Agnosticism and the Illusion of Autonomy


Agnosticism is often presented as a position of humility—a refusal to commit to belief or unbelief in God due to insufficient evidence. But beneath this modest exterior lies a bold philosophical claim: that human reason can function autonomously, without dependence on divine revelation. The agnostic claims not to know whether God exists, yet assumes he is competent to analyze worldviews, assess evidence, and adjudicate truth—even concerning God Himself.

The Pluralism of the Agnostic

As Jimmy Stephens puts it:

“The agnostic is committed to the position that he does not know whether God exists. With respect to worldviews, the agnostic is pluralistic, believing that no worldview sufficiently answers whether God exists or not, at least none that he knows of, at least not yet. All the while, agnosticism presupposes the autonomy of humankind.”

This posture implies more than neutrality. It presupposes that human beings are capable of evaluating ultimate questions without already depending on some ultimate authority. The agnostic assumes that he can reason and weigh options without a definitive worldview in place—especially not one that begins with God’s revelation.

As Stephens continues:

“The agnostic holds that he does not know whether God exists, that he does not have access to any worldview capable of answering the question, and that in the meantime, he is quite capable of reasoning, of analyzing worldviews, and adjudicating about facts whether they support God’s existence.”

In other words, even while professing ignorance of divine reality, the agnostic assumes the sufficiency of his own cognitive faculties to examine truth claims and stand in judgment over them.

Autonomy Smuggled In

What the agnostic rarely acknowledges is that his position depends on a foundational commitment to the autonomy of the human mind. He believes that even in the absence of certainty about God, he can nonetheless trust his faculties to investigate reality, interpret facts, and make provisional judgments about metaphysical claims. This is not epistemic humility—it is a bold epistemic assertion.

Stephens captures this dynamic with characteristic clarity:

“Quintessentially, the agnostic defense of autonomy is that there might be a worldview out there that explains the independence of reason from God. Somewhere across the buffet of worldviews sits that special sauce that proves man’s ability to reason without relying on God’s revelation, and the agnostic has caught a whiff of it. The problem is that this defense is self-defeating.”

The agnostic clings to the mere possibility of a future justification for autonomy—hoping such a worldview will emerge—even while depending on autonomous reasoning in the present.

The Problem of Possibility

But this argument is fundamentally unstable. The agnostic stakes his position on possibility: because it’s possible that some worldview could one day vindicate his independence from divine revelation, agnosticism is justified. And then, as Stephens notes, “it is alleged that the Christian has the duty of disproving this possibility.”

But this demand can be turned around.

“Instead, the Christian replies in kind. It is possible there is an explanation yet to be found or offered why agnosticism is incoherent or otherwise impossible. Therefore, it is up to the agnostic to show otherwise and thus directly or indirectly defend autonomy.”

The agnostic cannot claim privilege for his possibility while dismissing the Christian’s. If possibilities are sufficient grounds for belief, then agnosticism must contend with its own vulnerability to possible defeaters. In such a scenario, both parties bear the burden of proof—and the agnostic can no longer hide behind the façade of neutrality.

The Inescapability of Presuppositions

Ultimately, the agnostic cannot escape presuppositions. In claiming to lack knowledge about God while trusting in his ability to reason about such matters, he assumes the very autonomy he has not—and cannot—justify. He acts as if human reason can operate neutrally, while denying that any authoritative revelation has spoken.

This is not a position of epistemic modesty. It is a worldview unto itself—one that places man, not God, at the center of all knowledge. And if that assumption cannot be defended, agnosticism collapses under the weight of its own inconsistency.


Conclusion

Agnosticism appears to offer a safe middle ground—avoiding dogmatism on either side. But in reality, it rests on an unproven (and often unexamined) faith in human autonomy. As Jimmy Stephens shows, this position is not only philosophically vulnerable but inherently self-defeating. The agnostic cannot justify his reasoning apart from God, and he cannot avoid the burden of proof for the autonomy he assumes.

To stand on agnosticism is not to stand on neutral ground—it is to stand on borrowed ground, and that ground belongs to the God the agnostic claims not to know.

One thought on “Agnosticism and the Illusion of Autonomy

  1. “Agnosticism is often presented as a position of humility—a refusal to commit to belief or unbelief in God due to insufficient evidence. But beneath this modest exterior lies a bold philosophical claim: that human reason can function autonomously, without dependence on divine revelation. The agnostic claims not to know whether God exists, yet assumes he is competent to analyze worldviews, assess evidence, and adjudicate truth—even concerning God Himself.”

    Curious how theists, including christians, have yet to show that their god exist, much less that it is “necessary”. Eveyr cult claims divine revelation, and not one can show that this ever happens.

    We know that human reason functions, since we interact correctly with reality. All that christians, and other theists have, are baseless claims that their god hides for some reason.

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