Covenantal Apologetics, Jimmy Stephens, Thomism

Debunking Scholastic Lutherans: A Defense of Presuppositionalism

Addressing Objections from Scholastic Lutherans: A Rebuttal

In this article, Jimmy and I will address the objections raised by a collaborative YouTube channel called Scholastic Lutherans. This channel uploaded a video last December on the topic of Presuppositionalism, providing several objections. Here, we respond to those objections. The format below quotes the video and then offers our rebuttals.

Scholastic Objection: First Principles

Scholastic Lutherans:

The Aristotelian says that the first principles are indemonstrable so they aren’t known by inference nor can arguments be given for them. There’s some debate as to what the true first principles are but for brevity’s sake let’s say that it’s the principle of non-contradiction, for example. How do we go about proving the law of non-contradiction? Well, we don’t. We don’t have to prove it because it’s self-evident. If someone really wanted to deny it they would fall into absurdity.

The Sire’s Response: One problem with using the law of non-contradiction (LNC) is that many different systems of logic reject LNC. Controversy persists over whether LNC holds, and the history of Buddhism, Jainism, and other worldviews shows this isn’t some freak outlier. I’m not denying the LNC. I’m simply saying that it’s not a good example of something “obvious” if it has been a point of philosophical discord for millennia and the Scholastic Lutherans have no further court of appeal beyond one partisan faction in the crowd.

This would be like saying a political issue is “obvious” because anyone who is not a Republican/Democrat is a sophist. Without further backing, this reduces to name-calling. However, there is a more important problem.

Notice how this objection to presuppositionalism emulates the very sort of reasoning the presuppositionalists promote. The Scholastic Lutheran says we know the law of non-contradiction non-inferentially and say that its rejection is absurd. We say we know God non-inferentially and say that the rejection of the knowledge of God is absurd. “If someone really wanted to deny it they would fall into absurdity.” That is exactly how presuppositionalists use transcendental reasoning for God. So it seems the video has silenced itself.

Scholastic Objection: Coherence Theory of Truth and Circular Reasoning

Scholastic Lutherans:

In this respect, I think the presuppositionalist is wrong. They want to say that axioms of logic, mathematics, etc., are proven in a circular mode analogous to what presuppositionalists do with God’s existence, but when push comes to shove nobody actually does this. I know some presuppositionalists will say otherwise – that the circularity in question is not really the circularity of begging the question but more of circularity in terms of the coherence theory of truth.

The Sire’s Response: Notice how unhelpful the language of axiom is. “Axiom” is often used for postulated beliefs that aren’t justified. If you are going to say your fundamental beliefs aren’t justified, then it seems the beliefs inferred from them are just as unjustified as the initial belief. Presumably, when the video says First Principles are non-inferential or self-evident, that meant First Principles are known immediately or something. But why can’t that be the case for knowledge of God? The video not only fails to provide a reason to think knowledge of God is not a First Principle, but it also fails to be clear as to whether First Principles are arbitrary starting points or immediate knowledge.

As for accepting a coherence theory of truth, coherence is just an aspect of truth. Even correspondence theorists believe and think it’s important that their theory explains why truth is exhaustively coherent. Presuppositionalists don’t think that the sole conditions of truth or justification are coherence.

Jimmy Stephens’ Response: With room for expansion, the Van Tillian theory of truth is roughly a theory of agreement. Truth is when human thoughts agree with the divine Mind. This is not a coherence theory of truth because it neither reduces truth to coherence of some human mental state (e.g., beliefs), nor does it prioritize coherence as explanatorily superior to other aspects or merits of truth (e.g., correspondence). Strictly speaking, this is not a correspondence theory either since truth is not reduced to some psychology of world-representation. Rather, coherence and correspondence are aspects or merits of truth sustained by agreement with the divine Mind.

In Revelation, John records the deity of Christ in an interesting way. Jesus is entitled Faithful, True, and the Word of God. He is designated King of Kings and Lord of Lords, after the God of Israel. But there is still a deeper name, a name only Jesus can speak, a name hidden for himself (v12). You see, Christ is the God who names Himself. Where everything in the universe is named for God by God, when it comes to God Himself, no one can know His name except the Lord Himself.

Although John is not writing philosophy or defending a theory of truth, this Biblical passage (and others) provides a unique way for us to conceive of truth. You see, before creation, God existed, and He was truth. But what was this truth? One way to answer this question is to suggest that God has a name, a holy designator, a “saying,” if you will. Only God can speak it. Its meaning and audience are God Himself. It is a Triune name.

That self-named God names the world. We see this in the Genesis creation story. God names landmasses, animals, and man himself. Adam comes along to name the animals because this mimics God’s ordering activity and reconstructs God’s taxonomies. Where everything in creation is named by God for God, only God possesses a name in and of Himself.

Truth, then, is like a name. Better yet, it is a naming. It is the conversation between God’s mind and ours in which exchange we must choose: will we agree with God’s names, or will we make up our own? Agreement. Truth is the status of human mental states when, like musicians joining into a beautiful piece with unique parts all guided by the director, they agree with God by renaming things after He has originally named them. If you’re following, hopefully the reader can see why this view is richer, grander, and vastly more powerful an explanation than mere correspondence or coherence.

Truth includes coherence, yes. Truth includes correspondence, sure. Truth includes utility, too. It has social elements as well! But these are facets, not the diamond. What captures all that is truth is the conversation between God and man, a conversation we carry out at every moment in our thought life, a conversation in which we are constantly hearing names and providing them, a conversation in which we must choose whether to speak names like our Father or make up our own, ugly and futile.

Scholastic Objection: God’s Relation to Universals

Scholastic Lutherans:

Of course, many embrace this position [idealism] including some presuppositionalists who would want to be careful with this line of thinking. If reality does not exist apart from an act of the intellect then there are a few absurdities that arise concerning God’s knowledge of Himself. Recall that presuppositionalists say that there are no facts apart from interpretations and I think this needs greater clarity. Is the presuppositionalist saying that there are no facts apart from interpretation for the human but not for God (and maybe some higher Spiritual Beings)?

Jimmy’s Response: Forgive me the length of this response.

It is a common mistake to conclude that God can violate logic simply because He creates it. The idea is that, because God precedes the order of His creation, God is capable of exemption or outright violation of the very laws He set into creation. If God’s power is not limited to or at least delineated by logic, He must be able to transgress logical laws, so the thinking goes. If what is possible for God is not determined by laws of logic, that means it’s possible God could be or already has been illogical, right?

Despite its popularity and persuasive force among Christian philosophers, this reasoning fails. It fails because it reduces the possibility to God’s power in the abstract. What I mean by “in the abstract” is that the person reasoning in this way is only considering God’s power in isolation from His other divine attributes. In that way, the argument suffers a sort of inferential amnesia – it forgets that what is possible for God isn’t determined by God’s omnipotence alone. (As if God’s omnipotence can be “alone” at all!)

To illustrate the point, suppose someone reasons the following way. Since God is omnipotent, He can change Himself. God can turn Himself into a dog, for if He couldn’t, then He wouldn’t be omnipotent. Therefore, God is subject to change, not immutable. What are the flaws of this argument? Well, one of them – I submit, the biggest one, is that it tries to reason about God’s omnipotence in a vacuum, without considering the whole set of God’s attributes. It prioritizes one divine perfection at the cost of others.

Now, this is exactly the mistake our Lutheran brothers have made. Just because God is capable of violating logic on the scenario where we only consider His omnipotence in a vacuum, that does not make it possible all things considered. After all, God’s omnipotence in a vacuum is not possible in the first place! God is not a mindless force. God is faithful, unchanging, and purposeful. So on the Van Tillian position, we can say, per impossibile, that God has the mere power to break the laws, in the same way we can say, if squares have three sides, then squares are not quadrilaterals.

On the Van Tillian position, God created logic, sure, but He did so for important reasons. If God violated His own created laws, He would defeat His own goals and undermine His own motivations. Example: He would undermine His goal to reveal Himself in general since all human knowledge is contingent on logical conformity. Another example: the laws themselves would no longer express something unique of God’s pre-logical Wisdom since being illogical is just as Godlike as being logical. Another example: God’s act of inspiration would fail since exegeting Scripture presupposes a commitment to logical laws.

I could keep going, but you get the point. It’s not that God isn’t powerful enough to break logic. It’s that breaking logic is ungodly for other reasons. For those familiar with Cartesian voluntarism and the McEar objection to omnipotence, this should be a familiar strategy of apologetic. The lesson of this tale is don’t cut up God’s attributes, kids.

In summary, the error in the video’s reasoning is in the following conditional: “if logic is created by God’s omnipotence, isolated and arbitrary.” But nothing is created this way and the Van Tillian isn’t saying otherwise. Yahweh – not some Platonic omnipotence abstracted from His nature – is the Creator of logic. Therefore, it does not follow that because God transcends logic, He can “break” the laws of logic. On the contrary, God’s logical ordering presupposes His faithful intent never to break the foundation He has set up for His human creatures. A theologian, Rob Dalrymple, once put it this way: God is alogical, but He is not illogical. He transcends logic, but it is ironically this very alogicality that makes the Creator capable of making, sustaining, and perfectly fulfilling logical exigencies, which He indeed perfectly fulfills in the God-man, Jesus Christ.

Now, this is already long, but I would like to anticipate an erroneous rebuttal. As the video has already elsewhere, Scholastic Lutherans could reply that my response here invokes logic, therefore presupposing the application of logic to all my claims. Yes, it does, and so what? All this shows is that logic is a condition of human knowledge (viz. of God), not that logic is a condition of God. (Van Tillians are more than happy to grant this point and in fact, wield it as an apologetic weapon.) Yes, I have to use logic to talk about God, but that is a fact about human epistemology, not about God’s nature. After all, I can only express theology in English, too, but it doesn’t follow that God is metaphysically preoccupied with rules of English grammar.

Scholastic Objection: (Con)fusing Van Tillianism with Clarkianism

Scholastic Lutherans:

Let’s say just for fun that none of the above problems exist. God declares what is true and what is false in Scripture, so Scripture is the true ground of logic. If that is the case, then we have to ask how Scripture grounds these truths. If Scripture grounds these truths in the sense that Scripture simply contains examples of logic, then it seems that presuppositionalists are making claims that are too bold. On the other hand, if scripture is truly needed such that, apart from scripture as written, we cannot know logic, then we have the obvious problem of people who use logic every day but do not have access to scripture, or do not use it.

Jimmy’s Response: At best, I suspect this is Clarkianism, not Van Tillianism. Sometimes the definition or historic notion of “presuppositionalism” is made to include the philosophies of Cornelius Van Til, Gordon Clark, and Francis Schaeffer en masse. Sometimes others are added to the roster. (This is one reason why I reject the term “presuppositionalism.”) What this objection discusses is not compatible with Van Til or Schaeffer, but does sound remarkably on point for Clarkianism.

Scholastic Objection: Confusion of Epistemology and Ontology

Scholastic Lutherans:

Both the classical apologist and the presuppositional apologists say that God is the ontological precondition of all reality and in a sense the epistemological precondition of all reality, but the classical apologist affirms the latter in virtue of the definition of truth, the conformity of a proposition to some real being. And since God is the source of all being, God is necessarily the source of all truth. To say that something is true implies that God exists because being is defined upon God.

Jimmy’s Response: There’s so much to be said about these claims, but it takes us too far afield.

Suffice it to say, minimally, this objection just begs the question. And wow – given that it commits petitio principii, the Dunning-Kruger of all fallacies, it is very difficult to understand how this objection could be convincing, much less “devastating.” Just how does this objection beg the question? It assumes, rather than demonstrating, that Van Tillians put forward a mere idea of God in place of revealed knowledge. The Van Tillian claim is not about a mere religious construct of the mind. The Van Tillian claims that God Himself has implanted an idea of Himself for the express purpose of accurately reflecting who He is (read: revealed knowledge). It’s more than a little silly if your “most devastating objection” to someone’s view is just to assume that its claims are false.

Scholastic Objection: Conceptual Relativism

Scholastic Lutherans:

The general notion of conceptual schemes that should be obvious by now – Van Tillian presuppositionalism relies heavily on the idea of a conceptual scheme to say that today, unbelievers are fundamentally unable to interpret metaphysical facts properly and that Christianity as a whole is presupposed for intelligibility. Donald Davidson is pretty critical of conceptual schemes and I think he’s right. He argues that the dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points of view, falls into a paradox because points of view only make sense in so far as there’s a common coordinate system on which to plot them. As he says in his paper, the existence of a common system betrays the whole notion of conceptual relativism. Applying this to presuppositionalism, it doesn’t seem possible to compare worldviews unless there is some underlying scheme beneath both of them – not something merely contained in both of them accidentally, but an overall basis on which all worldviews are built that allows comparison.

Jimmy’s Response: Let’s try to understand this objection. We’ll call this objection conceptual relativism. Remember that Van Tillians accuse all unbelieving worldviews of subjectivism – that is, unbelieving epistemologies fail to resolve justificatory regress. Perhaps the video has this in mind when bringing up conceptual schemes and Davidson. If so, perhaps the objection is supposed to be that, if Van Tillians are similar to postmodernists who think we all only have access to our personal conceptual schemes without genuine universality or objectivity or exception to change, then no matter what critique is unleashed on unbelieving conceptual schemes, at bottom, the Van Tillian is foredoomed by his own imprisonment in a conceptual scheme along with everyone else. So isn’t Van Tillianism self-defeating?

That would indeed be a severe problem, but our response is simple. Van Tillians do not believe in this notion of conceptual schemes. We do not believe humans lack any universal, objective, invariant elements of knowledge. To borrow Davidson’s lingo, we simply maintain that the coordinate system available to all men by which they can and do navigate conceptual schemes is revealed Christian knowledge. Indeed, the God who is immutable, omnipresent, and sovereign possesses the needed attributes to provide something changeless, everywhere and every time, independent of human opinion.

Notice how this not only avoids relativism, but in fact, it’s a direct and positive rejection of it. Revelational epistemology does not construe worldviews as postmodern conceptual schemes. A “worldview,” for Van Tillians, is more – much more than an adoptable framework for ivory tower intellection. Worldviews are a way of life that answers its basic questions, which inherently commits one to some kind of gospel narrative, which shares unargued desires and goals at its roots, and which is fundamentally religious “yea” or “nay” to Christ.

It’s reasonable to ask why we should think those things are all related, but answering that question isn’t needed to resolve the objection. Yes, what a worldview is, how it comes back to Christianity, needs to be developed and defended – no doubt. But all that’s necessary to answer the conceptual relativism objection is to note that it attacks a secular idea of conceptual scheme, not the Van Tillian notions of revelation and worldview, wherewith relativism is outright denied.

Scholastic Objection: Biblical Issues

Scholastic Lutherans:

The notion that the Bible is the basis of all truth seems to assume that you know things outside of Scripture in order to interpret various passages. First, it’s not really clear what presuppositionalists mean when they say that the truth of the Christian worldview is presupposed for intelligibility. It seems that God and the Bible are the first principles of natural reason, at least according to some presuppositionalists like Van Til, Frame, and Oliphint. In that sense, it appears that God and His Revelation are both the single basis of knowledge, but there are a few problems with this view that need more clarification.

It also doesn’t seem satisfactory to appeal to Scripture as the basis of Truth solely because it is given by God. If so, I’m not sure what we do with creation since God made it as well. Kemp also puts an apocryphal text next to a scriptural text and says that if Scripture is the basis of all knowledge, we should know immediately which is which, but it doesn’t appear that way. I’m also curious about what we do with Scripture prior to its existence. Was man not able to be rational prior to the writing of Scripture or is this an issue of content?

Presuppositionalists specifically claim that unregenerate men cannot properly interpret facts about reality. Once men are regenerated, they can interpret facts and nature is useful. The presuppositionalist believes that God has not given the unregenerate man common grace such that he could look to the stars and infer God’s existence. Instead, the presuppositionalist says that man knows that God exists innately.

I don’t think Scripture acts like this. In Exodus 4, Moses is sent to Pharaoh’s court and to show that his message is true, God gives Moses the ability to perform miracles. It seems that God operated on the notion that Pharaoh would be able to interpret the reality of miracles in relation to God. In the presuppositionalist worldview, shouldn’t Moses have said that Pharaoh presupposes God’s existence for him to know anything? In Deuteronomy 18, the Israelites are instructed to test prophecies in virtue of their coming to pass. This seems to lie on a correspondence theory of truth rather than a coherence theory of truth. Scripture frequently tells its readers to compare God and idols by putting them both to the test and seeing which is true. In 1 Kings 18, Elijah says that the prophets of Baal should call upon their gods and he’ll call upon God and they’ll see which God is true. This sounds quite evidential if not classical as opposed to presuppositional. When John the Baptist’s disciples asked Jesus if he was the Messiah, does he respond that they presuppose his status as the Messiah? No, Jesus performs miracles.

Luke 7:18-23 says: “Then the disciples of John reported to him concerning all these things. And John, calling two of his disciples to him, sent them to Jesus, saying, ‘Are you the Coming One, or do we look for another?’ When the men had come to him, they said, ‘John the Baptist has sent us to you, saying, “Are you the Coming One, or do we look for another?”’ And that very hour He cured many of infirmities, afflictions, and evil spirits; and to many blind He gave sight. Jesus answered and said to them, ‘Go and tell John the things you have seen and heard: that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, the poor have the gospel preached to them. And blessed is he who is not offended because of Me.’”

In the early church, the resurrection is given as a sign for those who don’t yet believe. Acts 2:22-24 says: “Men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested by God to you by miracles, wonders, and signs which God did through Him in your midst, as you yourselves also know— Him, being delivered by the determined purpose and foreknowledge of God, you have taken by lawless hands, have crucified, and put to death; whom God raised up, having loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible that He should be held by it.”

The most famous passage, of course, is Romans 1:18-20 which says: “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse.”

The presuppositionalist will emphasize that the unrighteous suppress the truth in unrighteousness and that God has shown it to them. That’s fair. I think many have not accounted for the fallen intellect when examining man’s ability to recognize these truths and that the further one goes into sin, the further one suppresses the truth. However, the passage says that God’s invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, so that they are without excuse. It’s not that God’s attributes are known because they are the preconditions of intelligibility, nor is it that only regenerate man recognizes these things from the external world. Instead, it says that God’s invisible attributes are seen in the world and that they are without excuse, which clearly refers to those that suppress the truth. They are without excuse because they have all the evidence around them in the world, but they deny it. There is nothing here that says that Scripture is the precondition of intelligibility.

Jimmy’s Response

Clarifying the Role of Scripture in Presuppositionalism

The claim of revelational epistemology is unclear, says our commenter. What is the role of Christianity supposed to be in epistemology? Whatever else we might say in response, it is strange that the author proposes new undefined language (“first principles of natural reason”) not found in Van Til, Oliphint, or Frame, instead of adducing language they use and clarifying it.

Says the commenter, “I’m honestly not sure and I’d love some information on this,” about natural and progressive revelation according to Van Tillians. (This would explain his idiosyncratic language.) There is nothing wrong with these concerns and it would be the fault of revelational epistemologists if we did not answer them well. However, to my memory, where Van Til does not systematically answer these questions, his followers produce interesting answers, especially Frame.

Says the commenter, “The presuppositionalist believes that God has not given the unregenerate man. . .to. . .infer God’s existence.” This is close but not quite right. It is more accurate to say Van Tillians believe the unregenerate heart is indisposed to admit God and the philosophical systems constructed by an unregenerate heart are irrational, and so, incapable of justifying any belief, inferentially or otherwise. This does not mean unbelievers cannot infer Yahweh’s existence. It means they cannot be relied upon to do so, and in those rare circumstances when they do, it will be in spite of, not in virtue of their worldview.

The Role of Miracles in Scripture

Pharaoh exemplifies these entailments. His hardness of heart keeps him from admitting what he knows, perhaps at some level mysterious to us. Meanwhile, his pagan worldview does not provide the resources to interpret Moses’ demonstrations. Polytheism, as a rule, undermines epistemic justification, and so the use of miracles as evidence of anything. On the contrary, God’s miracles wrought through the prophet are all performative internal critiques; each one demonstrates Yahweh’s exclusive sovereignty over what Egyptians attributed to false gods.

For example, if Yahweh can sabotage what Egyptians attributed to their sun-deity, while He Himself takes the role of sun-ruler, that falsifies the Egyptian worldview on its own claims while at the same time establishing that any theological beliefs that were accidentally true, such as the divinely appointed role of the sun, are explained and knowable only in virtue of the true God, Yahweh.

The claim that Deuteronomic prophecy tests (or the associate laws and epistemic ethic) entail a correspondence theory of truth is not an objection. This for several reasons.

For one, few, if any, self-proclaimed Van Tillians are coherentists about truth; Van Til, Frame, and Oliphint are not. At best, there are maybe a handful of (arguably confused, but well-meaning) Van Tillians who are coherentist about justification. (And this whole objection makes me wonder if our friend hasn’t confused alethic and justificatory conditions.)

Second, this objection does not cover why a Van Tillian cannot be a correspondence theorist. So prima facie, even if this critique went through, a Van Tillian could just take up correspondence theory.

Third, Van Til explicitly covers this topic, such as in Survey, and explains why he is neither a coherentist nor a correspondence theorist about truth. Bahnsen then clarifies this issue in a number of paragraphs on truth early on in Van Til’s Apologetic.

Fourth, if anything, the closest foil for Van Tillians is an identity theory of truth, the idealist notion.

To round off this thought, I’ll draft briefly what I think our truth theory is. For Van Tillians, truth is an agreement or the agreeability between an object of thought as God condescends to think it, and human minds as we think it. A truth is an agreement between God’s mind and a man’s in their joint picture of the world. Such an agreement will naturally preserve correspondence and coherence as secondary essential properties, wherefore our objector is confused.

Elijah’s Contest with the Prophets of Baal

Our objector fails to clarify why Elijah’s contest with the prophets of Baal refutes revelational epistemology. Why does it constitute an example of evidentialism, let alone classicalism?

The latter suggestion (classicalism) is silly at face value. Neither Elijah nor the prophets of Baal defend anything like a bare or philosophical theism, but specifically a Baal theology vs. the Yahweh of Israel. There’s also no methodological divide between proving said bare theism and the specific theologies in view.

As to evidentialism, it’s hard not to read this objection as that old-hat mistake of confusing the use of evidence and ordinary demonstrations with evidentialism. One needs to account for the nature of Elijah’s performative proof in such a way as to reconcile the fact that the prophets of Baal hold to a worldview that makes proof impossible ipso facto.

Furthermore, this objection is dangerous for evidentialists and classicalists because it doesn’t take long to notice they aren’t calling fire down on watered altar heaps as part of their methodology either. Performing miracles does not factor into their modern apologetic just as much as the KALAM and historic resurrection arguments do not feature in the miracles of Elijah or Jesus. But if different time periods and cultural contexts are something available to classicalists and evidentialists, Van Tillians are free to use the same nuance. In fact, I think reading our material would show we use it much better. We are the better exegetes, a fact that really summarizes why someone should be a Van Tillian over the alternatives.

The miracles of Christ and the Apostles, accomplished by the Spirit, all require a worldview in which reversing sin and its natural effects associates the miracle-performer with the One who promised to resolve those problems, Yahweh. Without that belief, miracles do not constitute evidence at all. Our objector has unwittingly given evidence for our position!

Romans 1 and Immediate Knowledge of God

Our objector’s handling of Romans 1 suggests a poor understanding of its Van Tillian exegesis. I’m not faulting him or anyone for ignorance on the matter; anyone has limited provenance, myself included. However, it seems a recurring theme that Van Til’s opponents would benefit greatly from either more research or from stronger exegetical arguments that do not admit the possibility of revision.

It goes without saying, no Van Tillian is purporting that Paul explicitly claims Scripture is a precondition of intelligibility. It is also misleading when our objector characterizes natural revelation as evidence: do Van Tillians disagree? What is significant but missed by our objector is the nature and role of that revelatory evidence. Namely, knowledge of God is not acquired inferentially but immediately via God’s communicative acts, it is necessary for human moral agency and therefore epistemically necessary, and its means of acquisition is sufficient.

Put simply, there is no inference or evidence weighing on which this evidence depends. The evidence is such that it directly causes and by itself justifies belief in its God-intended audience.

Objection: John Frame’s View of Circularity

Dr. John Frame has a view regarding circularity that is objected to. I will post a video explaining where we disagree with it. Maybe, they think epistemic circularity also has the same issues but we’ll have to wait for a response:

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have provided responses to the objections raised by the Scholastic Lutherans. While their points raise important questions, we believe our rebuttals demonstrate the coherence and robustness of the presuppositionalist position. For further reading, please refer to the links below:

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