Jimmy Stephens states:

I think I found an even more striking, simpler version of the eschatological issue.

I formulated it like three different ways, and now I think it just winds down to a ground motive problem.

All humans possess a desire for absolute satisfaction, that is satisfaction without exception.

That absolute satisfaction is essential to our ground motive, so it is at the strongest, most basic level of human desire.

On Tyler’s theism, this desire is principally unrealizable, whether because death, annihilation, or whatever will stop us from its realization.

On Tyler’s theism, moral (and epistemic) facts are principally unmotivating because divorced from our ground motive, our desire for absolute satisfaction. Specifically: for reasons of general-agent ontology and not because of moral fault.

P1. If moral facts are inconsistent with reasonable expectation of absolute satisfaction, then moral facts are not rationally motivating.

P2. If moral facts are not rationally motivating, either humans are not moral agents or there are no moral facts.

P3. If humans are not moral agents or there are no moral facts, not Tylerism.

P4. If Tylerism, moral facts are inconsistent with reasonable expectation of absolute satisfaction.

C: If Tylerism, not Tylerism.

There’s like a whole family of arguments here that I’ve both never seen used and they’re really strong.

Like, suppose that epistemic and moral reasons are at least co-harmonious. Moral reasons always provide reasons for beliefs about morality, and vice versa, and so even if they’re different in some important or categorical way, they map perfectly in correspondence.

Now consider that everyone desires absolute satisfaction.
Nothing short of perfect rationality would suffice.
This is like… a weird version of the desire argument, where you’re tying in reason and morality to our desires.