Here is a dialogue regarding the Stroudian objection and I will add any updates when they come about. For other occasions and dialogues about such:

Bosserman on Stroud’s Objection – The Council (spirited-tech.com)

Stroud and Van Til – The Council (spirited-tech.com)

Chris Matthew:

Transcendental arguments over-promise and under-deliver. No extant transcendental argument has proven the *entirety* of the Christian worldview with *certainty*, contrary to what its proponents claim for themselves. There are various auxillary objections, such as the Stroudian objection or the Fristianity objection, which illustrate this central problem. Instead of holding ourselves hostage to these promises with the vain hope that such an argument will one day be produced, it is better to argue that Christianity is the most theoretically virtuous explanation for various fundamental features of our reality. This is how Christians working in the philosophy of religion argue.

 

Jimmy Stephens:

I am surprised you think the metaphysical-conceptual-division objections (Stroud, Fristianity) succeed. Take Stroud as an example.

Why not suppose the Stroudian objection simultaneously:
(a) begs the question against Christianity with Kantian metaphysics-epistemology divide,
(b) commits one to a self-refuting Kantian metaphysics-epistemology divide,
&
(c) mistakes a doxological faith for a *mere* conceptual scheme

?

 

So, there are two things to say here.

The first point is that I’m committed to thinking that there is a distinction between metaphysics and epistemology on the conceptual level. I don’t think that any gerrymandered attempt to get beyond this will turn out to be viable, even if it’s meant to sound profound.

The second point is that we’re concerned with the *dialectical* nature of the transcendental argument; or in other words, its potential to persuade. The worn-out Butler strategy of insisting that Christianity is a “doxological faith”, more than a “mere conceptual scheme”, is of no avail in a conversation with a sceptic, for whom it *is* nothing more than a conceptual scheme. You must say something more if you want to suggest to the unbeliever that Christian-theism is *true*, as opposed to being something that’s psychologically necessary to affirm in the face of possible self-stultification.

 

I’ve never understood what this is supposed to mean outside of just positing the Kantian noumenal-phenomenal distinction. Sure, apples and oranges are different concepts, but they’re still both fruit, both have to follow certain physical laws, etc etc etc. What does saying epistemology is not metaphysics do at all for the Stroudian objection?

I submit that this is to lose track of the dialectic. It is the *unbeliever* who posits the Stroudian Objection. It is his onus to fund that objection. He needs Christianity to be a mere conceptual scheme. Can he prove it? I think not.

I don’t have to put out any effort whatsoever in convincing him it is more than a conceptual scheme beyond just answering his objection because that happens to be built into the very concept of Christianity.

 

Chris Matthew:

 

This is a confused reply.

What does saying epistemology is not metaphysics do at all for the Stroudian objection?

It means that something can be psychologically necessary without being metaphysically necessary. Consider that, as I go about my day, it’s psychologically necessary that I think about time in decidedly A-theoretic ways, as if temporal passage obtains and the present is ontologically privileged. But nothing about this entails that the A-theory is, in fact, correct as a metaphysical view.

I submit that this is to lose track of the dialectic. It is the unbeliever who posits the Stroudian Objection. It is his onus to fund that objection. He needs Christianity to be a mere conceptual scheme. Can he prove it? I think not.

Not at all. You’re the one losing track of the dialectic. Recall that the Stroudian objection is not a rebutting defeater. It’s rather an undercutting defeater. You are surely familiar with this distinction.

The Stroudian doesn’t make the positive claim that there is evidence against the transcendental argument. The Stroudian makes the negative claim that the transcendental argument is not connecting the premises with its conclusion in the right sort of way. For all our interlocutor knows, everything that the transcendental argument demands is satisfied by treating Christianity as a mere conceptual scheme. He has been given no reason to think that Christianity is metaphysically necessary.

At the risk of sounding like a broken clock, I’m concerned with the dialectical value of the transcendental argument for Christian-theism. Some wordplay to show that our unbelieving interlocutor has “no ship from which to fire his cannons”—or whatever metaphor you like to use now—means little to me. I care about having arguments that show Christianity to be plausible on the unbeliever’s own terms. And surely, this is exactly what we should expect if worldview-neutrality is impossible.

The modal ontological argument is valid and sound. But it is not dialectically useful, and so it fails to contribute to apologetics (although it might contribute to the philosophy of religion as a test case for exploring modality). The following argument is also valid and sound under classical logic:

1. If apples are red, then Christianity is true.
2. Apples are red.
3. Therefore, Christianity is true.

But it isn’t a very useful argument. Likewise with the transcendental argument.

 

Jimmy Stephens:

 

[S]omething can be psychologically necessary without being metaphysically necessary.

This is exactly what I had in mind. There is no question that psychological necessity is not and does not, by itself, entail epistemic necessity. I simply do not understand how this distinction, true as it is, undercuts transcendental criticism.

How does the unbeliever intend to show, without begging the question against Christianity, that the relevant argument in question only reaches psychological and not epistemic necessity? You put it well:

The Stroudian makes the negative claim that the transcendental argument is not connecting the premises with its conclusion in the right sort of way.

Alright, but when investigated, this claim has never been evidenced except on the basis of a Kantian rejection of realism that both:
(a) involves justifications that preclude Christianity, and so begs the question,
&
(b) refutes itself.

I’m afraid the Stroudian has smuggled a rebuttal into what he intended to be an undercutter. That’s the slippery nature of that objection. It’s not what it appears.

I care about having arguments that show Christianity to be plausible on the unbeliever’s own terms.

Suppose for the moment that this aim requires the fulfillment of two conditions.

Condition 1: Native Reasons. The argument will have to count as the provision of a reason to believe Christianity according to criteria of reason native to your audience.

Condition 2: Motivation. The reason(s) will have to convict and compel your audience in such a way as to force them to go nuclear (abandon reason altogether) unless they concede the truth of Christianity.

If Condition 1 is not met, the argument won’t be persuasive for obvious reasons. This is a common problem with formalizations of TACT, if not TAs for Christianity.

If Condition 2 is not met – and I propose the MOA would fail Condition 2 even were I to grant it Condition 1 – then the unbeliever will in Quine-esque fashion just be able to smooth the bumps out in the rug, so to speak, and find new consistency with whatever recapitulations left unchallenged by the argument.

Nothing short of a Christian TA is going to fulfill those Conditions.

You need to give a reason available to the relevant listener that has no competing motivation within the sphere of reason. If the reason is not available, it won’t convince anyone. If it’s less than 100% motivating, then it will only persuade people by accident.

(As all classical arguments do)