Cactus:

I understand that the problem of induction is philosophically pressing. To base your worldview on whatever answers this one complicated question best seems fair to me. But it does not follow that it’s True.

I believe you will always win the argument of coherence in this chat, but – I’ve said it once and I will say it till it is properly addressed: A claim to knowledge != knowledge. ” ” ” Ultimate truth != ultimate truth

And unfortunately, the Christian Worldview, as presented, is only actually coherent IF its ultimate truth. Otherwise, it’s preferring the claims of one worldview over the other.

So we can argue how on paper your worldview is more coherent than everyone else’s all day and all night, but until you actually prove the extraordinary claim of God’s existence with both valid and sound arguments, don’t expect anyone to believe you.

And every single time you critique another Worldview in order to undermine the arguments of the individual it often begs the question of : what makes your worldview so immune from the same critiques, which hinges on the True coherence of your worldview, which hinges on the existence of God.

Necessitarian:

I think that is a fair critique of, say, Ronald Nash or Schaeffer, who both think Christianity is the best worldview because it holds the most abductive value across multiple issues, provides the most plausible framework of history, teaches the best system of morality, etc. That is not the argument, though. The argument is that answering the inductive problem is part of a worldview’s “job description,” as it were. The role of those beliefs which constitute our worldview is to account for rationality. Now, I came in at the middle of the conversation, but I think Stygy and Vincent represent a non-Christian and Christian viewpoint. To Stygy, autonomy is possible (because it is actual), and the Christian God is superfluous at best. To Vincent, autonomy is impossible, and the Christian God makes rational thought possible. This is a dichotomy; one must be true, the other false. Vincent’s argument, roughly put, is that autonomy is not possible because the problem of induction cannot be solved autonomously and since rationality is not possible without an answer (in principle) to the problem of induction, rationality is not compatible with autonomy. It could be formulated as follows: CT v A A –> A(IP) A –> ~CT(IP) ~A(IP) CT(IP) ~A CT where CT means Christian Theism and A means autonomy, the thesis that human life is possible without the Christian God. Premise 2 holds that if autonomy is the case, then there is an autonomous answer to the problem of induction. If Stygy’s autonomous worldview is rational, then he must possess an inductive principle beside that offered by the Christian worldview.

Premise 3 is unnecessary to stipulate, but holds that if autonomy is the case, then the Christian answer cannot be sufficient anyway. Put the other way, if Christianity answered the problem of induction, that would just be to say that Christianity is a precondition of rationality, since that’s exactly what an inductive principle is. In order for autonomy to obtain, the Christian answer to the problem must fail. The reason for enlisting P2 and P3 is because either one is a sufficient condition of the conclusion. For autonomy to work, it needs to answer the problem. For autonomy to work, the Christian answer needs to fail. Premise 4 is that autonomy does not answer the problem of induction. Premise 5 is that the Christian worldview does. Either sufficient condition of autonomy’s failure is met. It follows that autonomy is false, premise 5.

CT, the only alternative, follows.

If you look closely, you can see how this is just a more specific adaption of the transcendental critique. Generally, TACT, the transcendental argument for Christian Theism, could be put like this: CT v A ~A CT and you see this above as the husk of the argument. What has been added is an argument regarding the failure of the unbelieving ideology to account for induction and the reliability of nature. There are actually two sub-arguments here: A –> A(IP) ~A(IP) ~A and A –> ~CT(IP) CT(IP) ~A These are both modus tollens, denial of the consequent. The overall format is very much like Bahnsen’s Trilemma, just reduced to a dilemma. Both parties assume that some philosophical perspective renders reasoning intelligible and possible, or else there would be no point to communicating and arguing with each other. Now then, since the dialogue between the believer and the unbeliever assumes the meaningfulness of their words and the intelligibility of their reasoning, the unbeliever either (1) implicitly assumes the Christian’s presuppositions, (2) considers it a mystery that not everything is mysterious or nonsensical, or (3) offers a worldview in which his words and reasoning are meaningful. If he admits to (1) or (2), he has conceded defeat in his attempt to prove Christianity wrong. If he attempts (3), the apologist proceeds to reduce his autonomous outlook to absurdity. . .

“. . .[The unbeliever] may make an admittedly ‘blind leap of faith’ and hold out the hope that someday, somewhere, someone will furnish an adequate autonomous worldview to protect unbelievers against the compelling rationality of Christianity – in which case he has reverted to position (2) and loses anyway.The kind of necessity for which the presuppositional apologetics argues is transcendental or inherent in the arguing itself. . .not a matter of exhaustively eliminating unbelieving worldviews (all of which share the critical point of presumed autonomy [i.e. independence (of any kind) from God’s authority].”

Quote from Van Til’s Apologetic, footnote on page 487

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Introduction

The problem of induction remains one of the most significant challenges in philosophy. How can we justify the reliability of nature and our reasoning without presupposing them? This question forces every worldview to demonstrate its coherence and explanatory power.

In a recent discussion, two opposing perspectives emerged: Cactus, who questions whether coherence implies truth, and Necessitarian (Jimmy Stephens), who defends the necessity of Christian theism for rationality. Their debate illuminates the fundamental tension between autonomy and theistic dependence in accounting for the problem of induction.

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The Critique: Coherence Doesn’t Equal Truth

Cactus:
I understand that the problem of induction is philosophically pressing. To base your worldview on whatever answers this one complicated question best seems fair to me. But it does not follow that it’s true.

I believe you will always win the argument of coherence in this chat, but – I’ve said it once and I will say it till it is properly addressed: A claim to knowledge != knowledge. Ultimate truth != ultimate truth.

And unfortunately, the Christian worldview, as presented, is only actually coherent IF it’s ultimate truth. Otherwise, it’s preferring the claims of one worldview over the other.

So we can argue how on paper your worldview is more coherent than everyone else’s all day and all night, but until you actually prove the extraordinary claim of God’s existence with both valid and sound arguments, don’t expect anyone to believe you.

And every single time you critique another worldview in order to undermine the arguments of the individual, it often begs the question: what makes your worldview so immune from the same critiques? It hinges on the true coherence of your worldview, which hinges on the existence of God.

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The Response: The Necessity of Christian Theism

Necessitarian (Jimmy Stephens):
I think that is a fair critique of, say, Ronald Nash or Schaeffer, who both think Christianity is the best worldview because it holds the most abductive value across multiple issues, provides the most plausible framework of history, teaches the best system of morality, etc. That is not the argument, though. The argument is that answering the inductive problem is part of a worldview’s ‘job description,’ as it were. The role of those beliefs which constitute our worldview is to account for rationality.

Now, I came in at the middle of the conversation, but I think Stygy and Vincent represent a non-Christian and Christian viewpoint. To Stygy, autonomy is possible (because it is actual), and the Christian God is superfluous at best. To Vincent, autonomy is impossible, and the Christian God makes rational thought possible. This is a dichotomy; one must be true, the other false.

Vincent’s argument, roughly put, is that autonomy is not possible because the problem of induction cannot be solved autonomously and since rationality is not possible without an answer (in principle) to the problem of induction, rationality is not compatible with autonomy.

It could be formulated as follows:

1. CT v A (Christian Theism or Autonomy).
2. A → A(IP) (If autonomy is true, it must answer the problem of induction).
3. A → ~CT(IP) (If autonomy is true, the Christian answer must fail).
4. ~A(IP) (Autonomy does not answer the problem of induction).
5. CT(IP) (Christian theism does answer the problem of induction).

Conclusion: ~A (Autonomy is false). CT (Christian theism is true).

If you look closely, you can see how this is just a more specific adaptation of the transcendental critique. Generally, TACT, the transcendental argument for Christian Theism, could be put like this:

CT v A
~A
CT

What has been added is an argument regarding the failure of the unbelieving ideology to account for induction and the reliability of nature.

There are actually two sub-arguments here:

1. A → A(IP)
   ~A(IP)
   ~A
2. A → ~CT(IP)
   CT(IP)
   ~A

These are both modus tollens, denial of the consequent. The overall format is very much like Bahnsen’s Trilemma, just reduced to a dilemma.”

Premise 3 is unnecessary to stipulate, but holds that if autonomy is the case, then the Christian answer cannot be sufficient anyway. Put the other way, if Christianity answered the problem of induction, that would just be to say that Christianity is a precondition of rationality, since that’s exactly what an inductive principle is. In order for autonomy to obtain, the Christian answer to the problem must fail. The reason for enlisting P2 and P3 is because either one is a sufficient condition of the conclusion. For autonomy to work, it needs to answer the problem. For autonomy to work, the Christian answer needs to fail. Premise 4 is that autonomy does not answer the problem of induction. Premise 5 is that the Christian worldview does. Either sufficient condition of autonomy’s failure is met. It follows that autonomy is false, premise 5.

CT, the only alternative, follows.

If you look closely, you can see how this is just a more specific adaption of the transcendental critique. Generally, TACT, the transcendental argument for Christian Theism, could be put like this: CT v A ~A CT and you see this above as the husk of the argument. What has been added is an argument regarding the failure of the unbelieving ideology to account for induction and the reliability of nature. There are actually two sub-arguments here: A –> A(IP) ~A(IP) ~A and A –> ~CT(IP) CT(IP) ~A These are both modus tollens, denial of the consequent. The overall format is very much like Bahnsen’s Trilemma, just reduced to a dilemma. Both parties assume that some philosophical perspective renders reasoning intelligible and possible, or else there would be no point to communicating and arguing with each other. Now then, since the dialogue between the believer and the unbeliever assumes the meaningfulness of their words and the intelligibility of their reasoning, the unbeliever either (1) implicitly assumes the Christian’s presuppositions, (2) considers it a mystery that not everything is mysterious or nonsensical, or (3) offers a worldview in which his words and reasoning are meaningful. If he admits to (1) or (2), he has conceded defeat in his attempt to prove Christianity wrong. If he attempts (3), the apologist proceeds to reduce his autonomous outlook to absurdity. . .

“. . .[The unbeliever] may make an admittedly ‘blind leap of faith’ and hold out the hope that someday, somewhere, someone will furnish an adequate autonomous worldview to protect unbelievers against the compelling rationality of Christianity – in which case he has reverted to position (2) and loses anyway.The kind of necessity for which the presuppositional apologetics argues is transcendental or inherent in the arguing itself. . .not a matter of exhaustively eliminating unbelieving worldviews (all of which share the critical point of presumed autonomy [i.e. independence (of any kind) from God’s authority].”

Quote from Van Til’s Apologetic, footnote on page 487