Nat:

Well, I think that’s false. Communication is a two way street. God’s side of communication can be infallible, but the other side can be perfectly fallible, or even shut down entirely the communication, as an example

But you could argue that the AIM of communication is indeed something that could circumvent this. Given that the aim is to pass on knoweldge, its relation to the will of the recipient can be seen as an accident and not essential to it

Jimmy Stephens:

revelation still would need to be compatible with reason.
No doubt. The integration of reason and revelation is standard for Christian philosophy. What warrants saying here is that it is a hegemony. Revelation incites, sustains, and controls reason, and not vice versa.

Incites, as in, no mental content lacks God-content given by Him, and the biography of a person’s knowledge conceives with God-knowledge. Or, put really simply, the first and most important thing anyone understands and which defines everything else they think and feel, is their acquaintance with God as a result of His imprint on the mind. In this way, reason is exhaustively conditioned by this most important content caused by God.

Put another way, to be human is to think humanly, and to think humanly is to think in terms of the knowledge of God which we are caused to know by Him in our most basic consciousness. Human reason is a Yahweh-shaped reason, on this view.

Illogical knowledge is nonsensical.
Depending on what you mean by “logic” (I will assume the loosest sense for now), I agree. All knowledge is logical; no illogicality is noetic. Illogicality is coextensive with disknowledge, cognitive error – whatever we wish to call it.

The idea is not that God is illogical but that He is trans-logical or alogical, and He provides human logic. The “structure” you speak of is, on my view, created by God. It reflects God’s uncreated Wisdom, but it is not itself identical to God’s Wisdom. It’s the imprint of a stamp, to speak metaphorically.

how can we ground a revelation as authentic knowledge?
Yeah, excellent question – probably top 3 most important questions for my view. Let me interact with some of your comments to preface my response.

the senses are passive in that they are also revelatory. They reveal something, but that is insufficient to ground that revelation as knowledge as senses can be deceitful.
I don’t think this is a good analogy. Our eyes are a good example of. . .TBC
[9:31 PM]
noetic passivity. That is, without any inference, they provide us with knowledge. We are caused to know things through that organ; we do not reach percepts by some mental performance of the will or some discreet procedure, like an argument. There is just a stream of consciousness hitting us with cognition similar to the way a flashlight might be shown in your eyes against your will. However, that’s not worthy the term “revelation.”

Our eyes have no will, no desire or intent to express anything. They’re just organs, mechanisms. A better example would be the testimony of a person, like how you’re acquiring knowledge of my thoughts just by reading this message. I’m “revealing” things to you in a sense there. I am using media (words, discord interface, etc) to express myself to you. That’s much closer to the idea with what the Christian God is doing. He is expressing Himself to His creatures through certain mediums – minimally, through creation itself broadly, and through explicit verbage in the Bible.

Similar to how an art critic can become familiar with an artist and their ideas through their art, humans are the audience of God’s art: the world, all of human experience. Similar to how you and I share thoughts via language, God has coauthored a series of texts with human beings in such a way as to make the verbal content God’s speech writ.

@Nat
I also have a question regarding this. It seems to me that you think reason can be passive, as in receiving and revelatory, but how can we ground a revelation as authentic knowledge? We can say, for example, that the senses are passive in that they are also revelatory. They reveal something, but that is insufficient to ground that revelation as knowledge as senses can be deceitful. In theological terms, how would you know whether the revelation is of God and not demonic or worse(a given category)? How do you know it’s also not a demonic one passing on as a revelatory of God? Maybe a deceitful entity is playing with the Jewish line(including Christianity). Maybe God IS deceitful. If our reason cannot ground such knowledge on its own and requires this revelatory guidance, we have no way to gauge potential revelations, or at least we cannot claim knowledge about those revelations as knowledge, could we?

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/02/2023 9:38 PM
.
But now to your question – in virtue what can someone know that God’s revelation is trustworthy? Well, let’s consider some of the theological backing here. On this view, there is a Triune Creator. He possesses social reality in and of Himself, being three eternal conversants in His own divine life. This God speaks the world into existence, divinely naming things at the conceptual level; meaning, God literally defines everything about everything by saying it so. To this authorial, upper-story explanation corresponds a historical, in-world explanation: God enters history and makes man in His image.

So God possess social harmony, integrity, fidelity in and of Himself, as manifest in His trinity.
Then, God determines all the facts about creation.
Then, some of those facts include God Himself entering creation to fabricate humans, designing their psychology and cognitive features top-to-bottom. This is part of what it means to be “in His image” (we can get more into that as it becomes necessary).
Finally, that God speaks to and walks with those humans as not only their divine king, but as a friend of man, in union with humanity.

On that theological picture, the question seems reversed: how could God’s revelation fail to be a sufficient condition of knowledge that it is reliable, trustworthy, et al?
[9:39 PM]
On that view, it seems to follow straightforwardly that simply reading and comprehending the Bible – as we would any other non-divine work – is enough to cause the reader to know:
1) Who God is
2) Something about His plan for humanity
3) That this text is God’s divine work
[9:40 PM]
This (3) is sometimes called self-authentication or autopistis. It means, the divine properties of the Bible, which it inherits from God, make it a sufficient-condition of recognizing its divine authorship.
[9:41 PM]
The same can be applied to revelation in general. Divine revelation ipso facto installs the recipient with knowledge that it is reliable because divine.

Nat:

If the terms of knowledge are God-given, how can I think wrong things or immoral things?

Also, why say that human reason is Yahweh-shaped reason? I understand that is part of the cosmology but in the analysis that has not been warranted in any way. You can say God, but not Yahweh.

I think that if you say God is outside human logic but not outside logic because God is logic, I guess I may agree, but there’s a fundamental logic that allows us to understand that as a logical knowledge and allows us to speak logically about God, including the proposition that God is outside human logic. But then what kind of logic was used by us to know THAT?

I understand your critique of my analogy to mean that it is bad because it’s an impersonal form of knowing. I think that’s merely semantic. I can say “revealing” in relation to a photo, of “I opened my eyes and a world was revealed to me”. I think that the analogy still works in the specific similarity I pointed out: that we can passively receive information doesn’t imply the information is knowledge. Be it because it was received not as revelation but as part of a material organ or because it was revealed by a supernatural entity.

Also, I wonder whether you’re also stating that implicit and necessary to the concept of revelation is that it needs to be mediated(through words/interfaces or the Bible). I don’t see why that would be the case.

I don’t think a theological backing is allowed here as that’s precisely what’s in question. This is a frequent issue with TAG exponents, that you can give a theoretical account doesn’t mean you have actually have knowledge. We would have to accept the narrative as true in order then to prove that it is true. Seems like it begs the question.
If the point is that a knowledge can be made knowledge because God imparts in the relation the meta-knowledge of the knowledge being true knowledge, then that’s coherent but problematic in an epistemic sense
[6:26 PM]
ANY claim can be justified in such a way. “God has revealed it into me”, and not even contradictions would serve us, as that would seem to be human logic, and who are humans with their logic to negate God’s order? But more importantly, how do you know that the entity you call God can do that without first having a solid actual(and not merely speculative) grounds for such knowledge? It seems the solution dodges the blunt of the objection rather than solves it.

For example, someone could say that God has revealed itself to me and it’s a She, and She has told me that male humans are an accursed race that need to be destroyed. How could I, a peasant in front of God’s prophet, deny them? I would only be able to do so from my human context. Or that dinosaurs are a Satanic invention, that the whole scientific project is just hubris that needs to be rejected, and even if it seems that there have been successes for science, they are all a deception, or that the Orthodox Jewish deity is the true deity and the Christ entity Christians worship is a demon who is deceiving Christians into worshipping a false god, or that God only communicates through the numerology found only in the “Have you seen?” lost poster phones, and that only a few select can understand the Divine code, or God has commanded me to kill all the infidels and make a just war against States and to receive the loot as justified terrestrial bounty? We would have literally no defense or proper epistemic defense against such claims other than: well, it seems bogus to me for these epistemic reasons accessible to my noetic faculties and God has not revealed THAT to me.

Nat — 02/03/2023 6:28 PM
I could conjure up a given narrative that seems coherent(although it doesn’t even need to be coherent) to our noetic faculties, and yet that still would not in my view justify those claims. They are still fundamentally flawed. You cannot work within the theological narrative unless you have proven the narrative, I think, and merely presenting the possibility that a meta-logical God outside human limited understanding has decreed it so in a way only accessible in a limited way? I mean, sure, God could seem to do so, but as I said, if we accept that as sound, then literally anything goes. It’s a free for all for any and all theological conceptions, and we can get real creative here

Jimmy Stephens:

There’s too much going on here to try and tackle everything. We should condense and focus on one topic – take an issue at a time. Some of these are simpler than others.

In case we need to track it:
https://discord.com/channels/294987080482816000/351751235310714883/1071208353398796298

If the terms of knowledge are God-given, how can I think wrong things or immoral things?
The question is difficult because there’s no immediately relevantizing context. It would be like asking, if God is good, how can evil exist? Rather, if God is good, how is it mysterious that evil can? So to your question, what is the perceived tension between God setting the terms and conditions of human knowledge with human error?

You can say God, but not Yahweh.
We’re discussing my epistemology, not bare-theism. Unless you mean to argue that God can be something other than Yahweh, it’s just not yet relevant to the discussion. Sure, I haven’t argued that my epistemology is the only good one or that it works better than others or that it’s true, but I can’t very well argue for something that hasn’t been clarified sufficiently.

Nat:

Well, how about we go bottom up. Are you Orthodox, Protestant? Why should I be a Christian?

Jimmy Stephens:

I’m roughly speaking a Reformed evangelical. I would be surprised if you weren’t familiar with at least some Calvinist theology.

You should be a Christian for a number of reasons. It’s true. It’s good for your soul to follow Christ. Doing otherwise bears the worst consequences. Christianity is beautiful. etc etc

Nat:

From what I remember pf Calvinism, it conceives of God as supreme and therefore there is no human freedom, and there will be people who are predestined by God to go to Heaven
[12:06 AM]
What is the strongest evidence for Calvinism being true_

@Nat
What is the strongest evidence for Calvinism being true_

Jimmy Stephens:

God’s testimony in Scripture

Nat:

What is the evidence of that?
[12:07 AM]
Saying so doesnt explain much to me

Jimmy Stephens:

I don’t propose that you believe Christianity because I say its holy Scriptures are God’s word. I’m just answering your question. You asked what the strongest evidence is. There’s no more effective evidence than God testifying to the truth of Christianity. That’s what we have in the Christian Scriptures.

So believe because you read and recognize the Scriptures for what they are, not on my say so

Nat:

Whats the strongest compelling, epistemic evidence for it?
[12:24 AM]
I think you get what my question is
[12:27 AM]
Or rather, if you will what is the best argument that Christianity is true?

Jimmy Stephens:

What do you have in mind as an “argument?” If you just mean something like a formal syllogism, I’m indifferent about whether there’s a syllogism that’s universally persuasive. Seems to me people have sufficiently different background beliefs such that there’s no reason to concern ourselves with such a thing, until someone happens upon it, and I haven’t.

If you just mean some kind of method of supporting a belief that involves thinking, then roughly speaking, the strongest “argument” is to observe that doubt of Christianity is parasitic on Christianity. This is sometimes called a transcendental argument, or better yet, a transcendental critique. It’s to investigate the rational motivations for doubting Christianity only to find that there is no such thing.

As far as evidence, nothing is more is needed once God has spoken. For Someone who is self-existent creator and master of the universe, who designed everything about human psychology and language, to tell us in human categories that He is Christ and we are sinners in need of Him – that epistemically sufficient. No argument needed.

Nat:

How is doubt of Christianity parasitic on Christianity?
[1:11 AM]
IF God has spoken in the way you say it is, which is the thing in question

Jimmy Stephens:

That is to use reason against the source of rationality.

Nat:

How do you know that the Christian God is the source of rationality?
[1:29 AM]
So far you have made claims but dont seem even interested in providing compelling epistemic evidence

Jimmy Stephens:

We covered that, briefly. God has revealed Himself as the Creator and Lord of the universe, including human reason. There are different media or examples of revelation, but of highest epistemic importance is the holy Scriptures. The Bible is a book or a collection of books, not a claim, let alone of mine.

I imagine you’re just not familiar with revelational epistemology. If you ask me why I think oranges taste good, and I hand you an orange, saying, “Try it,” and you respond with a dubious glance and say that’s just a claim, it seems you’ve missed the point. So when you ask me why believe Christianity, and I point to its holy writings and say, “read it,” it’s the same as tasting the orange. The only difference is that an orange might be bad or subject to tastes, where the word of God is not. Metaphorically speaking, it’s an orange that tastes perfect and so anyone who fails to appreciate it reveals their poor taste in food. (edited)
[2:21 AM]
Now, you can claim that the Bible is not evidence or not sufficient epistemic evidence. Fair, but you’ll have to defend that claim. I’ve given a brief introduction as to why a Christian believes what he believes. His very consciousness is like a computer running on the programming language of God’s revelation. But what evidence do you have that the Christian Scriptures are not “compelling epistemic evidence”?

Nat:

But we haven’t concluded that God has revealed himself through media or objects. This is something that needs to be demonstrated.
Also that the one of highest epistemic importance is the Bible.

I imagine you’re just not familiar with revelational epistemology.

No. I tend to see most apologetics as not very honest. I am not familiar with apologetics of multiple religions and in Christianity there’s a lot of diversity and internal disagreement. I think that your example of orange is about aesthetics, not epistemology. How do you know that your tasting of the orange reflects an objective reality and not a poor taste of your own? I find a lot of things in the Bible, in Christian doctrine, Christian practice, Christian attitude to be distasteful, or if you will, following the metaphor, contrary to my revealed image of the Divine.

If I say so, it seems we are dissolving the epistemic into the aesthetic with no way to gauge different perceptions of what is revealed. I think the evidence I have for them not being compelling is that I’m not compelled. But I think that in honest dialogue we would need to reach something further. I would also make the objection that the Christian narrative is a historic one and one that imports a cultural interpretation and therefore it is not truly innate. This is not relevant, then, to our previous discussion of revelation as innate to our faculties(like reason). Reason orients you to math. Without any books, we will reach similar mathematic knowledge, and that’s why the knowledge is the same across all cultures. This makes it a better epistemic base than the hypothetical revelations. The same with fudamental logic, and that’s why we can agree that our logic arises from a revelation, but not a written revelation, or an externalized, indirect form of revelation

Nat — 02/05/2023 11:20 AM
I’m also skeptic of how in tune the Bible is in with the innate consciousness of Christians. A very well known problem of conflict is Hell. For most people Hell is distasteful, it acts against their innate consciousness, and it is upheld not by their consciousness being in line with the Revelation, but because of the validation of an external, taught order beyond their own innate appreciation of the doctrine. The Christian seems to me not to only war with the world, but with themselves(not in relation to the Fall) and with doctrine. Some of those conflicts are general and persistent.

But I would also posit that there are contradictions in the Bible, doctrine and attitude of Christianity. It is important to note, that even internal conflicts weren’t solved by saying something like “God has revealed it to me, if He hasn’t revealed it to you, suck it up”, they were argued for in councils of wise men who argued for their positions and refuted the positions of others through their reasoning. For example, the issue of Trinity would not be solved by appeals to your example of the orange, but would be about intense debates.

And lastly, I would say that even if we agree that there are passages or the Bible has content we both can recognize as God-like and in relation to our innate faculties, there would be a matter of realism vs anti-realism. Let’s say the narrative of a God that becomes human to redeem us or to share our humanity is appealing in this sense, does it then follow that it is historically true? Not really

Jimmy Stephens:

Like I said above, words like “argument” and “conclude” are ambiguous. What exactly do you have in mind as a “demonstration?”

The orange-tasting analogy is not about aesthetics, but recognition of a property. It’s an epistemic question. Just as you might convince your friend to acquire the knowledge that oranges taste good, so too, to acquire knowledge that Christianity is true, one merely need read the Bible. That is all the demonstration necessary.

Needless to say, your response makes my case for me – a lot of what you’re saying amounts to the claim that the Bible is not (sufficient) epistemic evidence. Okay, why not?

You mention some reasons, and I’ll get into them, but again, let’s take things one objection at a time.

Last thing, what I put forth above isn’t an “apologetic,” strictly speaking. I laid out a brief intro to an epistemology, a theory of knowledge, not a method of arguing about it.

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/05/2023 11:33 AM
the Christian narrative is a historic one and one that imports a cultural interpretation and therefore it is not truly innate.
This is a non-issue. Yes, not all of Christianity is innate. It is readily clear that if I say people need to read the Bible or hear it preached or some such, in order to understand the Gospel and be saved from sin, then not all Christian doctrine is innate. That’s no objection to my view though.

My view is that knowledge of the Christian God is intrinsic to the human condition, not that knowledge of the specific historical claims about what He’s done to redeem sinners and save people from their sin.
[11:34 AM]
Reason orients you to math.
There are Buddhists, fundamentalists, and others who disagree with you. Many mathematicians disagree with each other. So this is not saying much. Furthermore, I do not grant that humans are not preoriented to act in response to Yahweh. You’d need to show that.
[11:36 AM]
but because of the validation of an external, taught order beyond their own innate appreciation of the doctrine.
Now this is aesthetics, not epistemology.
[11:37 AM]
Besides that psychologically difficult does not indicate epistemic difficulty, every worldview has doctrines distasteful to this or that bunch of people, and not everyone finds hell distasteful – Roman Catholics find penal substitutionary atonement so distasteful they make themselves heretics over it.

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/05/2023 11:40 AM
For example, the issue of Trinity would not be solved by appeals to your example of the orange, but would be about intense debates.
I fail to see how this relates to our discussion, though. For early church councils all the way to modern intra-church debates, common ground is had over the fact that the issue has to be reasoned from Scripture. In other words, the main course and needed supply of content for the arguments comes from exegeting Scripture. The main arguments were exegetical arguments.

Let’s say the narrative of a God that becomes human to redeem us or to share our humanity is appealing in this sense, does it then follow that it is historically true?
I agree, but I have at no point appealed to some nebulous, humanistic notion of appealingness.
[11:41 AM]
The story of God sending His Son to sacrifice Himself for sinners who do not deserve it – that is extremely appealing. However, if you abstract the emotional appeal from that Gospel, then yes, it’s not warrant to believe it.
[11:42 AM]
However, there is an elephant in the room there. Namely, why is it appealing. Christianity has a good explanation for why truths and falsities are appealing. The history of non-Christian views trying to explain this is a history of utter failure.

Nat:

A demonstration would be something that would reasonably take me from my position to yours.

The orange-tasting analogy is not about aesthetics, but recognition of a property. It’s an epistemic question. Just as you might convince your friend to acquire the knowledge that oranges taste good, so too, to acquire knowledge that Christianity is true, one merely need read the Bible. That is all the demonstration necessary.

But “tastes good” is an aesthetic category. Analytically so. Taste relates to aesthetic. You can join things by stating that there is knowledge about the aesthetic, which is fine. But at best you would seem either to argue that aesthetic seemings are also epistemically sound, or reduce the epistemic to the subjective: by tasting the orange you know you have found the orange tasty.

I don’t think this works on Christianity being true. That Christianity “tastes good” for you, does not mean that it objectively tastes good, or that it is true. But what if Christianity tastes rotten to me? What if I taste it and it tastes bitter, and I see that those who eat from that fruit get sickly? What do we do then? I think most people perceive Hell as a monstruous and nasty thing, even Christians, and what sustains their belief in it, is not the beauty of the fruit but on the contrary, fear and tradition.

I think, then, that your method is not of epistemic relevance. Or at the very least, not in a social sense. You have told me “taste this and you will see it is a divine taste that will satisfy your God-oriented soul”, but I have tasted it and found it utterly human and un-God-like. I have seen the community of fruit-eaters and they seem sickly to me, and when they stop eating that fruit they recover their health. By using your epistemic method I have reached the opposite conclusion. If you say it gives knowledge, then either knowledge is uncertain or it is a bad epistemic method

@Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep
> the Christian narrative is a historic one and one that imports a cultural interpretation and therefore it is not truly innate. This is a non-issue. Yes, not all of Christianity is innate. It is readily clear that if I say people need to read the Bible or hear it preached or some such, in order to understand the Gospel and be saved from sin, then not all Christian doctrine is innate. That’s no objection to my view though. My view is that knowledge of the Christian God is intrinsic to the human condition, not that knowledge of the specific historical claims about what He’s done to redeem sinners and save people from their sin.

Nat — 02/05/2023 4:56 PM
But what do you mean by the Christian God? If the Christian God took the form of Jesus, then there’s no intrinsic revelation of that to humans. At best you would get an intrinsic relation that would seem to be compatible(or not) with the Christian God, not the Christian God. I think there’s a linguistic game at hand. If we know that the murderer of X was a human, how can we say that we then have intrinsic knowledge that the murderer was your suspect? It is true that your suspect is a human and we have knowledge of it being a human(in this example), but not of the relation. Furthermore, upon closer story, we may find that there’s an alibi and it cannot be your suspect, or that the notion simply doesn’t stand and that there are multiple other suspects. The intrinsic knowledge would seem to have to link ultimately as it is to the Christian God as a Christian God, and the Christian God is a God that has been revealed in a particular way and that information is extrinsic and therefore it is false that we have intrinsic knowledge of the Christian God.

There are Buddhists, fundamentalists, and others who disagree with you

Disagreement is not very important. There are flat earthers. It is empirically true that we use basic math in China and in the US, now and since the Egyptian times. That’s how we build buildings.

Furthermore, I do not grant that humans are not preoriented to act in response to Yahweh.

I think I’ve done that. Given that Yahweh is a notion that rises up contextually, it is not intrinsic. The distinctiveness of Yahweh is distinct from abstract generalities that ARE intrinsic. So, we are oriented towards God but not necessarily to Yahweh, and precisely because the relation is not necessary it is also not fundamental.

 

However, there is an elephant in the room there. Namely, why is it appealing. Christianity has a good explanation for why truths and falsities are appealing. The history of non-Christian views trying to explain this is a history of utter failure.

Some aspects of the narrative are appealing, others don’t. I would say that what appeals to us appeals to us because it reflects a meta-truth, not a historic truth. Just like Buddhist or Hinduistic narratives have been universally appealing: they also relate to a meta-truth. The meta- truth needs not relate in the terms the concrete narrative does
[5:04 PM]
Maybe I’m not fully comprehending your position, because to me I can just revert your notions: Hell and many aspects of Christian doctrine are repulsive. The elephant of the question would be: why are they repulsive? If your answer was for the affirmative for Christianity it also validates the general negative for Christianity. Certain doctrines are so repulsive because they are false. If we let our seemings to be epistemically sound, as it seems to me you’re proposing, then we have a conflict of seemings. It seems to you that Christianity is appealing and true in a fundamental way, I find that Christianity is extremely appealing and true in a different way, and extremely repulsive in another. I can adopt the appealing parts and reject the repulsive ones, following the Christian maxim “by the fruits ye shall know them”, and not be a Christian

Stinger:

he above is not meant for you

this is though

It sounds like you’re saying that if you had never read The book of Amos and I had a bunch of different books that all sounded like Bible stories all about a guy called Amos and then I mixed The Amos pages together with the false Amos pages that you could reconstruct the book of Amos successfully out of this mixed up pile just by reading.

Is that what you’re suggesting

Jimmy Stephens:

Short answer, yes. It is theoretically possible.

More to the point, the constitution of the Biblical canon is organic. It naturally upholds a certain divine structure protected by God’s providence. In virtue of the latter, the correct version of Amos will always win out over history. In virtue of the former, this occurs through the natural processes of lower criticism and the church.

The Bible is like streams from a pure fountain. You can poison the water, but it’s (a) noticeable in itself, (b) limited in its immediate effects, and (c) is limited by time, because water naturally purified the poison.

 

A demonstration would be something that would reasonably take me from my position to yours.
The Bible does that. So I have met my onus.

But “tastes good” is an aesthetic category. . . .That Christianity “tastes good” for you, does not mean that it objectively tastes good. . .
This whole section both misses the forest for the trees (misinterpreting the analogy) and fails to reconstruct what I said. Strangely, you’re discombobulated in a way I already anticipatorily corrected, when I said, to acquire knowledge that Christianity is true and earlier, The only difference is that an orange might be bad or subject to tastes, where the word of God is not. It’s like you skimmed over that part – don’t know. You’re not a blockhead, so I imagine you just missed it.

What if I taste it and it tastes bitter[?] . . .but I have tasted it and found it utterly human and un-God-like.
Yes, indeed, that’s a legitimate response that I anticipatorily addressed when I said, Fair, but you’ll have to defend that claim. . .what evidence do you have that the Christian Scriptures are not “compelling epistemic evidence”?

For that is the gist of the disagreement after all. On my epistemology, the Bible is epistemologically self-sufficient. On yours, it is not. On my epistemology, the best reason to prefer my epistemology over yours comes via reading the Bible itself. What is, on your epistemology, the best reason to prefer your epistemology over mine? That is where the conversation really lies.

Let’s not repeat ourselves. I have laid my cards: the Bible, no more, no less, ordinarily read by ordinary human beings with ordinary reading comprehension is sufficient occasion to know with utmost certainty that Christianity is true, to the epistemic result that anyone who says otherwise makes a moral error, not just an epistemic one, and condemns themselves.

You’ve laid out some of your hand. Let’s address the cards one by one and not return to reclarify what’s already clear.

@Nat
But what do you mean by the Christian God? If the Christian God took the form of Jesus, then there’s no intrinsic revelation of that to humans. At best you would get an intrinsic relation that would seem to be compatible(or not) with the Christian God, not the Christian God. I think there’s a linguistic game at hand. If we know that the murderer of X was a human, how can we say that we then have intrinsic knowledge that the murderer was your suspect? It is true that your suspect is a human and we have knowledge of it being a human(in this example), but not of the relation. Furthermore, upon closer story, we may find that there’s an alibi and it cannot be your suspect, or that the notion simply doesn’t stand and that there are multiple other suspects. The intrinsic knowledge would seem to have to link ultimately as it is to the Christian God as a Christian God, and the Christian God is a God that has been revealed in a particular way and that information is extrinsic and therefore it is false that we have intrinsic knowledge of the Christian God. > There are Buddhists, fundamentalists, and others who disagree with you > Disagreement is not very important. There are flat earthers. It is empirically true that we use basic math in China and in the US, now and since the Egyptian times. That’s how we build buildings. > Furthermore, I do not grant that humans are not preoriented to act in response to Yahweh. > I think I’ve done that. Given that Yahweh is a notion that rises up contextually, it is not intrinsic. The distinctiveness of Yahweh is distinct from abstract generalities that ARE intrinsic. So, we are oriented towards God but not necessarily to Yahweh, and precisely because the relation is not necessary it is also not fundamental.

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/05/2023 7:05 PM
At best you would get an intrinsic relation that would seem to be compatible(or not) with the Christian God, not the Christian God.
No, to know (e.g., via acquaintance) the Christian God is incompatible with other theistic beliefs. To know x is incompatible with belief y-that-is-~x. Now, maybe you want to say that, on Jimmy’s view, this God knowledge is not enough to construct any successful theology, and I agree. Yes, natural theology is nonsense; philosophical theism is intellectual trash.

The murderer analogy makes clear you’re addressing my view as if it were compatible with mere theism when it is not. I am not saying all men know a Supreme Being, who may then turn out to be this or that religious historic figure. I’m saying all men know the God of the Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, David, Christ, so that when they come into contact with those historic associations, if they do, it faithfully progresses their Yahweh concept, as a unique block falls into to a unique hole in Tetris.
[7:05 PM]
.
[7:10 PM]
To give an alternate analogy, it’s more like everyone has met King Adonai. Everybody lives in the city He built, kept in order by His rule. Everyone eats the provisions he sends down the street everyday. Everyone sees his style of artistry in the buildings they inhabit and the clothes He gave them to wear. Everyone sees his chief produce in themselves, His offspring. Besides meeting the King, everyone has come across some of His messengers. But despite all this, the sons of King Adonai are rebellious and ungrateful; tragically, they prefer contrived stories about Moony or Joe or Zeus on the throne of the city, which are really just projections of their own self-indulgent tastes. Others try to explain away having a father at all, saying the city magically rules itself! The epistemic status of the King’s identity is obvious. No, it’s the most obvious thing whatsoever.

The problem is not lack of evidence or the failure of citizen’s to provide entertaining proofs. The problem is that people prefer lies to truth, fleeting self-indulgence to eternal happiness. They prefer freedom from King Adonai even if it means slavery to dehumanizing nightmares and finally, a fate worse than Lovecraft’s wildest dreams. People are bad. The sons of Adonai have orphanized themselves because they prefer eating fancy-dressed poison to the humble provision of their Father.

Apologies for the length of the metaphor.

@Slinger
I wonder did you decide if the long ending of Mark 16 was valid through this sense or did you have to appeal to history

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/05/2023 8:07 PM
Saying all that the conjunction holds – (a) all will become clear by the end, (b) everything essential is preserved for the church, and (c) all corruptions are temporary and in a state of principally recognizable incongruity – in no way requires me to know this “long ending,” much less have an opinion about it.
[8:08 PM]
Yes, probably, some people already know immediately, without any research required.

We are constantly in a process of correction. To clarify, the poison in my analogy represents textual corruption. Just as your piss is going to be washed away in a river and just as it’s categorically distinguishable from H2O by comparing water and piss, textual corruption is not concealable (to pick a verb arbitrarily) and it’s in a state of being removed from the outset.

Spicy:

I’m not sure I understand. Unless there is a consistent stream of piss entering the river, all piss should be long gone. Is all the piss long gone? If not, and there is still piss in our river, why haven’t we noticed it yet if piss is so obviously distinguishable from water?

@Spicy
I’m not sure I understand. Unless there is a consistent stream of piss entering the river, all piss should be long gone. Is all the piss long gone? If not, and there is still piss in our river, why haven’t we noticed it yet if piss is so obviously distinguishable from water?

Jimmy Stephens:

What textual corruption have we not noticed? The nature of textual corruption is that it’s a continued process, like someone copying the piss-in-the-river behavior of someone else.

Spicy:

My original question about canonicity was meant to reference books protestants typically don’t consider canonical but are considered canonical by the majority of christians historically speaking. If these books are “piss”, that took some time to clear from the river, then clearly it isn’t actually that easy to distinguish between piss and water no?

Jimmy Stephens:

Oh, my analogies have been aimed at lower criticism, not debates about book-canon disputes. I wouldn’t grant the way you frame the question. I don’t think it’s knowable whether the majority of Christians have considered divinely inspired more than the protestant enumeration.

The canon issue is a lot easier than the transmission issue in the sense that there’s no case for more than a protestant canon and there’s an overwhelming amount of issues for the putative additions.

Spicy:

Well its just a matter of if scripture is really so recognizable or not. We can put “majority” aside, we know that a lot if not all of christendom for large portions of time considered certain texts to be scriptural that protestants reject as scripture.

Jimmy Stephens:

Yes
[8:32 PM]
In other words, Christians have disagreed about the canonicity of certain books, especially the apocrypha or deuterocanon.
[8:32 PM]
People have also debated whether or not anything exists. People have debated really everything under the sun.
[8:32 PM]
That says less than nothing about what’s obvious or not.
[8:33 PM]
Or, more precisely, it says nothing about the epistemic recognizability of this or that thing.

Spicy:

If Christians can en masse make major mistakes about distinguishing piss from water, then scripture isn’t a good foundation for knowledge.

Jimmy Stephens:

(1) Why?
(2) What do you mean “en masse”?

Spicy:

(1) Because there is no way for you to know that you aren’t similarly mistaken now
(2) the usual meaning
[8:35 PM]
To clarify about (1)
[8:35 PM]
It doesn’t really matter if piss and water are objectively obviously distinguishable if people are frequently unable to properly distinguish them

Jimmy Stephens:

Okay, and what is meant by “major mistake”? What’s a major mistake as opposed to a minor mistake?

How does it follow that S is principially mistaken about x because everyone else is mistaken about x?

Spicy:

I think you are asking for details that are not relevant but a major mistake would be considering an entire book to be scripture when it isn’t for centuries.
What is S?

Jimmy Stephens:

S is Some knower S

I don’t see why that’s a major mistake. Mistaking non-divine x as divine is not the same thing as denying divine y. Also, even denying divine y and/or mistaking non-divine x as divine in no way inherently threatens Gospel knowledge z from divine z.

Christendom has never been en masse mistaken about the protestant canon. There are plenty of Reformed experts on the matter you can look into.

But let’s examine the conditional anyway. Does it follow from every Christian in existence thinking Blah is divine when it is not entail that the protestant canon is not inherently recognizable? As much as the sky is blue entails pigs can fly on wings made out of the green-cheese moon.

Stinger:

Right, but it seems like you have a firm that there is some magic power to the text.

Reading it you experience some kind of qualia that tells you you’re listening to God.

If this is in fact the standard then it would be absolutely easy to prove to the skeptics.

All you would have to do a modified version of The Amos test above

Just right in exact copy word for word of the book of Amos but replace the titular Amos with a different Amos such as the fictional Amos from the Jerry Reed song Amos Moses.

The real Amos document will look exactly the same as the second Amos document but the subject of the word Amos will change and therefore the meaning of the document will change.

Make a hundred copies of the Jerry Reed Amos manuscript and mix the real Amos in with the pile.

Christians would be able to pick out the real Amos at a staggering rate of accuracy well beyond chance if your model of self authentication holds.

The book would be verifiably unique in a living miracle that all of us could access in a public manner m

Jimmy Stephens:

I don’t think that follows. There’s a lot wrong with that, but here’s just three reasons.
1.) It’s immoral. The Old and New Testaments have explicitly condemned this kind of act, with dire consequences. This involves intentional duplicity about God’s word. I take immorality to be coextensive with irrationality, so that alone means this is not an effective plan of demonstration even if we couldn’t spell out further details why.

2.) This is not possible:
replace the titular Amos with a different Amos
How would you substitute Amos? Well, supposing you want it to effect the doctrinal teaching of the text, you’ll have to edit a lot more than verses that include the name Amos. It’s not going to look at all like a word-for-word copy. Leaving Amos word-for-word is not going to succeed in changing authorship.

Per impossibile, to the extent that it’s otherwise word-for-word undermines the test since the people could just be recognizing authenticity in the words that actually belong to Amos rather than the attribution to the wrong author. This would even be consistent with reports attributing evidential aid to pseudo-authorship. In fact, ironically! Ecclesiastes and Hebrews are examples of this phenomenon already: people misappropriate believed authorship as important evidence to their canonical status.

More radically, human authorship is not of final importance at all. Whether Bimbo Magimbo or Moses wrote the Tanach – who cares. That God divinely inspired it is what mattes. Authorship is more important for reasons of exegesis than canonicity, and is only a second-order evidence where divine canonicity is concerned.
[1:26 AM]
.
[1:29 AM]
3.) You’re misunderstanding the doctrine of perspicuity. That the Bible in general is inherently recognizable does not require the book of Amos to be equally recognizable as any other book. Furthermore, that the book of Amos is inherently recognizable does not mean the background beliefs, experiences, and cultural heritage of a given reader leaves the book equally recognizable as any other book. It’s perfectly consistent to say the Bible as a whole bears the divine “ring of truth” such that eventually anyone would recognize it, and also that not all texts share the same clarity in themselves and that not all individuals are as predisposed to hear the “ring of truth” as quickly from a given text as others.

Case in point: most American Christians find the Biblical geneologies boring. Sadly, those who get interested usually do for reasons of creationist apologetics.
[1:31 AM]
However, there have been people who have come to believe Christianity because of those genealogies and the connection they perceived to God because of their culture’s preoccupation with a lineage going back to the divine.
[1:31 AM]
.

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/06/2023 1:33 AM
However, as to actually testing the doctrine, it’s not hard to find all variety of testimonies of people reading the Gospel of John and on reading it, converting. Augustine himself is an example of this sort of change. It’s possible for that to happen over Amos or Song of Songs, but there are clearer texts, and it’s not hard to find the information on google about people being convinced by the sharing of the Gospel via word or a sermon on a text or reading a Gideon Bible in a motel.

Nat:

I think this is crucial. We agree that there’s an intrinsic orientation towards “God”. But your position builds no top of that beyond the intrinsic knowledge and goes into a specific model. This separates from the innate revelation I’ve been talking about. So, while formally I would agree that there’s a compatibility with this new revelation and the innate, so that it COULD be build on it, there’s no such evidence, and given that the form allows for different contents(is compatible with them), we need more than that. You seem to argue that you are validated because of the new revelation, but that is something different revelations claim. It is true that internally, there could be such connection, but there could also be a mistake about the connection. I suppose that Muslims that claim such a revelation, or other kinds of theisms that claim such equal revelation, there is no common ground for me to epistemically verify that their claims are indeed true, and internally any of those could be true. And the list of compatible theisms is long, and it includes from all major religions to even personal revelation, and from those who are compatible with our human experiences and those that are not. So, how am I to gauge the veracity of those revelations? If it is reduced to the personal, there is no way for me to negate it, but there is also no way for me to validate it, and therefore it is epistemically useless in a social way.

The person that seems schizophrenic to me and told me that God has ordered him to murder his family COULD be as validated as the person that seems Saint-like to me. The only way I can gauge them is by comparing them to the innate and how God-like they seem, knowing that the innate image is not perfectly clear in all regards.

I can understand your metaphor, but as I said, that doesn’t demostrate the veracity of the metaphor
[1:17 PM]
It seems to me that the more proper metaphor is that we are on a city, with terrible and beautiful things, and that many have claimed that they’ve met the King but say different things about the King. Many claim to have letters of the King but their seals don’t seem King-like to me. They do things as the letter says but do un-King like things. I have no intrinsic reason to validate those letters and do have an intrinsic reason to invalidate many letters. That you present a letter to me that includes monstruous things, and present it as coming from the King doesn’t mean anything if we cannot validate that indeed the letter comes from the King. Telling me that the King has personally delivered it to you, doesn’t mean much to me because so do others, and it goes against my personal relation with the King. I would also ask: how, other than through our innate knowledge of the King, are we to know whether the one that gave you the letter is indeed the King?

I think that the seal is innate known to us through the Divine and we can know things that are Divine, things like Peace, for example. Anything that carries with it Peace has the Divine Seal. That would be my metaphor

Jimmy Stephens:

We agree that there’s an intrinsic orientation towards “God”. . .given that the form allows for different contents(is compatible with them). . .
Strictly speaking, we do not. You mean by “God” a mere theism, which I do not. I mean everyone is oriented toward the Christian God, Yahweh; so it is not “compatible with [different contents],” but only with Christianity. If you keep reading me in terms of philosophical theism, it will just be misreading me, friend.

You seem to argue that you are validated because of the new revelation
No, I’m setting forth my view in different ways to correct misconceptions. For example, it is a misconception to think I have been saying people are born into a general sense of some deity, and then happen to find out it’s Yahweh later on. Rather, what I have said is that everyone knows God as Yahweh from the first moment of consciousness, but as to His specific historic acts, that’s mysterious until they run into textual recording in the form of Scripture.

This is neither an argument, nor is it attempting to build on mere/philosophic theism. I can’t hope to focus on arguing my view until it’s better understood. And again, I’m not being condescending. It’s just that mainstream Christian apologetics is overrun with secularistic epistemologies, like video games where Christianity is just a DLC you add to the main content. This is a thoroughly Christian epistemology – Yahweh is there at the title screen, character creation, and every quest along the way, even though you don’t know how Yahweh interacts with you at each quest until you get there, if you get there.

there is no common ground for me to epistemically verify that their claims are indeed true
Depending on what you mean, this sounds like a concession that your epistemology suffers a very big underdetermination problem. If you cannot check competing epistemologies so as to prefer one over the other, then your epistemology suffers skeptical paralysis.

@Nat
I don’t follow. Can you rephrase the issue?

And the list of compatible theisms is long. . .
Right, for your worldview it is. That’s a big problem for your worldview, since you suffer a galactic underdetermination problem.

As for my position, these alternative theisms are ruled out from the outset, so I don’t suffer the same weakness.

@Nat
I think this is crucial. We agree that there’s an intrinsic orientation towards “God”. But your position builds no top of that beyond the intrinsic knowledge and goes into a specific model. This separates from the innate revelation I’ve been talking about. So, while formally I would agree that there’s a compatibility with this new revelation and the innate, so that it COULD be build on it, there’s no such evidence, and given that the form allows for different contents(is compatible with them), we need more than that. You seem to argue that you are validated because of the new revelation, but that is something different revelations claim. It is true that internally, there could be such connection, but there could also be a mistake about the connection. I suppose that Muslims that claim such a revelation, or other kinds of theisms that claim such equal revelation, there is no common ground for me to epistemically verify that their claims are indeed true, and internally any of those could be true. And the list of compatible theisms is long, and it includes from all major religions to even personal revelation, and from those who are compatible with our human experiences and those that are not. So, how am I to gauge the veracity of those revelations? If it is reduced to the personal, there is no way for me to negate it, but there is also no way for me to validate it, and therefore it is epistemically useless in a social way. The person that seems schizophrenic to me and told me that God has ordered him to murder his family COULD be as validated as the person that seems Saint-like to me. The only way I can gauge them is by comparing them to the innate and how God-like they seem, knowing that the innate image is not perfectly clear in all regards. I can understand your metaphor, but as I said, that doesn’t demostrate the veracity of the metaphor

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/06/2023 2:07 PM
However, maybe not, as you seem(?) to offer a criterion. It’s not clear what it is.
The only way I can gauge them is by comparing them to the innate and how God-like they seem, knowing that the innate image is not perfectly clear in all regards.
What is “the innate” here? If you mean to borrow my idea of the innate, then you just mean knowledge of the Christian God. If you mean to propose some other concept of theistic knowledge, you’d need to spell out your God concept, especially in contrast to mine, and see how you go about verifying that your “innate” idea is, in fact, non-Christian.
[2:09 PM]
Hopefully it’s clear from the above that I’m thinking out loud on purpose to indicate that I’m trying to figure out exactly where you’re at in your theological constructs in comparison to me.

Nat:

Ah, I see. You try to differentiate things from other conceptions by claiming that we all know Yahweh as opposed to my understanding that we know the abstract Divine but we do not know whether it is Yahweh or Zeus, for example. I take it that this is the difference between the abstract vs the concrete. We know not the abstract “Divine” you seem to say, but the concrete Yahweh, would I be understanding correctly?

If I have understood correctly. Then it seems that you are committed to claiming that infants born in 3,000 BCE knew Yahweh as Yahweh, but were guilty of self-deception. Can you elaborate? What would it mean to know God as Yahweh? What is Yahweh if not the name that encapsulates a particular idea of God? How can a baby know Yahweh? What of concrete Yahweh do they know?

And more importantly, how is that view substantiated? Anyone can claim that one knows concretely X and that all negation of knowledge of X is self-deception and social deception. One could easily argue that it is another concrete deity, some that you have not even heard of, and that your Christianity is just another self-deception to not honor the true God? Also, how do you reconcile the fact that throughout history many people have postulated deities towards which they subordinate, and that conceive of them as sinners, even fundamental sinners, with your notion that we self-deceive ourselves from the knowledge of concrete Yahweh because we don’t want to subordinate or we enjoy sin?(I’m paraphrasing)
[2:22 PM]
There are other problems I can conceive of with the notion. Probably the strongest to me is the relation between the abstract and the concrete, the abstract being superior to the concrete, and therefore an abstract Yahweh is more Godly than a merely concrete Yahweh, although arguably a both concrete and abstract deity is more Divine than either(arguably)

Jimmy Stephens:

That last line is a bit weird. The knowledge of God given by Him is concrete knowledge of Yahweh; if that’s what you’re asking, yes.
A lot of those questions are more under the domain of psychology than epistemology. Minimally, to know God as Yahweh is to possess an assented mental representation of Yahweh and to have true beliefs about Yahweh, and other such things.
[8:52 AM]
One could easily argue that it is another concrete deity, some that you have not even heard of, and that your Christianity is just another self-deception to not honor the true God?
[8:52 AM]
Okay, if it’s easy, go ahead and argue it.
[8:53 AM]
However, I anticipate no forthcoming argument as I think the history of philosophy has shown how tremendously difficult it is to get any worldview off the ground.
[8:55 AM]
the abstract being superior to the concrete, and therefore an abstract Yahweh is more Godly than a merely concrete Yahweh
Perhaps I don’t know what you mean. Abstractness and concreteness are indispensable and yet difficult concepts to define, but putting that aside, there’s nothing about abstractness generally understood that offers superiority ipso facto. Furthermore, there are good reasons to think an “abstract God” is the equivalent of a triangular square: nonsense.

Nat:

Well, there’s the issue. If you know Yahweh as a mental representation, then one doesn’t know Yahweh, only a given mental representation, which then becomes an abstract. One abstractly knows Yahweh, not concretely. But also, what mental representation of Yahweh can an infant born 3,000 BCE have of Yahweh? What mental representations do they have of anything? If you are speaking of mental representations then you are back on my alley. What can it mean? Does it mean our mental representation is exhaustive of Yahweh? Surely not, this would seem heretical and impossible, our limited minds cannot even comprehend in principle the eternity of Yahweh. So, it must be an aspect of Yahweh, as we’ve discussed above with logic. But, in order for your reasoning to work, this limited notion must also be distinctive to the mere abstraction of God. It must be a concrete abstraction of God, but isn’t that kind of paradoxical? And if the universal abstractions of God aren’t true abstractions, why are they universal? Why is is it that all cultures speak of the Divine and we can abstract the Divine but this abstraction of the Divine not necessarily correspond to the abstraction of Yahweh? I think we can explore this idea very profoundly

Okay, if it’s easy, go ahead and argue it.

Well, yes. I just need to create a fictitious character, Xenu, and then apply the same characteristics that are necessary for the transcendental argument to work, and then apply particular characteristics. So, Xenu would be the true God but is 4 persons, has revealed himself only exclusively to a hippie commune doing drugs. I’m not sure why it would be tremendously difficult. Or am I missing something?

there’s nothing about abstractness generally understood that offers superiority ipso facto.

But it does. That is precisely the nature of transcendentals. Abstractions transcend the concrete. That’s why they are required to make sense of the concrete. All concrete is a form of the abstract not vicevers

Jimmy Stephens:

I just need to create a fictitious character, Xenu. . .
You mean imagine a fiction? That’s going to defeat the purpose of your argument. You were supposed to show that it’s easy to argue that we know a specific non-Christian God, but fiction is definitionally not knowledge of a real God.

All concrete is a form of the abstract not vicevers
This is extremely problematic. You’ll have to tell me what is a non-concrete abstraction.

If you know Yahweh as a mental representation, then one doesn’t know Yahweh. . .
I suppose, but that’s not quite what I said either. I said to know is to have a mental representation of Yahweh, not to know a mental representation. It would have been a little silly if I had tried to clarify “know” by using the word “know” in my definition by example.

Nat:

I’m making a hypothetical, to show the conflict in the principle. I am being honest in saying it’s fictitious because it’s hypothetical. But even then, the principle remains. I don’t need to look for similar cases of real people who have claimed theirs to not be fictitious. I could even point to the psych ward as an example

Jimmy Stephens:

The nature of God requires Him to not be hypothetical, so that’s not going to work.
[10:08 AM]
You’re just begging the question against the theology.
[10:09 AM]
Well, also, we don’t even need to claim God to see how fictions aren’t going to serve as a theistic explanation for knowledge.

Nat:

Guess we’ll have to agree to disagree. I can use the hypothetical of something someone could believe to not be hypothetical. You are claiming the knowledge of the real God as the real God in opposition to all oppositional claims. Yet by the very reasons you use, I must also validate the oppositional claims of real Gods, or you must present a particular case for your own that doesn’t devolve into the abstract

Jimmy Stephens:

I’m not sure I understand that. This is pretty simple. It is impossible in the nature of the case for the transcendental condition of knowledge to be stipulated fiction. Why so? Because you need knowledge first in order to stipulate anything, like fiction. So you would first need to know that which provides you with any knowledge at all in order to then stipulate a fictional explanation for knowledge.

Nat:

I think you’re being needlessly unhelpful. Yes, hypotheticals are hypothetical, but because of the principles used in the hypothetical they serve hypothetically. It would be like saying “why would I need concern myself with a fictitious trolley problem? The trolley is fictitious, it can’t harm anyone”

Jimmy Stephens:

You’re not understanding the problem.
[10:12 AM]
We’re talking about what item of knowledge makes knowledge possible.
[10:12 AM]
Can that be a fiction?
[10:12 AM]
No
[10:12 AM]
Why not?
[10:12 AM]
Stipulating a fiction is something you do after you have knowledge with which to construct fictions.
[10:12 AM]
So you can’t get behind the knowledge you needed in the first place to then stipulate hypothetical alternatives.
[10:13 AM]
You must first know that which makes you knowledgeable at all, and then you can figure out what’s possible or not.

Nat:

That can be reverted unto you. Stipulating Yahweh as the true God is something you do after you have knowledge with which to stipulate Yahweh as the true God. You mist first know that which makes you knowledgeable at all, then you can figure out whether it’s Yahweh or not.

You want to bypass the abstraction of what makes knowledge possible into a concrete, so it is Yahweh who gives you knowledge, but this becomes circular as to make sense of that you first need to have knowledge of you sense-making and knowledge-oriented faculties, and that knowledge is even possible and so on.

But if Yahweh is an option, so would be Xenu for someone who doesn’t believe it is hypothetical. I say Xenu is hypothetical but I also think so of Yahweh. If Yahweh is an option for you as a believer, then Xenu is an option for a different believer. Or we can go to the psych ward and speak with people who are deemed to be insane because they claim personal contact with God
[10:16 AM]
Or a true believer of a different religion with an exclusivist claim as Yahweh

Jimmy Stephens:

Stipulating Yahweh-
Yes, that would be problematic.
[10:17 AM]
But no one is stipulating Yahweh.
[10:17 AM]
Yahweh revealing Himself to all men =/= Jimmy stipulating Him on a discord chat
[10:17 AM]
Hence: begging the question.

Nat:

No, but it is your claim that Yahweh is revealing Himself to all men. I know of no such thing. I did not even know about Yahweh until I read Bible stories as a child

Jimmy Stephens:

I don’t grant you that.

Nat:

You are making a claim about that fact and that doesn’t make you the fact

Jimmy Stephens:

You’d have to show you don’t know it.
[10:19 AM]
I’ve already fulfilled my onus:
[10:19 AM]
The Bible clearly falsifies your claim.
[10:19 AM]
Do you have counter evidence?

Nat:

It doesn’t matter if you grant things about me. I don’t even need to show you anything about myself. You have not fulfilled an onus, you have made a circular claim that is self-referential and therefore its own self-referentiality and circularity is applicable to other people who like you have also claimed direct revelation of their specific deities
[10:20 AM]
Counter evidence to what? To your claims?
[10:20 AM]
Claims are not evidence

Jimmy Stephens:

1.) Claiming you don’t have to fulfill your burden of proof is just that: a claim.

2.) The Bible is not a claim. We’ve covered that, friend.

I agree! So what’s the evidence for your claim that you’re not aware of Christianity being true?

Nat:

I have fulfilled my burden of proof. It is internal. Whether the burden of proof I have needs to convince you is a matter of social epistemology. You making the claim that I knew Yahweh prior to me being aware of it(consciously, I imagine) is something you have not fulfilled with any burden of proof. My burden of proof is internal. I tell you I’m a male, do I now NEED to show it to you? No.

That the Bible is true is a claim. We have not covered the Bible, even. All of this has been formal and is not tied as evidence of anything, really.

The evidence for my claim of being unaware of Christianity being true is that such a thing is not apparent in my awareness. Rather, what is your evidence that I WAS aware?
[10:24 AM]
So far, you’ve only claimed it to be the case
[10:24 AM]
You haven’t proven anything

Jimmy Stephens:

I have fulfilled my burden of proof. It is internal. . .The evidence for my claim of being unaware of Christianity being true is that such a thing is not apparent in my awareness.
So it’s your testimony against God’s? A fallible, finite, morally foul human vs an infallible, infinite, morally perfect Creator? Not good odds. I’ll expand below.

That the Bible is true is a claim. We have not covered the Bible, even.
Yes, we covered – if at a surface level – the gist. I pointed out that on my epistemology, the Bible is coauthored by God. Its words constitute God’s words. Its reliability and authority over the reader is just God’s perfect trustworthiness and inherent authority over all creatures.

On that view, the Bible is epistemically sufficient. Reading is the occasion for the reader to be justified by what it says to believe what it says. No further element is necessary.

And as I clarified before, you’re just making the opposite claim that it’s not sufficient. The issue is that while my epistemology consistently recognizes the testimony of our Creator in Scripture as sufficient, your own epistemology does not make you a reputable source of counter-testimony.
[10:32 AM]
.
[10:33 AM]
On a side note, I have no idea the consciousness of people’s Yahweh belief. I imagine it’s pretty submerged / it’s not terribly conscious. Consciousness of our mental states is a pretty complicated spectrum with all sorts of nuance.

Nat:

No. It is my testimony about a more authoritative source than you. YOU are making the claims.

In your view X, but you need to show X, not to say that it is your view. You have not shown that the Bible is coauthored by God.

My epistemology does make me a reputable source. From my own view, it does, because God has revealed itself directly and is revealing himself constantly through our conscience.

Yes. Consciousness is complicated. It is perfectly possible that I know Yahweh and don’t know it, or suppress it or any other such thing. But that alone is insufficient to prove your claim. I could also be suppressing the belief of XHWY, of my child abuse, and you could also be supressing beliefs and so.

I am getting frustrated and have to work. I respect you and do not wish to be rude. I think you have been deliberately unhelpful. I want to be charitable and think this is because you think such a move proves something, it’s a performative move of the epistemology, maybe in a way I’m not catching on, but I think it fails and is just frustrating and leaves me unconvinced of the truth of your claims. You seem to think I am not understanding, and I think that you are not understanding and we cannot seem to move forward. Before I remove myself from the conversation, I want to give it another shot.

What is your proof that, the Bible is co-authored by God? It is insufficient to propose a view you believe, you would need to prove that, or at least to show that it is the best option we have. And the thing you used to prove it need also to be proven

Jimmy Stephens:

You have not shown that the Bible is coauthored by God.
This is just the claim I said you were making: that the Bible is not epistemically sufficient. All I’m doing is reporting its teaching on the matter.

The Law of the LORD is perfect, reviving the soul; the testimony of the LORD is trustworthy, making wise the simple. The precepts of the LORD are right, bringing joy to the heart; the commandments of the LORD are radiant, giving light to the eyes.
– Psalm 19:7-8

How is this not proof?

I’m not out to be rude. As best I can tell, the problem is you’re not recognizing the different methods of demonstration indigenous to our epistemologies. There’s no higher form of demonstration, on my view, than to cite God in one’s favor, which is only made possible by His verbal revelation in Scripture.

Like I said a while back in the convo, it’s fair for you to disagree, but you’ll need to take responsibility for your disagreement. I’ve met the terms and conditions of my epistemology for proving something, and I asked you at the outset what you meant by “demonstration.” You haven’t given a notion of demonstration that I have quashed in any way.

It seems you intend to do so though – but you’ll need to lay out what you think a demonstration is such that I have not fulfilled the concept, complete with a reason for thinking that’s a good concept of demonstration.

Nat:

By demonstration I don’t mean anything special. To demonstrate something is to establish the truth of something. It guarantees the preservation of truth in what is being demonstrated in a way that build the knowledge ground up.

The Bible would be truth-preserving, indeed, if that could be shown. You would first need to show why the Bible is truth-preserving. You will say “because it is the word of God”, but you need to show that such a thing is true. It may be true, but you would need to show that indeed truth has been preserved and guaranteed. You seek to do so by claiming that it is God that has guaranteed so, but that in itself is not a guarantee, it is a claim. The foundational base we operate for any epistemology is logic. That serves to build knowledge ground up. We are guaranteed that illogical notions are false, because logic serves as truth-preservation(although not necessarily truth demonstration)
[11:03 AM]
In order for me to validate your epistemology we need to know that its basis is sound. This leads to a backwards problem for how do we know which basis of epistemology are sound from which aren’t

Jimmy Stephens:

Why is logic truth preserving?

Nat:

And that leads to my own epistemology. It is necessary that we have some innate basis of knowledge, for even to claim we lack knowledge is in of itself a knowledge claim.
Because its negation is an impossibility
[11:05 AM]
The very question seems nonsensical to me

Jimmy Stephens:

How does the impossibility of the negation of logic follow from logic?

Nat:

The question assumes logic in order to be ofrmualted

Jimmy Stephens:

Yeah, but that’s not an issue.
[11:05 AM]
Employing logic to challenge its sufficiency =/= challenging its necessity

Nat:

The negation of logic assumes the logic it attempts to negate

Necessity is a logical term

Jimmy Stephens:

The nonexistence of logic is not a negation of logic.
[11:06 AM]
It’s just a-logic.
[11:06 AM]
“Negation” would not even be a concept.

Nat:

In such a case, there would not even be anything. Nothingness, but we don’t have nothingness. The thing we have is logical by necessity in its structure

Be that the metaphysical thing or the physical thing

The very epistemological question already assumes logic. Logic is a necessary assumption implicit in any human activity, even skepticism

Jimmy Stephens:

That’s not a reason to think it’s sufficient.

Nat:

I’m not claiming it is sufficient

Jimmy Stephens:

You said:

“The foundational base we operate for any epistemology is logic. That serves to build knowledge ground up.”

Nat:

I’m saying that something that would lead to a contradiction would be an impossibility

Jimmy Stephens:

This is the claim I’m challenging.

Nat:

On what basis are you challenging it?
[11:08 AM]
What is “challenge”?

Jimmy Stephens:

What is “challenge” when you asked what the basis is for believing the Scripture is authored by God? Whatever that basis is, it’s open for me to employ here regarding your claim about logic.

Nat:

No, because that challenge spoke of possibility, it assumes logic. Necessity and possibility are modes of logic. The challenge I put forward is in relation to the possibility of the Scripture not being authored by God. Your challenge would then have to be about the possibility of the impossibility of logic. It’s nonsensical

Jimmy Stephens:

You’re using logic in a way I’m unfamiliar.
[11:11 AM]
So when you said “logic” before, you specifically meant modality?

@Nat
No, because that challenge spoke of possibility, it assumes logic. Necessity and possibility are modes of logic. The challenge I put forward is in relation to the possibility of the Scripture not being authored by God. Your challenge would then have to be about the possibility of the impossibility of logic. It’s nonsensical

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/08/2023 11:11 AM
the possibility of the Scripture not being authored by God.
[11:11 AM]
And what reason do you have to claim that’s possible?

Nat:

Modality is about logic but it is not exhaustive of logic. When we speak of modes we speak of logic, the basic modes being possible and necessary

Jimmy Stephens:

I don’t know what that means.
[11:13 AM]
Generally speaking, it has become popular to cash out possibility and necessity in terms of logical consistency of states of affairs or propositions, and such things.
[11:13 AM]
Necessity is usually used to talk about states of affairs or propositions or whatever without which consistency is unavailable, fails to obtain, cannot be possessed – whatever.

Nat:

Logic refers to a formal structure. The structure includes the modal aspects but also other aspects.

What do you mean?
[11:13 AM]
Ah, I see

Jimmy Stephens:

Possibility is usually used to talk about states of affairs being mutually compatible.
[11:14 AM]
In other words, possibility is a feature of states of affairs or propositions where no contradiction is entailed/involved.
[11:14 AM]
If that’s what you mean, it’s easy enough to go back and catch up to what you were saying.
[11:14 AM]
But maybe you mean something else by these modal terms.

Nat:

Yes. Possibility means there’s no contradiction. Necessary means that its negation is contradictory

Jimmy Stephens:

Okay, so what reason is there to think there’s no contradiction involved in God not being the author of Scripture?
[11:15 AM]
How did you go about determining that there’s no contradiction?

Nat:

I see your point but this is just something we will not agree and each end up frustrated. If I say “it is possible that tomorrow rains”, how would I show that there’s indeed no contradiction? I think that the obvious course of action is to assume possibility unless a contradiction is shown as necessary. There’s no necessary contradiction between the terms “tomorrow” and “raining”, so it is possible. But will surely object that there is a necessary contradiction between “God” and “not the author of Scripture”, but in that case it would be up to you to show what the contradiction is. But you will likely reject this saying that it is my burden of proof to show that it is not contradictory. That method just seems bad faith to me. If such were the case, then a Scientologist can argue the same way: I would need to show that there’s no contradiction between the Scientologist texts and Truth. But that seems backwards to me. Not-contradictions in an absolute sense are practically impossible to prove as there are infinite possibilities and relations. A contradiction is easier to show. It would be impossible for me to show you that there are no men who give birth and much eaesier for you to prove a man that gives a birth.

If we don’t agree on that, which seems good faith and accepted even by Christian apologists, then ew won’t be able to move forward and we should stop the conversation. If you agree with that, then we can move forward, and show that God and Him not being the author of Scripture is contradictory, or if not then accept it as, maybe if you will, a prudential possibility

Jimmy Stephens:

But you will likely reject this saying that it is my burden of proof to show that it is not contradictory.
Correct, as that is your claim after all, and you hold me to the same standard. One must follow what he imposes on others. However, I think I can fulfill the onus where I humbly suggest you cannot. We’ll see in a moment.

I think that the obvious course of action is to assume possibility unless a contradiction is shown as necessary.
1.) This is done ad hoc out of convenience, not on the basis of reason. It amounts to laziness.
2.) This is inconsistent. If we are allowed to just forego demonstrations when they’re difficult, I can play that game with Christianity, and everyone’s at a paralyzing draw of subjectivism.
3.) I do not mean this rudely, so don’t take this the wrong way, but all your language “seems” “seems” “seems” betrays the subjectivism. These words are euphemisms for what’s really going on: I believe it because I want to – wishful thinking.

Here’s the alternative, though. On my view, we humans have access to the Triune God Who controls what is possible and what is not. Not only does He know and determine possibility, He has given us the epistemic key to map possibility from our experience. That is, in Scripture, we are given a verifying picture of God and the world on the basis of which we can interpret experiences, and so draw from both an emerging picture of what is necessary and possible.

For example, I know rain tomorrow is possible because I know God, who controls modality, from general and Biblical revelation, and I know meteorological facts from past experience. From this, I can draw basic consistency, and I can continue to add more contextualizing facts to explore for a contradiction. But see, essential to that building-block notion of modal knowledge is my access to the God who controls modality.
[11:40 AM]
.
[11:45 AM]
I’m happy to end here, if you do not wish to continue, and I hope you have a pleasant Wednesday.

That said, I think most of what’s going on here can be summarized as a justificatory regress problem. It’s similar to the Münchhausen Trilemma. We have an idea of logical properties. However, what justifies our beliefs about them, about what they apply to and how, and to what extent?

I submit that my beliefs on the matter are safeguarded by personal acquaintance with the Christian God, and by extension, developed experience of His historic acts, His image bearers (other people), and His providentially ruled world. There’s a big tree here, but the root is Yahweh.

I think, ultimately, there is no justification behind your logic beliefs. It washes out in a subtle goalpost shift to convenience, sometimes called pragmatic justification, or just autobiographical reports of confidence, which is subjectivism.

Nat:

Correct, as that is your claim after all, and you hold me to the same standard. One must follow what he imposes on others.

In a way, you are correct. I am saying that there is no contradiction present. That may be too high of a standard in a non-casual sense. There is no reason to believe there is a contradiction is a weaker claim that points to the same thing.

This is done ad hoc out of convenience, not on the basis of reason. It amounts to laziness.

No. On the reason that there are an infinite number of potential relations. To have such a standard is to require an impossible standard and to negate the use of the categories, which leads to absurdity.

This is inconsistent. If we are allowed to just forego demonstrations when they’re difficult, I can play that game with Christianity, and everyone’s at a paralyzing draw of subjectivism.

But that’s not what I’m doing. I’m saying that in order to show a true ontological LACK of contradiction implies asking me to show ALL possible relations and then showing how they are not contradictory. Such a standard not even you can hold.

I do not mean this rudely, so don’t take this the wrong way, but all your language “seems” “seems” “seems” betrays the subjectivism. These words are euphemisms for what’s really going on: I believe it because I want to – wishful thinking.

Seems does not imply subjectivism. I’m a perspectivist in many things. Subjectivism and perspectivism are different. But in any case, the “seem” is a friendly gesture of openness.

On my view

It’s not relevant until you prove your view. Also, this is bizarre. Prior to Scripture we could not interpret experiences? Could not interpret necessary or possible? How does Scripture help you to know whether tomorrow will rain or not?

From this, I can draw basic consistency, and I can continue to add more contextualizing facts to explore for a contradiction.

But you have not shown a lack of contradiction. The question is epistemic
[3:37 PM]
It doesn’t matter if God controls modality or not(God also does so from my view), what matters is your access to such facticity. How do you demonstrate possibility? You can show impossibility by pointing out the contradiction. But how do you demonstrate that it’s possible that tomorrow rains. You have to be assured that none of the relations relevant lead to a contradiction, but not only that, prove it and that is just an impossible standard.

I submit that my beliefs on the matter are safeguarded by personal acquaintance with the Christian God, and by extension, developed experience of His historic acts, His image bearers (other people), and His providentially ruled world. There’s a big tree here, but the root is Yahweh.

You need to prove it, though, not submit it. Theoretical submissions abound. There are even deeper problems with the thesis. But if you do not accept the use of possible(and therefore impossible) unless I map out all (ironically, paradoxically) possible relations between two things, then how could we possibly(wink, wink) continue?

Nat — 02/08/2023 3:45 PM
And no, I think my view is as sound as yours. I have certain knowledge which is warranted because God has created me in his image and there’s an intrinsic, innate link between me and God. I also think beyond this certain knowledge, we have practical knowledge, which is also justified, in the casual sense, in the practical sense, in the everyday sense. Which I’m not sure why you would disagree. Christian mathematicians, scientists and Christians in general are also fallible in their practical knowledge and yet still find themselves justified in their practical faculties. That you claim the Christian God places knowledge upon people does not warranty infallibility. All it does is attempts to immunize your theology from attacks. It is only your private theological knowledge that is assured by your method, no other kind of knowledge. You are less justified in your piloting claims than the atheist pilot, even if the atheist pilot cannot give coherence between their atheism and their knowledge. The same method is used by different denominations and in every case the case seems clear to me: they are just trying to immunize their particular theology from external critique, but that doesn’t warranty their theology. From there they can place offensive and defensive, but that just seems like a rhetorical device.

I am sure you will disagree, but I’m not sure we can continue. You claim an uniquely high epistemic standard for modal logic that you don’t share elsewhere(it would not be possible). It’s like when saying “human beings are not rabbits” expecting me to go hunt all potential human beings everywhere and show that they are indeed not rabbits.

Nat — 02/08/2023 4:26 PM
To end up, I have a question. You say neither I no nor-[NOT DENOMINATION]-Christians are justified nor do we have knowledge. But if that’s true, then why would you EVER get on a plane with not your denomination person? If someone who pretends to know more than you, a so-called-expert of say, botany, biology, medicine, physics, or any branch tells you something, the thing you ought to ask is “Are you [DENOMINATION]”? Because if not, even if their beliefs were true, they would not be justified! They certainly can’t know more than you or any other such Christian. So, if they say “take care, the foundation of your building is vulnerable” or “your pet needs this special diet” or “here’s how banking works”, you ought to treat them as unjustified fools that lack knowledge and therefore cannot be trusted to know what they are saying. But by extension you would not be justified in treating our modern technology, science, infrastructure and so on as the the product of knowledge. This extends beyond mere practicality. Most contemporary academics are atheistic, they would just not be justified, according to you, because their knowledge is not true knowledge, and they may believe themselves to be epistemically justified when a physicist tells you that the Sun is a star, but they are not
[4:26 PM]
So, the unique knowledge that relies on their expertise would also equally crumble
[4:26 PM]
That would be my last question

The Meows Cat:

I’ll preemptively answer something that is quite a common misconception.

You say neither I no nor-[NOT DENOMINATION]-Christians are justified nor do we have knowledge. But if that’s true, then why would you EVER get on a plane with not your denomination person?
Jimmy is saying that on what THEY profess to believe, they can’t know things. People who don’t believe Christianity is true can know things. Everyone is able to know things because Christianity is true and not as a result of them merely believing Christianity or not.
So, the unique knowledge that relies on their expertise would also equally crumble [under their own claimed epistemology]
That’s what you should have said/asked. This also relates back to what Jimmy said about everyone having revealed knowledge of God (having it and professing it are two different things). On revelational epistemology everyone can know things (doctors, veterinarians, physicists, pilots, etc.) because of what Jimmy has already gone through with you.

I’ll let Jimmy reply to the rest of this, but since this is such a common misunderstanding, I figured I’d clear it up and save Jimmy some time.

Jimmy Stephens:

Woof. A lot was said while I was away. I will get to what I find substantial, but forgive me for overlooking things I don’t find helpful, others for the sake of time/expediency.

I am saying that there is no contradiction present.
Right, and this is to disagree with Jesus. Nat says other theisms are possible. Jesus says He is the way, the truth, and the light, the only way to the Father. Who’s testimony bears more expertise on possibility, coherence, epistemic evidence, and all that?

See, you believe your claim is “weaker,” but in reality you’ve made the most bombastic, far-reaching claim anyone could possibly make. If you can’t back up your claim, that would amount to maximal arrogance. Why? Because your assertion amounts to saying you know better than my God what’s possible and what’s not, a claim which is of course logically identical to asserting the impossibility of my Christian outlook. You’d better have something to back that up, because to say that on a whim would amount to delusions of grandeur.

To have such a standard [justification that x is possible] is to require an impossible standard
It may be impossible on your epistemology, and that’s just to concede a flaw of your system. My epistemology doesn’t suffer this problem. I say tongue in cheek, step aside, bro, and let God bench when you can’t even get the weights on the bar.

TBC. . .
[5:34 PM]
But that’s not what I’m doing. I’m saying that in order to show a true ontological LACK of contradiction implies asking me to show ALL possible relations and then showing how they are not contradictory.
First, you’re quite right and humble to concede that you as a human creature do not have the faculties, methods, or tools to score all things, properties, et al, and illuminate possibility from impossibility. I agree.

However, what you and I as humans cannot do is no problem for God. All we would need is God’s testimony – dare I say, Christian revelation – as to the most basic categories what He has made possible or not. You need the modal key to the map, which God can give. My epistemology affords that. You honestly and rightfully admit: your epistemology can’t.

But that’s not what I’m doing. I’m saying that in order to show a true ontological LACK of contradiction implies asking me to show ALL possible relations and then showing how they are not contradictory.
First, you’re quite right and humble to concede that you as a human creature do not have the faculties, methods, or tools to score all things, properties, et al, and illuminate possibility from impossibility. I agree.

However, what you and I as humans cannot do is no problem for God. All we would need is God’s testimony – dare I say, Christian revelation – as to the most basic categories what He has made possible or not. You need the modal key to the map, which God can give. My epistemology affords that. You honestly and rightfully admit: your epistemology can’t.

TBC. . .
[5:37 PM]
Seems does not imply subjectivism. I’m a perspectivist in many things. Subjectivism and perspectivism are different. But in any case, the “seem” is a friendly gesture of openness.
I will correct myself then. I appreciate your humble tone here.
[5:37 PM]
TBC. . .

Eastern Reformed Blokes Rep — 02/10/2023 5:43 PM
Prior to Scripture we could not interpret experiences?
We can. Human beings do so on the basis of knowing the Creator, Yaweh, of those experiences. Remember, that was our main point of discord: I think all knowlede is rooted in, sustained by, and infused with Yahweh-consciousness. I cannot experience an apple except as a Yahweh-made-human recognizing a Yahweh-made-apple using Yahweh-assenting-faculties. At every turn, human knowledge includes and increases God-knowledge – in fact, all human life is life with Yahweh. Every thing we do is a choice for or against Him, part of a life dedicated to Him or against Him – He is the most basic category of our existence.

So of course we can all know things, interpret our experiences, and so forth. But the objective, common ground by which we all know and share these things is the “light of the life of all men,” God.

It’s not relevant until you prove your view. . . .But you have not shown a lack of contradiction.
You’re repeating the same mistake as before, my friend. Remember, on my view, appealing to Scripture is sufficient proof. You haven’t explained why that’s not a good reason to believe Christianity.

TBC. . .
[5:49 PM]
I have certain knowledge which is warranted because God has created me in his image and there’s an intrinsic, innate link between me and God. I also think beyond this certain knowledge, we have practical knowledge, which is also justified, in the casual sense, in the practical sense, in the everyday sense.
I formally agree, friend, but this does not show where your view differs with mine. Do you mean a God who is possibly not Yahweh here? If so, we need to investigate the differences in theology and your theo-epistemology – how you got to that theology through consistent epistemic means provided by it.

We can’t do that until we get a clearer idea of your theology.

It’s like when saying “human beings are not rabbits” expecting me to go hunt all potential human beings everywhere and show that they are indeed not rabbits.
No, I think you and I know the modal components of this fact (humans are not rabbits) because we know what humans and rabbits can possibly be (and more) because we know God and so have some knowledge how He controls what’s possible.

You say neither I no nor-[NOT DENOMINATION]-Christians are justified nor do we have knowledge.
@Eating Sirloin Rib Bones and @Tuber anticipated my response well. For all I know, you, Nat, could be smarter, wiser, more educated than I am, as an unbeliever. I’m no exemplary of wisdom, and there are plenty smarter atheists than you or I, probably. We just disagree on what knowledge content makes that intelligence possible.

I say it’s revelation from the God of the Bible. You say, nope, not that, something else. Okay, so let’s compare and contrast my theology and yours.

It’s not that atheists cannot know but cannot give an account of their knowledge
[5:50 PM]
[5:52 PM]
their atheism is incompatible with the possibility of knowledge, not merely an issue that they do not know. It is not that they lack justification and therefore knowledge(which is what I had understood) but that they having justification and knowledge would then be proof of the God that Jimmy is positing.
Exactly. Recall my metaphor earlier of God’s city. There is nothing in God’s city (viz. creation) which an atheist can point to that doesn’t have the fingerprint of its Author indelibly written upon it. Nonbelievers have committed the crime of cosmic copyright infringement.
[5:55 PM]
If you like syllogisms:
P1. If knowledge, then [insert epistemic problem] is resolved.
P2. If non-Christianity, [insert epistemic problem] is not resolved.
P3. Knowledge
C: Christianity

You have been engaging with P2. You have both disaffirmed P2 and accused my evidence (Biblical teaching) for it of being insufficient. We now need to investigate the justification for ~P2 and for the claim that the Bible’s testimony P2 is not sufficience evidence of P2.

This seems a bit confused. I mean, what you say here is, minimally, not representative of my view.

I take natural/general revelation and special/covenantal revelation to form an organic whole. This means:
A.) Natural revelation supports, leads to, and rules counterfeits out in favor of special, and vice versa. For example, contradictions can be drawn from unitarian theism, historic problems from the Mormon sacred texts, vindications of Biblical claims can be drawn from history; in the opposite direction, the Bible nowhere limits knowledge to its own propositions, describes scientific enterprises, and speaks of men being drawn to God by their human experience.

B.) The information or content in both has tremendous overlap. Things revealed naturally are revisited or verified in special revelation. For example, God creates the world in a way that implants and experientially reinforces knowledge of Him as Creator, but God also verbally identifies Himself as Creator in many passages of Scripture.

C.) It is impossible for natural to function without special, and vice versa. The Bible is incomprehensible without background experience with language, books, humans, and above all, the Author Himself. Natural revelation cannot be interpreted successfully without knowledge of God in terms of His covenant with man. (In other words, all counterfeit religions and false worldviews are genetically sourced back through history in falsehoods constructed from what our original ancestors knew in the garden. In this way, all false religions carry shining gems of truth redeemable by Christians that constitute what might be called remnantal revelation.)

D.) The whole organic system of revelation in which man is steeped and which acts like the atmosphere of the mind the way oxygen is for our lungs, defines every human’s ground motive, solicits desire for God, and empowers man over and above sin to some extent to unbelievers as a means of common grace.
[6:09 PM]
Here’s a paper by Dennison that well represents my view:
[6:09 PM]
https://www.kerux.com/doc/2102A3.asp

 

An extremely important distinction to make – which I have already stated in this conversation – is that while God is known, and therefore, His perfections or attributes to some extent, it does not follow that unbelievers can thereby construct natural theology. The problem is that, without Scripture, we lack vital historic information. Theology is a philosophical pursuit and philosophy is historically contextualized; we are all subject to our cultural heritage and our placement on the timeline of human history. To rightly interpret that timeline, you need covenant information: you need to know how God has promised and fulfilled His promise in Christ to redeem humanity to Himself.

Even moreso, sin is an obstacle to accurate theological construction. Naturally theology is doomed by the presence of sin for nonbelievers. First, it is doomed because we fundamentally despise our Creator for subjecting us to His rule. In our hubris, we want to be God, and therefore are filled with loathing every time we are reminded that He, not we, are God – a reminder that comes with every experience whatsoever.

Second, unbelieving natural theology is doomed by a sinful neglect of God-knowledge in philosophical approach. Our conversation on modality here is a great example. Nat’s view neglects from the outset the importance of Yahweh. Yahweh is treated as a dormant mere potential update to what is assumed to be a sufficient system of handling modality without Him. So it is for unbelievers on all topics – epistemology, metaphysics, axiology. God, the most important person in the universe, is secondary when He should be primary and therefore, His revelation the first thing we consider and interpret when doing philosophy.

In this way, what is sometimes called pre-dogmatic natural theology has no hope. Only Christians – regenerated by the Spirit, called by the Father, saved from their sins by the Son – can build an accurate theology reliably.