This is from Chris Matthew:

An argument on the transgender phenomenon

1. If it is rational for some people to be transgender, then it is rational for some people to be transspecies (or ‘otherkin’).
2. It is not rational for some to be transspecies.
3. So, it is not rational for some people to be transgender. (1, 2 MT)

I’ll say something brief in defence of both premises.

Premise 1. This premise advances a ‘companions-in-innocence’ strategy: namely, if transgender self-identification is veridical and rational (TG), then so is transspecies self-identification (TS). A minority of people sincerely report their conviction that they were born into the wrong species, and should thus be allowed to express themselves in a manner more fitting for the species they identify with. What should we do about this? Most, if not all, reasons given for believing in TG extend, mutatis mutandis, to TS. For example, it seems to follow from the liberal commitment to autonomy: per Mill’s harm principle, transspecies individuals who respect the rights of others should not face social opprobrium. Nor should they be regarded as needing help, since that’s objectionably paternalistic. Furthermore, thought experiments used to motivate TG (eg., Corvino 2000: 174) can easily be modified to support TS. And so on. So, we have some reason to think that (1) is true.

You might raise the worry that, since gender is a social construct and species biology is not, we have a plausible symmetry breaker between TG and TS. But this response isn’t satisfying. Otherkin individuals are keen to stress that “biological essentialism” and “biological determinism” should be rejected. And on assumptions widely held amongst believers in TG, why think otherwise?

If gender is construed as the social meaning of sex, then we might likewise distinguish between the social meaning of species and the biological meaning of species. With this conceptual apparatus in place, an otherkin individual might argue something like this: “Sure, there are certain biological facts about animal species. But the norms that disapproves of people walking on their four limbs, or barking publicly, are social constructs. And if I sincerely desire to live as a member of another species, why should some biological facts about animal taxonomy inform such restrictive social norms?”

And again, this is not unlike how many proponents of TG argue.

Premise 2. This premise should purchase intuitive support. No-one should be obliged to sincerely believe that someone who identifies as transspecies is, in fact, transspecies. No-one should be obliged to treat it as rational behaviour, or as behaviour that conduces to human flourishing. Even if we lived in a society where more people identified as transspecies (and that society might be ours in the not too distant future), inclusivity shouldn’t come at the expense of truth. And the truth is that being a woman, or being a non­-human, isn’t a matter of self­-identification. By recognising this, we can help dysphoric individuals embrace their identity as given, which is healthier and more truthful than accepting their self-identification.

For more on this line of argument, see Whittaker (2022). Or we can tease out the argument in further discussion.

Further Reading:

A Dilemma for Transgenderism – The Council (spirited-tech.com)

The 3 Most Bizarre Branches of the Trans Rights Movement (hli.org)