We’re going to take a look at an article from Creation Ministries International by Dr. Jonathan Sarfati titled, “Is using the Bible to prove the Bible circular reasoning?” Here’s a key excerpt:

All philosophical systems start with axioms (presuppositions), or non-provable propositions accepted as true, and deduce theorems from them. Therefore Christians should not be faulted for having axioms as well, which are the propositions of Scripture (a proposition is a fact about a thing, e.g. God is love). So the question for any axiomatic system is whether it is self-consistent and is consistent with the real world.
— Creation.com

But there’s a problem with this framing: not all worldviews actually start with “axioms.” That’s a feature of foundationalist systems specifically. Other epistemological models—such as skepticism, infinitism, and coherentism (or hybrids between them and foundationalism)—approach justification differently. Even within foundationalism, many deny that our worldview rests on arbitrarily assumed, unprovable postulates. Instead, they point to properly basic beliefs—those that are non-inferentially justified.

So it’s not correct to claim that axioms lie at the heart of every worldview. While the idea might be useful as a rhetorical reversal against atheists who assume neutrality or brute facts, it’s not a helpful model for describing the Christian worldview itself.

Why? Because the Christian worldview is not unprovable—it is revealed. It is presupposed in all rational thought. So rather than starting with an axiom that cannot be proven, we begin with divinely revealed truth. This changes the entire framework.

To illustrate the problem with treating Christianity as a mere axiom, consider this argument:

• P1: If something exists, then the Christian God exists.
• P2: Something exists.
• C: Therefore, the Christian God exists.

This argument is both valid and (from the Christian view) sound. But if Christianity is only assumed as an axiom, then accepting this argument as actually proving something undermines the whole “axiomatic” approach. Axioms, by definition, are supposed to be unprovable. Yet divine revelation directly affirms such propositions—and we know them by that revelation. So calling them “axioms” mischaracterizes their epistemic status.

There’s another issue: how do we determine which axioms are legitimate? If no method exists to distinguish between proper and improper axioms, then we’re left with pure arbitrariness. But if there is a method, then that method—not the axiom—is what’s ultimately foundational. As Dr. Chris Bolt explains:

Once a person is questioned concerning his acceptance of axioms, he will answer by suggesting that some contradiction results from rejecting the axiom in question. But how does he know this? Surely it is only by way of Reason or Senses or similar means that axioms are known and/or defended. So it is a bit of a toss-up as to whether or not an axiom is more ultimate than the Reason or Senses etc. by which that axiom is known and defended. Of course, one might also simply accept an axiom as such. But then what is to prevent someone else from doing the very same thing, leading us back to the arbitrariness that plagued the first understanding of presuppositionalism described above?
— Formal Faith, Choosing Hats

Chris Matthew summed up the internal inconsistency of Sarfati’s model:

Not only is Sarfati’s position bereft of the ability to prove and justify, he seems to be inconsistent with himself. He asserts that (1) axioms are “non-provable propositions,” but then goes on to say that (2) “axiomatic systems” must be verified according to whether they are “consistent with the real world.” But then, what does it mean to say that these axioms are non-provable? (1) and (2) suffer from inconsistency.