Satan For Christ:

Satan For Christ’s Argument Against Pragmatism:

Premise 1 (P1): If pragmatism is true, then those theses are false which lack inferential utility.

Premise 2 (P2): Pragmatism lacks inferential utility.

Conclusion (C): Therefore, if pragmatism is true, then pragmatism is false.

Nickk: “Those these” are the syllogisms?

Satan For Christ: Huh?

Nickk: In P1 you said those theses. Sorry, it almost looks malformed in the way it’s said. Clarify.

Satan For Christ: To say, those X are Y which Z is just a way of classifying things.

Nickk: I see. Of course. P2 will be wanting a justification.

Satan For Christ: Sure.

Semper Reformanda: We all know 42 is the answer to everything….

Satan For Christ: But I’m not interested in arguing for that in a vacuum. Broadly speaking, there’s at least three cases: one psycho-historical, one deflationary, and one just a modified case for competing theories (i.e., those that deny pragmatism).

The psycho-historical case amounts to reasoning inductively that on pragmatism’s own criteria, the best motivations and explanations for success we have in human history are anti-pragmatic theses.

The deflationary case is just that there’s no epistemic norm that favors pragmatism over its competitors, making it inherently unpragmatic.

The third case is just going to be reclarifying some case for a competing view that shows how the arguments effectively rule out pragmatism.

Nickk: The type of pragmatism will be the type from William James or pragmatists from that era, 19th century. If you’re familiar.

Satan For Christ: Vaguely. Been a while since I read or studied any James. As I recall, one of the big claims of early American pragmatism is that truth is reducible to some kind of experiential consequence in comparison to aims.

This just suffers the same conceptual merry-go-round that instrumentalism of any variety does. Namely, it infinitely defers the concept of truth to a further question of aim and/or consequence, so that we never arrive at the concept at all.

Nickk: Does anything here presuppose epistemic certainty?

Satan For Christ: I don’t think that’s particularly relevant, but sure?

Nickk: So you get an infinite regress of aims? So you can never arrive at any concept? If so, can you pose an example?

Satan For Christ: Basically. In order to arrive at a rational aim, I need to know truths in the non-pragmatic sense. But on pragmatism, I don’t. So the only aims I have presuppose an answer to this question I can’t answer.

Nickk: “Truth and Verifiability: For James, truth isn’t an inherent or immutable property of ideas. Instead, it’s an occurrence within an idea depending on its verifiability. Verifiability, then, consists of a pleasant feeling of harmony and progress in the succession of ideas and events. In other words, when you have certain ideas, these follow one after another and adapt to each previous event in the reality you experience.”

Using this from James, how would you pose the objection?

Satan For Christ: Wish I knew whether this were true or not. ; )

Comment for anyone confused:

Satan For Christ made this remark to highlight a problem with William James’s definition of truth. By saying “Wish I knew whether this were true or not,” he humorously points out that if truth is based on what feels right or what works in our experiences, then we can’t be sure if James’s idea of truth itself is true. This creates a confusing loop where we never actually get to a solid understanding of what truth is.