In this article, we will examine the charge against presuppositionalism that it involves circularity.

Why isn’t circular reasoning a fallacy when it comes to fundamental (by which I assume you mean foundational or noninferential) beliefs?
The very question “How do you know that your reasoning is valid?” appears to be predicated upon a basic category error. Reasoning isn’t valid. Arguments are valid (or invalid).

Circular reasoning, defined as a premise identical to a conclusion, remains problematic due to its inherent self-referential nature. However, within philosophical discourse, there’s a spectrum of perspectives concerning the nature of question-begging. These disagreements encompass various nuances:

1. Universality in Deductive Arguments: Some argue that circular reasoning is inherent in all deductive reasoning, contending that the truth of the conclusion is contained within the premises. This view suggests that any deductive argument implicitly involves circularity.
2. Reiterations and Convincing Premises: Others see circular reasoning as arising from reiterating the conclusion within the premises or relying on premises deemed convincing by the arguer. This perspective broadens the scope of what constitutes circularity beyond strict identity between premise and conclusion.
3. Explicit versus Implicit Statements: Debates arise on whether circularity exists only when a conclusion is explicitly restated within the premises or if it can occur implicitly without direct reiteration.
4. Formal and Informal Reasoning: Discussions extend to whether circular reasoning is exclusive to formal deductive logic or also applicable to informal reasoning, such as everyday arguments or reasoning in non-logical contexts.

These varying viewpoints underscore the complexity surrounding circular reasoning and its identification within different argumentative frameworks and contexts.

Presuppositionalists often refer to Epistemic Circularity, where an argument defends a belief source’s reliability using premises based on that source. However, differentiating how we know God from how we argue for God is crucial. While I perceive knowing God non-inferentially, it might not convince others.

Confusions arise about the concept of ‘validity’ when Pallmann links it solely to arguments. Presuppositionalists emphasize veridicality, not the properties of syllogisms.

I don’t know why one thinks that meaningful sentences presuppose laws of logic. What’s the argument for this?

What is the argument for the idea that one must use logic to be justified in believing in logic? Why is it impossible for logical beliefs to be justified noninferentially apart from argument?

Suppose we lived in a world where our brains didn’t operate in accord with laws of logic or rules of inference, or where the stuff of physics, biology, and chemistry behaved in ways not even trackable by human thoughts. Those realities wouldn’t afford us the ability to think. Whatever mental “content” we had would just be chaos.

However, some critiques seem pedantic without substantive objection. There’s a focus on logical validity as the key challenge to trust in reasoning, overlooking other crucial aspects:

(1) Pallmann’s differentiation between psychological tokens, which refer to the individual mental processes involved in reasoning, and form types, which represent the abstract structure or validity of arguments, might seem overly technical without offering substantive insight. By criticizing individuals for relying on psychological tokens while simultaneously highlighting the importance of form types’ validity, a perplexing contradiction emerges. This contradiction leaves readers questioning the relevance of Pallmann’s distinction or whether it indeed correlates with the broader discussion of reasoning and validity.

In essence, while attempting to draw a line between the psychological aspect of reasoning and its formal structure, Pallmann’s argument appears to lack coherence or a clear connection between these two facets of reasoning. This could lead readers to question the utility of such a distinction in addressing the complexities of circular reasoning and its broader implications within the context of philosophical discourse.

Pallmann’s distinction between psychological tokens and form types appears pedantic without substance. Faulting individuals for psychological tokens despite emphasizing the form type validity poses a contradiction or a pointless distinction without correlation.

(2) Addressing the question requires exploring multiple legitimate avenues in philosophy:

• Firstly, questioning human cognition and rationality’s foundations, pondering if humans are systematically deceived about their knowledge. How is it that we know humans are rational and cognitive at all? How does someone know they are not systematically deceived to never possess knowledge?
• Secondly, considering the criterion for knowledge acquisition, exploring how the belief in validity and its constituents is justified. How does someone acquire knowledge of what validity is? For one’s belief that validity constitutes x, y, and z, how is that conjunctive belief justified and the concept veridical?
• Thirdly, examining the justificatory regress in understanding the justification condition for knowledge. How does one resolve the regress problem concerning the justification condition (or its substitutes) for knowledge?

This multifaceted approach broadens the discussion beyond mere validity to encompass broader epistemological concerns.

An alternate perspective to consider involves questioning our understanding of logic’s reliability and the nature of these governing laws themselves. Individuals often attempt to justify logic through non-inferential means, yet these approaches introduce distinct challenges, primarily stemming from subjectivism. These methods lack the robustness necessary to establish a compelling reason for accepting one account of logic over its denial.

Moreover, acknowledging the truth of logic doesn’t inherently clarify why these laws hold. Various abstract concepts vie for explanation, each accompanied by its set of objections. However, a more significant issue arises with individuals who perceive the metaphysical underpinnings of these laws as inconsequential to understanding them. Without delving into the essence of these concepts, it becomes challenging to ascertain how we might possess non-inferential knowledge regarding them.

If you justify your belief in God by reference to something other than God, does this imply that this other thing is greater than God? The answer is a pretty obvious “no” by my lights. I might know that a woman is married because of the ring on her finger. But this doesn’t imply that the ring is greater than she is. I might know a friend because of Facebook, but this doesn’t imply that Facebook is greater than my friend. I mean it’s just crazy to think that the way that something is known must be greater than the thing itself. On what possible basis could such an idea be justified in light of these clear counterexamples?

However, the comparison made in this scenario doesn’t precisely parallel the reasoning at hand. For instance, imagine a scenario where a woman claims to be married, but you’re uncertain. Then she presents her wedding ring as evidence, leading you to accept her testimony. Here, your knowledge of her marital status relies on recognizing the ring. This means the evidence, represented by the ring, becomes a stronger epistemic support for the belief than the woman’s testimony alone.¹

1. In a later article I clarify this criticism:
   
   https://watchmencouncil.com/2024/01/03/is-scripture-our-highest-authority/
   
   I’ve tackled a similar analogy in a previous article, yet it might not exactly mirror the current argument. Consider this: imagine a scenario where a woman claims to be married, but you’re uncertain. Then she presents a wedding ring as evidence, and you accept her testimony based on recognizing the ring.
   Here, the external evidence—the ring—strengthens the belief more than her testimony alone. I described a scenario where a woman’s claim about her marital status is reinforced by presenting a wedding ring as evidence, bolstering belief in her testimony.
   However, the distinction here lies in how we assess sources of belief. While some might argue that the ring isn’t an authority but merely evidence, the critical point is that it becomes a stronger epistemic support for belief compared to the woman’s testimony alone. This challenges the notion of divine testimony being the ultimate authority, particularly in the context of sola scriptura. The dilemma arises when an external source becomes a more compelling basis for belief than divine testimony, creating a conflict with the biblical principle of scripture alone as the ultimate source of knowledge.
   
   
   
   
   
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