Nickk:
@A… hey, can you type up your reasons for accepting molinism in here.
A…:
@Nickk Sure, so the first thing to do is to define the central claim of Molinism. As I see it, the claim is that God predestines you for salvation by bringing about the circumstances in which you will freely choose to accept his offer of salvation.
This seems to be explicitly taught in a few places in scripture. First, in Acts 17 Paul teaches that God determines the times and locations that we are borne so that we might search for him and perhaps find him. That is to say, God determines the circumstances in which you live with the purpose of placing you such that you might look for and find him.
We also see it explicitly taught in Romans 8:29, where it says that “those whom he foreknew, he also predestined…” Notice the order here, God’s foreknowledge comes prior to God’s predestination. What did he foreknow? If we want to say that he foreknew whom he would predestine, then the wording here becomes redundant. It seems a more plausible interpretation that the clause “those whom he foreknew” contains different information than “he predestined.” This makes sense on Molinism, but it isn’t clear that this is true on Calvinism.
Even if someone thinks it is not so clear that the scriptures above teach Molinism, we can treat Molinism as a model for how God’s sovereignty and human freedom are combined. We know both are taught in scripture, and we can think of Molinism as a plausible way that these two work together. I’m not aware of any scripture that would not fit in a Molinistic framework but I am aware of scriptures that seem problematic on both the Armenian and Calvinist frameworks. If for no other reason, this would be a good reason to adhere to Molinism unless and until a better model is offered.
Nickk:
The fellow that I mentioned to chat with was @Satan For Christ
Satan For Christ:
Interesting soteriological definition of molinism. It’s unfair to jump in too early if you haven’t fleshed out these exegetical points as far as they need to be, but if that’s the case and you have much more to cover for each of these passages, then just treat my response as more of a foil to cover in your upcoming expansion.
I don’t see the connection between molinism (as here defined) and Acts 17. It is true on Calvinism as well that God determines the spatiotemporal context of all men with their actions in mind. So without further information, Acts 17 does not support molinism because it does not favor it over Calvinism.
There is an additional problem about God determining the context for a free choice, but I’ll save that for now.
The argument about Romans 8 is clever, but there is an easy rebuttal. It has long since Calvin been popular to think of “foreknew” in v28 as the sort of love-act analogous to “Adam knew his wife.” It is therefore a knowledge of binding affection that is not redundant with predestination.
The molinist, however, much like the Arminian or Weslyan, suffers a different problem. First of all, nothing in the text supports adding conjecture about libertarian choices to Paul’s chain of redemption. It does not say that God foreknew choices. It does not say He foreknew circumstances. Paul could have easily used words for either, yet Paul emphasizes the personal nature of the knowledge by making the object persons.
Worse yet, on libertarian interpretations, God’s predestinating love is made contingent on mere theoretical knowledge about some historic event(s). Instead, God’s love remains unconditional, divine, on Calvinism. Ask Romans 8, why does God love you? Monolinism: because He knows something about your doings in the world and like a good banker, invests in people with the right doings. On Calvinism, God loves you and the reason why just that He’s loving – full stop.
To summarize this last argument, molinism depersonalizes God’s love in Romans 8 by making the foreknowledge a mere intellectual factoid. Calvinism preserves the radically loving nature of God’s predestination by basing it not on random deeds or circumstances, but on his own perfect affection.
We move now to a hermeneutical issue. It comes up when you speak of treating Molinism as something like an abductive model to be introduced to Scripture. This, I submit, is just a fundamentally flawed way of interpreting a text. We do not speculate independent of a text’s hard content what it could mean by using our imaginations. That’s just projection, not interpretation – plain eisegesis.
Put another way, no model is warranted which has no hard textual data insinuating its truth. The alternative is nothing short of interpretive subjectivism.
We have here an inductive argument against molinism, because almost all molinists repeat this mistake, as if it were necessary to believe the posit.
A…:
I’m approaching this like a conversation over coffee.
Let’s drill down on Acts 17 then. On Calvinism, do we seek after and find God or is our connection with God purely a work of God?
Satan For Christ:
What a sick approach. Big fan. ❤
I happen to be drinking an americano right now, so excellent timing
Calvinism is compatibilist. So God determines all human agency, and no agency of humans is merely God’s agency. Does that answer the question?
A…:
Is it compatible with Calvinism to say that we will to seek after God, we will to search for God, and that we will to find God?
Satan For Christ:
Short answer, yes. Long answer, in the sense Paul is speaking in Acts 17. Longer answer, it depends on what you mean by “we” and “seek.”
A…:
Ok, well then do you have a model for the compatibilism? I understand your use of that term to imply that God both determines us to will something and that we will it freely (compatibilism is the claim that determinism is compatible with free will). Do you have a model for this?
Satan For Christ:
Maybe, it depends on how much we need to model. My view is more or less just a softly updated Edwardsianism. I don’t usually define compatibilism with respect to freedom or free will because I don’t think the word “free” is helpful. It doesn’t capture what we’re after, which is usually moral responsibility.
God determines all things, including human choices, because by creating the world (not its first moment, but as a complete whole). Human agency is a moral agency because humans are persons made in God’s image who deliberate on the basis of moral values and evaluations, most basically their love or hatred for God.
I take this to be not much more interesting than just taking what everyone knows intuitively and then subtracting unneeded and incoherent libertarian free will beliefs from our conception of human agency.
A…:
I’m specifically looking for an explanation of your view.
You used the term “compatibilism.” Traditionally, this is the view that determinism and free will are both compatible. Now you seem to say that the word “free” is not “helpful”, but it’s part of the definition of compatibilism and so I’m left unsure what your view is.
If you believe that one and the same decision can both be determined by God and determined by us, then I’m asking you to explain how that works. If you don’t believe that, then I’m asking you to explain what you do believe. (edited)
Satan For Christ:
O _o Why, in the year 2024, I ask you, do computers still fault “compatibilism” as a spelling error?
I see. I have to admit, I’m a bit in the dark about what there is to explain other than perhaps the order. God does not determine x simpliciter, where x is my chosen course of action. God determines my choosing x, whereas I determine to choose x.
A…:
You don’t see how someone could wonder at how one and the same event (the event of the decision) would have multiple distinct causes?
“God determines my choosing x, whereas I determine to choose x.”
This just seems a restatement of the compatibilist claim. It is not at all clear to me how this can be the case, and so I’m asking for clarification. As far as I can tell, it’s incoherent and should be set aside. If it isn’t incoherent, then surely you can explain it.
The best I can make of what you’re saying is that there are two events, my willing to choose X and my choice of X. God causes my willing to choose X, and then I naturally choose X.
I don’t see how that leaves room for free will. Perhaps you intend to deny free will, which is why you said earlier that you find the word “free” to be unhelpful.
But that would leave you as a determinist, as far as I can tell, rather than a compatibilist.
Satan For Christ:
You don’t see how someone could wonder at how one and the same event (the event of the decision) would have multiple distinct causes? No, that already seems a given for Christianity. We already take it for granted that God created all things. There is only a question of how that divine act of creation, call it divine causality, intersects creature causality.
It is not at all clear to me how this can be the case I don’t think this is an issue, though. I could say the same for libertarianism, that I don’t see how it could be the case, but I wouldn’t think that’s a serious problem for your view until and unless I make an argument.
The best I can make of what you’re saying is that there are two events, my willing to choose X and my choice of X. God causes my willing to choose X, and then I naturally choose X.
This is not right on the one hand because it does not represent my position. My position isn’t that God chooses some x prior to your choice y that entails y. My position is that God chooses your choosing to x.
It’s also problematic on the other hand because there’s no genuine difference between “willing to choose” and “naturally choose”.
Here’s a concrete example:
As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good in order to bring about this present result, to keep many people alive.
Gen 50:20
So God intended the human intentions of the brothers.
One other way I can think of that may (or may not) be helpful is just to point out that molinism is just subtracting choice from the circumstances he already believes God creates.
The Calvinist is saying God creates the circumstances, which include our choices. The molinist is just subtracting any event that constitutes a choice from those circumstances God creates.
A…:
I don’t accept that Moses was teaching compatibilism there. It seems perfectly within the interpretive range of the text to take it another way (i.e. that God allowed it knowing what result would be produced). At best you’d say that the passage is compatible with compatibilism, but it would not be evidence for compatibilism if it is equally compatible with competing views.
My position is that God chooses your choosing to x.
I don’t see how this leaves your choosing to x as a free choice. If you deny that it is a free choice, then you seem to be a determinist rather than a compatibilist. If you maintain that it’s free but cannot explain any further, then I don’t have anything to accept or reject here – it just seems like two concepts are mashed together in a way that seems incoherent to me. (edited)
Satan For Christ:
It does not say “allowed.” It says God intended. Can God’s intentions fail?
A…:
It doesn’t say “determined” either. God certainly did intend what they did for good, which is perfectly compatible with saying that God’s intention for allowing it was to bring about the good.
Satan For Christ:
It’s not compatible with indeterminism because if God intended it, it will happen of necessity. Otherwise, God is not omnipotent (or He is lacking some other perfection).
A…:
Here you’ve made a mistake in logic. What follows isn’t that it will happen necessarily, but that it will necessarily happen.
If God intends choice x, then the choicemaker cannot do ~x.
This is false. The consequent should be “the choicemaker will not do ~x.”
Satan For Christ:
“of necessity” isn’t picking between those options, lad Read what I said this way: If God intends choice x, then the choicemaker cannot do ~x.
A…:
I’m not a lad.
It will necessarily happen, but it will not happen of necessity.
If God intends choice x, then the choicemaker cannot do ~x.
This is false. The consequent should be “the choicemaker will not do ~x.”
Satan For Christ:
< _< You’re a lass?!
A…:
I’m a grown man Are you not from the USA? Here “lad” means “boy.”
Satan For Christ:
Nah, I just mean bro, mate, friend X P
This is false. The possibility for x to occur if God intends x is just proportionate to the possibility that God is not omnipotent. Is that possible? No You’re confused about the nature of the modal fallacy probably because it’s overplayed by molinists. The fallacy occurs when you switch the modal predicate. It does not occur when you infer the modal predicate.
A…:
Like I said, you’re making a mistake in modal logic. Your claim simply does not logically follow from the antecedent.
It doesn’t follow from, “God knows that you will do X” that “You cannot fail to do X.” What follows is that “You will do X.”
- If X, then Y.
- X.
- Therefore, necessarily Y.
Above seems to be the argument you’re making, but 3 doesn’t follow from 1 and 2. What follows from 1 and 2 is just “Y.”
Satan For Christ:
This is irrelevant because that’s not the nature of the inference. The inference is that because ~x would falsify God’s attribute, and because anything incompatible with God’s attributes is impossible, ~x is impossible. Then all that’s needed to make the inference about Joseph’s brothers is the fact Genesis 50 teaches: God intended x. So ~x would falsify that God is omnipotent.
A…:
You’ve said that God’s intention for us to do X entails that we necessarily will do X. This is simply false, it does not follow from that logically by any rule of inference.
What I think we can agree on is that there is no possible world in which God intends for you to do X and yet you do not-X. It does not follow from this that you do X in every possible world (necessarily, you do X). There may be many possible worlds in which you do not-X, and in those worlds it will just be true that God does not intend for you to do X.
It’s the relation that’s necessary, not the content.
Satan For Christ:
This is silly because you’re still mistaken about the nature of the inference, but we can work with the scenario you presented because it’s sufficient.
For any world in which God intends x, ~x cannot occur.
A…:
I feel that we’re getting off topic.
You have said that you are a compatiblist and that God chooses your choosing of X. Now either you think that you also freely choose X, or you don’t.
So, do you think that you also freely choose X or do you think that you don’t freely choose X?
Satan For Christ:
What do you mean by freely? If you mean the definition I provided above, I don’t understand the significance of the question. You’d just be asking me, “If God determines you to choose x, do you choose x?” … well…. yes…. obviously…. Surely there’s some significant point here that’s been unstated in the question.
A…:
Ok, so as far as I can tell, you’re a determinist. You don’t think that our choices are our own to determine – they are determined for us by God.
Have I got that right?
Satan For Christ:
No Why are you assuming that God’s determination of a choice entails we do not determine it?
A…:
Well I have yet to hear an account of how one and the same event can have two different determining causes. I suggested a sort of domino determination where God determines us to determine the choice, but you rejected that.
So at this point, I can’t see how the view you are suggesting is coherent. You can say the words, but I don’t see how those words come together into a coherent idea. When I’ve pressed you for a model, you seem to just restate the words.
By contrast, I can offer a model for molinism. Let C represent a set of circumstances and let X be a choice.
God knows that, in C you will X. So, in order to bring about your choice of X, God brings about C. This naturally results in your choosing X.
You were not determined by God to choose X in C, however. It may have been the case that, in C you would choose not-X. In that case, however, God would have instead known that, in C you will not-X.
So you can see how this is a model for what God does and what we do, and it shows how God can bring about our choice of X without determining our choices at all.
I am looking for a model like this from you. Something that explains what you mean.
It seems like you’re model would be, “God makes you do X, and so you therefore do X.” Now if your model is determinism, well and good. You’re saying that you are a compatibilist, however. Perhaps explaining how your view differs from determinism will make this more clear?
Satan For Christ:
I don’t know what the objection is here. Even if you don’t understand my view, that hardly justifies belief that it’s incoherent. That’s quite the ad ignorantiam.
in order to bring about your choice of X, God brings about C. This is determinism. It’s an Aristotelian determinism (the domino model, for example) rather than Edwardsian, but this is determinism. If G -> C and C -> x, then G – > x, and that’s determinism.
A…:
It’s not determinism, God doesn’t cause your choice. C doesn’t cause you to choose X either. So my model doesn’t have “C -> X”
Satan For Christ:
If C -> X, then C doesn’t bring about X. Sorry If C does not -> X, then C doesn’t bring about X. To bring about is just a subset of an entailment relation. An entailment relation between c and x, c -> x, is logically synonymous with c -> ~(~x)
A…:
“If C, then X” is false because possibly “If C, not-X”.
Satan For Christ:
Right, so C doesn’t bring about x That’s all that means. So what’s God creating C for if He wants x and C doesn’t bring x about? X D
A…:
By contrast, I can offer a model for molinism. Let C represent a set of circumstances and let X be a choice. God knows that, in C you will X. So, in order to bring about your choice of X, God brings about C. This naturally results in your choosing X. You were not determined by God to choose X in C, however. It may have been the case that, in C you would choose not-X. In that case, however, God would have instead known that, in C you will not-X. So you can see how this is a model for what God does and what we do, and it shows how God can bring about our choice of X without determining our choices at all. I am looking for a model like this from you. Something that explains what you mean. It seems like you’re model would be, “God makes you do X, and so you therefore do X.” Now if your model is determinism, well and good. You’re saying that you are a compatibilist, however.
Satan For Christ:
I don’t see how your model is lacking anything not already present in mine. Yours just adds things that cause a mess.
A…:
Ok, well, like I said, I don’t see that you’ve presented a coherent model for how our choices can be ours and God’s beyond simply stating that it is the case. I’ve offered a model for molinism as an example for you. Perhaps you’ll be able to offer something to explain your view in the future, but at this point I just don’t see it.
Satan For Christ:
So is your claim that something isn’t possible unless you have a model explaining how it is possible?
A…:
“So what’s God creating C for if He wants x and C doesn’t bring x about? X D”
This makes me wonder if you’ve understood what I said above. C doesn’t cause X, it’s true that, in C, you cause X.
or it might be true that in C, you don’t cause X (in which case God would have instead known that).
My claim is that, as far as I can tell, you’ve offered a mashup of incompatible concepts. I can’t accept what seems incoherent to me, and so I can’t accept your view.
Satan For Christ:
The point is, C is causally irrelevant to x. So what motivation does God have to create C?
A…:
God knows that, in C, you will freely choose X. So his motivation would be to bring about X by bringing about the C in which you will X.
Satan For Christ:
Well, that’s false. He knows that you might x. He can’t know that you x. If He knows that you x, then you cannot ~x.
A…:
Why can’t he know the future?
Satan For Christ:
Because your future isn’t determinate on your view.
A…:
The future isn’t determinate? What do you mean by that? I think that there are true future-tensed propositions for every fact in the future, and those propositions are true now. Since God is omniscient, he knows all true propositions (including the future-tensed ones).
Satan For Christ:
P1. If God knows x, and x is not the case, God is not omniscient. P2. If y entails that God not omniscient, y is impossible. P3. God knows x, and x is not the case, is impossible. C: If God knows x, it is impossible that x is not the case. Hardly a non-sequitur
A…:
That’s not a non-sequitur but that’s not what you said.
I agree that “If God knows X, then not possibly not-X.”
What I think doesn’t follow is “not possibly not-X.” That would be a non-sequitur.
What I’ve been saying all along is that there is a necessary relation between God’s knowledge of what you will do and what you will do.
Satan For Christ:
Great, so if God knows choice x, then not possibly the ability to refrain (i.e. libertarian freedom). (edited) Welcome to determinism, brother The lines about the modal predicate are irrelevant because my argument is not especially concerned with the modal relation between God’s foreknowledge by itself and the choice known. The argument concerns the metaphysical primacy of that foreknowledge.
A…:
So back to Acts 17:26-27. Those verses identify two things that God does (when and where we are born) and three things that we do (seek for God, feel our way to God, and perhaps find God). It says that God determines the things that he does so that we will do the seeking/feeling/finding. This seems much more at home in a molinist framework than a calvinist one.
I gotta get back to work for a bit, will check in later.
Satan For Christ:
It seems that your exegesis depends crucially on a few points.
One is that God’s agency is incompatible with man’s, but you’ve provided no reason to believe that, and there’s no reason in the passage.
Another is that Paul is making an absolute dichotomy between circumstances and what men do in them, rather than a spectrum of emphasis, and you’ve provided no argument about the text implying that.
Another is that molinism is coherent, but we’ve touched on one (among several) reasons it is not: foreknowledge entails determinism.
In the meantime, Genesis 50 is very clear that God determines Joseph’s brothers to do what they did. He caused it to happen. We know that because we know God’s intention is causally sufficient for its object. And we know that because we know God is God, omnipotent, perfectly wise, etc.
If God intends x, and His intention is insufficient to causally ensure x, then it follows God is causally contingent on instrumental entities outside Himself. And that’s going to make God subject to whatever causal laws those instrumentalities invoke, which then makes God not self-existent, and we no longer have God at all.
No disrespect meant in any of this, by the way, @A….
The Council 