Panentheism and Christian Theology
Posted on October 12, 2017 by TheSire
Introduction
Panentheism comes from the Greek words for ‘all’, ‘in’, and ‘God’ — literally, “all-in-God-ism.” In this view, God is neither fully distinct from the universe (as in classical theism) nor identical with the universe (as in pantheism). Instead, the universe exists ‘in’ or ‘within’ God. The prepositions ‘in’ and ‘within’ are obviously not meant in a spatial sense (as in “Bob is in the kitchen”). Rather, they’re meant to capture the idea of ontological containment. God pervades and encompasses the universe in such an intimate fashion that there is an overlap or intersection between the being of God and the being of the universe. While God is more than the universe, there is no clear ontological distinction between God and the universe (which includes us, of course).
— Dr. James Anderson, Why I Am Not a Panentheist
Clarification of Terms
- A se: Refers to God’s self-existence and independence from the creation.
- Ontological containment: The concept that the universe exists within God in a non-spatial sense.
- Privation theory: The idea that evil is the absence of good, rather than a substantive entity itself.
Historical Context
Panentheism has its roots in various philosophical and theological traditions that attempt to reconcile the presence of God with the existence of the universe. This view contrasts with classical theism, which holds that God is wholly distinct from the universe, and pantheism, which equates God with the universe.
Common Objections to Panentheism
The two common objections to Panentheism are that it isn’t biblical and that it isn’t compatible with a morally perfect God.
i) Misinterpretation of Acts 17:28
The major prooftext is Acts 17:28. That has been dealt with before. Their proof-texting isn’t very persuasive. They simply misuse the text, attributing spatial metaphors to God.
ii) The Problem of Evil in Panentheism
A common attempt to address the issue of Evil’s existence being in God is to deny that evil has an ontological state. This response is insufficient. There’s a difference between the absence of something good and the presence of something evil. We may lack an army, but the enemy may be present. North Korea lacks a capitalist society, but it has a totalitarian regime. We may lack the physical presence of Christ, but that isn’t the same as being in the presence of Satan. Often, it’s not the lack of something good that is evil, but the presence of evil itself.
iii) Privation Theory of Evil
Furthermore, this doesn’t get God off the hook just yet. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states:
“One problem with the privation theory’s solution to the problem of evil is that it provides only a partial solution to the problem of evil since even if God creates no evil we must still explain why God allows privation evils to exist (See Calder 2007a; Kane 1980). An even more significant problem is that the privation theory seems to fail as a theory of evil since it doesn’t seem to be able to account for certain paradigmatic evils. For instance, it seems that we cannot equate the evil of pain with the privation of pleasure or some other feeling. Pain is a distinct phenomenological experience which is positively bad and not merely not good. Similarly, a sadistic torturer is not just not as good as she could be. She is not simply lacking in kindness or compassion. She desires her victims’ suffering for pleasure. These are qualities she has, not qualities she lacks, and they are positively bad and not merely lacking in goodness (Calder 2007a; Kane 1980. See Anglin and Goetz 1982 for a reply to these objections).”
Dr. James Anderson makes the same observation:
“A panentheist, as one commentator suggested, might be tempted to appeal to the privation theory of evil to explain how God need not be polluted by the evil of the world. I don’t think this move will work, for the simple reason that the privation theory must apply to God in the same way that it applies to the world. If a privation of good in the world entails that the world is (partly) evil, by the same token a privation of good in God (by virtue of his containing the world) entails that God is (partly) evil. And presumably the same goes for any other theory of evil. It’s hard to conceive of a containment relation that would serve the panentheist’s purposes but isn’t transitive with respect to evil. (And it’s his burden, not mine, to identify that relation.)”
iv) The Issue of Ontological Containment
I think God is such a being that it leads to an issue if everything is in God. If the substance of all things is God, then how do we escape pantheism? If God has attributes of infinitude, timelessness, moral perfection, omnipotence, then those are the attributes that make up all things. The world, however, is filled with the exact opposite: finitude, evil, temporality, and impotence. Either everything in reality is contradictory in essence and properties, the distinctions are illusory, or we have two different kinds of things. Panentheism doesn’t allow for this; it suggests that all things are the same in different forms.
v) Incompatibility with Christian Theology
Christian theology isn’t compatible with such metaphysical positions. It raises too many questions that are at odds with the God of biblical theism. How can one remain consistent in affirming that God is a se and that the universe is a part of God? If the universe is “a part” of God, then God depends on the universe. The Bible teaches creation ex nihilo, but this implies creation “ex theos.”
Conclusion
Panentheism presents significant challenges when considered against the backdrop of Christian theology. It raises issues related to the nature of evil, the independence of God, and the consistency of biblical teaching. As such, it is not a tenable position for those adhering to the doctrines of classical Christian theism.
For more:
Watch this video for a detailed discussion:
The Council 
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