In a previous article, I discussed some of the basic principles of presuppositionalism. Here, I’d like to expand on those foundations and develop a few core arguments more thoroughly.
1. Transcendental Argument
In that earlier piece, I briefly introduced the form of the transcendental argument (TAG) and noted the diversity of its formulations. The key issue is that TAG is not a single argument but a family of arguments that share a common structure. I believe it’s legitimate to utilize multiple forms of TAG, depending on the philosophical context.
One objection, raised by David Reiter, claims that TAG fails to demonstrate that God is the necessary precondition for intelligibility. He argues that TAG either:
- (a) is too weak to demonstrate that the Christian God necessarily exists, or
- (b) merely shows that God exists in the actual world, which is inadequate.
In response, Dr. James Anderson observes that Van Til’s version of TAG had modal implications:
“Van Til held not merely that God’s existence is a necessary condition of human thought (knowledge, predication, argumentation, etc.) but that his existence is a necessary condition of the possibility of such thought. Even had there been no human thought in actuality, God would still have had to exist.”
From this insight, Anderson formulates a Modal TAG:
- (P1) Possibly, Human Thought.
- (P2) Necessarily, possibly, Human Thought.
- (P3) Necessarily, if possibly Human Thought, then Christian Theism.
- (P4) If necessarily, possibly Human Thought, then necessarily Christian Theism.
- (C5) Therefore, necessarily, Christian Theism.
Another influential formulation comes from Dr. Michael Butler, a student of Greg Bahnsen. Butler uses a disjunctive syllogism structure:
A TA takes on (roughly) the following form: For x to be the case, y must also be the case because y is the necessary precondition of x; since x is the case, y must be the case.
Disjunctive form:
- P1. Either the Christian worldview or autonomy is the precondition of intelligibility.
- P2. It is not the case that autonomy accounts for intelligibility.
- C. Therefore, Christian theism is the precondition for intelligibility.
For a further variation, see the Don Collett version of TAG as explained by Robin Ingles-Barrett.
2. Revelational Epistemology
A major feature of revelational epistemology is its open acknowledgment of epistemic circularity. This differs from vicious circularity: the conclusion is not used as a premise but operates as a presupposition of the entire argument. This kind of circularity is common in epistemology, as scholars like William Alston have recognized.
Attempts to avoid epistemic circularity often lead to strengthening the criteria for knowledge—but this brings us directly into the Problem of the Criterion, as raised by ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics. They observed:
- To know which beliefs are true, we need a criterion of truth.
- But to identify a valid criterion, we must already know which beliefs are true.
From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
(1) We can know that a belief based on source K is true only if we first know that K is reliable.
(2) We can know that K is reliable only if we first know that some beliefs based on source K are true.
— IEP entry on epistemic circularity
This is precisely what Bahnsen highlights in his critique of neutrality. He uses the analogy of an apple-sorting machine: how can one sort good apples from bad without already knowing something about apples? This is the classic debate between the Methodist (who wants a method first) and the Particularist (who starts with known instances).
Christian epistemology begins with God’s revelation as our particular and ultimate foundation. It enables us to critique other “circles” of reasoning as incoherent, rather than collapsing into epistemic relativism. See also:
3. The Impossibility of the Contrary
The usual objection to the Christian transcendental argument is the notion that other worldviews are possibly true. There is, they claim, an infinite set of worldviews. This objection only has force if we begin from the assumption that possibilities are brute facts—ungrounded and neutral. But that very assumption presupposes that Christianity is false.
In Christian theism, possibilities are God’s possibilities. As Van Til puts it:
“The finite mind cannot thus, if we are to reason theistically, be made the standard of what is possible and what is impossible. It is the divine mind that is determinative of the possible… Thus the very existence of the universe depends upon God’s knowledge of or plan for the universe.”
— The Defense of the Faith, 4th Ed., p. 62
So we reject the objection that presupposes brute modal facts. We stand on a revealed ontology and metaphysic of possibility.
Moreover, presuppositionalism maintains that there are fundamentally only two worldviews:
- The Christian worldview grounded in divine revelation
- The autonomous worldview grounded in man
Therefore, the objection about infinite refutations is a category error. Additionally, the skeptic often assumes modal frameworks external to God, thus begging the question. In truth, modal space is defined by the divine decree. The Christian worldview grounds all modal truths in the eternal plan and character of God.
As Ronald W. Di Giacomo argues:
“The Christian need not evaluate an infinite number of worldviews in order to know (and justify) that there are only two worldviews… We have an appeal for such premises—the truth of God’s word—which tells us that there are only two worldviews.”
— “The Impropriety of Trying to ‘Prove’ the Absolute Truth Value of a Transcendental Inductively”
See also:
Choosing Hats – “Some Thoughts About the Impossibility of the Contrary”
Watchmen Council – “A Response to Spencer Hawkins on Presuppositional Apologetics”
Further reading:
When a Cactus misses the Point
The Council 