God by all these names, we indeed speak imperfectly, in finite terms, in limited human ways, yet not falsely.8
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10638512211017525?icid=int.sj-full-text.similar-articles.1
The Council 