Background:

‘ De re ’ means ‘of, or concerning, a thing’. For example, a de dicto belief is a belief that a bearer of representative content is true, while a de re belief is a belief concerning some thing, that it has a particular characteristic. Such de se ascriptions occur when an agent holds a mental state towards a proposition about themselves, knowing that this proposition is about themselves.

Nick:

P1. The Father knows everything
P2. The Son knows everything
P3. If De Se knowledge exists -> The Father doesn’t know something

C: De Se knowledge does not exist

Another option might be to say that the Father only knows that which is possible for him to know (and exclude the Sons de se knowledge). But you have to be clear that this knowledge is excluded because it’s logically impossible (and not actually a limitation of God’s omniscience)

Jimmy Stephens:

It is a silly trick with indexicals. Not very interesting.

The real issue is for the one-mind view of the Godhead. On it, there are not three minds but one mind shared by each Member of the Trinity. So there is one center of knowledge, or ego.

The problem then is, the Son cannot think or know He is not the Father. Even more problematic, the reason why the Son cannot do this is not merely because of a contradiction. At first, that’s what it would seem.

To think, “I am not the Father,” the referent “I” refers to the mind of God. But the mind of God is the Father, especially if you hold to the Monarchy view.

And what’s of supreme significance is that the forthcoming solution for the single mind/will view is indistinguishable from a view where God’s mind is both one and three in distinct ways.

Chris:

Why do you say it’s a “trick” though? Is it because the information known is not kept from another? As in the point is possession rather than data? Like how I know I’m Chris and you can’t possess that but you can know that I am Chris?

Jimmy Stephens:

It’s not mere data/information. De se knowledge is non-propositional. The object known is a person, not a set of statements or “data.” Moreover, the knowledge relation is reflexive: de se knowledge is a person relating to themselves.

Were we to just make this about possessing true propositions about the Son/Father, the Father and Son will know all propositions. The trick only occurs when you word a proposition indexically. But the classical theist will just reply that God knows the given content non-indexically.

Chris:

The point of it though isn’t so much a gotcha, as maybe social trinitarians might would do, for me it’s a, “hey, this is wonky from a one divine mind perspective and seems to point to individuals within the Trinity being able to do things individuals do”.

Why exactly is it non propositional? Is that settled or debated?

Jimmy Stephens:

Nothing is settled, but I think it’s easily defended. De se knowledge is not knowledge about yourself, nor is what is known a proposition. It’s self-knowledge.

Some, at this point, will happily deny de se knowledge (as defined) because they think all knowledge is (only ever) propositional.

Chris:

Interesting.

I’m not sure I would grant it is not propositional.

It contains content, because along with knowing oneself is they also know they are not another. As in, “the Son knows he is the Son and not the Father.” Seems like propositions that can only be true for the Son. The Father can know that the Son knows these things but he himself cannot possess that same knowledge.

Or am I completely off base here and this is more akin to Cambridge properties?

What is it to know yourself if not self propositional content? What work is “know” doing there if not?

Jimmy Stephens:

Knowing that the Son is not the Father isn’t a problem, Chris. Knowledge that is propositional. The Son can know that “the Son knows He is the Son and not the Father.” That true propositions affords no strangeness.

What would be hardship is to say, the Son cannot know “I am not the Father.” But “I” is an indexical and as long as the knowledge is propositional, you can just get rid of the indexical relation. In other words, if “I am not the Father,” is reducible to the mere proposition, “the Son is not the Father,” no problem arises.

The contradiction is supposed to be this:

Pa. The Son knows, “I am not the Father.”
(This is non-propositional self-consciousness.)

Pb. The “I” is the mind of the Father.
(Since God is supposed to have one mind.)

How can God think, “I am not the Father?”

Worse for monarchists, how can the Father think, “I am not the Father?”

Worse for monarchists, how can the Father think, “I am not the Father?”

Chris:

Would that be a derived contradiction? As in because of the model built a contradiction is found? And if that’s the case wouldn’t those who built the model be required to answer the contradiction? Being as the model, although it was built believing it best describes what is revealed, is not required in a hardline way by what is revealed?