I’d like to offer some thoughts on Jonathan Mclatchie’s review of “Canon Revisited – Establishing the Origins and Authority of the New Testament Books, by Michael J. Kruger.” I’ve touched on his perspective briefly before, and I believe this is an opportune moment to highlight our differences. Dr. Mclatchie states:

“I am afraid that the best overall assessment I can give of Kruger’s book is that it is epistemologically muddled. Kruger’s central thesis is that the canon of Scripture is self-authenticating. The most obvious objection here is that Kruger has engaged in a textbook case of circular reasoning. For example, while Kruger suggests that the canon itself ‘sets the terms for its own validation and investigation’ (p. 91), it is unclear why he thinks that those terms of validation ought to be derived from the canonical books and not another set. Clearly, Kruger had to use some set of criteria to determine which books to extract his criteria from. Thus, Kruger’s entire approach is to beg the question in favor of the New Testament canon.

To the charge of circularity, Kruger replies that circular reasoning is inevitable since ‘If we try to validate an ultimate authority by appealing to some other authority, then we have just shown that it is not really the ultimate authority,’ (p. 91). He gives the example of providing a justification for the belief that one’s sensory perception is accurate. This raises the well-known regress problem in epistemology. However, as a classic foundationalist, I would argue that every belief must either itself be basic or otherwise ultimately trace its justification back to a basic belief – that is, a belief that does not depend on any other beliefs for its justification. Such basic beliefs have the property of being incorrigible – that is to say, they are not subject to being corrected, improved, or reformed. Clearly, sensory perception is an incorrigible belief. While one may lack robust epistemic certainty that one’s sensory perception offers a representation of the world that approximately corresponds to reality, one still possesses rational justification for such a belief. Indeed, alternative hypotheses, I would argue, have a prior probability that is significantly lower than that of the face-value interpretation that our experiences are caused by a real external world of physical objects.”

i) I find an issue with this initial premise. It requires a commitment to a position called internalism, which posits that the factors making a belief justified are internal to the mind. The problem with internalism is explaining human fallibility. As Jimmy Stephens explains:

“Since, on internalism, all knowledge depends for justification on the knower, all justification could amount to deception, unconscious or willful. The former could just be a case of insanity – perhaps everyone is just a delusional animal. For instance, consider someone who firmly believes they can fly without any external evidence or expert validation. They might hold this belief with absolute conviction, feeling the sensation of flight every time they jump off a ledge. However, this belief lacks external validation and is not grounded in objective reality. Internalism, in this case, would justify the belief solely based on the individual’s internal experiences and convictions, leading to potentially erroneous conclusions about the world.

And for the internalist, we need not bicker with him over petty details in the universe. All that matters, for the sake of his view, is that he cannot compete with God in terms of attributes. Without infinity, the internalist has no way of guaranteeing the shape of the universe is not an inherently Christocentric one. Without infallibility, the internalist cannot guarantee that he isn’t borrowing from the Christian worldview, cannot guarantee his own autonomy. Without sinlessness, the internalist cannot answer Romans 1.”

This example illustrates how internalism can lead to problematic beliefs if solely reliant on internal experiences and convictions without external validation or objective criteria.

ii) McLatchie’s foundationalism faces a challenge akin to Stroud’s critique of transcendental arguments. Namely, McLatchie’s assertion of incorrigibility in basic beliefs suggests they are conceptually necessary at best. While these beliefs may be crucial to human psychology and belief systems, it does not guarantee their cognitive reliability. It leaves open the possibility that our beliefs could be inherently false or confused. This brings into question the reliability and objectivity of foundational beliefs, highlighting the potential limitations of foundationalism in providing a solid epistemological basis.

iii) The question arises: how do McLatchie and classical foundationalists avoid epistemic circularity? Why presume the existence of non-inferential knowledge? While Dr. Mclatchie may argue that properly basic beliefs go beyond wishful thinking and are justified, the basis for this justification remains unclear. This lack of clarity raises doubts about the epistemic justification of foundationalism and its ability to provide a robust framework for knowledge acquisition.

Self-evidence or perceptual justification would entail epistemic circularity. McLatchie’s reliance on incorrigibility appears to hinge on human psychology itself, creating a circular reasoning loop. Thus, McLatchie’s attempt to circumvent epistemic circularity falls short, highlighting the challenges inherent in foundationalist epistemology.

iv) Additionally, McLatchie’s perspective clashes with the nature of Biblical revelation as outlined in the doctrine of Sola Scriptura. The Bible asserts that encountering God’s word through its written form leads to immediate recognition of its divine nature. While nuances exist regarding the level of consciousness in this recognition, the audience of God’s word consistently perceives its divine essence. This direct and unmistakable recognition contrasts with McLatchie’s foundationalist approach, emphasizing the divergent epistemological frameworks at play.