In his response to Thomas Schreiner’s review of Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in Romans 9:10–18, Brian Abasciano critiques the Reformed interpretation of Romans 9, especially the notion that Paul teaches unconditional individual election. Abasciano argues instead for a corporate, conditional model of election rooted in Second Temple Jewish concepts and Old Testament precedent. His central thesis is that God’s “calling” is not an effectual, internal act producing faith, but rather a forensic “naming” of those who have already believed. While Abasciano brings thoughtful exegesis and considerable attention to background literature, his interpretation is ultimately flawed at several crucial points.

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Introduction

In his response to Thomas Schreiner’s review of Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in Romans 9:10–18, Brian Abasciano critiques the Reformed interpretation of Romans 9, especially the notion that Paul teaches unconditional individual election. Abasciano argues instead for a corporate, conditional model of election rooted in Second Temple Jewish concepts and Old Testament precedent. His central thesis is that God’s “calling” is not an effectual, internal act producing faith, but rather a forensic “naming” of those who have already believed. While Abasciano brings thoughtful exegesis and considerable attention to background literature, his interpretation is ultimately flawed at several crucial points. This article critiques his view on lexical, contextual, theological, and historical grounds, demonstrating that Paul’s doctrine of election is not conditional or corporate-only but rooted in the sovereign, effectual call of God.

1. Romans 8:30 and the Order of Salvation

Paul’s theology of calling is further clarified in Romans 4:17, where God is said to “call into existence the things that do not exist.” As Schreiner notes, this underscores the creative and causative nature of divine calling. Just as God brought forth a people from Abraham’s barren body, so too does He bring forth spiritual life and faith from the spiritually dead. Schreiner writes: “God’s call effectually brings into existence things that did not exist.” This reinforces that calling in Romans 8:30 is not mere recognition or declaration—it is the divine act that brings faith itself into being.

This theology of grace also ties directly into Paul’s contrast between grace and works in Romans 9:11 and again in Romans 11:5–6. As Moo explains, “If God’s election is based on grace, then it cannot be based on works of any kind.” Even faith, if made a prerequisite for calling, would nullify grace. Schreiner similarly argues that any view that denies unconditional election subtly reintroduces human merit into justification.

Abasciano argues that the term “calling” (kaleō) in Romans 8:30 should be read as a declarative naming of individuals who have already believed. In this reading, God predestines a corporate group (believers), and individuals are “called” in the sense of being publicly declared as members of this group after faith. But this interpretation fails on multiple grounds—lexical, contextual, theological, and syntactical.

The verse reads:

“Those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified” (Rom. 8:30, ESV).

Abasciano’s model inverts the logical sequence. If calling follows faith (as he insists), then calling should follow justification, since justification is by faith (Rom. 5:1). But Paul explicitly places calling before justification. This indicates that calling is the means by which one comes to faith and is thereby justified.

As Thomas Schreiner puts it:

“Calling (klētos) must be understood as effectual. It is not merely an invitation that human beings can reject, but it is a summons that overcomes human resistance and effectually persuades them to say yes to God… If all those who are called are also justified, then calling must be effectual and must create faith” (Romans, 2nd ed., p. 442).

Douglas Moo likewise notes:

“The verb ‘he called’… denotes God’s effectual summoning into relationship with him… ‘Those who are called’… describes Christians not as the recipients of an invitation that was up to them to accept or reject, but as the objects of God’s effectual summoning” (The Letter to the Romans, 2nd ed., p. 527).

Thus, calling is not a recognition of faith but the divine act that creates faith. This reading also fits the broader Pauline pattern seen in 1 Corinthians 1:24, where those who are “called” are those in whom the gospel becomes “the power of God and the wisdom of God.”

Calling vs. Works

Furthermore, this explains why Paul can oppose election and calling to works. In Romans 9:11, Paul writes that God’s purpose in election “not because of works but because of him who calls” was demonstrated in His choice of Jacob over Esau before they were born. Even faith is excluded from consideration as a basis for God’s choice. God’s call is antecedent to any human act, virtue, or response—including faith.

As Jimmy Stephens insightfully argues, Paul’s language in Romans 9 deliberately echoes the principle of law versus grace. Just as the Mosaic law was incapable of securing righteousness because it depended on human performance, so too would an election based on foreseen faith collapse into a new form of law-keeping. If faith is treated as the decisive condition of election, then grace is no longer grace, and the gospel becomes just another covenant of works. In this sense, conditional election via foreseen faith mirrors the failed system of the law—it bases God’s redemptive action on human initiative rather than divine mercy. Paul’s polemic against works includes not only moral or ceremonial works but any human condition imposed upon divine grace, including faith as a precondition for election.

Furthermore, this explains why Paul can oppose election and calling to works. In Romans 9:11, Paul writes that God’s purpose in election “not because of works but because of him who calls” was demonstrated in His choice of Jacob over Esau before they were born. Even faith is excluded from consideration as a basis for God’s choice. God’s call is antecedent to any human act, virtue, or response—including faith.

As Jimmy Stephens has noted, the naming-vs-calling objection fails for two major reasons. First, if God’s calling were motivated by our faith, it would undercut the entire logic of salvation by grace. It would make calling meritocratic (since God would be reacting to our righteousness), reduce the divine act to mere human recognition, and remove any basis for assurance grounded in divine causality. Second, even if one prefers the lexical rendering of “naming,” the word does not exclude monergism. A Calvinist can accept “naming” while still affirming that it is causally connected to predestination. The issue is not the word, but the theological function attributed to it. Thus, Abasciano’s semantic distinction is, at best, a distinction without a difference.

Finally, there’s an exegetical inconsistency: Abasciano’s examples of divine naming (from both Old and New Testament) all involve acts that bring about salvific ends. If God’s naming is truly effectual, it accomplishes salvation — not merely recognizes faith. If, on the other hand, naming is simply about labeling what already exists, then it trivializes the divine act. It becomes an empty title for something already achieved by man.

Semantic Clarification: Naming Does Not Deny Monergism

Abasciano attempts to exploit a lexical point by arguing that kaleō can mean “to name.” But even if one accepts this rendering, the issue remains theological. The meaning of “name” in biblical and ANE contexts is not forensic or observational but performative and destinative.

As Stephens explains, a Calvinist could affirm “naming” while maintaining monergism, since the act of naming in Scripture often functions as the means by which God effects a new identity or role. The word kaleō may lexically allow for “naming,” but the theological use Paul makes of it in Romans 8:30 clearly indicates a causal, effectual calling, not a mere label.

Even Abasciano’s own scriptural examples undermine his case. He appeals to instances where God names individuals, but these very examples—as we’ll show in Section 2—involve God creating the identity or destiny through the act of naming. Thus, Abasciano’s distinction between “naming” and “effectual calling” is a false dichotomy.

The Broader Theological Context

Finally, we must step back and see the theological significance. Abasciano’s reading does not merely introduce an error in parsing a Greek term. It constitutes a failure to grasp Paul’s theology of grace. To reinterpret calling as a recognition of human faith reorients salvation around human initiative. But Paul’s gospel is unambiguous: salvation is from Him, through Him, and to Him (Rom. 11:36).

2. Naming in the ANE: Not Descriptive, but Destiny-Giving

Even if Abasciano is correct that “call” can sometimes mean “name,” this does not support his claim that it merely refers to forensic identification. In the Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) and biblical context, naming is not descriptive but performative: to name is to define and assign destiny.

Genesis 17:5 – God renames Abram as Abraham: “for I have made you the father of many nations.” The name declares and confers a future role.

Genesis 1:5 – God calls the light Day and the darkness Night, thereby assigning their function in creation.

This pattern continues throughout Scripture. Naming is an act of sovereign appointment.

In fact, the connection between naming and destiny was widely recognized in the ANE religious worldview. As John H. Walton notes:

“The significance of destinies (which define the functions and roles) of the gods is evident. Names are related to destinies, as demonstrated in tablets six and seven of Enuma Elish, where the gods in assembly declare the destiny of the champion Marduk by bestowing on him fifty names, which give him all of the roles and functions necessary to exercise kingship over the gods.” (Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament, Kindle loc. 1722–1725)

In such a worldview, to name is to define what someone is and what they are to do. If Paul is operating with this theological backdrop, then God’s “calling” is not passive designation but the conferral of role, identity, and purpose.

Nowhere is the divine power of naming clearer than in Isaiah 44–45. There, God says of Cyrus:

“I call you by your name, I name you, though you do not know me” (Isa. 45:4).

Cyrus is called and named apart from faith, even in ignorance of God. Yet God still appoints him as “my shepherd” and “my anointed” (Isa. 44:28; 45:1), roles reserved for kings and messianic agents. This naming confers a historical destiny and divine vocation.

Abasciano’s claim that calling is a response to faith is impossible to sustain in light of this. If Paul is drawing on this rich theological backdrop (as he does in Rom. 4:17), then calling must be an effectual, sovereign act that creates identity and determines purpose.

3. Romans 4:17 — Calling into Existence What Does Not Exist

Paul explicitly identifies God as the one:

“who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist” (Rom. 4:17).

Here, calling is parallel to creation and resurrection. God’s word is causative. He called Abraham “father of many nations” before he had any children. Likewise, He calls sinners to Himself before they believe.

Abasciano’s model collapses under this weight. His forensic naming model cannot account for this theology. Paul does not present God as a recognizer of human faith, but as a creator of it.

4. Second Temple Background: Misused and Misapplied

Abasciano appeals frequently to Second Temple Jewish literature to support a corporate and conditional framework. But this appeal is selective. Many Second Temple sources affirm individual, deterministic election:

• 1QS 3–4 (Qumran): God has appointed humanity into the sons of light and sons of darkness.
• Wisdom of Solomon 3–5: The righteous are predestined to glory; the ungodly are appointed to judgment.

While Paul certainly draws from Jewish traditions, he often subverts them. Romans 9 is a prime example: he shows that God’s purposes transcend ethnic identity and law observance, cutting to the heart of individual, unconditional election.

5. Corporate vs. Individual Election

Paul’s theological method integrates both corporate and individual election, without collapsing one into the other. Moo captures this balance well: “Paul’s key task is to explain how individual election qualifies the nature and significance of this corporate election. This he does in 9:6–29.” Abasciano’s framework fails to account for this. His insistence on reading Romans 9 only in corporate terms ignores the clear particularity of Paul’s examples.

It is also significant that Paul grounds God’s saving purposes in his “purpose according to election” (prothesis kat’ eklogēn, Rom. 9:11), the same term used earlier in Romans 8:28. This indicates continuity in Paul’s soteriological logic. In both places, God’s sovereign plan is carried out independently of any human condition. As Schreiner explains, Paul intentionally uses examples (Isaac/Ishmael, Jacob/Esau) that remove all possible human distinctions—biological, behavioral, or volitional. The point is not that these individuals symbolize a group, but that they exemplify God’s right to choose whom He will.

Moreover, Paul explicitly states in Romans 9:16, “So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who has mercy.” Abasciano’s view, which makes election depend on human response (faith), contradicts this conclusion. If God’s mercy is conditioned on faith, then it does depend on the human will—precisely what Paul rules out.

The force of Paul’s argument is further evidenced by the rhetorical objection in Romans 9:14 and 9:19. If Paul had merely taught that God chooses people based on foreseen faith, it is difficult to see how such objections—accusations of injustice and determinism—would arise. No one accuses God of unrighteousness for rewarding belief. The very fact that Paul anticipates this resistance confirms that he is teaching unconditional individual election, not conditional corporate inclusion.

Paul’s theological method integrates both corporate and individual election, without collapsing one into the other. Moo captures this balance well: “Paul’s key task is to explain how individual election qualifies the nature and significance of this corporate election. This he does in 9:6–29.” Abasciano’s framework fails to account for this. His insistence on reading Romans 9 only in corporate terms ignores the clear particularity of Paul’s examples.

Abasciano insists Paul is speaking only of groups. But Paul’s chosen examples in Romans 9 — Jacob and Esau, Pharaoh — are individuals. Paul even states that the choice occurred before they were born, “though they had done nothing good or bad” (Rom. 9:11). This affirms a principle of unconditional individual election, not merely the choice of a lineage.

Similarly, Pharaoh is not merely a symbol of Egypt. He is a concrete historical person whom God raised up “that I might show my power in you” (Rom. 9:17).

Paul’s concluding statement in 9:18 is categorical:

“So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills.”

This is not corporate. It is deeply personal.

As Schreiner rightly observes:

“The choice of Jacob instead of Esau contradicts the notion that we have corporate over against individual election here… The corporate should not be played off against the individual.” (Romans, p. 503)

Abasciano insists Paul is speaking only of groups. But Paul’s chosen examples in Romans 9 — Jacob and Esau, Pharaoh — are individuals. Paul even states that the choice occurred before they were born, “though they had done nothing good or bad” (Rom. 9:11). This affirms a principle of unconditional individual election, not merely the choice of a lineage.

Similarly, Pharaoh is not merely a symbol of Egypt. He is a concrete historical person whom God raised up “that I might show my power in you” (Rom. 9:17).

Paul’s concluding statement in 9:18 is categorical:

“So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills.”

This is not corporate. It is deeply personal.

As Schreiner rightly observes:

“The choice of Jacob instead of Esau contradicts the notion that we have corporate over against individual election here… The corporate should not be played off against the individual.” (Romans, p. 503)

Moo concurs:

“Paul’s key task is to explain how individual election qualifies the nature and significance of this corporate election. This he does in 9:6–29.” (The Letter to the Romans, p. 586)

6. The Inconsistency of Abasciano’s Methodology

Abasciano champions a historical-contextual reading of election (e.g., corporate election in Israel and Second Temple Judaism), yet he abandons the historical understanding of calling in the same context.

In the ANE and biblical tradition, divine calling is destinative. Naming by God shapes reality. Abasciano cannot selectively historicize election while dehistoricizing calling.

If one respects the context for election, one must respect it for calling — and both point to divine sovereignty.

7. Romans 11:5–6 — The Remnant by Grace

Abasciano’s reading of Romans 9 neglects the continued argument Paul unfolds in Romans 11:5–6, where the doctrine of election is reasserted in light of Israel’s partial hardening. Paul writes:

“So too at the present time there is a remnant, chosen by grace. But if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace” (Rom. 11:5–6).

This text further confirms that election—whether of individuals or a remnant—is not conditioned upon any human response, including faith. As Moo rightly comments, “The remnant has come into being as the result of God’s gracious election… Jews are no different from Gentiles: only by God’s gracious intervention can they be saved.” Schreiner echoes this: “The inclusion of the remnant in God’s people is due to his electing grace… not to their free will, wisdom, or perception.”

The theological point is identical to that of Romans 9: God’s sovereign mercy alone accounts for who is called and saved. If faith were the condition for divine calling, then grace would be nullified. Paul eliminates that possibility decisively.

Conclusion

Abasciano’s critique of Schreiner seeks to uphold human responsibility and corporate categories, but at the cost of exegetical and theological coherence. His claim that God’s calling is a forensic naming based on faith cannot account for the structure of Romans 8:30, the meaning of Romans 4:17, the witness of Isaiah 45, or the examples in Romans 9.

By contrast, the Reformed interpretation of effectual calling and individual election does justice to Paul’s flow of argument, to his use of Scripture, and to the biblical doctrine of God’s sovereign grace.

God’s call does not recognize faith — it creates it. And those whom He calls, He justifies.

“It depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who has mercy” (Rom. 9:16).