Jimmy Stephens on God as the Solution to the Problem of Universals
You ask: “How can God be both universal and particular? And how does His being these two things ground their presence in the world?”
Good question—because it shows just how deep the rabbit hole goes.
Let’s start with the problem. All human experience assumes both universality and particularity. You can’t have knowledge of anything unless there’s a stable identity across instances (a universal), and yet everything you actually encounter is a particular. You know what a tree is because you’ve seen many, but not one of them is “tree-ness.” And yet somehow, they all are. That’s the paradox.
Now, here’s the issue: In any non-Christian worldview, this tension is a dead-end. If you start with abstract universals (like Plato), you can’t explain how they ever touch the dirt. If you start with bare particulars (like the empiricists or nominalists), you can’t explain how we ever form general categories that mean anything beyond sound vibrations. You’re left either with disembodied forms or brute chaos—neither of which can explain knowledge, meaning, or language.
So what does Christianity offer?
The Triune God is the ontological solution. Why? Because in Him, unity and diversity are equally ultimate.
- God is one essence—universal.
- God is three persons—particulars.
But the persons are not parts of God, nor are they interchangeable expressions of the one. There is both unity and distinction within the being of God. So within God’s very nature, we already have what all metaphysical systems have been groping for: an eternally harmonious interplay between the universal and the particular.
This isn’t some arbitrary theological wallpaper. It’s the precondition of intelligibility. Because the world is created by this God, it reflects His character:
- Particulars (like oak trees, electrons, or dogs) are not random. They instantiate natures—universal concepts God has ordained.
- Universals (like “oakness,” “dogness,” “justice,” etc.) are not free-floating abstractions. They exist because God’s mind gives the world a rational structure.
So how can the world contain both? Because God is both. And how do we recognize them? Because we are made in the image of the One who unites them.
No pagan metaphysics can solve this. They can only suppress it or fragment it.
That’s why all attempts to critique Van Til without dealing with this are like playing chess without a board. You’re just knocking pieces around on the floor and pretending it’s strategy.
The question demonstrates an immense ignorance about the problem of universals.
How can a man be a particular? After all, the word “man” is a universal. No matter what word I pick out to classify, a universal is always referenced or employed.
Yet, how can there be particular universals? Have I escaped referring to a particular thing by saying “universal?” Not unless the class is empty of referents and therefore vacuous.
The trouble is that all predication presupposes a system of universal and particular. Classification presupposes a world concept in which all particulars inhere in universals and universals exhaust in particulars without reduction. In other words, all things in human experience require particularity and universality, and must be reconciled without contradiction.
The reason why people take potshots at Van Til, followed by quickly devoting one’s face to the sand, is because there is no argument to be found from them. The hypocrisy is both telling and hilarious.
Further Suggestion:
The Council 