Introduction

Genesis 1 has long been a flashpoint of interpretive debate, especially regarding how it portrays God’s creative work (“creation out of nothing” versus ordering pre-existent chaos) and the meaning of humanity being made “in the image of God.” Biblical scholar Dan McClellan has advanced two provocative claims on tThis analysis demonstrates that McClellan’s grammatical arguments against creatio ex nihilo in Genesis 1, while scholarly and linguistically nuanced, face substantial challenges from textual evidence, canonical integration, and theological coherence. Similarly, his purely functional interpretation of the imago Dei, though offering valuable insights into ANE royal ideology, fails to account for the text’s universal application and theological trajectory in the broader biblical witness.

The Creation Narrative: Between Text and Theology

The merism “heavens and earth” in Genesis 1:1 most naturally indicates that all reality originates from God’s creative activity, not merely that God ordered pre-existing chaos. While the Hebrew grammar of Genesis 1:1 permits either an independent or dependent clause reading, the strongest evidence—including ancient translations, syntactical considerations, and canonical development—favors the traditional rendering that implies an absolute beginning.

Genesis 1 undoubtedly employs ANE cosmological imagery, but it does so with deliberate polemical intent, transforming familiar motifs to communicate a distinctive theological vision. The text’s demythologization of cosmic elements, absence of divine conflict, and emphasis on creation by divine word all suggest a radical departure from standard ANE chaos-to-order paradigms.

John Sailhamer aptly summarizes:

“Genesis gives us a picture of the beginning that is simple yet profound. It shows an awareness of other ancient creation accounts but transforms their imagery to serve a fundamentally different theological purpose: to establish God as the sole sovereign Creator who depends on nothing outside himself.”

The Theological Trajectory of Creatio Ex Nihilo

McClellan correctly notes that the formal doctrine of creatio ex nihilo crystallized in the 2nd century AD in response to Greco-Roman philosophical challenges and Gnostic cosmologies. However, this theological articulation represented a natural development of biblical principles rather than an alien imposition on the text.

As Gerhard May demonstrates in his definitive historical study Creatio Ex Nihilo:

“The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo emerged as early Christian thinkers systematically reflected on the implications of monotheism and divine sovereignty already present in biblical texts. While the specific philosophical formulation was new, the underlying theological commitments were deeply rooted in Scripture.”

This demonstrates the dynamic relationship between biblical text and theological formulation—a hermeneutical circle where Scripture informs doctrine, and doctrinal frameworks in turn illuminate Scripture’s implications.

The Integration of Functional and Ontological in the Imago Dei

Regarding the image of God, McClellan’s functional emphasis correctly highlights the ANE# Creation ex nihilo or Order from Chaos?

An Assessment of Dan McClellan’s Interpretations of Genesis 1

This analysis examines two significant claims advanced by biblical scholar Dan McClellan regarding Genesis 1: (1) that the text does not teach creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) but depicts God imposing order on pre-existent chaos, aligning with ancient Near Eastern cosmological patterns; and (2) that the “image of God” (imago Dei) represents a functional royal role rather than an ontological endowment. This critique engages McClellan’s assertions through careful textual analysis, comparison with alternative scholarly perspectives, and consideration of the broader theological implications.

McClellan represents a growing scholarly trend that emphasizes the embeddedness of biblical texts within their ancient Near Eastern context, often at the expense of traditional theological interpretations. While his historical-critical methodology provides valuable insights into the cultural background of Genesis, it sometimes risks overlooking the text’s distinctive theological innovations and its canonical development. This critique aims to assess whether McClellan’s interpretations adequately account for both the ancient context and the text’s theological trajectory within the broader biblical witness.

I. Genesis 1: Creation from Nothing or Cosmos from Chaos?

McClellan’s Central Claim

McClellan unequivocally states that creatio ex nihilo “is not found anywhere in the Bible” and represents “a creation of 2nd century Christianity.” He argues that Genesis 1:1 should be translated as a temporal clause: “When God began to create the heavens and the earth,” followed by verse 2 describing pre-existing conditions. In McClellan’s view, this text assumes formless matter already existed as a dark, watery chaos before God’s creative activity began—similar to ancient Near Eastern creation myths like the Babylonian Enuma Elish.

According to McClellan, Genesis 1’s theological emphasis is not on matter’s ultimate origin but on portraying Israel’s God as the sovereign who brings cosmic order from chaos. The text presents a powerful contrast to pagan creation accounts, highlighting YHWH’s transcendence and the inherent goodness of the ordered world (“it was very good”).

Critical Grammatical Analysis: Independent or Dependent Clause?

The interpretation of Genesis 1:1 hinges significantly on whether בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים (bereʾšît bārāʾ ʾĕlōhîm) functions as an independent main clause (“In the beginning, God created…”) or a temporal dependent clause (“When God began to create…”).

McClellan’s Grammatical Argument

McClellan argues forcefully for the dependent clause rendering:

“It would actually be incorrect to translate it into English as ‘in a beginning,’ because the omission of the definite article in Hebrew is a signal that the word is in a specific grammatical relationship with the words that follow… It’s used in sentences that mean, ‘in the beginning of (something happening…).’ With the rest of the verse, it would read, ‘In the beginning of God creating the heavens and the earth…’ This would be translated more naturally into English as, ‘When God began to create the heavens and the earth…'”

From this grammatical reading, McClellan concludes:

“This means that there were already dark and murky waters before God’s creation of the heavens and the earth… What it clearly does not present is the notion of creatio ex nihilo—creation out of nothing.”

McClellan’s grammatical analysis aligns with several prominent modern translations, including the NRSV, JPS Tanakh, and Robert Alter’s Hebrew Bible translation, all of which render Genesis 1:1-2 as a temporal clause followed by a main clause. His reading has notable scholarly backing from E.A. Speiser, who argued in his Anchor Bible commentary on Genesis (1964) that verse 1 must be in construct relationship with what follows.

Comprehensive Grammatical Counteranalysis

However, this grammatical claim faces substantive challenges from multiple directions:

Absence of Article ≠ Construct Form: Copan and Craig directly contest McClellan’s grammatical premise, noting that the absence of the article does not necessitate a construct form. The broader usage of רֵאשִׁית (rēʾšît) in the Hebrew Bible overwhelmingly supports an absolute reading.
Biblical Parallels: Isaiah 46:10 provides a clear instance of רֵאשִׁית used absolutely, without the article: “I am God… declaring the end from the beginning (מֵרֵאשִׁית, mereʾšît)…” This usage contrasts “beginning” with “end” in a way that reinforces temporal comprehensiveness and divine sovereignty.
Additional Evidence: Proverbs 8:23, Job 8:7, 42:12, and Ecclesiastes 7:8 provide further examples where רֵאשִׁית is used absolutely—often as a merism contrasted with אַחֲרִית (“end”)—confirming its temporal totality and independence.
Expert Testimony: James Barr, a foremost authority on biblical semantics, states emphatically: “There is no grammatical evidence that ‘beginning’ is construct in Genesis 1:1. The construct reading is intrinsically unlikely.” He further argues that the construct interpretation “depends only on the absence of the article, and it simply will not work.”
Temporal Expression Patterns: Kenneth A. Mathews observes that “Hebrew frequently omits the article with temporal expressions. So, the lack of the article with רֵאשִׁית in Gen. 1:1 cannot be used as decisive evidence for a construct state.” Gesenius’s Hebrew Grammar (§126q) likewise acknowledges that certain temporal phrases regularly omit the article while still conveying an absolute sense.
The Missing Genitive Problem: As Walter C. Kaiser points out, if בְּרֵאשִׁית were in construct form, it would require an immediately following noun in the genitive case. Instead, it is followed by a perfect verb (בָּרָא), creating a grammatical tension for the construct reading. Bruce K. Waltke elaborates: “Since בְּרֵאשִׁית is followed by a finite verb rather than by a noun in the genitive relationship, most exegetes understand it as being in the absolute state.” (Creation and Chaos, 25)
Literary Considerations: Victor Hamilton notes that if 1:1 were a dependent clause, it would create an unusually long, disjointed sentence spanning multiple verses—entirely out of place in the structured, rhythmic narrative style of Genesis 1, which is characterized by concise declarations.
Ancient Translations: The Septuagint (LXX) translates Genesis 1:1 as “Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν” (“In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth”), clearly treating it as an independent clause. This represents the earliest interpretive tradition, dating to the 3rd century BCE. Similarly, the Vulgate’s “In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram” treats verse 1 as an independent statement.

U. Cassuto, the eminent Hebrew Bible scholar, makes a further syntactical observation about Genesis 1:2:

“If we were to render, ‘In the beginning of God’s creating’…then verse 2 would have no connection with verse 1. In that case, the right construction would have been: ‘In the beginning of God’s creating the heavens and the earth, WHEN the earth was without form and void…etc.'” (Commentary on the Book of Genesis, 20)

This syntactical difficulty presents a serious challenge to McClellan’s reading. The waw-consecutive structure of Biblical Hebrew narrative would require different connectives if verse 1 were merely introductory to the main action in verses 2-3.

Ancient Cosmological Understanding and Grammatical Choices

McClellan’s grammatical argument also presupposes that ancient Israelites would have found the concept of absolute creation unintelligible or foreign. Yet John Sailhamer notes:

“Though some have argued that the grammar of v. 1 makes it impossible to understand it as teaching creatio ex nihilo…such an interpretation pays little attention to the larger narrative and theological strategy of the Pentateuch.” (Genesis Unbound, 38)

Robert Jenson argues that the dependent clause reading often stems from “residual prejudices of a now-antique form of critical exegesis” that sought to find the “real” meaning of texts in earlier stages of the tradition, rather than interpreting the final form of the biblical text.

The Merism Argument: “The Heavens and the Earth” as Totality

Perhaps the strongest semantic evidence supporting the absolute reading of Genesis 1:1 lies in the Hebrew phrase “the heavens and the earth” (הַשָּׁמַיִם וְהָאָרֶץ, haššāmayim wĕhāʾāreṣ). This phrase functions as a merism—a rhetorical figure using two extremes to represent a comprehensive whole. “The heavens” (highest) and “the earth” (lowest) together signify the entire cosmos.

As Gordon Wenham explains:

“This combination [‘heavens and earth’] must then refer to the whole universe, as it does elsewhere in the Old Testament (e.g., Isa. 44:24)… It may thus be paraphrased ‘In the beginning God created everything.'”

This merism has profound implications for McClellan’s thesis. If “the heavens and the earth” encompasses totality, then Genesis 1:1 cannot merely describe the beginning of an ordering process—it must refer to the origination of all things, without exception. Even if one were to accept the dependent clause reading grammatically, the merism renders it theologically inconsequential, as Hershel Shanks notes:

“Perhaps more important, whether creatio ex nihilo is implied in verse 1 depends not so much on how we begin the verse, but on how we understand ‘heavens and earth.'”

Significantly, this merism directly contradicts McClellan’s claim that the scene begins with pre-existing waters and earth that God simply orders. The entire cosmos—including the deep and the darkness—is subsumed under this meristic totality as God’s creation.

Syntactical Structure of Genesis 1:1-2

The syntax of Genesis 1:2, beginning with waw + noun + verb (“And the earth was…”), reveals that verse 2 is circumstantial, describing the state of the earth that verse 1 brought into being. This structure confirms that verse 1 narrates an actual creative event, not merely an introductory clause.

Bernhard Anderson concludes:

“Genesis 1:1 is indeed an independent sentence, referring to an ‘absolute beginning,’ the origination of all things.”

Engaging the Ancient Near Eastern Context: Polemical Dimensions of Genesis 1

While acknowledging the ANE background that informs McClellan’s reading, we must carefully distinguish between literary influence and theological intention. The Genesis account undeniably employs familiar ANE metaphors and images (waters, darkness, separation, ordering) while simultaneously transforming them to convey a radically different theological message through deliberate polemical strategies.

The Polemical Character of Genesis 1

Genesis 1 functions as a sophisticated theological polemic against surrounding cosmogonies. As Gerhard Hasel argues, “The Genesis cosmology represents not only a ‘complete break’ with the mythological cosmologies of the ancient Near East but represents a parting of the spiritual ways brought about by a conscious and deliberate antimythical polemic” (The Polemic Nature of the Genesis Cosmology, 82).

This polemical intent is evident in numerous aspects of the text:

Demythologization of Nature: Genesis deliberately strips cosmic elements (sun, moon, stars, sea) of the divine status they held in ANE pantheons. The sun and moon are not even named but referred to as “greater” and “lesser” lights—serving functions assigned by God rather than functioning as deities.
Sequential Creation vs. Theogony: Unlike ANE myths where creation emerges from divine procreation or the bodies of slain deities, Genesis presents an ordered, purposeful sequence initiated by divine speech.
Creation Without Conflict: The conspicuous absence of divine combat (theomacy) stands in stark contrast to Mesopotamian and Canaanite myths. While ANE cosmogonies often feature violent struggles between deities (e.g., Marduk vs. Tiamat in Enuma Elish), Genesis portrays creation as the effortless result of divine command.
Linguistic Subversions: The Hebrew term תְהוֹם (tehom, “the deep”) in Genesis 1:2 linguistically parallels the Babylonian chaos monster Tiamat, yet Genesis deliberately de-personifies this term, reducing it to a mere element of the physical world subject to God’s creative authority.
Sabbath as Creation’s Climax: Unlike ANE accounts where temple-building forms the culmination of creation, Genesis presents the Sabbath as creation’s climax—emphasizing divine rest rather than divine habitation as the goal of cosmic order.

Walther Eichrodt notes that this polemic extends even to the treatment of chaos:

“What we have here is a conception carefully purged of all mythological elements… The watery chaos is no opposing divine power, but a part of the world already created.” (Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. 2, 95)

The Tannin and Leviathan Polemic

Particularly relevant to McClellan’s chaos-to-order thesis is the biblical treatment of sea monsters (tannin) and Leviathan. While ANE myths (especially Ugaritic texts) depict these as primordial chaos monsters that gods must defeat, Genesis 1:21 starkly demythologizes them:

“So God created the great sea monsters (hatanninim hagedolim) and every living creature that moves…”

Here, the sea monsters—which represented cosmic chaos in surrounding mythologies—are merely creatures made by God on the fifth day, fully subordinate to divine authority. This deliberate undermining of mythological symbols continues in Psalm 104:26, where Leviathan (the cosmic chaos serpent in Canaanite mythology) is reduced to God’s plaything:

“There go the ships, and Leviathan that you formed to sport in it.”

This consistent demythologization strategy directly challenges McClellan’s thesis that Genesis 1 simply reworks standard ANE chaos-to-order motifs. The text shows a deliberate theological intent to refute such mythological frameworks.

Material Origins in ANE Thought

David T. Tsumura warns against overinterpreting ANE parallels, noting that ancient Near Eastern people were not oblivious to material origins. Ugaritic texts, for instance, call the creator god El the “creator of creatures,” indicating interest in the origin of tangible beings. John Walton, despite emphasizing functional ontology, acknowledges:

“Material origins were of interest to people in the ancient world and were discussed in their literature.” (The Lost World of Genesis One, 43)

This challenges McClellan’s claim that Genesis 1 is exclusively concerned with ordering rather than with ultimate origins.

Historical Development of Creatio Ex Nihilo

McClellan correctly observes that the formal doctrine of creatio ex nihilo crystallized in the 2nd century AD. However, his conclusion that it represents a “reflective innovation” rather than the plain sense of Genesis requires qualification.

The historical development of theological formulations does not necessarily indicate their absence from biblical texts. Many Christian doctrines underwent similar developmental processes (e.g., the Trinity) without contradicting their scriptural foundations. The 2nd-century articulation of creatio ex nihilo emerged precisely as Christians reflected more deeply on the implications of biblical creation texts when confronted with competing Greek philosophical and Gnostic cosmologies.

2 Maccabees 7:28 (2nd century BC) already explicitly asserts that God made the universe “not from existing things”—showing that pre-Christian Judaism had moved toward articulating creation from nothing based on their understanding of Genesis and broader biblical teaching.

The Canonical Perspective: New Testament Evidence

From a canonical perspective, several New Testament passages reinforce the understanding that God created all things without pre-existing material:

John 1:1-3: Creation Through the Word

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being.”

The prologue to John’s Gospel begins with the same temporal marker as Genesis 1:1 (ἐν ἀρχῇ/בְּרֵאשִׁית) and explicitly states that everything that exists came into being (ἐγένετο) through the Word. The emphatic statement that “without him not one thing came into being” (χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν ὃ γέγονεν) logically excludes the existence of primordial matter outside divine creative activity.

Larry Hurtado observes:

“John’s prologue makes an exclusive claim for the Word’s role in creation that leaves no room for independent primordial matter. The emphasis on ‘all things’ and ‘not one thing’ without his agency represents a cosmic claim of unprecedented scope.”

Romans 4:17: Calling Non-Existence Into Being

Paul describes God as the one “who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist” (καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα). This language of calling non-existent things into existence directly connects to creation and aligns with the ex nihilo concept, as recognized by patristic interpreters like Theophilus of Antioch.

The phrase τὰ μὴ ὄντα (“things that do not exist”) uses the Greek philosophical language of non-being, suggesting that God’s creative power extends beyond mere re-arrangement of existing matter to causing existence itself.

Hebrews 11:3: Creation Not From Appearances

“By faith we understand that the worlds were prepared by the word of God, so that what is seen was made from things that are not visible.”

The phrase μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων (“not from things that are visible/apparent”) has been variously interpreted. While McClellan might read this as merely distinguishing visible results from invisible processes, the passage’s emphasis on divine speech creating reality through faith-perception suggests a more fundamental ontological claim.

David deSilva argues:

“Hebrews 11:3 refers to creation as an act of divine speech that does not depend on pre-existing materials. The author contrasts the visible cosmos with its non-phenomenal origin, emphasizing divine sovereignty over existence itself.”

The reference to divine speech (ῥήματι θεοῦ) also connects back to Genesis 1’s repeated “And God said,” reinforcing the sovereignty of divine command in bringing reality into being.

Colossians 1:15-17: Christ’s Cosmic Priority

“He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible… all things have been created through him and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”

Paul’s Christological hymn emphasizes Christ’s priority to “all things” (τὰ πάντα) both temporally (“before all things”) and causally (“in him… through him… for him”). The comprehensive scope leaves no room for uncreated matter.

Gregory Beale notes:

“Colossians attributes to Christ both originating and sustaining causation of the entire cosmos. The text makes both temporal and ontological claims about Christ’s relationship to creation that are incompatible with eternal matter.”

Revelation 4:11: Creation by Divine Will

“You are worthy, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created.”

This doxology in Revelation presents creation as the direct result of divine will (διὰ τὸ θέλημά σου), again emphasizing that nothing exists independently of God’s creative intent.

While none of these texts explicitly uses the phrase “creatio ex nihilo,” they collectively reinforce the understanding that nothing exists independent of God’s creative activity—precisely the theological insight that the doctrine of creation from nothing aims to preserve.

McClellan correctly identifies that the formal doctrine developed in the 2nd century AD, but these New Testament passages demonstrate that the theological trajectory toward creatio ex nihilo was already embedded in the canonical texts themselves, not artificially imposed later.

Theological Coherence and Implications

The theological stakes of this debate are significant. If McClellan’s reading is correct, Genesis 1 leaves open the possibility that matter (in chaotic form) is co-eternal with God—a position that creates substantial tensions with the biblical emphasis on God’s absolute sovereignty and the contingency of all created reality.

William P. Brown acknowledges that the Priestly author of Genesis was comfortable portraying a pre-existent chaos without feeling this compromised God’s transcendence. However, this apparent comfort may stem from the assumption that readers would naturally understand God as the ultimate source of all reality, making explicit statement unnecessary.

II. The Image of God: Ontological Reality or Functional Role?

McClellan’s Functional View of the Imago Dei

McClellan’s second provocative claim concerns the “image of God” (imago Dei) in Genesis 1:26-27. While traditional Christian interpretations have typically understood the divine image as an ontological endowment of human nature (relating to rationality, morality, or spiritual capacity), McClellan argues for a primarily functional interpretation tied to royal representation and temple theology.

The Royal Representative Function

According to McClellan, the divine image in Genesis 1 should be understood primarily through the lens of ancient Near Eastern royal ideology. In ANE thought, kings were considered living images of deities—their representatives who exercised divine authority on earth. McClellan argues:

“The ‘image of God’ concept in Genesis 1 directly parallels the way ANE kings described themselves as images of their patron deities. Far from being a unique metaphysical endowment, the biblical language draws from royal ideology to designate humans as God’s earthly representatives.”

This interpretation finds support in the immediate context of Genesis 1:26-28, where humanity is given dominion over creation immediately after being declared God’s image-bearers. The sequence suggests that bearing God’s image is directly connected to exercising delegated authority. As McClellan notes:

“The functional view makes better sense of the parallel between image-bearing and dominion. Humans don’t just happen to bear God’s image AND have dominion; they have dominion BECAUSE they bear God’s image—they function as God’s royal representatives.”

McClellan further points to Egyptian and Mesopotamian parallels where kings were described as divine images. For instance, in the Tukulti-Ninurta Epic, the Assyrian king is called “the eternal image of Enlil.” Similar language appears in New Kingdom Egyptian texts describing Pharaoh as “the living image of Amun.” These parallels suggest that when Genesis speaks of humans as God’s image, it employs recognized conceptual language from royal ideology.

Temple Inaugurational Context

Building on John Walton’s cosmic temple interpretation, McClellan situates the imago Dei within temple theology. He argues that Genesis 1 portrays creation as a cosmic temple, with humanity serving as the divine image within that temple—similar to how ANE temples housed divine images representing the deity’s presence and authority.

In this reading, Genesis 1:26-28 designates humans as God’s cult image or idol—not metaphysically, but functionally. They represent divine presence and mediate divine rule within creation. McClellan connects this to ancient practices where divine images were ritually “enlivened” through mouth-opening ceremonies before being installed in temples. Genesis, he suggests, subversively replaces lifeless idols with living humans who bear God’s image.

Critiquing the Purely Functional View

While McClellan’s functional interpretation offers valuable insights, it faces several significant limitations and challenges:

1. False Dichotomy Between Function and Ontology

The first problem is the creation of an unnecessary dichotomy between functional and ontological interpretations. As Richard Middleton observes in The Liberating Image:

“The image of God in Genesis is undoubtedly functional, but function presupposes form. The human capacity to represent God in the world depends on corresponding ontological characteristics.”

Humans must possess certain capacities (rationality, moral agency, relational nature) to effectively function as God’s representatives. The text’s silence about these capacities doesn’t negate their necessity; it merely indicates they weren’t the primary focus of the Genesis narrative.

2. Universal Application Transcends ANE Royal Ideology

Unlike ANE parallels where only kings bear the divine image, Genesis democratizes this status, extending it to all humanity—male and female (Gen 1:27). As theologian Phyllis Bird notes:

“Genesis 1 radically universalizes what was elite ideology in the ancient Near East. The revolutionary claim is that all humans—not just kings—bear the divine image.”

This universal application suggests something more fundamental than royal-functional representation is at work in the Genesis account.

3. New Testament Development and Theological Trajectory

The New Testament develops the image concept in ways that move beyond mere function:

Colossians 1:15-20 identifies Christ as “the image of the invisible God” in an ontological sense that cannot be reduced to mere function
Romans 8:29 and 2 Corinthians 3:18 speak of believers being “conformed to the image” of Christ through spiritual transformation
Ephesians 4:24 connects the image with “righteousness and holiness”—moral qualities rather than just functional roles

G.K. Beale’s research on Adam-Christ typology demonstrates that the New Testament consistently treats the image as something that can be damaged, distorted, and restored—suggesting an ontological reality rather than merely a designated role.

4. Traditional Theological Integration

The Christian theological tradition has consistently integrated functional and ontological aspects of the imago Dei. Augustine located the image in rational capacity, Irenaeus distinguished between “image” (natural resemblance) and “likeness” (moral conformity), and Karl Barth emphasized relationality as core to the divine image.

Thomas Aquinas summarized the integrated view:

“Man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature… But the intellect or reason is that through which man exercises dominion.”

This synthesis acknowledges both the functional role emphasized by McClellan and the ontological capacities that enable that function.

5. Historical-Grammatical Considerations

While Genesis 1 undoubtedly employs ANE royal language, the Hebrew phrase בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ (“in our image, according to our likeness”) suggests more than function alone. As C. John Collins notes:

“The pairing of ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ creates a hendiadys emphasizing resemblance. This is strengthened by the prepositions בְּ and כְּ, which typically indicate correspondence or similarity.”

The careful language suggests that humans bear God’s image precisely because they correspond to or resemble God in certain ways—an ontological claim that grounds their functional role.

6. The Context of Divine Image Bans

McClellan’s temple-functional reading must also be considered against the backdrop of the biblical prohibition against divine images (Exodus 20:4-6). As biblical scholar Brevard Childs observed:

“Genesis 1:26-27 stands in tension with the later image ban, suggesting that humans themselves are the only legitimate ‘images’ of God—not because they merely function as such, but because they uniquely reflect divine reality.”

This creates a theological statement about human nature that transcends mere functional designation.

Conclusion

This analysis demonstrates that McClellan’s grammatical arguments against creatio ex nihilo in Genesis 1, while scholarly and linguistically nuanced, face substantial challenges from both textual evidence and theological coherence. The merism “heavens and earth” in Genesis 1:1 most naturally indicates that all reality originates from God’s creative activity, not merely that God ordered pre-existing chaos.

While Genesis 1 undoubtedly employs ANE cosmological imagery, it transforms these motifs to communicate a distinct theological vision. The text may not explicitly articulate creatio ex nihilo in philosophical terms, but its theological trajectory—particularly when read canonically—strongly supports the understanding that all reality, including the primordial “chaos,” owes its existence to God.

Rather than viewing creatio ex nihilo as a late invention disconnected from biblical teaching, we might better understand it as an articulation of what Genesis 1 implies: that God alone is eternal, and all else—whether formed or unformed—exists by divine will. This theological insight preserves what is most essential in the biblical creation account: God’s absolute sovereignty, creation’s inherent goodness, and the fundamental distinction between Creator and creation.

Copan & Craig: A Scholarly Rebuttal

Copan and Craig directly challenge the grammatical assumption underlying McClellan’s claim. They observe that the absence of the article does not necessitate a construct form and that the broader usage of rēʾšît in the Hebrew Bible overwhelmingly supports an absolute reading:

“We can forcefully say that it just has not been shown that bereʾšît (‘in [the] beginning’) cannot have an absolute sense.”
—Copan & Craig, Creation Out of Nothing, 37

They point to Isaiah 46:10, which reads:

“I am God… declaring the end from the beginning (mereʾšît)…”

This is a clear instance of rēʾšît used absolutely, without the article, and in contrast to “the end.” Walter Eichrodt interprets this to mean God possesses “absolute disposition over beginning and end,” reinforcing the temporal comprehensiveness and sovereignty expressed.

Furthermore, Copan and Craig cite Proverbs 8:23, Job 8:7, 42:12, and Ecclesiastes 7:8 as examples where rēʾšît is used absolutely, often as a merism in contrast to “the end.” As James Barr emphatically states:

“The construct argument depends only on the absence of the article, and it simply will not work.”
—Creation Out of Nothing, 37

Furthermore, Copan and Craig cite Proverbs 8:23, Job 8:7, Job 42:12, and Ecclesiastes 7:8 as examples where rēʾšît (or its variations) are used absolutely—not in construct form—often contrasted with ‘aharît (“end”), which further confirms its temporal totality and independence from any following genitive or clause.

James Barr, a foremost authority on biblical semantics, underscores this:

“There is no grammatical evidence that ‘beginning’ is construct in Genesis 1:1. The construct reading is intrinsically unlikely.”
—James Barr, Fundamentalism, 1977

This reflects a broader semantic pattern in Hebrew: construct phrases require a genitive complement, which is absent here. As Raymond Van Leeuwen points out:

“The phrase bĕrēʾšît in Genesis 1:1 lacks the expected genitive complement, suggesting instead an absolute usage, much like in Isaiah 46:10: ‘declaring the end from the beginning [mērēʾšît].’”
—Van Leeuwen, DOTP, 2003

Additional strength comes from John Walton, who—although favoring a functional ontology—admits that:

“The syntax of bĕrēʾšît can go either way, but nothing in the verse demands a construct reading. Context becomes decisive.”
—Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, p. 27

Kenneth A. Mathews adds an important grammatical observation:

“Hebrew frequently omits the article with temporal expressions. So, the lack of the article with rēʾšît in Gen. 1:1 cannot be used as decisive evidence for a construct state.”
—Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, NAC, p. 139

Even Gesenius’s Hebrew Grammar (the foundational reference) acknowledges that certain temporal phrases regularly omit the article and still convey an absolute sense (GKC §126q).

The Literary and Syntactical Form

Building on this, Bernhard Anderson argues that stylistically and contextually, Genesis 1:1 is best read as a self-contained declarative sentence:

“Genesis 1:1 is indeed an independent sentence, referring to an ‘absolute beginning,’ the origination of all things.”
—Bernhard Anderson, Creation versus Chaos, 185

Victor Hamilton concurs, stating that if 1:1 were a dependent clause, it would create a long, disjointed, and awkward sentence spanning multiple verses, entirely out of place in the structured and rhythmic narrative of Genesis 1:

“If Genesis 1:1 is a temporal dependent clause, then the result is an unusually long, rambling sentence… quite out of place in this chapter, laced as it is with a string of staccato sentences.”
—Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, 109

The syntax of Genesis 1:2, beginning with a waw + noun + verb construction (“And the earth was…”), shows that verse 2 is circumstantial, describing the state of the earth that was just brought into being in verse 1. This structure confirms that verse 1 must be narrating an actual event, not just an introductory title or temporal clause.

Broader Literary and Theological Context

As Copan and Craig also note, the construct view often stems from historical-critical prejudices that seek to read Genesis through reconstructed pre-canonical stages, rather than interpreting the final form of the biblical text:

“The dependent clause derives from ‘residual prejudices of a now-antique form of critical exegesis’ that sought to find the ‘real’ meaning of texts in earlier stages of the tradition.”
—Robert Jenson, as cited in Creation Out of Nothing, 45

Raymond Van Leeuwen adds that the absolute beginning in Genesis 1:1 implies God’s complete sovereignty over creation—both its origination and its ordering.

“Genesis 1:1 communicates both an absolute beginning to the universe as well as God’s absolute sovereignty by first bringing it into existence and then ordering it by his will.”
—Van Leeuwen, Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch

Von Rad calls verse 1 an “overarching theological affirmation” that sets the Genesis account in stark contrast to ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies, where matter or chaos is often eternal and divine.

The Merism Argument: “The Heavens and the Earth” as Totality

One of the strongest semantic arguments supporting the absolute reading of Genesis 1:1 lies in the Hebrew phrase “the heavens and the earth” (haššāmayim wĕhāʾāreṣ). According to Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, this phrase functions as a merism, a rhetorical figure that uses two extremes or parts to refer to a comprehensive whole. In this context, “the heavens” (the highest place) and “the earth” (the lowest) represent everything in existence—the entire cosmos.

“Third, the phrase ‘the heavens and the earth’ is a merism that refers to the totality. According to Hershel Shanks, many of the alleged problems for the absolute reading brought up by Speiser and others… are resolved when we see that ‘the heavens and the earth’ is a merism… In Genesis 1:1, the author is not telling us about the order of creation; instead, he is telling us that ‘God made the universe.’” (Copan & Craig, Creation Out of Nothing, p. 40–41)

This merism supports the absolute and independent reading of Genesis 1:1 because it refers to everything God made—material and immaterial—without exception. If “the heavens and the earth” is understood as totality, then the verse is not just the beginning of some things, but the origination of all things. In this view, Genesis 1:1 proclaims a cosmic beginning, not merely the onset of a particular creative phase.

“If ‘heaven and earth’ describes only organization and ordering, then some primordial existence is not precluded. But if ‘heaven and earth’ refers to everything—‘the works’—that would exclude primordial matter.” (Ibid.)

Gordon Wenham concurs:

“This combination [‘heavens and earth’] must then refer to the whole universe, as it does elsewhere in the Old Testament (e.g., Isa. 44:24)… It may thus be paraphrased ‘In the beginning God created everything.’” (Genesis 1–15, p. 12–13)

Likewise, Westermann states that the term “beginning” in Genesis 1:1 must be taken absolutely, and the phrase “the heavens and the earth” encompasses the totality of what is created, pointing toward a cosmic origin and not just a functional reshaping:

“The beginning [in Genesis 1:1] means not the beginning of something, but simply The Beginning. Everything began with God.” (Genesis 1–11, quoted in Copan & Craig, p. 41)

This helps answer Dan McClellan’s critique that Genesis 1 is only about function and ordering, not creation ex nihilo. If “the heavens and the earth” is a merism indicating totality, then the dependent clause view, which suggests a chaotic substrate already exists when God begins creating, collapses. The merism implies that nothing else preexisted; “the heavens and the earth” include everything God brought into being—even the chaotic waters of verse 2.

Even if someone argues for the construct view grammatically, this merism renders it theologically inert, as Hershel Shanks notes:

“Perhaps more important, whether creatio ex nihilo is implied in verse 1 depends not so much on how we begin the verse, but on how we understand ‘heavens and earth.’” (Quoted in Copan & Craig, p. 41)

In sum, even if one were to insist on a dependent clause grammatically, once the phrase “heavens and earth” is seen as a totality, the claim that God merely shapes preexistent matter becomes impossible. There would be no “chaos” before God’s creation, because “everything” originates in this act. This reading aligns precisely with the rest of Scripture’s affirmation that all things—seen and unseen—are God’s handiwork (Isa. 44:24; Psalm 148:5; Col. 1:16; Heb. 11:3).

This directly contradicts Dan McClellan’s claim that the scene begins with already-existing waters and earth that God simply orders. On his reading, the “heavens and the earth” appear to be created later or are presupposed as already present. But the merism, taken seriously, renders such an interpretation theologically incoherent. The entire cosmos, including the deep and the darkness, is subsumed under the meristic totality—and God made it.

Hershel Shanks makes the same point: if “heaven and earth” is a totalizing phrase, then even if one were to read Genesis 1:1 as a construct phrase grammatically, the theological implication would remain the same: creatio ex nihilo is implied.

“Perhaps more important, whether creatio ex nihilo is implied in verse 1 depends, not so much on how we begin the verse, but on how we understand ‘heaven[s] and earth.’”
—Shanks, quoted in Copan & Craig, p. 41

Robert Alter, whom McClellan cites favorably, likewise observes that this phrase points to everything created:

“The paired terms heavens and earth are a merism, a rhetorical device for indicating totality by mentioning two extremes.”
—Robert Alter, The Hebrew Bible: A Translation with Commentary, Vol. 1, Genesis 1:1 note

Thus, even Alter’s literary approach does not support the idea that some preexistent, unordered substrate exists independently of God. The opening of Genesis is not a scene set for divine ordering—it is a declaration of divine authorship over all that is.

This also connects powerfully to later intertextual affirmations. For instance, Isaiah 44:24:

“I am the LORD, who made all things, who alone stretched out the heavens, who spread out the earth by myself.”

This explicit denial of rival causality or dualistic creation affirms the absolute nature of the merism: all things came into existence by divine fiat, with no prior material or pantheon involved.

In short, the merism “the heavens and the earth” functions not only as a semantic totality but also as a theological shield against the idea of eternal matter, pre-cosmic chaos, or divine limitation. It insists that no realm lies outside the Creator’s sovereignty, and it forms the lexical and conceptual basis for the absolute, ex nihilo reading of Genesis 1:1.

Theological Coherence: The Construct View Undermines Canonical Monotheism and Biblical Cosmology

Copan and Craig argue that the temporal/construct reading of Genesis 1:1—which interprets the verse as “When God began to create the heavens and the earth…”—fails to align with the overwhelmingly consistent theology of creation found throughout the rest of Scripture. If Genesis 1:1 were merely introducing a scene in which matter already exists, this would contradict numerous passages that ascribe to God the creation of all things—including the chaotic elements—by his own word and without external materials.

They write:

“A key problem with the construct reading is that it does not comport with the remainder of biblical theology. The overwhelming witness of Scripture is that the whole cosmos was created by God out of nothing—including what appears in Genesis 1:2.”
—Copan & Craig, Creation Out of Nothing, p. 45

Let’s examine the passages they highlight to demonstrate this.

1. Isaiah 40:21

“Do you not know? Do you not hear? Has it not been told you from the beginning? Have you not understood from the foundations of the earth?”

Here the “beginning” (rēʾšît) is an absolute temporal reference to the origination of the cosmos. There is no suggestion of a prior substrate—this is the time when all things were brought into being by God. This undercuts Dan McClellan’s claim that Genesis 1:1 merely sets the scene for shaping a pre-existent chaos.

2. Isaiah 44:24

“Thus says the LORD, your Redeemer, who formed you from the womb: ‘I am the LORD, who made all things, who alone stretched out the heavens, who spread out the earth by myself.’”

This is one of the clearest anti-dualist declarations in the Old Testament. God created the heavens and the earth alone—without any rival, aid, or independent material. The verbs “stretched out” and “spread out” emphasize sovereign action, not manipulation of already-present stuff. It directly contradicts the notion—implied by the construct reading—that chaos was there before God acted.

3. Isaiah 45:7–12

“I form light and create darkness, I make well-being and create calamity… I made the earth and created man on it; it was my hands that stretched out the heavens, and I commanded all their host.”

This passage affirms that even darkness (linked in Genesis 1:2 to primordial chaos) is created by God. In McClellan’s reading, darkness is part of the scene that exists before creation begins. But Isaiah says no—God formed it, alongside all other things. The theological import is that God is not a craftsman working with preexistent matter; he is the sovereign Creator of all conditions—light, dark, peace, calamity, sky, earth, and sea.

4. Isaiah 48:13

“My hand laid the foundation of the earth, and my right hand spread out the heavens; when I call to them, they stand forth together.”

Copan and Craig appeal to this to show God’s foundational authorship of creation. It doesn’t describe God shaping what already exists—it shows him laying down the very framework of reality. There is no “already present earth” to be formed, no murky waters awaiting divine order. There is only God’s sovereign will, acting freely and omnipotently.

5. Psalm 33:6, 9

“By the word of the LORD the heavens were made, and by the breath of his mouth all their host… For he spoke, and it came to be; he commanded, and it stood firm.”

This is a strong poetic and theological affirmation of creation by divine fiat—not shaping, but bringing into existence by speech. The psalmist doesn’t say “he organized what was there,” but “he spoke, and it came to be.” The phrase “he commanded, and it stood firm” shows that God’s word is effectual and self-sufficient—an idea that dissolves if creation begins with existing murky waters and darkness.

6. Psalm 148:5

“Let them praise the name of the LORD! For he commanded and they were created.”

Again, the creation of everything in heaven and earth is credited to a divine command, not to a process of arrangement. The psalmist says “they were created”—a clear passive divine action—not “they were shaped” or “restructured.”

Conclusion: Coherence With Canonical Theology

The construct reading, as advanced by scholars like Dan McClellan, isolates Genesis 1:1–2 from the rest of Scripture. It reduces the opening of the Bible to an anthropomorphic setup scene—an earth already submerged in chaotic waters awaiting divine intervention. But as Copan and Craig rightly emphasize, the broader theological witness of the Bible is that:

God alone created all things,
God’s creative word brought everything into being,
And there is no rival material, force, or chaos uncreated by him.

In sum, as they write:

“Genesis 1:1 should not be interpreted in isolation from the larger theological testimony of Scripture. The construct view not only disrupts the literary and grammatical flow—it collapses under the weight of the biblical worldview it fails to support.”
—Copan & Craig, Creation Out of Nothing, p. 45–46

1. Independent Clause Argument

1. Kenneth Mathews: Morphology and Syntax Oppose the Dependent Reading

Mathews insists Genesis 1:1 should not be read as a construct form but as an absolute noun introducing a main clause. He writes:

“The Masoretic accent on berēʾšît is disjunctive, separating it from the rest of the verse, indicating that it is in the absolute state, not construct. Furthermore, the ancient versions—LXX, Vulgate, Targums, Peshitta—all render it as an independent clause, which supports the traditional translation: ‘In the beginning, God created…’”

This is important because the construct theory, advocated by Speiser and echoed in modern translations like the NJPS and NEB, treats the word berēʾšît (“beginning”) as a construct noun requiring a genitive complement, turning Genesis 1:1 into a dependent temporal clause: “When God began to create…”

But Mathews and others note that if berēʾšît were construct, we would expect the syntax to be like Hosea 1:2 (“When the Lord began to speak…”), where a construct is explicitly followed by a genitive or infinitive phrase. Genesis 1:1 lacks such a structure.

He continues:

“The absence of the article on reʾšît does not necessitate a construct state; absolute temporal expressions often lack the article in Hebrew” (cf. Isa 46:10; Prov 8:23; Mic 5:2).

2. Victor Hamilton: Aesthetics, Syntax, and Ancient Versions

Hamilton also favors the independent clause reading, calling the dependent reading “a jarringly unaesthetic” and grammatically implausible structure in context:

“If Gen 1:1 is a temporal dependent clause… the result is an unusually long, rambling sentence, in itself not unheard of, but quite out of place in this chapter, laced as it is with a string of staccato sentences”.

Hamilton is highlighting how form matters for interpretation. The literary rhythm of Genesis 1 is tight and sequential. Reading verse 1 as a dependent clause would break the cadence of the narrative, unlike the concise “And God said…” style that follows.

He also stresses that:

“Verse 1 presents the heavens and the earth as the first effect of the divine word, not as a background for it” (NICOT: Genesis, p. 103).

Hamilton identifies the major flaw in reading verse 1 as “when God began to create…”: it renders the next two verses syntactically incoherent and stylistically bloated. In his words:

“If Genesis 1:1 is a temporal dependent clause, the result is an unusually long, rambling sentence, quite out of place in a chapter laced with staccato structure.” (Genesis 1–17, p. 124)

Genesis 1 is marked by short, crisp, and formulaic sentences: “And God said… and it was so… and God saw that it was good.” The idea that the first three verses are a single, awkward compound sentence contradicts this deliberate parataxis.

In contrast, the independent-clause reading provides a clean narrative break:

Verse 1: the act of initial creation.
Verse 2: the condition of the unformed earth.
Verse 3: the first creative word (light).

This preserves both literary coherence and theological momentum.

Hamilton also addresses the argument that the Hebrew phrase בְּרֵאשִׁית (b’reʾšît) is in the construct state and must introduce a following clause. He counters by noting that:

Absolute uses of rēʾšît do exist in the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Isa 46:10).
All ancient versions—LXX, Vulgate, Targum Onkelos, Syriac—understand Genesis 1:1 as a complete sentence.
The Masoretic accenting supports an independent reading, marking b’reʾšît with a disjunctive accent (tiphcha), typical of independent clauses.

He concludes:

“It cannot be denied that the absolute reading of rēʾšît is legitimate and even preferable… the construct hypothesis raises more problems than it solves.” (Genesis 1–17, p. 125)

For Hamilton, the grammar leads to a theological point. The construct reading pushes the act of creation to verse 3, leaving the origin of “the earth” and “the deep” unaccounted for. This opens the door to the chaoskampf hypothesis (i.e., that God simply tames preexistent chaos), which he firmly rejects:

“Genesis 1:1 declares the origination of all reality under divine sovereignty. Nothing precedes God’s act. There is no chaos monster; no Tiamat lurks in the background.” (p. 126)

Hamilton thus maintains that Genesis 1:1 stands as a decisive break from pagan creation myths and affirms creation ex nihilo, even if the phrase is not formally used.

3. Allen P. Ross: Construct Reading Violates Hebrew Expectations

Ross explains that the construct reading would require Genesis 1:2 to begin with wayhi or a siRoss defends the independent clause reading grammatically, syntactically, and exegetically:

“Such a view takes verse 1 as an independent, narrative sentence recording the first part of the work of God in creation on the first day… Verse 2 records three disjunctive, parallel clauses that describe the condition of the earth immediately after the creation of the universe.”

Ross continues that if b’reʾšît were in construct, we would expect the main clause (v. 2) to begin with a verbal form like wayhî (“and it was”). Instead, it begins with a disjunctive clause, marked by a non-verbal subject (“the earth”) and verb (hāyĕtā). This marks circumstantial background, not a temporal sequence, which is strong evidence that Genesis 1:1 initiates the narrative:

“If b’reʾšît were taken as construct, then verse 2 would begin with wayhî or hāyĕtā. Moreover, the Masoretes, as well as the ancient versions, understood the form as absolute.”

Ross affirms that the word “beginning” (rēʾšît) here refers to the first phase of the universe—not a poetic or indeterminate start—and that the verb bārāʾ (create) supports an absolute act, not a reforming of chaos.

4. Gordon Wenham: Lexical Considerations

Wenham offers both grammatical and theological grounds for rejecting the construct reading. First, he challenges the assumption that b’reʾšît must be construct because it lacks a definite article:

“The majority of recent writers reject the construct interpretation. The absence of the article is not decisive, for temporal expressions often omit it.”

Wenham cites many examples (e.g., Isa 41:4; 46:10; Mic 5:1) to show that “beginning” can function as an absolute noun even without an article. James Barr supports this point, arguing there is “no grammatical evidence” for the construct view, calling it “intrinsically unlikely.”

Additionally, Wenham stresses that the verb bārāʾ is unique to divine action, never used of humans, and is never employed for reshaping existing materials. This makes the construct-dependent rendering (“when God began to create…”) incoherent:

“The verb bārāʾ always has God as its subject and never mentions the material used, reinforcing the idea of absolute creation.”

5. John Sailhamer: Textual Flow and Theological Framing

SaI. Syntactic and Grammatical Argument

Sailhamer strongly affirms that Genesis 1:1 is not a temporal clause dependent on what follows, but rather a standalone verbal clause marking the first act of creation—a complete and independent sentence:

“The first verse, a verbal clause, should be taken as an independent statement rather than a summary of the rest of chapter 1. Thus 1:1 describes God’s first work of creation ex nihilo, and the rest of the chapter describes God’s further activity.”

This distinction is critical. If verse 1 were a dependent temporal clause (“When God began to create…”), then the act of creation itself is deferred to verse 3, implying that the formless and void state of the world in verse 2 was not itself created by God. But as Sailhamer rightly notes, this would undermine the affirmation of divine sovereignty over all things—visible and invisible.

Moreover, he argues that the grammar of the Hebrew supports the event reading:

“The author’s usual style in Genesis is to use nominal clauses as summary statements at the beginning of a narrative (e.g., 2:4a; 5:1; 6:9; 11:10), and verbal clauses as summaries at the end of the narrative (e.g., 2:1; 25:34b; 49:28b).”

But Genesis 1:1 is a verbal clause, which clearly indicates it is not a heading or summary, but rather a narrative action: “God created.” This alone undermines the literary structural expectation for a summary title.

II. The Use of the Perfect Verb בָּרָא (bārāʾ)

Sailhamer emphasizes that the use of the Hebrew perfect (past tense) verb בָּרָא indicates an event completed before the subsequent narrative. He writes:

“The verb בָּרָא is not used here as a general description but as a narrative action, anchoring it within the sequential chain of events.”

This is bolstered by comparisons to other narrative openers in Hebrew scripture, such as Daniel 1:1 and Ezra 1:1, where the Hebrew narrative structure follows the same sequence: temporal marker → perfect verb → subject. This linguistic pattern overwhelmingly favors an independent reading.

C. John Collins similarly confirms this pattern:

“The use of the Hebrew perfect tense at the commencement of a narrative normally refers to an antecedent event. The structure in Genesis 1:1 fits this standard narrative form and points to an actual creative act, not a heading or summary.”

III. Syntactic Coordination Between Verse 1 and 2

Another argument is based on how verse 2 begins with a waw + noun + verb structure (“and the earth was…”), which in Hebrew typically introduces circumstantial information about a previous statement, not new narrative advancement. This syntactic relationship implies that verse 1 is a completed action and verse 2 describes the resulting state of that creation:

“The conjunction at the beginning of 1:2 shows that 1:2–2:3 is coordinated with 1:1 rather than appositional. If the first verse were intended as a summary of the rest of the chapter, it would not be followed by a conjunction.”

This severely weakens the dependent clause reading, since circumstantial clauses presuppose an already existing narrative action—in this case, “God created.”

Sailhamer ultimately emphasizes the canonical importance of reading Genesis 1:1 as an event. He argues that the statement sets the theological tone for all of Scripture:

“The purpose of the statement is threefold: to identify the Creator, to explain the origin of the world, and to tie the work of God in the past to the work of God in the future.”

To relegate Genesis 1:1 to a subordinate or circumstantial clause weakens its doctrinal force. The verse is not merely background to a later creative command—it is the foundational truth: God alone is Creator of all that exists.

2. Dependent Clause Argument and Counterarguments

However, alternative readings of Genesis 1:1 exist. Scholars such as E.A. Speiser and Robert Holmstedt propose that Genesis 1:1 should be read as a dependent clause, introducing a condition under which the main creative acts (starting in verse 3) occur. Their argument hinges largely on the absence of the definite article in בְּרֵאשִׁית and syntactical parallels with other Hebrew texts employing dependent clauses at their openings.

E.A. Speiser argues syntactically that Genesis 1:1 is dependent, forming an introduction to verse 3. He proposes a structure: “When God began to create the heavens and the earth, the earth being unformed and void…” followed by God’s speech act in verse 3. Speiser sees verses 1-2 as parenthetical, a structure similar to some ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies.
Robert Holmstedt reinforces this by providing an intricate grammatical case that bereshit heads a construct state introducing an unmarked relative clause. For Holmstedt, the grammar favors a restrictive dependent clause rather than an absolute main clause.

Despite these claims, numerous counterarguments exist against reading Genesis 1:1 as dependent. Gordon Wenham critiques the dependent interpretation robustly, noting that the absence of the article in bereshit does not necessitate a construct form. Wenham points to numerous temporal Hebrew expressions without the definite article yet clearly understood as absolute. He also contests the parallels drawn with ancient Near Eastern creation stories as superficial rather than substantive, arguing Genesis stands apart in its monotheistic clarity.

3. Linguistic and Literary Observations by Poythress and Collins

Vern Poythress and C. John Collins highlight grammatical patterns that bolster the independeII. Arguments from Vern Poythress and C. John Collins

A. Grammatical Cohesion (Gen. 1:1–2)

Poythress argues that Genesis 1:1 and 1:2 are grammatically and syntactically linked, but crucially, this linkage supports an independent reading rather than a dependent temporal clause. He notes:

“The term ‘the earth’ (הָאָרֶץ) occurs as the last term in v. 1 and the first main term in v. 2. The syntactic linkage between the two verses consists in a waw-conjunctive, which, when followed by a noun and then the main verb of the clause, customarily introduces circumstantial information.”

He emphasizes that verse 2, introduced by this waw-conjunctive, provides a circumstantial description of the state resulting directly from the action in verse 1. This means the initial act of creation described in verse 1 left the earth in the unformed state depicted in verse 2:

“The act of creation mentioned in v. 1 results in an earth that is ‘without form and void.’ The early unformed state of the earth is described by 1:2 with reference to the earth of v. 1. So 1:1 cannot be a summary.”

Thus, grammatically, verse 1 describes the initial event (creation ex nihilo), and verse 2 gives circumstantial information about the immediate result of that event, clearly supporting the independent-clause interpretation.

Collins complements and clarifies this grammatical argument in Reading Genesis Well:

“The verb ברא (bārāʾ, ‘created’) in Genesis 1:1 is perfect in Hebrew, which normally refers to an event anterior (prior) to the main storyline. Thus, the grammar alone strongly supports reading Genesis 1:1 as an initial act of creation rather than as a subordinate clause to what follows.”

For Collins, this perfect verb form strongly implies a completed, antecedent event (the original creation), not an ongoing activity that verse 2 could merely describe as contemporaneous.

B. Theological Purpose: Absolute Divine Sovereignty

Poythress underscores the theological implications of this grammatical understanding, pointing out that interpreting Genesis 1:1 as dependent seriously undermines the absolute sovereignty emphasized throughout Genesis 1:

“If God did not make [the earth], if it is just eternally there, its original constitution escapes God’s sovereignty… Anything coeternal with God, even an impersonal coeternal, is really a rival to complete sovereignty. So it is fitting that the narrative in Gen 1:1 closes this door to rivalry.”

Thus, by creating ex nihilo, the narrative explicitly establishes God’s absolute and unrivaled sovereignty.

Collins similarly argues theologically that the dependent clause reading creates profound conceptual difficulties:

“To read Genesis 1:1 as a temporal clause (‘When God began to create…’) implies that the raw materials—the waters, darkness, and formless earth—were already there independently of God’s creative act. Such a reading implicitly introduces eternal matter, which stands in tension with the theological trajectory of the rest of the Hebrew Scriptures, consistently affirming God’s absolute sovereignty over all things.”

Collins highlights that the theology of the Old Testament consistently portrays God’s authority as absolute, not shared or contested by uncreated materials.

C. Narrative Structure: The Use of the Perfect Verb for Antecedent Events

Poythress and Collins both highlight that the Hebrew perfect verb form at the start of narratives typically denotes an antecedent (prior) event rather than serving as a subordinate clause. Collins specifically emphasizes this narrative convention:

“Hebrew narratives regularly use the perfect tense at their opening to set forth a completed, antecedent event that provides essential background for understanding subsequent narrative actions. Genesis 1:1 follows precisely this narrative convention.”

Collins cites clear analogies from Hebrew Scripture:

Daniel 1:1: “In the third year… Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon came (בָּא)…”
Ezra 1:1: “In the first year… the LORD stirred up (הֵעִיר)…”

He explicitly draws the parallel to Genesis 1:1:

“In both Daniel 1:1 and Ezra 1:1, we have an opening temporal expression (‘In the third year,’ ‘In the first year’) followed by a perfect verb form (‘came,’ ‘stirred up’), clearly indicating a narrative’s starting point with a completed event. Genesis 1:1 matches this structure exactly, strongly supporting the independent, absolute clause reading.”

Thus, Collins concludes that the syntactical pattern exhibited by Genesis 1:1 aligns with standard Hebrew narrative conventions, which solidly support the independent reading as the original and natural interpretation.

4. Theological Implications Reinforcing an Independent Clause

Moreover, Poythress also stresses the theological coherence of the independent clause interpretation. Genesis 1 emphatically portrays divine sovereignty without rival. Reading Genesis 1:1 as dependent would imply the existence of pre-existing matter (the earth and the deep), potentially rivaling God’s sovereignty. Genesis’ theological intention is to portray a God with total sovereign control over the origin and existence of all things, not merely their ordering or shaping. Hence, a dependent reading, introducing chaos prior to God’s action, undermines the core theological affirmation of divine sovereignty over creation.

5. Broader Scholarly Consensus

Paul Copan and William Lane Craig compellingly argue in favor of interpreting Genesis 1:1 as an independent clause (“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth”). They marshal extensive textual, historical, and linguistic evidence against the dependent-clause reading (“When God began to create…”) frequently suggested by recent scholars. Here, we clarify and further explicate their argumentation, providing richer detail and context for each source they cite.

1. The Hebrew Grammar and the LXX Rendering

The Hebrew phrase is:

בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ

The traditional and grammatically strong interpretation takes the word bereshit (“in the beginning”) as absolute rather than construct. If it were construct, the verse would be incomplete, functioning merely as a temporal clause connected to subsequent verses.

Yet, nearly all ancient translations interpreted it as absolute, including prominently the Greek Septuagint (LXX):

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν.

This Greek rendering, significantly, uses ἐν ἀρχῇ (en archē) in the absolute sense (“In the beginning”), making Genesis 1:1 a complete and independent declaration. As Bernhard Anderson argues:

“The testimony of the LXX, which treats Genesis 1:1 as an independent sentence in Greek, reinforces the thrust of an absolute beginning of the cosmos in that passage.” (Anderson, Creation versus Chaos, 185)

The LXX translators, Jewish scholars working around the 3rd century BC, thus affirmatively interpreted Genesis 1:1 as an independent sentence, establishing a powerful historical precedent.

2. The New Testament Witness (John 1:1)

This absolute interpretation is supported further by the prologue of the Gospel of John (1:1):

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος (“In the beginning was the Word”).

The direct parallelism between John 1:1 and the LXX’s Genesis 1:1 strongly indicates John’s intentional affirmation of an absolute beginning. This alignment of New Testament authorship with LXX’s interpretation further cements the independent reading’s historical credibility.

3. Josephus (First-Century Jewish Antiquities)

Josephus, a first-century Jewish historian writing in Greek, explicitly supports the absolute reading in his Jewish Antiquities (1.1):

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔκτισεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν
(“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.”)

Josephus’s decision to quote Genesis 1:1 in absolute terms strongly suggests that this was the authoritative interpretation among learned Jews of his day. As Hamilton observes:

“Rather than understanding Genesis 1:1 as construct, Josephus in his Antiquities follows the absolute rendering of the LXX.” (Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, 107)

This first-century witness is invaluable historically, reflecting mainstream Second Temple Jewish understanding.

4. Early Jewish and Christian Versions

Copan and Craig emphasize the unanimous ancient versions:

Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion: Early Greek translations from the Hebrew, widely known for their careful precision, all follow the absolute reading. Had the construct reading been plausible, these meticulous translators would likely have reflected it. Their agreement speaks volumes historically.
Targum Onkelos (Aramaic): Authoritative in ancient Judaism, it explicitly renders Genesis 1:1 independently: בקדמין ברא ייי ית שמיא וית ארעא
Pseudo-Justin (3rd century AD) directly cites LXX Genesis 1:1, further demonstrating widespread acceptance in early Christian circles: “Moses wrote thus: ‘In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.'” (Hortatory Address, 28)
Theophilus of Antioch (ca. AD 180) similarly draws from the absolute reading of the LXX: “In the beginning God created heaven” (To Autolycus 2.4).

5. Jerome’s Latin Vulgate (4th Century)

Jerome’s authoritative Latin translation reads Genesis 1:1 as an independent clause clearly and decisively:

In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.

Jerome’s Hebrew knowledge was renowned, and he consulted Jewish exegetes closely. Had the dependent reading had serious traction or linguistic validity, Jerome would likely have considered it. His choice strongly suggests an established scholarly tradition in favor of the independent clause.

6. Saadia Gaon (10th Century)

Saadia Gaon, the influential medieval Jewish scholar, produced a landmark Arabic translation of the Torah. He likewise rendered Genesis 1:1 independently. Saadia, known for his profound grammatical sensitivity, provides yet another historically significant Jewish confirmation of the traditional interpretation.

7. Masoretic Textual Tradition

The Masoretes (6th–10th century AD) accentuated and pointed the Hebrew text to indicate an absolute clause. Their punctuation system (disjunctive accent tiphcha on bereshit) explicitly favors reading Genesis 1:1 as an independent sentence. Wenham summarizes:

“The various versions and the Masoretic pointing imply that ‘this was the standard view from the third-century BC (LXX) through to the tenth century AD (MT).'” (Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 13)

The Independent Clause of Genesis 1:1: Ancient Witnesses and Historical Clarity

What emerges from Copan and Craig’s carefully selected evidence, when fully explained, is a remarkable historical unanimity:

All significant ancient translations (LXX, Targums, Vulgate, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion) affirm Genesis 1:1 as absolute.
Prominent ancient Jewish sources (Josephus, Masoretes, Saadia Gaon) unanimously support this absolute interpretation.
Early Christian authors (Theophilus, Pseudo-Justin, Jerome) firmly accept the independent reading as authoritative and normative.
John’s prologue (John 1:1) explicitly follows the absolute rendering, underscoring its theological significance in the Christian canon.

This consistent historical tradition significantly weakens the grammatical and linguistic arguments offered by recent proponents of the dependent reading. Though the dependent-clause hypothesis remains linguistically “possible,” its overwhelming historical disconfirmation, as Copan and Craig demonstrate, severely undermines its credibility.

In other words, historical and textual scholarship strongly aligns with Copan and Craig’s conclusion that Genesis 1:1 is best read as an absolute, independent clause affirming an absolute beginning of creation ex nihilo.

Summary of Scholarly Views on Genesis 1:1:

Independent Clause (Absolute Beginning):
- Traditional Hebrew textual evidence (Masoretic, Septuagint, Vulgate)
- Grammatical parallels with Daniel 1:1, Ezra 1:1 (Poythress, Collins)
- Theological coherence (Poythress, Wenham, Waltke)
- Dominant scholarly consensus today (Ross, Waltke, Wenham, Poythress)
Dependent Clause (Relative or Conditional):
- Suggested grammatical parallels (Speiser, Holmstedt)
- ANE literary form parallels (Speiser)
- Critiqued by Wenham and others as grammatically weak and theologically problematic

The weight of grammatical, linguistic, literary, historical, and theological evidence strongly favors understanding Genesis 1:1 as an independent, absolute clause, describing God’s initial creative act of calling the heavens and earth into existence from nothing. This interpretation not only aligns with classical and traditional readings but also ensures theological clarity regarding God’s ultimate sovereignty over all creation.

1. The Independent Clause Position

The traditional reading treats Genesis 1:1 as a complete, independent statement describing God’s initial creative act, with verse 2 providing the circumstantial details of the newly created world’s initial state.

Proponents argue:

The Hebrew term bereshit can function as an absolute noun even without the definite article
Ancient translations overwhelmingly favored this reading
The syntactic structure fits established Hebrew narrative patterns
Theologically, it establishes God’s sovereignty over all creation

2. The Dependent Clause Position

More recent scholars like E.A. Speiser and Robert Holmstedt have proposed reading Genesis 1:1 as a dependent temporal clause introducing the main creative acts beginning in verse 3.

This interpretation:

Focuses on the absence of the definite article in bereshit
Draws parallels with other Ancient Near Eastern creation accounts
Suggests the primary focus is on God ordering chaos rather than creating ex nihilo

B. Lexical and Grammatical Evidence

Gordon Wenham challenges the dependent clause reading on lexical grounds, noting:

“The absence of the article is not decisive, for temporal expressions often omit it.”

Wenham cites numerous examples (Isaiah 41:4, 46:10, Micah 5:1) where “beginning” functions as an absolute noun without requiring an article. James Barr supports this position, arguing there is “no grammatical evidence” compelling the construct view.

Critically, Wenham observes that the Hebrew verb bārāʾ exclusively describes divine action and “never mentions the material used,” reinforcing the concept of absolute creation rather than mere reorganization.

C. Narrative Structure and Syntax

John Sailhamer presents compelling evidence based on Hebrew narrative patterns. He notes that Genesis 1:1 is a verbal clause rather than a nominal clause, which is significant since:

“The author’s usual style in Genesis is to use nominal clauses as summary statements at the beginning of a narrative (e.g., 2:4a; 5:1; 6:9; 11:10), and verbal clauses as summaries at the end of the narrative (e.g., 2:1; 25:34b; 49:28b).”

As a verbal clause, Genesis 1:1 functions as a narrative action rather than a heading or summary. The use of the perfect tense verb bārāʾ indicates an event completed before the subsequent narrative begins.

C. John Collins reinforces this, noting that Hebrew narratives typically use perfect tense verbs at their opening to establish antecedent events, citing clear parallels in Daniel 1:1 and Ezra 1:1.

D. Syntactic Coordination Between Verses 1 and 2

The way verse 2 relates to verse 1 provides further evidence. Verse 2 begins with a waw + noun + verb structure (“and the earth was…”), which in Hebrew introduces circumstantial information about a previous statement rather than advancing the narrative. This syntactic relationship implies that verse 1 describes a completed action and verse 2 describes the resulting state:

“The conjunction at the beginning of 1:2 shows that 1:2–2:3 is coordinated with 1:1 rather than appositional. If the first verse were intended as a summary of the rest of the chapter, it would not be followed by a conjunction.”

E. Historical Testimony

The historical evidence overwhelmingly supports the independent clause reading:

Greek Septuagint (3rd century BC): Rendered with en archē, treating Genesis 1:1 as an independent sentence
New Testament witness: John 1:1 parallels the LXX’s absolute reading
Josephus (1st century AD): Explicitly supports the absolute reading
Early translations: Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Targum Onkelos all follow the absolute reading
Early Christian writers: Pseudo-Justin, Theophilus of Antioch cite the text as an independent clause
Jerome’s Vulgate: “In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram”
Masoretic tradition: The accentuation and pointing system favors the independent reading

As Wenham summarizes, the absolute reading was “the standard view from the third-century BC (LXX) through to the tenth century AD (MT).”

F. Theological Implications

Vern Poythress stresses that reading Genesis 1:1 as dependent would undermine the theological thrust of Genesis, which emphasizes divine sovereignty:

“If God did not make [the earth], if it is just eternally there, its original constitution escapes God’s sovereignty… Anything coeternal with God, even an impersonal coeternal, is really a rival to complete sovereignty.”

The independent clause reading establishes that nothing exists outside God’s creative power—even the initial “formless and void” state was brought into being by God.

G. New Testament and Broader Canon

The New Testament reinforces the creation ex nihilo concept:

John 1:3: “All things came into being through [the Logos], and without Him not one thing came into being that has come into being”
Colossians 1:16: “By [Christ] all things were created—in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible”
Hebrews 11:3: “By faith we understand that the universe was formed by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things that are visible”

These passages strongly imply that no matter exists independently of God’s creative action.

II. The “Image of God”: Functional Representation vs. Ontological Status

A. The Functional Interpretation

Dan McClellan argues that the “image of God” concept in Genesis 1:26-27 should be understood primarily in functional and relational terms rather than as a statement about human metaphysical nature. In his view:

“For the authors of Genesis, humanity was created as an ‘image’ of God, which brought the divine presence near in a templeless age and universalized it for an Israel extending beyond its regional boundaries.”

This interpretation draws on Ancient Near Eastern cultural contexts where:

Kings were described as the “image” of a deity, representing divine authority on earth
Cult statues in temples were understood to embody a god’s presence
The “image” concept relates to royal-priestly functions

Genesis democratizes this concept by extending the image to all humans, not just royalty. John Walton emphasizes this functional aspect as connected to the mandate to “have dominion” over creation—the image is essentially a job description for humanity to serve as God’s vice-regents.

B. Temple Ideology and the Image

McClellan ties the imago Dei to temple theology, viewing Genesis 1 as a “cosmic temple inauguration” narrative. In ANE practice, placing a cult image in a temple was the final step in temple inauguration. Genesis presents humans themselves as the true “image” rather than an idol or statue.

This interpretation frames humans as the vehicle of God’s presence in creation—essentially functioning as “priests” mediating God’s glory to the world. The creation account thus establishes humanity’s purpose within sacred space.

C. Critique and Synthesis: Beyond Function Alone

While the functional interpretation offers valuable insights grounded in ANE context, there are compelling reasons to see the image as encompassing both function and ontology:

The Adam-Christ Typology: G.K. Beale notes that the New Testament presents Christ as the perfect “Image” and “Second Adam.” Unlike Adam, Christ perfectly embodies both the function (obedient dominion) and the ontological reality (divine nature). Colossians 1:15 states that Christ “is the image of the invisible God,” and Hebrews 1:3 describes Him as “the exact imprint of [God’s] being.”
Persistent Image After the Fall: Genesis 9:6 affirms that humans “are made in God’s image” even after the Fall, grounding the prohibition against murder in this continuing reality. This suggests an enduring ontological status not dependent on proper functioning.
Image and Moral Renewal: New Testament passages link the image concept to internal renewal: “Put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its Creator” (Col 3:10); “Be conformed to the image of His Son” (Rom 8:29). These imply that imaging God involves mirroring His attributes—something that touches on our being, not just our function.
Human Dignity: A purely functional definition risks undermining human dignity. What about humans who cannot currently fulfill the dominion function (infants, those in comas, etc.)? The Christian tradition has tied human sanctity to the imago Dei as an inherent status.

D. A Holistic Understanding

A comprehensive biblical-theological understanding holds together both aspects:

Status and Vocation: The image of God represents both who humans are (God’s image-bearers by nature) and what they are called to do (represent God functionally).
Structural Capacity and Moral Reflection: Humans possess structural capacities (rationality, creativity, relational capacity) that enable them to reflect God’s character morally and spiritually.
Temple Presence: The temple imagery in Scripture culminates in the New Testament concept that believers are a “temple of the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor 3:16, 6:19), suggesting that the restored image involves God indwelling humans by His Spirit.
Christological Fulfillment: The image reaches its perfect expression in Christ, who both perfectly represents God (function) and is one with God in being (ontology). Believers are progressively conformed to this image (2 Cor 3:18).

III. Genesis 2 and Creation

Some argue that Genesis 2 presents a different creation account that undermines the concept of creatio ex nihilo because:

It begins with the earth already existing
Man is formed from pre-existing dust
The account seems to present God using “trial and error”

Response:

Genesis 2:4b-25 as a Topical Focus: The structure of Genesis indicates that chapter 2 is not a competing cosmogony but a complementary elaboration focusing specifically on the creation of humanity. The formula “These are the generations of…” (2:4a) marks a narrative shift in focus, not chronology.
Created Dust: The dust used to form Adam was not primordial or eternal—it was part of the earth created by God as described in Genesis 1:1. Isaiah 44:24 declares that God “made all things” and “spread out the earth,” confirming that even the earth’s materials were created by God.
Intentional Narrative: God’s statement that “it is not good for man to be alone” is not evidence of divine trial and error but a narrative technique establishing the importance of human relationships and preparing for woman’s creation.

IV. Synthesizing the Evidence

The weight of grammatical, linguistic, literary, historical, and theological evidence strongly favors understanding Genesis 1:1 as an independent, absolute clause describing God’s initial creative act of bringing all things into existence. This interpretation:

Aligns with traditional and historical readings across Jewish and Christian tradition
Is supported by grammatical analysis of Hebrew syntax
Provides theological clarity regarding God’s ultimate sovereignty
Harmonizes with the broader biblical canon

Similarly, the “image of God” concept is best understood as encompassing both functional representation and ontological status. Humans are God’s representatives by both position and design—called to reflect God’s character and exercise dominion as God’s vice-regents in creation.

The biblical narrative presents creation as both the establishment of order from chaos (creatio ordinans) and the ultimate origin of all that exists (creatio ex nihilo). These are complementary rather than contradictory perspectives, with Genesis 1 emphasizing God’s ordering work while also establishing that nothing exists independently of God’s creative will.

(See Table 1 for a comparison of McClellan’s ANE-oriented interpretation and a more traditional theological interpretation of these issues.)

Table 1. Contrasting Perspectives on Genesis 1 and the Imago Dei

Perspective	Creation in Genesis 1	“Image of God” in Genesis 1	Theological Implications
McClellan & ANE Contextualist (Order-from-Chaos View)	– Gen 1:1–3 depicts God ordering a pre-existent, chaotic watery mass into an organized cosmos (light, sky, land, etc.). Creation is presented as order-from-chaos, not explicit creation from nothing. – The Hebrew grammar (“When God began to create… the earth was formless and void”) and ANE parallels (e.g. Marduk vs. Tiamat) indicate that primordial matter (the “deep”) was already there, subdued and structured by God’s wordtheapotheosisnarrative.wordpress.com christianity.stackexchange.com. – Emphasizes functional origins: Genesis focuses on how God assigns roles and functions (day/night, fish/birds, etc.) and inaugurates the cosmos as a sort of temple, culminating in divine “rest” on Day 7 (a motif of temple enthronement).	– “Image of God” is understood functionally: humans are made as God’s royal representatives on earth, akin to how ancient kings or idols were images of gods. It’s a commission to govern on God’s behalf (Gen 1:28). – Tied to temple ideology: Just as a deity’s image would be placed in a shrine to represent the god’s presence, here humanity itself is God’s image placed in the cosmic temple. This “brings the divine presence near” even in a world without a physical idol or templedanielomcclellan.wordpress.com. – Not about human ontology or attributes (reason, soul) per se, but about a role and relationship: to mirror God’s dominion and creativity in the world (caring for creation, multiplying, subduing chaos on a local scale under God’s ultimate authority).	– Creatio ex nihilo is not a direct teaching of Genesis 1. The text aligns more with creatio ex materia (formation from pre-existing matter), consistent with most ANE cosmologies. Theological focus is on God’s sovereignty in ordering chaos, rather than on the origin of matter itself. – In line with this, the formal doctrine of creation from nothing is seen as a later development. McClellan (following May, etc.) notes it emerged in the 2nd century AD to address philosophical challengestheapotheosisnarrative.wordpress.com. One can accept it doctrinally, but it’s ancillary to Genesis’ own message. – Humanity’s dignity lies in its function: all people are essentially God’s deputies, charged with a sacred task. This democratizes ancient royal privilege (everyone, not just kings, images God) and implies a fundamental equality and purpose. However, the “image” is not an immortal soul or a divine spark; it’s our designation as God’s earthly agents. – The problem of sin would be seen as a failure of humans to live up to the image-bearing role (a functional failure to represent God’s justice and order), rather than loss of an ontological status. Restoration would mean recommissioning and empowering humans to reflect God properly (as eventually seen in Christ, who perfectly images God and succeeds where Adam failed).

Dan McClellan’s argument from Genesis 2 hinges on the claim that it, like Genesis 1 (understood in the construct/temporal sense), begins not with an act of absolute creation, but with the presumption of preexisting materials. In The Bible Says So, McClellan writes:

“The second creation account that begins in the second half of Genesis 2:4 doesn’t fare any better. It begins, like Genesis 1:1, with a temporal clause and a description of an earth that already exists when God begins the act of creation. Note that the heavens aren’t even a part of this creation. This time, the initial creative act appears to be a mist that rises up to water the ground, allowing for a male human to be molded from the dust of the ground.”
—Dan McClellan, The Bible Says So, Kindle Loc. 636.

He draws out several implications:

The Earth Already Exists: Genesis 2:5–7 assumes the existence of “the ground” (אֲדָמָה) and moisture (“mist went up from the earth”), prior to God’s formation of man.
Creation Is a Molding Process: Man is formed from dust (עָפָר), not from nothing, which McClellan sees as a clear denial of creatio ex nihilo.
The Account Presents a God Who Uses Trial and Error: Yahweh attempts to find a suitable helper for man, creating animals before settling on woman—thus denying the sovereign immediacy emphasized in Genesis 1.

Response: Genesis 2 Does Not Undermine Absolute Creation

1. Genesis 2 Is Not a Separate Creation Account, But a Topical Zoom-In

The structure of Genesis makes clear that Genesis 2:4b–25 is not a competing or earlier cosmogony but a complementary elaboration of day six. As Paul Copan and William Lane Craig emphasize, Genesis 2:4 marks a narrative shift, following the formulaic toledot (“These are the generations of…”), used consistently to move the story forward (cf. Gen 5:1, 6:9, 10:1). This signals a change in focus, not chronology.

As they put it:

“Factor 2: ‘This is the account/These are the generations . . .’ (2:4a) is a standard marker in Genesis … It always announces a new section of narrative; this is its ‘usual function.’ In the case of 2:4, the chiastic inversion from ‘heavens and the earth’ (2:4a) to ‘earth and the heavens’ (2:4b) focuses our attention on the elaboration of the general description of Genesis 1:1–2:3—the setting for, and the actual creation of, man and woman in Genesis 2:5–25.”
(Creation Out of Nothing, p. 39)

Thus, Genesis 2 presumes what Genesis 1 already declared: God created the heavens and the earth. The presence of earth and dust in Genesis 2 doesn’t imply eternal matter; it assumes the prior creative act of Genesis 1:1.

2. Dust Language Is Common in Creaturely Formation and Doesn’t Deny Ex Nihilo

McClellan’s conclusion that man being formed from dust implies no ex nihilo creation misses a key theological distinction. The dust of the ground, adamah, is not primordial or eternal—it was created by God. Isaiah 44:24 says:

“I am the LORD, who made all things, who alone stretched out the heavens, who spread out the earth by myself.”

Copan and Craig note this point as well:

“Isaiah 44:24 declares that God alone created everything—even the earth itself—ruling out any co-eternal material.”
(Creation Out of Nothing, p. 42)

This harmonizes with Genesis 2:7, which describes the human’s creation in terms of formation from created matter. There’s no contradiction between God forming man from dust and God first creating that dust from nothing.

3. The Mist, Like the Waters in Genesis 1:2, Is Not Eternal

McClellan views the “mist” in Genesis 2:6 as a kind of primordial substance preexisting divine activity. But the text makes no such metaphysical claim. The mist is mentioned only to set the stage for what God does next. There is no reason to think the mist was uncreated or eternal, especially since it is part of the earth that God “made” (Gen 2:4).

As Wenham points out:

“The creation of the man is seen as an act of divine craftsmanship, using the dust of the earth that God himself had already made (2:4b).”
—Gordon Wenham, Genesis 1–15, Word Biblical Commentary.

Dan’s conclusion that Genesis 2 presents a deity fashioning an already-existent world ignores this canonical context. God formed Adam from dust, but this dust is not a metaphysical given—it’s part of the universe created in Genesis 1:1.

4. The “Not Good” in Genesis 2:18 Does Not Imply Divine Trial and Error

McClellan’s claim that God’s creation “involves trial and error” because God says “it is not good for the man to be alone” misreads the narrative. This is not a revision of Genesis 1 but a narrative technique to prepare for the climax of woman’s creation.

As Bruce Waltke comments:

“This is not a divine oversight, but an intentional progression to underscore the suitability and significance of the woman.”
—Bruce Waltke, Genesis: A Commentary.

Moreover, the refrain “God saw that it was good” in Genesis 1 marks each phase of a deliberate sequence culminating in humanity’s creation and the Sabbath rest. Genesis 2 isolates and explores this sequence in more detail—particularly the relational purpose of human life.

5. No Mention of Heaven Does Not Undermine Theological Unity

Genesis 2 focuses on man’s dwelling place—the garden, the ground, and human relationships—not because it denies the creation of the heavens, but because it assumes them. It’s a change of emphasis, not a contradiction.

As Poythress explains:

“Even if [Gen 2] does not recapitulate the heavenly focus of Gen 1, it implies it as already given. The shift in focus from cosmic to covenantal is deliberate.”
—Vern Poythress, Interpreting Eden, p. 208.

Conclusion:
Dan McClellan’s argument that Genesis 2 undermines creatio ex nihilo rests on a misreading of narrative focus as metaphysical claim. Genesis 2 presupposes the absolute act of creation from Genesis 1:1. It does not describe the first act of creation, but the formation of humanity within the created world. Its language of dust and mist is descriptive, not ontological. When read in canonical and literary context, Genesis 2 complements, not contradicts, the theology of divine creation from nothing.

1. McClellan’s Chaoskampf Thesis

Here’s how Dan McClellan articulates his core claim:

“There’s another [creation account], but it’s spread across a few different texts… This account also shares a number of points of contact with a tradition we find in other societies that involved battle with malevolent divine forces associated with the sea… In these texts, the Northwest Semitic storm deity Baal does battle with Yamm, which is the Ugaritic word for ‘sea.’ Through this battle, Baal establishes his sovereignty and kingship… Now, there’s no direct reference to creation in this text, but… Isaiah 27:1… [uses] the Hebrew equivalents of the Ugaritic words used to describe Litan… Leviathan, the wriggling serpent… Isaiah is unlikely to be quoting directly… but both texts obviously descend from a shared tradition.”

He further states:

“Throughout the developmental phases of this tradition… creation always involves existing materials… In the more recent versions… the sea knows who’s in charge. The sea doesn’t put up a fight. It has already learned its lesson.” (The Bible Says So, Kindle loc. 697–697)

According to McClellan, Genesis 1 is just one stage in the evolving chaoskampf mythology. In earlier forms, God allegedly fights sea monsters (Leviathan, Rahab), while in later forms, he simply rebukes or confines them. He claims that this literary-theological trajectory undermines the idea of ex nihilo creation and reflects the Hebrew Bible’s reliance on ANE cosmogonic motifs.

2. Framing the Response: What Must Be Demonstrated

To critique McClellan’s chaoskampf argument, we must examine:

Whether Genesis 1 contains chaoskampf elements (e.g., divine combat with a sea entity or chaos monster).
Whether references to Leviathan or Rahab (e.g., in Job, Psalms, Isaiah) imply a shared ANE cosmogonic theology.
Whether later biblical writers adopt or adapt such motifs to assert Yahweh’s unique sovereignty, or if they affirm the ex nihilo framework through redefinition.
Whether intertextual usage (Isa 27:1; Job 26; Ps 74) is best read as polemical adaptation or theological continuation.

Dan McClellan proposes that Genesis 1 reflects an ancient Near Eastern (ANE) worldview, specifically arguing that it adopts the “chaoskampf” motif—creation by combat against chaos. He implies that tehôm (תְּהוֹם) in Genesis 1:2 is a vestigial reflection of Tiamat in the Babylonian Enuma Elish, and that Genesis presents God as ordering a preexisting, chaotic substrate. However, Dr. David Tsumura, in Creation and Destruction and numerous scholarly articles, demonstrates that this claim rests on multiple linguistic and conceptual missteps.

1. Linguistic Impossibility of Tehôm Deriving from Tiamat

Tsumura makes clear that the identification of tehôm (deep) with Tiamat (the chaos monster in Enuma Elish) is linguistically untenable. He writes:

“Linguistically speaking, such a borrowing is impossible. The word təhôm could not have been derived from the name Tiamat. Rather, the Hebrew təhôm—together with the Ugaritic thm, the Akkadian tiāmtu, the Arabic tihāmat, and the Eblaite ti-à-ma-tum/tihām(a)tum—is simply a reflection of the common Semitic term tihām, meaning a large body of water, while the name Tiamat is just a personified Akkadian form of the term tiāmtu.” (p. 253)

In short, the similarity is etymological, not mythological. Tehôm is not a character, has no agency, and is not personified in the Genesis text. Unlike Tiamat, it is never the subject of a verb, never battles God, and is never given divine or monstrous status. It is simply a term for the deep waters.

2. Creation by Divine Fiat is Theologically Unique

McClellan argues that Genesis 1 depicts a “division of chaos” much like Marduk slaying Tiamat to form the cosmos. But Tsumura refutes this claim:

“The very different creation by divine fiat, as in Genesis, is unique in the ANE; furthermore, the creation of light as the first act of creation appears only in Genesis.” (p. 253)

The decisive absence of conflict in Genesis 1 stands in radical contrast to ANE theogonies. There is no cosmic battle. No gods are born. There is no violence. Instead, God simply speaks, and reality obeys. This is what Copan and Craig describe as a theology of sovereign command rather than victorious conquest.

Tsumura strengthens this contrast:

“Creation and battle (conflict) are associated only in the Chaoskampf of Enuma Elish, so there is no reason they should be associated in Genesis.” (p. 254)

3. Tehôm is Not a Chaotic Entity in Genesis

McClellan’s theological argument depends on reading tehôm as a chaotic force. But Tsumura explains that Genesis 1 does not describe chaos in the modern or mythological sense:

“We should stop using the term ‘chaos’ when dealing with the biblical concept of ‘creation,’ meaning cosmic origin, because neither təhôm (‘the deep’) nor tōhû wābōhû (traditionally ‘without form and void’) in Gen. 1:2 has anything to do with the concept of chaos.” (p. 254)

This echoes Victor Hamilton, who says:

“Genesis 1:2 is not an account of chaos or evil. Rather, it is an undeveloped state, unproductive and uninhabited.” (NICOT Genesis 1–17)

And Wenham agrees:

“There is nothing here of a chaotic conflict between rival deities; instead, we are shown a picture of an empty, shapeless earth waiting to be formed and filled.” (Genesis 1–15, p. 15)

4. The LXX and the Rejection of Chaos

Tsumura notes that the Septuagint (LXX) translators could have used the Greek word χάος (chaos) in Genesis 1:2 if they believed it fit the concept. But:

“The LXX translator(s) did not use χάος for Gen. 1:2 even though they could have.” (p. 254)

Instead, they preserved the Hebrew description of the unformed and empty state in value-neutral terms. This alone is fatal to the claim that the Hebrew cosmology reflects mythic chaos rhetoric.

5. Tannînîm are Natural, Not Mythological

McClellan also alleges that terms like tannînîm (sea monsters) in Genesis 1:21 are mythic polemics. Tsumura concedes that metaphorical or poetic texts (like Psalm 74) do reflect mythic language, but not Genesis 1:

“In Ps. 74:14, on the other hand, tnn may be a metaphorization of the originally Canaanite mythological term. In other words, the meaning of the term in myths had been ossified, or fossilized, and here the term is used metaphorically for… the Lord’s enemy.” (p. 255)

“In Gen. 1, tnn is essentially a natural reality—a large sea creature, such as a whale.” (ibid.)

This confirms G.K. Beale’s point in A New Testament Biblical Theology, where he argues that mythic motifs may be de-mythologized for theological polemic, but Genesis 1 itself does not present a mythic narrative. Instead, it uses language common to the Semitic world and subverts it by treating sea creatures and deep waters not as threats to the divine, but as products of divine command.

6. If Genesis Was Opposing Tiamat, It Used the Wrong Word

One of the most devastating linguistic critiques Tsumura offers against McClellan’s “Tiamat → tehôm” line is this:

“If Gen. 1 were a polemic against Tiamat, its author would have used a form such as tʾmh or tʾmt based on the Akkadian proper noun directly, or perhaps have used yām, ‘Sea,’ the enemy of the storm god Baal… But instead he used the meaning-wise unrelated tǝhôm.” (p. 254)

This proves that the term tehôm cannot be read as a hidden reference to Tiamat or any battle with a sea monster. It refers to the deep—not an enemy, not a threat, not a deity.

Dan McClellan’s assertion that Genesis 1 participates in an ANE chaoskampf framework is contradicted on every level by the linguistic, literary, and theological data:

Tehôm is not a proper noun nor a personified deity.
There is no combat, no theogony, and no polytheistic inheritance.
Genesis presents a radically non-mythic cosmology: creation by sovereign word, not battle.

Tsumura’s careful philological work reveals that the similarities between Genesis 1 and ANE myths are surface-level and non-substantive. The deep waters are not gods. The sea creatures are not monsters. The Word of God alone creates, orders, and sustains.

We are not seeing a relic of Babylon here. We are seeing its refutation.

Dan McClellan claims that Genesis 1 stands within the Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) chaoskampf tradition—a mythological motif where creation results from a divine battle with a chaos monster. He asserts that Genesis 1 reflects this pattern by reworking Babylonian and Canaanite themes, such as the conflict between Marduk and Tiamat in Enuma Elish or Baal and Yamm in Ugaritic myth. The presence of the Hebrew word təhôm (“deep”) in Genesis 1:2 is, for McClellan, a telltale trace of this influence, implying not creation ex nihilo, but a reordering of preexistent chaotic waters.

But this framework fails on multiple fronts—linguistic, exegetical, and theological.

1. The Metaphorical Use of Creation Imagery in Isaiah, Psalms, and Job

McClellan cites texts like Psalm 74, Isaiah 51, and Job 41 to support the idea that the Bible preserves ancient combat mythologies. However, these passages are not alternative cosmologies—they are retrospective theological metaphors grounded in actual redemptive history, especially the Exodus. They reappropriate creation motifs to describe historical acts of God’s deliverance. For instance:

Psalm 74:12–17 describes God breaking the heads of sea monsters and drying up rivers—imagery that clearly alludes to the Red Sea event, using the language of creation and conquest. But the chaos monsters here are not pre-existent rivals; they are poetic metaphors for Egypt and its forces. The entire psalm is about God’s redemptive acts, not cosmological origins.
Isaiah 51:9–10 recalls the Exodus by calling God to “awake” and “cut Rahab in pieces.” This Rahab is not a primordial being but again represents Egypt. The passage explicitly identifies the event in view as when “you dried up the sea, the waters of the great deep”—a direct allusion to the Red Sea crossing.
Habakkuk 3:8–15 employs similar imagery of God riding upon the storm, crushing foes, and parting waters. Yet again, this is not a record of creation but a vision of the Lord’s intervention in historical salvation.

As J. Oswalt rightly explains:

“In each of these passages it is the exodus that is in view. Here the imagery is utilized to express God’s victory over evil when he triumphed over the waters in the exodus and brought his people through… This kind of appropriation of the figures is diametrically opposite to their original usage among pagans” (The Bible Among the Myths, 94–96).

This means McClellan’s intertextual parallels are category mistakes. He conflates poetic imagery about creation with texts that are accounts of creation. But metaphor is not metaphysics. There is no cosmic theomachy in Genesis—just the effortless speech of a sovereign God.

2. Job 41 and the Nature of Leviathan

McClellan also appeals to Job 41 as evidence of lingering mythological ideas about chaos monsters. But this too collapses upon closer inspection.

First, Leviathan is not a rival god or preexistent chaotic being. God explicitly says, “I made him” (Job 41:11)—which fundamentally undercuts any chaoskampf interpretation. Far from being a force opposed to God, Leviathan is a creature of God’s own design, ruled effortlessly by him.

Second, the speaker matters. In the book of Job, only God’s speech at the end of the book (chs. 38–41) carries divine authority. The prior dialogues, while containing true insights, often reflect partial or mistaken theology. But when God finally speaks, he settles the issue—establishing divine sovereignty over all creation, including Leviathan. Statements by human characters are not normatively revelatory in the way God’s direct speech is.

Leviathan in Job is not a remnant of pagan mythology—it is God’s object lesson. “Can you put a rope in his nose?” God asks Job. The answer is no. But God can. That’s the point.

As Oswalt explains:

“In no way is the worldview of continuity presupposed here. God is simply asking Job in another way the question which he has put to him several times, ‘Can you control nature?’” (The Bible Among the Myths, 94)

So rather than affirming ancient combat myths, Job 41 does the exact opposite. It emphasizes that Yahweh alone is sovereign over all powers, including the most terrifying. Leviathan is not an enemy; he is exhibit A in God’s courtroom demonstration of absolute rule.

However, as Now My Eyes Have Seen You by Robert Fyall and Tryggve Mettinger argue, the imagery surrounding Leviathan does carry deeper symbolic meaning. Drawing on ancient Near Eastern background materials, these scholars show that Leviathan is a theological symbol of cosmic evil—not a mythic god or primordial being, but a representation of the forces of death, suffering, and disorder in a fallen world.

Fyall argues:

“Leviathan is neither a crocodile nor merely a poetic flourish. He symbolizes that which lies behind Job’s suffering—cosmic opposition to God’s order, though under God’s control” (Fyall, Now My Eyes Have Seen You, p. 87).

Mettinger similarly connects Leviathan to the broader ANE backdrop while emphasizing God’s unilateral power over him:

“The Book of Job shows Yahweh as one who has no need to battle Leviathan for dominion. He created it and rules over it effortlessly” (In Search of God, p. 198).

This points to a critical theological distinction. The imagery may echo ANE categories, but it empties them of their polytheistic force. God is not one among rivals in a mythic theomachy. He is the Creator who made even the symbols of cosmic disorder. In this way, Job becomes a uniquely monotheistic subversion of myth.

God’s Answer to Job: Not Evading the Problem but Framing It Eschatologically

One critique sometimes leveled against the divine speeches in Job 38–41 is that they don’t address Job’s actual suffering. But, as the Dallas Theological Seminary review of David Burrell’s Deconstructing Theodicy notes, this objection fails to grasp the deeper logic of God’s speech. Scholars like Gibson, Fyall, and LaCocque have shown that God’s reference to Behemoth and Leviathan is deeply theological.

These creatures symbolize evil and chaos, and God is saying in effect:

“You suffer because you live in a world that is under assault by cosmic disorder. But I have created these forces, and I alone can subdue them.”

This gives Job not a philosophical theodicy, but a revelatory framework: the chaos and evil Job experiences is real—but not ultimate. It is encompassed within God’s sovereign plan and awaits its final defeat. Job is not given a deductive answer, but a redemptive assurance. As the review summarizes:

“God does address the issue of Job’s suffering in a very pointed way by reminding him that the chaos in the world originates with the Enemy—an enemy that God alone can and will subdue.”

Thus, Leviathan is not a leftover god, nor a mythic echo passively absorbed. He is the Lord’s creature, repurposed as a symbolic signpost to eschatological hope.

3. Selective Mythic Echoes vs. Canonical Transformation

It is true that biblical authors use mythic terminology—təhôm, tannînīm, Rahab, etc.—but they never adopt mythic ontology. As Tsumura has shown, təhôm is linguistically unrelated to Tiamat. And terms like Leviathan or Rahab are employed as fossilized poetic metaphors, not ontological claims. Even when mythic language appears, it is re-purposed within a radically different worldview:

In Genesis, the deep is not a goddess; it is lifeless, passive water.
The sea monsters in Genesis 1:21 are not enemies of God—they are called “great creatures” that God made and blessed.
The “lights” in Genesis 1:16 are not deities but are explicitly not named “sun” or “moon,” likely to avoid pagan associations. God simply made them.

“To say, as Speiser does, that ‘on the subject of creation biblical tradition aligned itself with the traditional tenets of Babylonian science’ is not supportable. Enuma Elish is not about creation at all.” (Oswalt, 101)

In short, McClellan’s reading is hermeneutically flattened and theologically reductionistic. He confuses literary allusion with ontological agreement, poetic metaphor with metaphysical commitment. The biblical text, by contrast, appropriates mythological vocabulary only to subvert it, stripping it of divine agency and re-centering all power in the one Creator God.

1. Psalm 74:12–17 — Redemption as New Creation

Text:

“Yet God my King is from of old, working salvation in the midst of the earth.
You divided the sea by your might;
you broke the heads of the sea monsters on the waters.
You crushed the heads of Leviathan;
you gave him as food for the creatures of the wilderness.
You split open springs and brooks;
you dried up ever-flowing streams.
Yours is the day, yours also the night;
you have established the heavenly lights and the sun.
You have fixed all the boundaries of the earth;
you have made summer and winter.” (Psalm 74:12–17, ESV)

a. Leviathan as Political Symbol, Not Primeval Chaos

McClellan interprets this as describing Yahweh’s primordial battle with chaos, citing Leviathan and “sea monsters.” However, scholars such as John Oswalt and Robert Fyall have shown that Psalm 74 is not a cosmogony—it’s a lament and petition in the context of Israel’s national crisis, probably the destruction of the temple (v. 3–7). The psalmist appeals to God’s past acts of deliverance, using cosmic imagery to affirm his covenant faithfulness and sovereign power.

Fyall: “The language of Leviathan’s destruction is poetic, symbolic of Egypt in the Exodus… The poet is not describing a creation event but rehearsing redemptive history in creational terms” (Now My Eyes Have Seen You, 79).

This aligns with Isaiah 51:9–10, which also links Rahab and the sea with the Exodus from Egypt:

“Was it not you who cut Rahab in pieces, who pierced the dragon? Was it not you who dried up the sea, the waters of the great deep?”

In both cases, the Exodus is described using creation language—a motif common throughout the Hebrew Bible. Yahweh’s power over creation becomes the foundation for trusting him in national deliverance. He defeated “Leviathan” (Egypt) once; he can do it again.

b. Leviathan as Historical Allusion, Not Theological Rival

The verse “you gave him as food for the creatures of the wilderness” (v. 14) especially refutes the mythic view. This is mockery—not fear of a rival. God doesn’t struggle against Leviathan; he kills it and feeds it to scavengers. The image is triumphant, political, and rooted in covenantal memory, not in polytheistic metaphysics.

As Oswalt puts it:

“The Bible’s usages are directly analogous to calling someone ‘a Hercules’—a literary figure used to emphasize strength, not to invoke the myth” (Bible Among the Myths, 93–94).

2. Isaiah 27:1 — Eschatological Judgment on Leviathan

Text:

“In that day the Lord with his hard and great and strong sword
will punish Leviathan the fleeing serpent,
Leviathan the twisting serpent,
and he will slay the dragon that is in the sea.” (Isaiah 27:1, ESV)

a. Future-Tense, Not Primordial Past

Unlike Psalm 74, Isaiah 27 is prophetic and eschatological. This is not describing something God once did—it’s what he will do. Leviathan here represents eschatological enemies of God and his people. The description (“fleeing serpent,” “twisting serpent”) echoes Ugaritic epithets for sea monsters like ltn (lit. “Leviathan”) in Baal mythology, but these phrases are borrowed for polemic, not theology.

John Walton notes: “The imagery is stripped of mythological force… Yahweh does not struggle with Leviathan—he slays it” (Ancient Near Eastern Thought, 185).

Isaiah presents no primordial combat or theomachy. There is no pantheon, no battle for cosmic dominance. God alone rules. Leviathan is simply a symbolic embodiment of evil, to be crushed in the final judgment.

b. Metaphor for Political Powers

Many interpreters link Leviathan in Isaiah 27 to historical enemies like Egypt or Assyria, and ultimately to satanic rebellion as seen in Revelation 12–20. It’s an image of the unruly nations (cf. Isaiah 17:12–13; Daniel 7:2–7). God’s sword will slay Leviathan just as he will ultimately defeat the dragon in Revelation.

As Oswalt again emphasizes, this is not myth-absorption, but myth-deconstruction:

“What might have been said of the gods can only truly be said of Yahweh… He sits above the flood, not within it” (Oswalt, Bible Among the Myths, 106).

3. Conclusion: Leviathan Is Not a Second God

McClellan’s reading is fundamentally flawed on two fronts:

Category mistake: He treats poetic metaphor as theological assertion. These texts use evocative imagery to magnify God’s redemptive power, not to narrate an actual cosmogony by combat.
Canon context blindness: In every text, Leviathan is firmly under God’s control—whether as a historical enemy (Psalm 74), eschatological symbol (Isaiah 27), or created beast (Job 41).

Rather than supporting a mythological worldview, these texts sustain biblical monotheism: one sovereign Creator, unmatched in power, who conquers all chaos—not through divine warfare, but through speech, sovereignty, and salvation.

Claims Against Creatio Ex Nihilo in 2 Maccabees 7:28

Dan McClellan claims that 2 Maccabees 7:28 does not affirm creatio ex nihilo because the Greek phrase ex ouk onton (“out of non-being”) allegedly derives from Aristotelian or broader Greek philosophical categories, not Jewish theological commitments. He interprets the phrase as referring to unformed, preexistent matter, not absolute nothingness, arguing that for Greek thinkers, “non-being” included a substrate of matter without form or function. Thus, he concludes that both the heavens and the human race are said to have been formed from this unformed substrate—not from absolute nothingness.

This interpretation, however, faces substantial challenges when subjected to rigorous linguistic, historical, and theological analysis. This assessment will demonstrate that McClellan’s position inadequately accounts for the grammatical, contextual, intertextual, and theological evidence that supports reading 2 Maccabees 7:28 as an affirmation of creatio ex nihilo.

Linguistic and Grammatical Considerations

The Precise Formulation of the Greek Text

The grammar and semantics of the passage support a genuine ex nihilo reading far more convincingly than McClellan allows. Paul Copan highlights that the Greek ouk ex ontōn (οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων)—”not from things being”—is best read in this context as a denial of preexistent material. This grammatical construction employs a strong negation (ouk) that directly contradicts the existence of prior materials.

When we examine the full phrase in context: “ἀξιῶ σε, τέκνον, ἀναβλέψαντα εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάντα ἰδόντα γνῶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός” (“I beg you, my child, to look at the heaven and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize that God did not make them out of things that existed“), the most straightforward reading is that the mother appeals to the reality that God made the heavens and the earth not from existing things, but from what did not exist.

Distinguished Old Testament scholar Gerhard von Rad—an authority in Old Testament theology—asserts that this is the first textual occurrence of a conceptual formulation of creatio ex nihilo. The significance of this observation should not be understated; von Rad was not a theological conservative predisposed to find Christian doctrines in earlier Jewish texts, yet he recognized the clear implication of the phrase in context.

Alternative Renderings and Their Deficiencies

McClellan suggests that the phrase merely echoes Aristotelian categories of non-being that still presuppose some kind of material substrate. However, this interpretation strains the actual language of the text, which does not merely speak of transformation from one state to another, but of creation from what is emphatically stated to be “not existing” (ouk ex ontōn).

Had the author intended to convey the idea of God fashioning the cosmos from preexistent but unformed matter, more appropriate Greek formulations were available, such as terminology reflecting the demiurgic activity found in Plato’s Timaeus (e.g., ex amorphou hylēs – “from formless matter”). The deliberate choice of ouk ex ontōn suggests a stronger, more absolute negation of preexistent materials.

Theological Context: Resurrection and Creative Sovereignty

The Paraenetic Function of the Mother’s Appeal

The theological context of the appeal is not Greek metaphysics, but Jewish resurrection hope. The immediate context is paraenetic—a theological exhortation to trust in God’s omnipotence to create and resurrect, even from nothing. This indicates the mother’s point is not about technical metaphysics but divine power: the same God who made all things “not from being” can and will raise the dead.

This theological connection between creation and resurrection appears in other Jewish texts that ground resurrection in God’s creative sovereignty:

1QS 3:15 (Dead Sea Scrolls): “From him stems all there is and all there shall be.”
Joseph and Aseneth 12.1–3: Appeals to God who made “the visible from the non-appearing and non-being.”
2 Enoch 25:1–2: “Let one of the invisible things come out solid and visible.”

In these texts, resurrection hope is anchored in God’s ability to bring forth what is not from what is not—the quintessential meaning of creatio ex nihilo. The mother’s appeal in 2 Maccabees functions within this theological framework, not as an abstract metaphysical proposition.

The Logic of the Mother’s Argument

The internal logic of the mother’s argument deserves closer attention than McClellan provides. She is attempting to persuade her son to accept martyrdom by appealing to resurrection hope. Her argumentative structure follows this pattern:

God made heaven and earth ouk ex ontōn (not from existing things)
God likewise made the human race ouk ex ontōn
Therefore, God can and will resurrect the martyred from ouk ex ontōn

This syllogism only works if ouk ex ontōn means genuine non-existence, not merely unformed matter. If she merely meant that God shaped preexistent materials, it would provide insufficient grounds for believing in resurrection, which requires restoring life from absolute death—not merely reshaping existing elements.

Broader Second Temple Jewish Literature: A Cumulative Case

A Pattern of Affirmation in Diverse Texts

Hellenistic Jewish and Second Temple literature contains several affirmations of creation ex nihilo that form a cumulative case against McClellan’s position:

The Dead Sea Scrolls

The Qumran community’s writings provide significant evidence that pre-Christian Jews embraced concepts functionally equivalent to creatio ex nihilo:

1QS 3.15–16 declares: “From him stems all there is and all there shall be. Before they existed he made all their plans.”
1QH (Hodayot) 9.8–9 asserts even more directly: “You have created all the foundations of the earth, and from nothing you brought them forth.”

These are not references to shaping preexistent material but to divine pre-ordination and calling into being from non-being. The phrase “from nothing you brought them forth” (mē’ayin hōṣē’tām) is particularly striking in its explicit affirmation of creation from nothing.

Joseph and Aseneth: Non-being to Being

The pseudepigraphal book Joseph and Aseneth (ca. 2nd century BC – 2nd century AD) includes this remarkable prayer:

“You […] made the things that are and the ones that have an appearance from the non-appearing and non-being” (12:1–3).

This is not just Platonic imitation. The author is clearly affirming that visible reality was summoned forth by God’s word from non-being, without reference to any intermediate eternal matter. The pairing of “non-appearing” with “non-being” strengthens the case that the author means absolute nonexistence, not merely invisible or unformed matter.

2 Enoch and 2 Baruch: From Invisible to Visible

Other examples from Jewish apocalyptic and mystical literature include:

2 Enoch 25–26: “Let one of the invisible things come out solid and visible.”
2 Baruch 21:4: “[You] called from the beginning of the world that which did not yet exist.”

These are striking affirmations that creation occurred not from eternally existing elements but from an act of divine will upon that which was not. Far from being isolated anomalies, these texts show a diversity of pre-Christian Jewish affirmation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.

Philo of Alexandria: A Complex Case

Philo’s cosmology presents an interesting test case for McClellan’s claims. While Philo sometimes describes God shaping matter in Platonic terms, he also states:

“[God] brought the invisible things into the light, and made the things that are from the things that are not.” (On the Life of Moses II.266–7)

This tension in Philo highlights not that creatio ex nihilo is a late invention, but that Jewish theology was grappling with the limits of Greek metaphysics while affirming God’s total sovereignty over existence itself.

Rabbinic Debates and the Rejection of Eternal Matter

The rabbinic refutation of preexistent matter supports this trajectory of Jewish thought toward creatio ex nihilo. Copan cites a debate in Genesis Rabbah where Rabbi Gamaliel refutes a philosopher’s claim that God used preexistent materials:

“A philosopher asked Rabban Gamaliel, ‘Your God was a great artist, but he found good materials which assisted him!’ Rabban Gamaliel replied, ‘What are these?’ ‘Tohu, bohu, darkness, water, wind, and the deep,’ said the philosopher. ‘Woe to that man!’ he [Gamaliel] exclaimed. ‘The term “creation” is used by Scripture in connection with all of them.'”

Gamaliel then points out that each supposed “material”—darkness, deep, water, etc.—was itself created by God (citing Isa 45:7; Ps 148:4–5; Prov 8:24). This indicates an early Jewish polemic against any notion of co-eternal matter. If McClellan were correct that Jewish thought uniformly assumed preexistent matter, this rabbinic debate would be inexplicable.

Wisdom of Solomon: A Nuanced Case

The Challenge of Wisdom 11:17

McClellan points to Wisdom of Solomon 11:17, which speaks of God creating the cosmos “out of formless matter” (ex amorphou hylēs), seemingly confirming a Platonic framework. This text does indeed present a challenge to a uniform Jewish affirmation of creatio ex nihilo.

However, Copan rightly cautions that this alone does not negate creation ex nihilo in the broader tradition. Wisdom’s author may utilize Hellenistic categories, but he does not thereby eliminate the possibility of God creating from non-being elsewhere—or of tension within the broader tradition.

Contextualizing Wisdom within the Broader Literature

The evidence suggests that Wisdom represents one strand in a diverse tapestry of Second Temple Jewish cosmological thought, not the normative position. Several considerations support this view:

Wisdom’s Hellenistic character is well-established; it represents a deliberate attempt to translate Jewish concepts into Greek philosophical language.
The author’s primary concern is not cosmological precision but theodicy and the demonstration of God’s wisdom and power.
Other contemporaneous Jewish texts (as demonstrated above) more explicitly affirm creation from non-being.

The presence of Platonic language in Wisdom no more negates the existence of creatio ex nihilo in Jewish thought than Philo’s occasional use of demiurgic language negates his own statements about God bringing things from non-being into being.

The Later Tradition: From Second Temple to Rabbinic Judaism

Diversity in Post-Biblical Jewish Thought

While Dan McClellan claims that creation out of nothing is a late Christian imposition under the influence of Greek metaphysics, the historical record of post-biblical Judaism itself tells a more complex—and revealing—story.

As Copan and Craig note, even centuries after the New Testament period, Jewish thinkers exhibited considerable diversity regarding the mode of creation. Some rabbis expressed speculative and mythic accounts, but none reflect a uniform commitment to Platonism:

“As late as the third century, Palestinian teacher Rabbi Johanan stated that God took two coils—one of fire and the other of snow—wove them together, and created the world” (Genesis Rabbah 10:3).

This midrashic imagery is not systematic cosmology. It’s poetic speculation, possibly drawing on symbolic dualities, not on a Platonic eternal substrate. Importantly, it treats fire and snow as contingent materials created by God, not independent metaphysical entities.

Gersonides: The Exception That Proves the Rule

Later, the medieval Jewish philosopher Gersonides (Levi ben Gershon, 1288–1344) did adopt a more Platonic view, positing that God imposed form upon eternal matter. But far from being normative, this was a minority position even by medieval standards:

“Gersonides […] adopted the Platonic view of God’s imposing form on eternally pre-existent matter—a minority view by this time.” —Louis Jacobs, “Jewish Cosmology,” Ancient Cosmologies, 72, 75–76 (quoted in Copan & Craig).

This makes a critical point: If Platonism were the default framework for understanding creation in Jewish thought, we would not find Gersonides marked out as an exception well after the Second Temple and early rabbinic eras. Instead, we find strong evidence of resistance to Hellenistic metaphysics in much of Jewish theology—just as we’ve seen in Second Temple texts like 2 Maccabees, 2 Baruch, and Joseph and Aseneth.

Methodological Flaws in McClellan’s Approach

Oversimplification of Greek Philosophical Categories

McClellan’s claim that the phrase ex ouk onton “derives from Aristotelian or broader Greek philosophical categories” oversimplifies both Greek philosophy and its reception in Hellenistic Judaism. Aristotle’s conception of non-being was complex and nuanced, not simply reducible to “unformed matter.” Moreover, McClellan fails to demonstrate that the author of 2 Maccabees was operating within an Aristotelian framework rather than adapting Greek language to express distinctly Jewish theological concepts.

Neglect of the Text’s Rhetorical Function

McClellan misreads the conceptual backdrop of the passage by focusing narrowly on philosophical terminology while neglecting rhetorical purpose. His appeal to Aristotle misses the point that the Hellenistic Jewish author was not philosophizing about ontological categories but was exhorting belief in God’s total creative initiative. Even if the terms had Greek resonance, the theological intent was to express that God created without reliance on preexistent materials—this is functionally what ex nihilo means.

Anachronistic Application of Later Categories

McClellan’s approach imposes later philosophical distinctions onto Second Temple texts in ways that distort their meaning. The notion that creatio ex nihilo is a “late Christian invention” fails to account for the clear trajectory of Jewish thought toward affirming God’s absolute creative sovereignty against the backdrop of competing Hellenistic cosmologies.

Reception History: Early Christian and Jewish Readings

Patristic Understanding of 2 Maccabees 7:28

Other scholars (e.g., Chambers, Beale, Rainbow) observe that early Christian and Jewish readers saw in texts like 2 Macc 7:28, Wisdom of Solomon, and Hebrews 11:3 explicit or implicit affirmations of ex nihilo—based on the language and theological claims about God’s unique, absolute creative power.

The passage became a key proof-text for early Christian theologians like Origen and Chrysostom, who recognized its affirmation of God’s creation without preexistent material. These were not arbitrary readings but reflected an understanding of the text’s implications within its Jewish theological context.

Rabbinical Perspectives on Creation

The Talmudic and Midrashic literature contains numerous debates about the nature of creation that reveal a rejection of eternal matter. For example, Genesis Rabbah 1:9 states:

“R. Huna said in Bar Kappara’s name: ‘If it were not explicitly written in Scripture, it would be impossible to say it: “In the beginning God created” [Genesis 1:1]. From the beginning of God’s creation [was the world created]'” (Genesis Rabbah 1:9).

This passage struggles with the very concept of beginning and creation, suggesting that the rabbis were grappling with the implications of absolute creation—not merely shaping preexistent matter.

Conclusion: A More Nuanced Assessment

The claim that 2 Maccabees 7:28 does not affirm creatio ex nihilo fails on several counts:

Linguistic analysis shows that ouk ex ontōn most naturally reads as a denial of preexistent material.
Theological context demonstrates that the statement functions within a framework of resurrection hope grounded in God’s sovereign creative power.
Intertextual evidence from a wide range of Second Temple Jewish texts supports the concept of creation from non-being.
Later Jewish tradition exhibits diversity but includes strong strands that reject eternal matter.
Early reception by both Christian and Jewish interpreters recognized the text’s implications for God’s absolute creative sovereignty.

Dan McClellan’s dismissal of 2 Maccabees 7:28 and related Second Temple literature as evidence for creatio ex nihilo oversimplifies the data and fails to account for broader Second Temple Jewish cosmology, as shown in several neglected texts that reflect a range of views more supportive of ex nihilo than McClellan allows.

The persistence of creation-from-nonbeing language, rejection of eternal matter, and affirmation of God’s sovereign causation shows a native theological commitment that resisted syncretism with Greek metaphysical assumptions. While Second Temple Judaism did not uniformly embrace a fully articulated doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in its later systematic form, the conceptual foundations and early formulations of the doctrine are clearly present in texts like 2 Maccabees 7:28.

Introduction

Dan McClellan argues that Hebrews 11:3 does not affirm creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) but reflects Greek philosophical categories, specifically an Aristotelian notion of creation from “unformed matter” or “non-being stuff.” He posits that the visible world was formed from invisible, pre-existent material, aligning with Hellenistic metaphysical frameworks. This critique systematically dismantles McClellan’s interpretation through an exhaustive analysis of the passage’s grammatical structure, literary context, theological framework, historical background, and scholarly consensus. It incorporates additional intertextual, linguistic, and philosophical evidence, alongside early Christian exegesis, to demonstrate that Hebrews 11:3 unequivocally supports creatio ex nihilo within a Jewish theological tradition, emphasizing divine speech as the sole creative cause.

I. Detailed Grammatical Analysis of Hebrews 11:3

The exegesis of Hebrews 11:3 hinges on the clause:
εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέναι
(“so that what is seen was not made out of things that are visible”). A meticulous grammatical analysis reveals the flaws in McClellan’s interpretation.

A. The Role and Scope of the Negative Particle (μὴ)

McClellan links the negative particle μὴ to the prepositional phrase ἐκ φαινομένων (“from visible things”), suggesting creation from “non-visible things.” This reading faces multiple challenges:

Standard Koine Greek Syntax: In Koine Greek, μὴ typically modifies the verb it precedes, especially in infinitival constructions. Here, it most naturally negates γεγονέναι (“made” or “come into being”), not ἐκ φαινομένων. Thomas Schreiner argues, “Grammatically, the ESV and NIV readings are preferable, as the negative likely modifies the infinitive ‘made’ (γεγονέναι) rather than the prepositional phrase” (Schreiner, Commentary on Hebrews, 2015, p. 345). A.T. Robertson reinforces this, noting that negatives with infinitives typically negate the verbal action unless context explicitly indicates otherwise (Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament, 1914, p. 1160).
Rhetorical Word Order: The clause’s unusual word order—placing μὴ before ἐκ φαινομένων and delaying γεγονέναι—is a rhetorical device. William Lane explains that this structure emphasizes both the negation and the act of creation, framing the clause to highlight God’s non-material causation (Lane, Hebrews 9–13, 1991, p. 329). The early placement of μὴ underscores the rejection of visible origins, while the delayed γεγονέναι emphasizes the divine act.
Negation Scope: Daniel Wallace notes that when μὴ precedes a prepositional phrase modifying an infinitive, it typically negates the entire verbal idea, including its modifiers (Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 1996, p. 604). Thus, the clause denies any derivation of the visible world from observable phenomena.
Theological Implications: Philip Hughes warns against reading “made from invisible things,” as it imports Greek dualistic metaphysics alien to the Jewish author’s intent, which emphasizes divine speech (ῥήματι θεοῦ) as the sole creative cause (Hughes, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, 1977, p. 439).
Countering Ambiguity: McClellan might argue that the word order allows flexibility, permitting μὴ to modify ἐκ φαινομένων. However, the consistent New Testament pattern of negating material causation (e.g., Romans 4:17, τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, “things that are not as though they were”) supports the reading that μὴ negates the entire idea of material origins.

B. Significance of Grammatical Markers

McClellan overlooks key grammatical features:

τὸ βλεπόμενον (“what is seen”): The singular neuter article with the present passive participle refers to the entire visible cosmos as a unified entity. Gareth Cockerill states, “‘What is seen’ is singular, describing the whole created order” (Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 2012, p. 525).
ἐκ φαινομένων (“from visible things”): The absence of a definite article indicates a categorical reference to all perceptible phenomena, reinforcing an ontological divide between divine creation and material causation. F.F. Bruce notes, “This categorical distinction underscores God’s sole creative agency” (Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 1990, p. 279).
Perfect Tense of γεγονέναι: The perfect infinitive (“has come into being”) denotes a completed act with ongoing results, affirming the cosmos’s enduring existence as God’s creation (Cockerill, p. 526).
Prepositional Phrase εἰς τὸ: This phrase with the infinitive often indicates purpose or result (Blass-Debrunner-Funk, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament, 1961, §402). Here, it underscores the purpose of faith: to perceive that the visible world has no material origin.

C. Semantic Analysis of Key Terms

McClellan misinterprets critical terms:

κατηρτίσθαι (“framed,” “ordered”): McClellan suggests this implies organizing pre-existent matter, but Lane notes its LXX usage in Psalm 73:16 and 88:10, meaning “to establish” or “create” (Lane, p. 330). The subsequent clause negates material origins.
αἰῶνας (“worlds/ages”): This term encompasses spatial and temporal dimensions, undermining McClellan’s materialist focus. Cockerill states, “It refers to the entire created order, moving toward its eschatological climax” (Cockerill, p. 524).
φαινομένων (“things that appear”): McClellan reads this as metaphysical “invisible realities,” but Paul Ellingworth notes, “φαινομένων denotes observable phenomena, not philosophical abstractions” (Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 1993, p. 568). In Hellenistic Jewish texts like Philo’s De Opificio Mundi (129), φαινομένων refers to sensory phenomena, not metaphysical entities, further undermining McClellan’s Aristotelian lens.

II. Literary and Contextual Analysis

A. Chiastic Structure

Hebrews 11:3 employs a chiastic structure:

A: κατηρτίσθαι (“were ordered”)
B: τοὺς αἰῶνας (“the worlds”)
C: ῥήματι θεοῦ (“by the word of God”)
C′: μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων (“not from things that appear”)
B′: τὸ βλεπόμενον (“what is visible”)
A′: γεγονέναι (“has come into being”)

This pairs ῥήματι θεοῦ with μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων, identifying God’s word as the non-visible source, not invisible matter (Ellingworth, p. 569). Peter O’Brien reinforces this, noting, “God’s word corresponds to ‘what cannot be seen,’ opposing material causation” (O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews, 2010, p. 403).

B. Role Within Hebrews 11

Verse 3 is the foundational faith example:

Inaugural Example: Lane notes that πίστει (“by faith”) sets the stage for the chapter’s anaphora, uniquely using “we” to include the audience (Lane, p. 326). Creation ex nihilo is the paradigm for faith.
Communal Engagement: Cockerill observes, “The inclusive ‘we’ unites the pastor and hearers within the faith tradition” (Cockerill, p. 523).
Structural Inclusio: The verse connects to 12:1 (“let us run”), framing the faith catalog with creation and eschatological hope (Lane, p. 327).
Epistemological Foundation: Craig Koester states, “Faith apprehends what observation cannot, establishing creation ex nihilo as faith’s paradigmatic instance” (Koester, Hebrews, 2001, p. 473).
Rhetorical Polemic: Harold Attridge suggests that 11:3 counters Hellenistic skepticism, asserting divine sovereignty against rationalist cosmologies (Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 1989, p. 315).

C. Connection to Hebrews 11:1

Verse 3 instantiates 11:1’s definition of faith:

Faith as Hypostasis: Faith gives substance to unseen realities, such as creation’s divine origin (O’Brien, p. 401).
Faith as Elenchos: Faith provides conviction of God’s creative act. George Guthrie notes, “Faith sees beyond the visible universe to divine causation” (Guthrie, Hebrews, 1998, p. 372).
Contrast with Observation: The verse contrasts sensory perception with faith-based understanding, supporting creatio ex nihilo (Koester, p. 474).

D. Broader Cosmological Context

Hebrews’ cosmology reinforces creatio ex nihilo. Hebrews 1:2 states that God “made the universe (αἰῶνας)” through Christ, using the same term as 11:3. David deSilva notes, “This christological foundation excludes intermediary material causes” (deSilva, Perseverance in Gratitude, 2000, p. 88). This consistency undermines McClellan’s materialist reading.

III. Theological and Philosophical Frameworks

A. Jewish vs. Greek Theological Context

McClellan’s Greek categories misread the Jewish framework:

Jewish Scriptural Basis: F.F. Bruce asserts, “Hebrews affirms creatio ex nihilo, rooted in Genesis 1 and Psalm 33:6, not Greek thought” (Bruce, p. 280). Job 38:4–7, where God creates without reference to pre-existent material, further supports this.
Countering Hellenistic Judaism: Lane suggests the author corrects Hellenistic readings of Genesis influenced by Plato’s Timaeus (Lane, p. 331).
Absence of Platonic Dualism: Koester notes, “Hebrews lacks Platonic heavenly-earthly dichotomies, grounding its theology in Jewish monotheism” (Koester, p. 475).
Contrast with Middle Platonism: Unlike Philo’s syncretism (De Opificio Mundi), Hebrews avoids Platonic notions of pre-existent matter. James Dunn states, “Hebrews aligns with Jewish monotheism, not Platonic dualism” (Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 1998, p. 206).
Anti-Gnostic Implications: Hebrews counters proto-Gnostic ideas of emanations or chaos. Elaine Pagels notes, “Early Christian texts like Hebrews affirm God’s sole creative authority” (Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels, 1979, p. 132).

B. Divine Speech as Performative Cause

The phrase ῥήματι θεοῦ emphasizes God’s word:

Biblical Roots: Lane notes, “The text echoes Genesis 1:1–3 and Psalm 33:6, 9” (Lane, p. 330). Isaiah 48:13 and Romans 4:17 further affirm creation ex nihilo.
Contrast with Greek Theories: Hughes contrasts this with Greek demiurgic notions, stating, “The biblical doctrine excludes dualism, affirming God’s dynamic word” (Hughes, p. 440).
Theological Anthropology: Richard Bauckham notes, “Creation ex nihilo underscores human dependence on God, reinforcing faith amid persecution” (Bauckham, The Theology of the Letter to the Hebrews, 1995, p. 45).

C. Misapplication of Aristotelian Categories

McClellan’s Aristotelian lens is untenable:

Category Error: Terms like “non-being stuff” (ὕλη ἀμόρφος) are absent. Hebrews uses Jewish vocabulary (ῥήματι θεοῦ).
Stoic Comparison: McClellan might conflate φαινομένων with Stoic eternal matter, but Hebrews’ denial of observable origins rejects this (Koester, p. 476).
Textual Evidence: Ellingworth notes, “The absence of Greek metaphysical terms undermines Aristotelian readings” (Ellingworth, p. 570).

IV. Historical-Theological Context

A. Continuity with 2 Maccabees 7:28

Hebrews parallels 2 Maccabees 7:28 (“God did not make them out of things that existed”):

Grammatical Similarity: Lane identifies the shared denial of pre-existent material (Lane, p. 332).
Rhetorical Context: Both texts encourage faith amid suffering (Cockerill, p. 527).
Theological Trajectory: This reflects a Jewish emphasis on creatio ex nihilo (Bruce, p. 281).

B. Second Temple Jewish Context

McClellan neglects this context:

Qumran Evidence: 1QH IX, 9–10 and 1QS III, 15–16 affirm creation “from what was not” (Cockerill, p. 528).
Joseph and Aseneth: This text uses similar language, countering Hellenistic dualism (Ellingworth, p. 571).
Wisdom of Solomon: Wisdom 11:17 describes creation from “formless matter,” but emphasizes God’s omnipotence, aligning with creatio ex nihilo (Cockerill, p. 529).
Rabbinic Continuity: Genesis Rabbah 1:9 affirms creation from nothing, reflecting a tradition Hebrews anticipates (Lane, p. 333).

C. Scriptural Foundations

Hebrews builds on Genesis 1, Psalm 33:6, 9, Isaiah 44:24, and Job 38:4–7, emphasizing God’s sole creative sovereignty (Bruce, p. 280).

V. Refuting McClellan’s Specific Arguments

A. Misreading Colossians 1:16

McClellan cites Colossians 1:16’s “invisible” entities:

Category Confusion: These are created beings, not pre-existent matter. N.T. Wright notes, “Colossians emphasizes Christ’s creation of all things” (Wright, Colossians and Philemon, 1986, p. 71).
Distinct Focus: Colossians addresses Christ’s scope, Hebrews the mode of creation (Lane, p. 333).

B. False Analogy to Hyperbole

McClellan compares “all things” to John 4:29’s hyperbole:

Genre Misunderstanding: Theological statements in epistles serve doctrinal purposes. Lane notes, “The language establishes God’s sovereignty” (Lane, p. 327).
Anti-Dualistic Function: “All things” counters dualistic cosmologies (Bruce, p. 281).

C. Misunderstanding “All Things”

McClellan misreads the theological role:

Monotheistic Foundation: “All things” affirms God’s sole authority (Cockerill, p. 525).
Genesis Framework: The language reflects Genesis 1’s comprehensiveness (Bruce, p. 281).

D. Addressing Counterarguments

Hellenistic Jewish Influence: McClellan might cite Philo’s syncretism. Response: Hebrews avoids Philo’s Platonic terminology, aligning with the LXX (Lane, p. 331).
Ambiguity of φαινομένων: McClellan may argue it implies metaphysical realities. Response: Its LXX and New Testament usage denotes sensory phenomena (Ellingworth, p. 568).
Audience Context: McClellan might claim the audience understood the verse philosophically. Response: The epistle’s Jewish framework prioritizes scriptural revelation (Attridge, p. 315).

VI. Epistemological Dimensions

A. Faith vs. Empirical Verification

Hebrews 11:3 establishes faith as the means to apprehend creation:

Spiritual Perception: Lane states, “Knowledge of creation is a matter of faith” (Lane, p. 329).
Contrast with Greek Epistemology: Unlike Aristotle’s sensory-based aisthesis, Hebrews relies on divine revelation (Guthrie, p. 374).
Revelation in Hebrews: Hebrews 1:1–2 links divine speech to creation and redemption, grounding faith in God’s testimony (Attridge, p. 316).

B. Faith’s Comprehensive Scope

Pattern of the Unseen: Faith perceives creation, the promised land, and the heavenly city (Koester, p. 474).
Cloud of Witnesses: The “cloud of witnesses” (12:1) reinforces faith’s apprehension of divine realities (Lane, p. 327).
Divine Power: Creation ex nihilo establishes God’s power as the basis for faith (Lane, p. 326).

VII. Scholarly Consensus

A. Broad Agreement

F.F. Bruce (Evangelical): Affirms creatio ex nihilo (Bruce, p. 280).
William Lane (Reformed): Excludes Platonic influence (Lane, p. 331).
Gareth Cockerill (Wesleyan): “‘What is seen’ is the entire created order” (Cockerill, p. 525).
Thomas Schreiner (Baptist): Supports negation of material causation (Schreiner, p. 345).
Paul Ellingworth (Ecumenical): Notes absence of Greek vocabulary (Ellingworth, p. 570).
Luke Timothy Johnson (Catholic): Aligns Hebrews with Jewish creation theology (Johnson, Hebrews: A Commentary, 2006, p. 280).

B. Historical Reception

Patristic Support: Irenaeus cites Hebrews 11:3 to affirm creatio ex nihilo against Gnostic dualism (Against Heresies 2.10.4; Cockerill, p. 528).
Theological Trajectory: Hebrews bridges Genesis’s implicit creatio ex nihilo to explicit later formulations (Bruce, p. 281).

VIII. Theological Significance

A. Foundation for Faith

Paradigmatic Example: Creation ex nihilo sets the pattern for faith (Koester, p. 473).
Epistemological Framework: Faith apprehends unseen realities (Cockerill, p. 523).
Eschatological Hope: God’s creative power grounds hope for the “unshakable kingdom” (12:28; Koester, p. 475).

B. Contrast with Worldviews

Against Greek Dualism: Excludes dualistic cosmologies (Hughes, p. 440).
Against Hellenistic Judaism: Corrects Platonic readings of Genesis (Lane, p. 331).
Against Materialism: Reveals divine causation (Guthrie, p. 373).

C. Christological and Pastoral Implications

Christology: Hebrews 1:2 and 11:3 present Christ as creator and sustainer (deSilva, p. 89).
Pastoral Purpose: Affirming creatio ex nihilo bolsters perseverance amid persecution (Cockerill, p. 527).

1. Dan’s Claim About Colossians 1:16–17

Dan asserts:

“Apologists will frequently cite those passages that emphasize that God (or God through Jesus) created all things (Romans 11:36; Colossians 1:16; 1 Corinthians 8:6)… The most natural understanding of the rhetoric about God creating ‘all things’ in the contexts in which that rhetoric occurs would be as a reference to ‘all things that currently exist,’ which would exclude primordial matter.”
— The Bible Says So, Kindle Locations 738–740.

This assertion attempts to evade the text’s universality by redefining “all things” (τὰ πάντα, ta panta) as rhetorical hyperbole, rather than ontological totality. He also interprets “visible and invisible” as non-metaphysical language referring to formed elements within the existing cosmos, and denies that the phrase has any bearing on creation ex nihilo.

2. Exegetical Rebuttal from G.K. Beale

Beale forcefully rejects the idea that Colossians 1 refers only to “currently existing things” or excludes metaphysical categories:

“’All things’ comprises every animate and inanimate thing that has been created… Included among these created things are ‘the visible things and the invisible things’ (τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, ta orata kai ta aorata). There are realities in the creation that can be seen and those that cannot be seen with the naked eye… The list of these various kinds of powers is a further explanation of the preceding ‘things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible’”.

This is not poetic exaggeration. Beale confirms that:

“The neuter plural τὰ πάντα (ta panta) is a description of ‘the universe,’ as common in the NT, which further elaborates on the ‘all creation’ of 1:15”.

Beale further notes that the reference to “thrones, dominions, rulers, and authorities” strengthens the claim of universal scope. These are not limited to post-creation entities; they are ontologically included in the “all things” that were created—not merely ordered or organized.

He clarifies:

“Christ at the first creation is not the first of created reality nor in any way a part of the creation but is the means or agent of creation… the ongoing existence of the creation is the effect of his past creating activity”.

This rules out Dan’s claim that preexistent matter could have existed apart from Christ’s creative work.

3. Exegetical Rebuttal from Douglas Moo

Douglas Moo echoes Beale’s assessment and goes further to explain the chiastic structure and ontological scope:

“The universality expressed in ‘all things’ (τὰ πάντα) is a leitmotif… This point receives considerable emphasis by the addition of three sets of qualifiers: things in heaven and on earth; [things] visible and invisible; thrones or powers or rulers or authorities”.

Moo explains that this triple construction (heaven/earth, visible/invisible, powers/dominions) is not rhetorical but ontological:

“Heaven and earth is a common biblical merism… a construction in which two elements function together to indicate a single whole: in this case, the created order, the universe”.

Moo also rebuts the idea that these are merely poetic references to current functional structures:

“The inclusive language of this verse suggests that Paul is setting up that specific point by asserting Christ’s supremacy over the entire angelic realm… The existence of spiritual beings of various sorts and their critical impact… were fundamental components of the ancient worldview”.

This makes the scope of creation extend not merely to empirical matter but to every realm of being.

4. Lexical and Theological Context

The Greek terms themselves refute Dan’s redefinition:

τὰ πάντα (ta panta) — a standard term used to denote everything without exception, both in Paul (Rom 11:36; 1 Cor 8:6) and in broader Hellenistic Jewish usage. It parallels the Genesis merism “heaven and earth” and is used precisely to capture the totality of existence.
ἐκτίσθη / ἔκτισται (ektisthē / ektistai) — denotes bringing into being, not merely assigning order. This verb group (κτίζω) has the primary semantic sense of causing something to exist that did not exist before.

Beale affirms:

“The word ‘create [ktizō]’ is defined as ‘to bring something into existence’… Colossians 1:16–17 speaks comprehensively when it declares that all things were created in and through Christ and for him… these expressions ‘embrace everything, for there are no exceptions’”.

5. Theological Implication: Not Hyperbole, But Metaphysics

Dan appeals to rhetorical flexibility (e.g., “all things” in John 4:29), but Moo addresses this:

“The ‘all things’ of Colossians 1:20 includes the world of nature… the explicit teaching of the Scriptures about the reality of spiritual beings… must be taken seriously. To reinterpret ‘powers’ as institutions is a modern imposition”.

In other words, Paul does not use “all things” as a vague flourish here; he uses it in a metaphysical declaration of totality—Christ is not merely a shaping force within creation but the very ground of its being.

Analysis of Colossians 1:15–20 and Creatio ex Nihilo

This article refutes Dan McClellan’s claim that Colossians 1:16–17 does not support creatio ex nihilo. McClellan argues that “all things” (ta panta) refers to “all things that currently exist,” excluding primordial matter, and is used hyperbolically, not as a philosophical claim encompassing unformed matter. He asserts the passage’s context does not extend to primordial matter, ruling out creation from nothing. Drawing on James D. G. Dunn, N. T. Wright, Douglas J. Moo, F. F. Bruce, Robert H. Mounce, Peter T. O’Brien, G. K. Beale, Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Philo, I demonstrate that the hymn’s language, literary structure (inclusios, parallelism, chiasm, merism), and theology affirm Christ’s creation of all reality. McClellan’s neglect of these features renders his interpretation unsustainable.

1. Exegetical Context and Structure

Colossians 1:15–20, a christological hymn, exalts Christ’s supremacy in creation and redemption. Dunn suggests it reworks a Wisdom hymn, casting Christ as “the visible expression of the invisible God” (Dunn, 92). Wright calls it “a carefully crafted poem” linking Jewish monotheism to Christian theology, with Christ as the “image of God” (Wright, 74). Moo identifies three stanzas—creation (vv. 15–16), transition (vv. 17–18a), redemption (vv. 18b–20)—noting its “universal scope” (Moo, 108–109). Inclusios (ta panta’s repetition), parallelism (“heaven and earth”), and chiasm (“visible and invisible”) emphasize Christ’s sovereignty over all existence. O’Brien underscores the polemic: “The hymn was included to counter false teaching which depreciated Christ’s person and work” (O’Brien, 1982, 44). Irenaeus cites v. 16 against Gnostic cosmologies: “Christ formed all things that have a beginning” without preexistent matter (Against Heresies 1.22.1).

Contra McClellan: McClellan’s claim that ta panta excludes primordial matter ignores the hymn’s cosmic scope, evident in its inclusios and merism, which span “the whole sweep of created order” (Wright, 76). The polemic, per O’Brien and Irenaeus, refutes independent entities, supporting creatio ex nihilo.

2. Lexical Analysis: Ta Panta and Ktizō

Ta panta (“all things”) and ktizō (“to create”) are pivotal. Dunn defines ta panta as “the sum total of created reality,” with qualifiers (“in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, thrones, powers”) ensuring “no created thing is excluded” (Dunn, 95). Moo notes ta panta echoes Genesis 1:1’s merism “heaven and earth,” meaning “the entire universe,” while ktizō signifies “bringing into being” (Moo, 119–120). Wright highlights the perfect tense (ektistai): “All things have been created through him and continue to hold together in him” (Wright, 77). Bruce adds that ktizō in the LXX (e.g., Genesis 1:1) “points to creation out of nothing,” and ta panta includes “every grade of being” (Bruce, 1984, 57). Mounce agrees: “The phrase ‘all things’ is absolute, admitting no exceptions” (Mounce, 2000, 119). Wisdom of Solomon 7:21 calls Wisdom “the fashioner of all that exists,” and Philo’s Logos “framed” the universe, excluding preexistent matter (On the Creation 24).

Contra McClellan: McClellan’s restriction of ta panta to formed entities and ktizō to reorganization misreads their scope, ignoring the merism (“heaven and earth”) and chiasm (“visible and invisible”) that denote all reality (Moo, 119). Bruce and Philo’s ex nihilo emphasis contradicts his view.

3. Theological Implications

The hymn roots Christ’s role in Wisdom/Logos traditions, reoriented christologically. Dunn’s “dynamic monism” casts Christ as “the one in whom God’s creative purpose is focused” (Dunn, 93). Wright emphasizes: “He is not part of the creation but the one through whom it came to be” (Wright, 75). Moo notes the polemic: “Christ’s supremacy over all powers refutes any suggestion of rival authorities” (Moo, 120). O’Brien adds: “Christ is the agent, sphere, and goal of creation, leaving no room for competing powers” (O’Brien, 46). Athanasius affirms: “Through [Christ] all things were brought into being from nothing” (On the Incarnation 3).

Contra McClellan: McClellan’s suggestion of co-eternal matter clashes with the hymn’s monotheism, reinforced by parallelism linking Christ to Genesis 1. Wright’s and Athanasius’ ex nihilo theology precludes uncreated matter, aligning with Dunn and O’Brien.

4. Refuting McClellan’s Counterarguments

McClellan’s arguments crumble:

“Visible and Invisible” as Physical Forms: McClellan implies “visible and invisible” refers to physical entities (McClellan, Kindle Location 740). Moo counters: “The pair ‘visible and invisible’ is a comprehensive expression for everything in creation, material and spiritual” (Moo, 119). Dunn agrees: “It includes the unseen heavenly powers, not some unformed substance” (Dunn, 95). Irenaeus interprets it as “all things that have a beginning” (Against Heresies 1.22.1). The chiastic parallelism (“heaven/invisible, earth/visible”) denotes ontological totality, which McClellan ignores.
Rhetorical Hyperbole: McClellan claims “‘all things’ is rhetorical and its scope is limited by the rhetorical context” (McClellan, Kindle Location 756). Dunn refutes: “The use of ta panta in Colossians is not casual exaggeration but a deliberate theological assertion of totality” (Dunn, 94). Bruce adds: “In this context, ‘all things’ is not rhetorical but polemical, asserting Christ’s absolute sovereignty” (Bruce, 57). O’Brien notes: “The repetition of ta panta underscores its literal scope to counter rival claims” (O’Brien, 45). The inclusio of ta panta demands universality.
Platonic Dualism: McClellan’s view aligns with Greco-Roman ideas of eternal matter (McClellan, Kindle Location 764). Dunn counters: “The Wisdom/Logos concept bridges God and creation without requiring preexistent matter” (Dunn, 91). Philo’s Logos “framed” the universe monotheistically (On the Creation 24). Mounce states: “The hymn’s Jewish roots reject any dualistic notion of co-eternal matter” (Mounce, 120). The monotheistic parallelism rooted in Genesis 1 refutes McClellan.

5. Support for Creatio ex Nihilo

Colossians 1:16–17 unequivocally supports creatio ex nihilo, demolishing McClellan’s claim that ta panta excludes primordial matter. The hymn’s portrayal of Christ as the preexistent “image” and “firstborn” (Col. 1:15), rooted in Adamic theology, establishes him as the divine creator. Literary features—inclusios, parallelism, chiasm, merism—amplify ta panta’s universal scope, which McClellan’s cursory reading sidesteps, leaving his interpretation in tatters.

Universal Scope
McClellan asserts: “The most natural understanding of… ‘all things’ in [Colossians 1:16] would be as a reference to ‘all things that currently exist,’ which would exclude primordial matter” (McClellan, Kindle Location 752). This claim collapses under the hymn’s literary structure. Dunn asserts: “Ta panta refers to the sum total of created reality, with no created thing excluded, as the following phrases make clear” (Dunn, 1996, 95). Moo reinforces: “The repetition of ‘all things’ with comprehensive qualifiers—in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible—leaves no exceptions” (Moo, 2008, 119). Beale notes: “Ta panta is a description of ‘the universe,’… elaborat[ing] on the ‘all creation’ of 1:15, encompassing all that exists” (Beale, 2011, 150). O’Brien states: “The expression ‘all things’ is expanded… by two lines… ‘in heaven and on earth, things visible and invisible,’… [which] embrace everything for there are no exceptions” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2073). Mounce adds: “The phrase ‘all things’ is absolute, admitting no exceptions, whether material or spiritual” (Mounce, 2000, 119). Wright emphasizes: “Ta panta includes the whole sweep of created order, from the highest to the lowest” (Wright, 1986, 76).
O’Brien further clarifies: “The chiastic structure… is an example of inclusio: the words ta panta are repeated in the concluding line, binding the structure together” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2078). Dunn adds: “The qualifiers ‘visible and invisible’… ensure that ta panta is not a rhetorical flourish but an assertion of absolute universality” (Dunn, 1996, 96). Moo notes: “The merism ‘heaven and earth’ parallels Genesis 1:1, signaling the entire cosmos” (Moo, 2008, 119). Beale reinforces: “The phrase ‘all creation’ (1:15) is unpacked by ta panta, which includes every dimension of reality” (Beale, 2011, 151).
The inclusio (repeating ta panta), chiasm (“heaven/invisible, earth/visible”), and merism (“heaven and earth”) affirm ta panta’s exhaustive scope, encompassing all reality, material and spiritual.
Why McClellan’s in a Pickle: McClellan’s restriction of ta panta to “currently existing things” ignores the inclusio, chiasm, and merism, which O’Brien, Moo, and Dunn show encompass all reality, echoing Genesis 1:1. By dismissing these literary cues, he arbitrarily excludes primordial matter, contradicting the hymn’s universal scope and bolstering creatio ex nihilo.

Creative Act
McClellan implies that ktizō in Colossians 1:16 describes forming existing entities, not creating from nothing, as part of his broader claim that New Testament texts lack ex nihilo (McClellan, Kindle Location 752). The hymn’s tenses and structure crush this view. Wright explains: “All things have been created through him and continue to hold together in him, showing his role as both origin and sustainer” (Wright, 1986, 77). Bruce clarifies: “Ktizō in biblical usage, as in Genesis 1:1, points to creation out of nothing” (Bruce, 1984, 57). Moo notes: “The aorist (ektisthē) denotes the act of creation, the perfect (ektistai) its enduring result, emphasizing Christ’s foundational role” (Moo, 2008, 120). Beale adds: “The perfect verb… highlights a stative idea, referring to the very beginning of creation and to its continuing existence” (Beale, 2011, 139). O’Brien states: “In the first clause the aorist tense [of ktizō] is employed to draw attention to the historical act, while the second… uses the perfect to focus on creation’s continuing existence” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2046). Athanasius affirms: “Through [Christ] all things were brought into being from nothing, not from preexistent matter” (On the Incarnation 3).
O’Brien further notes: “The phrase ‘in him’ (en autō) points to Christ as the sphere within which the work of creation takes place, underscoring his preeminent role” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2060). Moo adds: “Ktizō’s use in the LXX and New Testament consistently implies bringing into existence, not reshaping” (Moo, 2008, 120). Dunn reinforces: “Ktizō denotes the act of bringing into being, rooted in Jewish monotheistic tradition” (Dunn, 1996, 95).
Parallelism (“created through him… hold together in him”) and the aorist-perfect tense interplay underscore ktizō’s origination, not reorganization.
McClellan’s view of ktizō as forming existing entities ignores the aorist-perfect tenses and parallelism, which O’Brien, Moo, and Beale tie to a singular creative act and sustenance. By overlooking en autō as the sphere of creation (O’Brien) and ktizō’s ex nihilo sense (Bruce, Athanasius), he misreads the hymn’s assertion of origination, cementing creatio ex nihilo.

Monotheism
McClellan aligns his view with Greco-Roman notions of eternal matter, suggesting that Colossians 1:16 does not address primordial matter (McClellan, Kindle Location 764). The hymn’s monotheistic framework, rooted in Wisdom traditions, obliterates this idea. Wright states: “The hymn stands firmly within Jewish monotheism, with Christ as the agent of God’s sole creative act” (Wright, 1986, 74). Dunn adds: “The Wisdom/Logos concept expresses God’s immanent action, not a secondary creator, ruling out any dualistic matter” (Dunn, 1996, 93). Philo reinforces: “God, through the Logos, is the sole cause of the universe, with no preexistent substance” (On the Creation 24). Beale clarifies: “Christ as the preexistent ‘image of the invisible God’ indicates his consubstantial relation to the Father, distinct from creation” (Beale, 2011, 150). O’Brien affirms: “Paul’s language is derived from Genesis 1 and the OT Wisdom literature… where Wisdom is styled the Creator’s ‘master-workman’ (Prov 8:30)” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2072).
Dunn further notes: “The hymn’s Wisdom background, unlike Stoic or Platonic ideas, assumes a monotheistic creation ex nihilo” (Dunn, 1996, 91). Wright adds: “Christ’s role as Wisdom personified excludes any co-eternal matter, as God alone creates” (Wright, 1986, 75). Mounce states: “The Jewish monotheistic context of the hymn precludes any notion of preexistent matter” (Mounce, 2000, 120). Parallelism (“in him… through him… for him”) echoes Genesis 1’s unified act, with Christ as the personal agent.
Why McClellan’s in a Pickle: McClellan’s Greco-Roman lens, implying eternal matter, dismisses the hymn’s monotheistic parallelism and Wisdom roots, which O’Brien, Dunn, and Wright anchor in Genesis 1 and Proverbs 8:30. By ignoring Christ’s divine role as sole agent (Beale, Philo), he posits an incompatible dualistic cosmology, which creatio ex nihilo refutes through God’s exclusive causation.

Polemic
McClellan claims: “‘All things’ is rhetorical and its scope is limited by the rhetorical context,” excluding primordial matter from Colossians 1:16 (McClellan, Kindle Location 756). The hymn’s polemic intent, targeting false cosmologies, buries this assertion. Moo explains: “Christ’s lordship over all powers refutes any rival authorities, including speculative cosmologies” (Moo, 2008, 120). Irenaeus applies this: “Christ formed all things, refuting those who say matter preexisted” (Against Heresies 1.22.1). Beale states: “The reference to such powers in 1:16 anticipates Paul’s argument against the false teaching besetting the Colossians” (Beale, 2011, 152). O’Brien notes: “Probably with special reference to the Colossian heresy Paul now emphasizes that even the cosmic powers and principalities… were created in Christ” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2088). Bruce adds: “The polemic context demands that Christ’s creative act encompasses all reality, leaving no room for independent entities” (Bruce, 1984, 58).
O’Brien further clarifies: “Good or bad, all [powers] are subject to him as Creator… they derive their existence from him” (O’Brien, 1982, Kindle Location 2090). Moo reinforces: “The inclusion of ‘thrones, dominions’ in ta panta counters any notion of powers existing outside Christ’s creation” (Moo, 2008, 121). Beale adds: “The hymn’s polemic ensures that no entity, material or spiritual, escapes Christ’s creative act” (Beale, 2011, 153). The inclusio of ta panta and chiasm (including “thrones, dominions”) target the Colossian heresy, affirming Christ’s supremacy over all reality.
McClellan’s claim that ta panta is hyperbolic and excludes primordial matter ignores the hymn’s polemic inclusio and chiasm, which O’Brien, Moo, and Beale show encompass all powers and reality. By missing the Colossian heresy’s context (O’Brien, Irenaeus), he allows independent matter, a notion creatio ex nihilo obliterates by affirming Christ’s universal creation.

Conclusion

Dunn, Wright, Moo, Bruce, Mounce, O’Brien, Beale, Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Philo decisively dismantle McClellan’s claims. Colossians 1:16–17’s universal ta panta, creative ktizō, monotheistic theology, and polemic purpose, amplified by inclusios, parallelism, chiasm, and merism, affirm creatio ex nihilo. McClellan’s neglect of literary features and theological context leaves his interpretation a fragile scaffold, toppled by the hymn’s clear assertion of Christ as the creator of all existence.

Rebuttal of Dan McClellan’s Hellenistic Interpretation of Romans 4:17

In The Bible Says So, Dan McClellan argues that Romans 4:17 does not refer to creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) but reflects a Greco-Roman philosophical framework where “non-being” (τὰ μὴ ὄντα) denotes unformed, invisible matter rather than absolute nothingness. He claims Paul employs a Hellenistic concept, akin to Aristotle’s notion of generation from potentiality to actuality, where God “calls” things from a realm of “non-being” into “being.” McClellan writes:

“Romans 4:17…concludes by referring to God as the one who ‘calls into existence the things that do not exist’ (NRSVue). Obviously, this is creation out of nothing, right?! Well, no… God calls things from the realm of non-being into the realm of being. It’s the same idea… for ancient Greek thinkers, it still existed; it just lacked form and function.” (The Bible Says So, Kindle loc. 717–740)

McClellan’s interpretation is fundamentally flawed, resting on unsupported assumptions that misalign with the text’s linguistic, contextual, theological, and historical framework. This comprehensive critique is structured into six segments: (1) the Jewish theological context of Romans 4:17, (2) a linguistic and syntactic analysis of the Greek text, (3) the scholarly consensus affirming creatio ex nihilo, (4) a direct attack on McClellan’s assumptions, (5) an evaluation of his motivations and methodological weaknesses, and (6) the theological implications and significance of this interpretive issue. Each section demonstrates that there is no compelling reason to adopt McClellan’s Hellenistic reading, which collapses under scrutiny in favor of the Jewish creatio ex nihilo interpretation.

Argument 1: The Jewish Theological Context of Romans 4:17

Contextual Framework

Romans 4:17 is part of Paul’s argument in Romans 4, where he establishes Abraham as the “father of many nations” (Genesis 17:5) through faith, encompassing both Jews and Gentiles in a covenant relationship with God. The verse describes God as “the one who gives life to the dead and calls into being things that do not exist” (τοῦ… καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα). The immediate context—Abraham and Sarah’s reproductive “deadness” (Romans 4:19)—parallels God’s creative power to bring forth life where none existed, mirroring both the creation of the world and the resurrection of the dead. This theological motif of divine power over impossibility is central to Paul’s argument about justification by faith.

The structure of Romans 4 reveals that verse 17 functions as a theological pivot connecting Abraham’s faith to God’s creative power. Paul quotes Genesis 17:5 and then immediately describes the God in whom Abraham believed, highlighting divine attributes that make faith possible. This rhetorical strategy underscores the inherent connection between Abraham’s faith and God’s ability to create ex nihilo—both reflect divine sovereignty unbound by natural limitations.

Jewish Theological Roots

Paul’s theology is deeply rooted in Second Temple Jewish traditions, which consistently affirm creatio ex nihilo. Key texts include:

2 Maccabees 7:28: “Look at the heaven and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize that God did not make them out of things that existed” (οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός), explicitly rejecting preexistent material.
2 Baruch 21:4: “You have called (into being) from the beginning of the world things that did not previously exist, and they obey you.”
2 Baruch 48:8: “With a word you bring to life that which does not exist, and with great power you hold that which has not yet come.”
Philo, Special Laws 4.187: “He called the non-existent into existence” (τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι).
2 Enoch 24:2: “Before anything existed at all, from the very beginning, whatever exists I created from the non-existent.”
Joseph and Aseneth 12:1-2: “Lord God of the ages, who created all (things) and gave life (to them), who gave breath of life to your whole creation, who brought the invisible (things) out into the light.”
4 Ezra 6:38: “O Lord, you spoke on the first day of creation and said, ‘Let heaven and earth be made,’ and your word accomplished the work.”

These texts articulate a Jewish theological axiom: God’s sovereignty enables creation without preconditions, distinguishing Jewish cosmology from Greco-Roman views of creation from chaos or formless matter (e.g., Plato’s Timaeus, where a demiurge shapes preexistent matter, or Aristotle’s Physics, where generation assumes preexistent potentiality). Paul’s citation of Genesis 17:5 and his focus on God’s promise to Abraham align with this Jewish framework, emphasizing divine fiat over human impossibility.

The rabbinic tradition, though later codified, reflects similar concepts. In Genesis Rabbah 1:9, Rabbi Hoshaya states: “Generally, a king of flesh and blood builds a palace out of existing materials, but the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world out of nothing.” While this text postdates Paul, it demonstrates the continuity of Jewish thought regarding divine creation.

Refutation of McClellan’s Hellenistic Framework

McClellan’s assumption that Paul adopts a Greco-Roman concept of “non-being” as unformed matter is baseless for several reasons:

Theological Incompatibility: Hellenistic philosophy, particularly Aristotle’s, views “non-being” as potentiality within preexistent matter (Metaphysics 7.7), which is then actualized into form. This fundamentally contradicts Jewish monotheism’s emphasis on divine sovereignty.
Textual Disconnection: In contrast to Hellenistic thought, Jewish texts like 2 Maccabees 7:28 and 2 Baruch 21:4 emphasize absolute non-existence. Paul’s Jewish identity, evident in his extensive use of Old Testament citations (e.g., Genesis 17:5, Isaiah 48:13), makes it highly unlikely that he would adopt a Hellenistic framework without explicit qualification.
Liturgical Parallels: Joseph A. Fitzmyer notes that Paul’s language echoes Jewish liturgical formulas, such as the Shemoneh Esreh, which praise God as the one who “makes the dead live” (Romans, 386). These parallels establish a Jewish theological context for Romans 4:17.
Contextual Coherence: Paul’s argument about Abraham’s faith connects directly to Jewish salvation history, not Greek philosophy. N.T. Wright observes that Paul’s theology in Romans “is not about a Hellenistic deity working within a Platonic or Aristotelian framework but about the covenant God of Israel working within the framework of Genesis and Exodus” (Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 668).
Theological Consistency: Throughout Romans, Paul consistently interprets Scripture within Jewish theological categories, not Hellenistic ones. His understanding of creation, covenant, and resurrection reflects Jewish apocalyptic thought, not Greek metaphysics.

McClellan’s Hellenistic reading thus imposes an alien framework, ignoring the Jewish context that underpins Paul’s theology and misrepresenting Paul’s engagement with Scripture. As Richard B. Hays notes, “Paul reads Scripture as a narrative of God’s election and redemption of Israel, and he sees this same God at work in Christ” (Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, 120).

Why This Matters

The Jewish context of Romans 4:17 underscores God’s power to create life from nothingness, aligning with creatio ex nihilo. McClellan’s assumption lacks textual or contextual support, as Paul’s theology is grounded in Jewish scriptures and traditions, not Greco-Roman philosophy. This distinction is crucial for understanding Paul’s argument about faith, which centers on God’s sovereign power to fulfill promises that seem impossible by natural means.

Argument 2: Linguistic and Syntactic Analysis of Romans 4:17

The Greek Phrase: τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα

The phrase τοῦ… καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (“who calls the things that are not as though they were”) is central to the debate. McClellan interprets τὰ μὴ ὄντα as unformed matter, drawing from Hellenistic philosophy. A rigorous linguistic and syntactic analysis refutes this assumption.

τὰ μὴ ὄντα (“the things that are not”)

In Greek, μὴ ὄντα denotes absolute non-existence, not potential or unformed matter. Several linguistic considerations support this:

Lexical Precision: Werner Foerster, in the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (1010), explicitly rejects interpretations that assign latent existence to μὴ ὄντα: “We should take the verse in a straightforward way—that God calls forth what does not yet exist.” This aligns with Jewish texts like 2 Maccabees 7:28, where μὴ ὄντα signifies absolute nothingness, not preexistent material awaiting form.
Negative Particle: The use of μή (rather than οὐ) with ὄντα reflects subjective non-existence—things that cannot be conceived or have no standing in reality—rather than merely lacking form. As Daniel B. Wallace notes, μή often denotes “non-existence from the speaker’s viewpoint” (Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 482), emphasizing absolute absence.
Substantival Participle: The use of the article τά with the participle ὄντα creates a substantival expression, “the things that are not,” emphasizing ontological status rather than material condition. This grammatical construction parallels Jewish theological expressions about divine creation (e.g., 2 Maccabees 7:28).
Contrast with Existence: The juxtaposition of μὴ ὄντα with ὡς ὄντα establishes a stark contrast between non-existence and existence, not between unformed and formed matter. This binary opposition reflects Jewish theology’s emphasis on God’s absolute creative power.
Septuagint (LXX) Parallels: In Isaiah 41:24, the LXX uses ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων to describe idols as “from things that are not,” denoting their nothingness. This usage aligns with Paul’s language in Romans 4:17, suggesting absolute non-existence rather than potential existence.

McClellan’s assumption that μὴ ὄντα refers to unformed matter lacks lexical support and contradicts the term’s usage in Jewish contexts. There is no linguistic justification for importing Aristotelian categories into Paul’s vocabulary.

καλέω (“to call”)

The verb καλέω in biblical contexts often signifies a divine act of creation or summons with effectual power:

Creative Force: In Genesis 1:3 (LXX), God’s creative word (“Let there be light”) demonstrates divine fiat, where calling brings something into existence. Isaiah 48:13 similarly portrays God’s call as creating reality: “My right hand spread out the heavens; when I summon them, they all stand up together.”
Effectual Power: In Romans 4:17, καλέω parallels God’s creative fiat in Genesis 1, where God’s word brings existence from nothing. This contrasts sharply with Hellenistic notions of “calling” as shaping preexistent matter, as in Plato’s demiurge or Aristotle’s actualization process.
Theological Resonance: The use of καλέω echoes Isaiah 41:4, where God “calls the generations from the beginning,” emphasizing divine sovereignty over history. This aligns with Paul’s argument about Abraham becoming “father of many nations” through divine promise.
Performative Function: In Romans 9:25, Paul uses καλέω in a similar way: “I will call ‘My people’ those who are not my people,” where God’s call constitutes a new reality. This performative function aligns with creation ex nihilo rather than material transformation.
New Testament Usage: Throughout the New Testament, καλέω often denotes God’s effectual summons (e.g., Romans 8:30; 1 Corinthians 1:9), emphasizing divine agency that creates new realities. As Douglas J. Moo notes, “God’s ‘call’ brings into existence the state or condition mentioned” (Romans, 282).

Paul’s use of καλέω reflects a Jewish understanding of divine sovereignty, not a Hellenistic reshaping of matter. The verb denotes creative power that requires no preexistent material, aligning with creatio ex nihilo.

ὡς ὄντα (“as though they were”)

McClellan argues that this phrase implies a rhetorical or metaphorical summons, not actual creation. This interpretation fails on several grounds:

Syntactic Function: Thomas Schreiner counters that ὡς can introduce a result clause, indicating that God’s call causes non-existent things to exist (Romans, 244). This usage is attested in Koine Greek, where ὡς can denote result rather than mere comparison.
Theological Parallel: Even if interpreted as “as though,” it reflects the certainty of God’s promise, as if the non-existent were already real due to divine fiat, not a transformation of preexistent material. This parallels God’s declaration to Abraham about “many nations” that did not yet exist but were certain due to divine promise.
Contemporary Usage: Frank Thielman notes that this idiom, found in contemporary texts like Philo’s On Joseph (126) and Strabo’s Geography (1.2.35), often denotes speaking of future realities with assurance, not reshaping matter (Romans, Kindle loc. 6514–6520). This usage aligns with Paul’s emphasis on the certainty of God’s promise to Abraham.
Contextual Logic: Paul’s argument centers on Abraham’s faith in God’s promise despite physical impossibility. The phrase ὡς ὄντα emphasizes God’s ability to treat non-existent realities as certain, paralleling Abraham’s faith that “gives glory to God” (Romans 4:20).
Rhetorical Force: The construction emphasizes the contrast between human impossibility and divine possibility, central to Paul’s argument about faith. C.K. Barrett notes that “God acts with creative power comparable with that which he showed at the creation of the world” (Romans, 94).

The phrase ὡς ὄντα does not undermine creatio ex nihilo but emphasizes God’s sovereign power to create by divine fiat, aligning with Jewish theology’s emphasis on divine transcendence over natural limitations.

Contextual Fit

The parallel clause, “who gives life to the dead,” reinforces the theme of God’s power over non-existence, whether in resurrection or creation:

Resurrection Imagery: The phrase “who gives life to the dead” (τοῦ ζωοποιοῦντος τοὺς νεκρούς) echoes Jewish beliefs about resurrection, expressing God’s power over death’s finality. This parallels creation ex nihilo, as both reflect divine sovereignty over non-existence.
Abraham’s Faith: The context—Abraham’s faith despite his and Sarah’s reproductive “deadness” (Romans 4:19)—mirrors this divine ability to create life from nothing, as seen in Isaac’s birth and the inclusion of Gentiles as Abraham’s spiritual heirs.
Scriptural Allusions: Colin Kruse connects this to Isaiah 48:13, where God’s creative act is sovereign and unconditional (Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 216). This allusion reinforces the Jewish theological framework of Paul’s argument.
Theological Unity: The parallel clauses establish a unified theological concept of God’s power over impossibility, central to Paul’s argument about faith. As Richard B. Hays notes, “Both clauses attribute to God the power to reverse the hopeless order of reality” (Echoes of Scripture, 57).
Narrative Connection: The verse connects to Paul’s broader narrative of salvation history, where God’s power to create and resurrect underlies the gospel’s transformative power. This narrative cohesion would be fractured by importing Hellenistic categories.

McClellan’s Hellenistic reading fails to account for this contextual coherence, as it disconnects the verse from its Jewish theological framework and undermines Paul’s rhetorical strategy.

Why McClellan’s Linguistic Assumption Fails

McClellan’s assumption that τὰ μὴ ὄντα refers to unformed matter is unsupported by the Greek text or its Jewish parallels:

Lexical Misinterpretation: The lexical evidence points to absolute non-existence, aligning with creatio ex nihilo. McClellan’s Aristotelian reading lacks linguistic support.
Contextual Incoherence: His Hellenistic framework misreads καλέω and ὡς, ignoring their biblical usage and imposing an Aristotelian concept that Paul never endorses.
Historical Anachronism: McClellan retrojects later philosophical categories onto Paul’s text without justification, ignoring the Jewish theological context.
Rhetorical Discontinuity: His interpretation disrupts Paul’s rhetorical strategy, which connects Abraham’s faith to God’s sovereign power over impossibility.
Theological Inconsistency: McClellan’s reading contradicts Paul’s consistent Jewish theological framework throughout Romans, imposing an alien philosophical lens.

There is no linguistic basis for McClellan’s interpretation, as it contradicts the plain meaning of the text and its Jewish context. The evidence overwhelmingly supports a reading aligned with creatio ex nihilo.

Argument 3: Scholarly Consensus Supporting Creatio ex Nihilo

The scholarly consensus overwhelmingly interprets Romans 4:17 as affirming creatio ex nihilo within a Jewish framework, leaving no room for McClellan’s Hellenistic reading. Below is a detailed synthesis of key scholars’ arguments across different theological traditions:

Contemporary Evangelical Scholarship

Douglas J. Moo: “The two descriptions of God [in Romans 4:17]—as one who ‘gives life to the dead’ and ‘calls things that are not as though they were’—pick up traditional Jewish language about God as creator and life-giver” (Romans, NICNT, 282). Moo emphatically rejects readings that limit this to reshaping matter.
Thomas Schreiner: “Most scholars understand [Romans 4:17] to refer to God’s creative activity by which he created the world out of nothing… God called what did not exist so that it came into existence” (Romans, 244–245). Schreiner emphasizes the ontological act, not a Hellenistic transformation.
F.F. Bruce: “The reference here is to the ‘many nations’ which were to spring from Abraham; not only had they no existence as yet, but… nothing seemed less likely than that they should ever exist” (Romans, 122–123). Bruce connects this to both creation and Abraham’s progeny.
Robert Mounce: “By definition the Creator brings into existence all that is from that which never was. Anything less than that would be adaptation rather than creation” (Romans, 128). Mounce directly refutes McClellan’s premise of preexistent matter.
Grant R. Osborne: “God’s creative power is so great that he can speak, and what he wishes comes into being out of nothing” (Romans, 117). Osborne explicitly rejects readings that posit preexistent matter.

Catholic and Ecumenical Scholarship

Joseph A. Fitzmyer: Ties Romans 4:17 to 2 Baruch 21:4, seeing it as referring to Isaac’s birth and Abraham’s spiritual progeny (Romans, 386). Fitzmyer emphasizes the Jewish theological context, rejecting Hellenistic interpretations.
Brendan Byrne: “The God in whom Abraham believed is described in terms familiar from Jewish tradition: the one ‘who gives life to the dead and calls into existence things that do not exist'” (Romans, 158). Byrne connects this to Jewish creation theology, not Greek philosophy.
Luke Timothy Johnson: “Paul’s language evokes God’s power both to create and to give life. The first power is basic to Israel’s confession of God” (Reading Romans, 73). Johnson explicitly connects this to Jewish theological tradition.
Peter Stuhlmacher: “God’s word creates reality where there is nothing” (Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 73). Stuhlmacher emphasizes divine fiat, not material transformation.
Raymond E. Brown: Connects Romans 4:17 to Jewish creation theology, emphasizing God’s sovereign power over non-existence (Introduction to the New Testament, 572).

Critical and Historical Scholarship

C.E.B. Cranfield: “There is little doubt that the reference is to God’s creatio ex nihilo” (Romans, 244). Cranfield, a leading critical scholar, finds no basis for rejecting the traditional interpretation.
James D.G. Dunn: “As creator he creates without any precondition: he makes alive where there was only death, and he calls into existence where there was nothing at all” (Romans 1–8, 218). Dunn rejects an Aristotelian framework, emphasizing God’s unique prerogative.
Leander E. Keck: “The God Abraham trusted is ‘the one who makes the dead alive and calls the nonexistent into existence’… creation out of nothing” (Romans, Abingdon New Testament Commentaries, 131).
Ernst Käsemann: Links justification to “an anticipation of the resurrection of the dead, which as no other event deserves to be called a creation out of nothing” (Commentary on Romans, 123). Käsemann sees creatio ex nihilo as central to Paul’s theology.
N.T. Wright: “The God who promises Abraham descendants more numerous than the stars is the God who created those stars in the first place… The creator God speaks, and worlds come into being” (Romans, 501). Wright explicitly connects this to creation ex nihilo.

Specialized Studies

Otfried Hofius: “Creation out of nothing in such passages [including Rom 4:17] is not doubtful” (Paulusstudien, 59). Hofius links creation and resurrection as twin expressions of God’s power over non-being.
Richard B. Hays: “Paul affirms that God is the one ‘who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist.’ These twin metaphors of creation and resurrection are central to Paul’s gospel” (Echoes of Scripture, 57).
Paul Copan and William Lane Craig: Argue that Paul’s “theological axiom” implies no precondition for God’s creative act, naturally supporting creatio ex nihilo (Creation Out of Nothing, 74–76).
Gerhard May: In his definitive study Creatio Ex Nihilo, May argues that Romans 4:17 reflects early Christian belief in creation from nothing, consistent with Jewish monotheism (145-148).
Jonathan T. Pennington and Sean M. McDonough: “Romans 4:17 is one of the clearest NT texts indicating creatio ex nihilo” in their article “Resurrection as Creation: A New Translation and Interpretation of Romans 4:17” (Catholic Biblical Quarterly 72 [2010]: 753–772).

Why the Consensus Rejects McClellan

The scholarly consensus rejects McClellan’s Hellenistic framework because:

Textual Fidelity: Paul’s language, context, and scriptural citations align with Jewish theology. McClellan’s assumption that Paul adopts an Aristotelian concept ignores the robust Jewish parallels and the consensus view that Romans 4:17 reflects creatio ex nihilo.
Historical Context: Scholars across theological traditions recognize Paul’s Jewish theological framework, rejecting anachronistic impositions of Hellenistic categories.
Linguistic Evidence: There is no scholarly support for interpreting τὰ μὴ ὄντα as unformed matter, as this contradicts both the text and its theological context.
Interpretive Coherence: McClellan’s reading disrupts the coherence of Paul’s argument about faith, divine promise, and Abraham’s position as father of believers.
Methodological Rigor: The consensus reflects careful attention to Paul’s Jewish context, linguistic usage, and theological framework, which McClellan’s interpretation lacks.

McClellan’s minority view contradicts scholarly consensus across theological traditions, reflects poor methodology, and fails to account for the textual and historical evidence supporting a Jewish reading aligned with creatio ex nihilo.

Argument 4: Direct Attack on McClellan’s Assumptions

McClellan’s interpretation rests on three core assumptions, each of which is demonstrably flawed:

Assumption 1: “Non-Being” Refers to Unformed Matter

McClellan assumes that τὰ μὴ ὄντα refers to unformed, invisible matter, as in Aristotelian philosophy. This assumption fails because:

Lexical Evidence: As Foerster notes, μὴ ὄντα denotes absolute non-existence in Jewish contexts (TDNT, 1010). Texts like 2 Maccabees 7:28 and 2 Baruch 21:4 use similar language to affirm creation from nothing, not from preexistent matter.
Jewish Terminology: In Jewish texts, μὴ ὄντα and similar expressions consistently denote absolute non-existence, contrasting with Hellenistic usage. Alexander T. Desmond notes that “the distinction between Jewish and Greek understandings of ‘non-being’ is crucial for interpreting Paul” (Old Testament in the New, 145).
Contextual Misalignment: Romans 4:17 parallels God’s power to “give life to the dead” with “calling into being things that do not exist.” The context of Abraham and Sarah’s barrenness emphasizes creation from impossibility, not reshaping matter.
Theological Coherence: Paul’s emphasis on divine sovereignty throughout Romans contradicts the Aristotelian notion of inherent potentiality within matter. As Richard Bauckham notes, “God’s creative power knows no boundaries or limitations” (God Crucified, 61).
Jewish vs. Hellenistic Cosmology: Jewish theology rejects preexistent matter, emphasizing God’s sovereignty (e.g., Isaiah 48:13). McClellan’s Aristotelian reading imposes a foreign framework that Paul never endorses.

Assumption 2: Paul Adopts a Hellenistic Framework

McClellan assumes Paul’s theology is heavily influenced by Greco-Roman philosophy, particularly Aristotle’s concept of potentiality and actuality. This assumption collapses because:

Paul’s Jewish Identity: Paul’s extensive use of Old Testament citations (e.g., Genesis 17:5, Isaiah 48:13) and parallels with Jewish texts like 2 Maccabees 7:28 demonstrate his Jewish theological framework. Gottfried Nebe notes that Paul’s creation theology avoids Hellenistic ideas of creation from chaos (Creation in Paul’s Theology, 84).
Theological Consistency: Throughout Romans, Paul interprets Scripture within Jewish categories, not Greek ones. His understanding of creation, covenant, and resurrection reflects Jewish apocalyptic thought, not Greek metaphysics.
Lack of Hellenistic Evidence: There is no textual evidence in Romans 4 or elsewhere in Paul’s writings that he adopts Aristotelian categories. His theology consistently aligns with Jewish monotheism, not syncretism.
Historical Context: While Paul was conversant with Hellenistic culture, scholars like E.P. Sanders and N.T. Wright have definitively shown that his core theological framework remained Jewish. As Wright states, “Paul’s thought world remained essentially Jewish” (Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 46).
Scholarly Rejection: Scholars like Dunn and Fitzmyer emphasize Paul’s Jewish roots, rejecting overly Hellenized readings as anachronistic. The “New Perspective on Paul” has thoroughly debunked the assumption that Paul abandoned Jewish categories for Greek ones.

Assumption 3: The Phrase “As Though They Were” Negates Creatio ex Nihilo

McClellan assumes that ὡς ὄντα implies a rhetorical or metaphorical summons, not actual creation. This assumption is baseless because:

Syntactic Flexibility: Schreiner argues that ὡς can introduce a result clause, indicating that God’s call creates existence (Romans, 244). Even as a comparative, it reflects the certainty of God’s promise, not a Hellenistic reshaping of matter.
Jewish Parallels: Texts like 2 Baruch 48:8 use similar language to describe God’s creative word, not a rhetorical device. This parallel establishes a Jewish precedent for Paul’s language.
Contextual Coherence: The phrase aligns with the context of God’s promise to Abraham, where non-existent “nations” are treated as real due to divine fiat, mirroring creatio ex nihilo.
Theological Function: The phrase emphasizes God’s sovereign power to create by declaration, central to Paul’s argument about faith. As David Garland notes, “The phrase underscores the efficacy of God’s creative word” (Romans, 258).
Rhetorical Purpose: Rather than undermining creation, the phrase emphasizes its certainty—God’s call makes the non-existent as real as the existent, reflecting divine sovereignty, not material reshaping.

Why There’s No Reason to Take McClellan’s View

McClellan’s assumptions lack linguistic, contextual, historical, or scholarly support:

Linguistic Distortion: His interpretation of τὰ μὴ ὄντα as unformed matter contradicts the Greek text and Jewish parallels, imposing Aristotelian categories without textual warrant.
Historical Anachronism: His Hellenistic framework ignores Paul’s Jewish theology, retroactively imposing later philosophical categories onto a first-century Jewish text.
Contextual Disruption: His reading of ὡς ὄντα misrepresents its syntactic role and disrupts the rhetorical function of Romans 4:17 within Paul’s argument.
Methodological Weakness: His approach cherry-picks philosophical parallels while ignoring the overwhelming textual and contextual evidence for a Jewish reading.
Theological Incoherence: His interpretation disrupts the theological coherence of Romans 4, disconnecting verse 17 from Paul’s argument about Abraham’s faith and divine promise.

There is no textual, historical, or theological reason to adopt McClellan’s view, as it imposes an alien philosophical lens that distorts Paul’s intent and undermines the coherence of his argument.

Argument 5: McClellan’s Motivations and Methodological Weaknesses

McClellan’s Motivations

McClellan’s interpretation appears driven by some concerning motivations, each undermining his credibility:

Popularizing Scholarship: As a social media scholar, McClellan often adopts contrarian positions to challenge traditional doctrines, appealing to audiences skeptical of creatio ex nihilo. This populist approach prioritizes accessibility over rigor, sacrificing textual fidelity for provocative claims that generate engagement.
Overemphasizing Hellenization: McClellan aligns with scholars like Rudolf Bultmann, who overemphasized Paul’s Hellenization, framing him as a syncretistic figure. This reflects a methodological bias toward cultural syncretism, downplaying Paul’s Jewish identity. As E.P. Sanders notes, this approach “systematically distorts our picture of Judaism” (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 6) and consequently misrepresents Paul.
Avoiding Theological Absolutes: By interpreting “non-being” as unformed matter, McClellan sidesteps the metaphysical implications of creatio ex nihilo, possibly to align with modern philosophical or naturalistic sensibilities. This presentist bias imposes contemporary preferences onto ancient texts, distorting their meaning.
Hermeneutic of Suspicion: McClellan adopts a hermeneutic that questions traditional interpretations without sufficient textual warrant, assuming that centuries of scholars have misunderstood Paul’s intent. This approach reflects unwarranted skepticism toward established scholarly consensus.
Prioritizing Novelty: McClellan’s interpretation prioritizes novelty over textual fidelity, seeking to distinguish his work through contrarian claims rather than rigorous analysis. This approach sacrifices scholarly integrity for attention-grabbing assertions.

Methodological Weaknesses

Ignoring Jewish Context: McClellan’s reliance on Hellenistic philosophy disregards Paul’s Jewish roots, evident in his scriptural citations and parallels with texts like 2 Maccabees and wisdom literature. This oversight neglects the apocalyptic Jewish framework that informed Paul’s understanding of resurrection.
Selective Reading: The approach cherry-picks passages that align with Greek philosophical concepts while downplaying or reinterpreting texts that explicitly describe bodily resurrection.
Anachronistic Interpretation: McClellan projects later Neoplatonic concepts back onto Paul’s writings without sufficient evidence that these specific philosophical frameworks would have influenced his thought.
Textual Inconsistency: The interpretation creates unnecessary tensions within Paul’s own writings, forcing complex explanations for passages that have simpler readings within a Jewish resurrection framework.
Historical Disconnect: This view places Paul at odds with earliest Christian communities’ beliefs about resurrection, which archaeological and textual evidence suggests maintained a more physical understanding of resurrection.

Refutation of Dan McClellan’s Interpretations of John 1:1–3

English (ESV, John 1:1): “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

Greek (NA28, John 1:1): Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.

English (ESV, John 1:3): “All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made.”

Greek (NA28, John 1:3): Πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν ὃ γέγονεν.

English (ESV, John 1:14): “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth.”

Greek (NA28, John 1:14): Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας.

Dan McClellan’s interpretation of John 1:1 in The Bible Says So is a theological sleight-of-hand, arguing that the anarthrous theos is qualitative, meaning “deity” or “divine” rather than the God of Israel, and casting the Logos as a Hellenistic, semi-autonomous “second god” akin to Philo’s Middle Platonic intermediary (Kindle Loc. 3382–3415). He claims a Trinitarian reading is anachronistic, citing John 17:3 to distance the Logos from God’s being, and weaves a contradictory tapestry of Hellenistic transcendental metaphysics and ancient Near Eastern (ANE) categories like chaoskampf and divine agency. Anthony Buzzard’s Unitarian argument, asserting that autou in John 1:3 (δι’ αὐτοῦ, “through him”) should be “it,” implying an impersonal Logos, denies its personal divinity (The Incarnate Christ and His Critics, Kindle Loc. 9027–9031). Both interpretations are exegetical mirages, disintegrating under John 1:1–3’s grammatical precision, intertextual depth, and Jewish monotheistic bedrock, particularly when viewed through the contrast between the Logos’ eternal “was” (ἦν) and its incarnational “becoming” (ἐγένετο).

This comprehensive exegesis, fortified by D.A. Carson, Richard A. Burridge, Colin G. Kruse, Nathan Chambers, James D.G. Dunn, Robert M. Bowman Jr., Paul Copan, William Lane Craig, Rudolf Bultmann, Daniel B. Wallace, J. Ramsey Michaels, John L. Ronning, Steve Hays, Andreas J. Köstenberger, Marianne Meye Thompson, and Craig S. Keener, obliterates these claims. J. Ramsey Michaels underscores the Genesis 1:1 echo, the focus on divine being, and the poetic, chiastic structure (λόγος, λόγος, θεός, θεός, λόγος) (The Gospel of John, NICNT, pp. 46–47). John L. Ronning’s distinction between the targumic Memra and Philo’s Logos exposes McClellan’s incoherent synthesis (The Jewish Targums and John’s Logos Theology, pp. 258–264). Steve Hays’ Pentateuchal framework—Genesis 1’s creation and Exodus’ Shekinah—anchors John in Jewish theology, with John 1:14’s incarnation contrasting eternal existence (ἦν) with the Son’s assumption of flesh (ἐγένετο). Robert M. Bowman Jr.’s refutation of Buzzard’s impersonal autou affirms the Logos’ personhood. John 1:1–3, culminating in 1:14, thunders the Logos’ full divinity, personal agency, and monotheistic identity, shattering Hellenistic and Unitarian distortions.

Exegetical Framework

John 1:1 unfolds in three clauses: (1) Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, asserting eternal preexistence; (2) καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, signaling intimate relational unity; and (3) καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, proclaiming divine essence. John 1:3 (Πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο) affirms the Logos’ creative agency, with χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν ensuring universality. John 1:14 (ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο) climaxes this, with the eternal Logos “becoming” flesh, dwelling as the Shekinah. Michaels highlights the Genesis 1:1 echo and chiastic structure (NICNT, pp. 46–47). The contrast between ἦν (imperfect, eternal “was”) in 1:1–2 and ἐγένετο (aorist, historical “became”) in 1:3 and 1:14 underscores the Logos’ preexistence and incarnational act, per Colin G. Kruse (John, p. 65). Steve Hays ties ἐν ἀρχῇ to Genesis 1 and ἐσκήνωσεν to Exodus’ tabernacle, with ἐγένετο in 1:14 echoing God’s immanent presence. John L. Ronning aligns λόγος with the Memra, not Philo’s intermediary (pp. 258–264). Andreas J. Köstenberger emphasizes the incarnation’s anti-Platonic thrust (John, BECNT, p. 27). This Jewish monotheistic framework, enriched by Second Temple and NT parallels, guides the critique.

Argument 1: The Qualitative Theos Means “Deity” or “Divine,” Not God

Grammatical and Syntactical Analysis

McClellan argues that the anarthrous theos in θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος is qualitative, denoting “deity” or “divine” rather than the God of Israel, favoring translations like “the Word was divine” (Kindle Loc. 3382–3390). While theos is qualitative, his lesser divinity is a theological misstep.

The grammar is clear: θεὸς, without the article (unlike τὸν θεόν), is a predicate nominative, emphasizing quality. D.A. Carson explains that theos ascribes to the Logos the full divine essence of τὸν θεόν (The Gospel According to John, p. 117). J. Ramsey Michaels notes the pre-verbal θεὸς lends “definiteness,” resisting reduction to “divine” (NICNT, p. 48). The clause distinguishes the Logos’ person from the Father’s while affirming shared essence. Daniel B. Wallace confirms theos denotes “all the attributes” of τὸν θεόν (Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, cited in The Bible Says So, Kindle Loc. 3390–3413). Robert M. Bowman Jr. rejects “a god,” emphasizing θεὸς’s divinity (Jesus’ Critics and the Gospels, Kindle Loc. 8827). Rudolf Bultmann affirms monotheistic identity (Creation Out of Nothing, p. 72). Andreas J. Köstenberger argues θεὸς ἦν equates the Logos with God’s essence (John, p. 28).

Michaels compares θεὸς to “God is Spirit” (John 4:24), where substantive attributes exceed adjectives; “the Word was God” surpasses “divine” (NICNT, pp. 48–49). The imperfect ἦν underscores eternal existence, contrasting with ἐγένετο in 1:14’s incarnation, per Kruse (p. 65), reinforcing the Logos’ uncreated divinity.

Theological and Contextual Considerations

John 1:1 operates within the Shema’s monotheism (Deuteronomy 6:4). Richard A. Burridge notes the chiastic structure balances distinction (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) and identity (θεὸς ἦν), upholding monotheism (The Lectionary Commentary, p. 473). Steve Hays ties ἐν ἀρχῇ to Genesis 1:1, situating the Logos as Creator. Marianne Meye Thompson emphasizes John’s integration of the Logos into God’s unique identity (The God of the Gospel of John, p. 68). Craig S. Keener notes John’s Jewish audience would reject Hellenistic intermediaries (The Gospel of John: A Commentary, 1:367). Wisdom of Solomon 7:25–26 calls Wisdom a “breath” of God, not a deity, and John personalizes this, per Köstenberger (p. 29).

Summary

McClellan’s “divine” dilutes theos’s weight. Carson, Wallace, Burridge, Bowman, Bultmann, Michaels, Köstenberger, Thompson, and Hays prove θεὸς denotes full divinity, rooted in the Shema and Genesis 1, with ἦν affirming eternal existence against Hellenistic gradations.

Argument 2: The Logos Is a Hellenistic, Semi-Autonomous “Second God”

Lexical and Intertextual Analysis

McClellan claims the Logos is a Hellenistic intermediary, like Philo’s “second god,” bridging spirit and flesh, citing John 17:3 to argue distinction from God’s being (Kindle Loc. 3390–3413). His Hellenistic-ANE synthesis is a theological chimera, collapsing under the contrast between ἦν and ἐγénετο.

James D.G. Dunn ties λόγος to dāḇār (Genesis 1:3ff.; Isaiah 55:11; Psalm 107:20) (Christology in the Making, p. 240). John L. Ronning distinguishes Philo’s Logos, which insulates God from matter, from the targumic Memra, a circumlocution for God’s presence (The Jewish Targums and John’s Logos Theology, p. 258). In Targum Onkelos, Genesis 3:8’s “the Lord God walking” becomes “the Memra of the Lord God” (p. 264). John’s λόγος aligns with Memra, not Philo, as Ronning notes: “Wherever people were familiar with the Targums, they were familiar with ‘the Word’ as a designation of the divine” (p. 264). The incarnation (σὰρξ ἐγένετο, 1:14) contradicts Platonism’s spirit-flesh divide, per Ronning (p. 259).

Steve Hays argues the Pentateuch is the sole precedent, with John 1:1–3 echoing Genesis 1:

Timemarker: Ἐν ἀρχῇ mirrors בְּרֵאשִׁית (Genesis 1:1, LXX).
Divine Creator: The Logos parallels God (Genesis 1:1).
Divine Speech: “And God said” (Genesis 1:3, 6, 9) is personified in λόγος.
Light-Darkness: John 1:4–5 echoes Genesis 1:3–5.
Life: John 1:4 parallels Genesis 1:20–27.

John reveals the preexistent Father and Son, with “light” and “life” signifying spiritual illumination and eternal life (1:4–5). John 1:14’s ἐσκήνωσεν (“tabernacled”) alludes to the Shekinah (Exodus 40:34–35) or pillar of fire (Exodus 13:21), per Hays. The contrast between ἦν (eternal existence, 1:1–2) and ἐγένετο (creation in 1:3, incarnation in 1:14) is pivotal: the Logos, eternally divine, “became” flesh, assuming human nature without ceasing to be God, per Köstenberger (p. 27). This anti-Platonic act affirms matter’s goodness, echoing Genesis 1:31’s “very good.”

Colin G. Kruse links λόγος to Proverbs 8:22–31, where Wisdom is “with” God, but John personalizes it (John, p. 63). Wisdom of Solomon 7:25–26 calls Wisdom an “image” of God, not a deity, aligning with John’s monotheism, per Köstenberger (p. 29). Philippians 2:6–11 (“form of God,” “emptied himself”) and Revelation 19:13 (“the Word of God”) confirm John’s Christology.

Grammatical and Syntactical Analysis

ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν uses πρὸς to imply a face-to-face relationship, denoting unity with Israel’s God, per Carson (p. 117). The imperfect ἦν (1:1–2) contrasts with ἐγénετο in 1:3 (creation) and 1:14 (incarnation), as Kruse notes (p. 65). Michaels’ chiastic structure exalts unity (NICNT, p. 47). Nathan Chambers ties ἐν ἀρχῇ to creatio ex nihilo (Reconsidering Creation Ex Nihilo, p. 129). The incarnation’s σὰρξ ἐγένετο uses ἐγένετο to mark a historical act, distinct from ἦν’s eternity, per Köstenberger (p. 27).

Refuting McClellan’s ANE-Hellenistic Synthesis

McClellan might argue John 1:3 reflects ANE chaoskampf (e.g., Marduk vs. Tiamat). Thompson counters that πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο affirms creatio ex nihilo, rejecting polytheistic chaos (p. 70). Genesis 1:2’s תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ is unformed creation, not chaos, per Chambers (p. 130). McClellan’s synthesis is incoherent: ANE cosmologies are immanent, while Platonism is transcendent. Ronning and Hays show λόγος aligns with Memra and Genesis, not Philo or Enuma Elish. The incarnation (σὰρξ ἐγένετο) is anathema to Platonism, which denies divine embodiment, per Köstenberger (p. 27). Carson refutes John 17:3, noting its incarnational context (p. 556). Kruse cites John 20:28’s “My Lord and my God” (p. 345).

Anti-Platonic Implications of Incarnation

John 1:14’s σὰρξ ἐγénετο affirms the Logos, eternally existent (ἦν), took human nature, becoming flesh without ceasing divinity, per Thompson (p. 68). This echoes Second Temple views of God’s immanence (e.g., Shekinah), not Philo’s dualism, per Keener (1:370). The ἐσκήνωσεν links to the tabernacle, where God’s glory dwelt, reinforcing the Son’s personal assumption of flesh, per Hays.

Historical Context

Second Temple texts personalize Wisdom, but not as a “second god,” per Keener (1:370). Justin Martyr (Dialogue with Trypho, c. 150 CE) cites John 1:1 for Christ’s divinity, per Köstenberger (p. 30).

Summary

McClellan’s Hellenistic Logos is a phantom. Dunn, Ronning, Hays, Carson, Kruse, Chambers, Köstenberger, and Thompson root λόγος in dāḇār, Memra, and Genesis, with ἦν/ἐγένετο crushing Platonism. NT parallels (Philippians, Revelation) confirm John’s Christology.

Argument 3: A Trinitarian Reading Is Anachronistic

Grammatical and Theological Analysis

McClellan calls a Trinitarian reading anachronistic, as the three persons framework postdates John (Kindle Loc. 3413–3415). Yet, πρὸς τὸν θεόν (distinction) and θεὸς ἦν (identity) suggest proto-Trinitarian depth.

Richard A. Burridge argues this anticipates Trinitarianism (The Lectionary Commentary, p. 473). Carson notes John’s syntax distinguishes persons within one essence (The Gospel According to John, p. 117). Michaels sees a relational dynamic (NICNT, pp. 47–49). Hays notes the preexistent Father and Son behind Genesis 1. Wallace argues θεὸς means shared essence (The Bible Says So, Kindle Loc. 3390–3413). John 1:14’s μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός (“only Son from the Father”) and 10:30 (“I and the Father are one”) reinforce this.

Historical Context

Paul Copan and William Lane Craig show John 1:1–3 shaped early theology (Creation Out of Nothing, p. 74). Irenaeus (Against Heresies, c. 180 CE) cites John 1:1 for Christ’s divinity, per Köstenberger (p. 30). Michaels notes the delay of “Son” is narrative (NICNT, p. 49).

Summary

McClellan’s anachronism charge fails. Burridge, Carson, Michaels, Wallace, Hays, Copan, and Köstenberger show John’s syntax and influence lay proto-Trinitarian groundwork.

Argument 4: The Pronoun Autou in John 1:3 Should Be Translated “It,” Implying an Impersonal Logos

Grammatical and Contextual Analysis

Buzzard argues autou in δι’ αὐτοῦ (John 1:3) should be “it,” citing its neuter form (λόγος) to deny personal divinity (Kindle Loc. 9027–9031). This fractures John’s theology.

Robert M. Bowman Jr. notes δι’ αὐτοῦ in John 1:3, 1:7, and 1:10 denotes personal agency. In 1:7, John the Baptist enables belief “through him” (δι’ αὐτοῦ). In 1:10, “the world was made through him” ties to Jesus Christ (1:14, 17) (*Kindle Loc. 9027–9031). Wallace clarifies that Greek pronouns match antecedent gender, but context determines personhood (Greek Grammar, p. 327). John 1:14’s σὰρξ ἐγένετο confirms autou’s personal reference, as only a person can “become” flesh, per Michaels (NICNT, p. 50). Hays links δι’ αὐτοῦ to Genesis 1’s personal divine speech.

Bowman cites NT parallels:

1 Corinthians 8:6: “Through whom [δι’ οὗ] are all things” (Jesus Christ).
Colossians 1:16: “All things [τὰ πάντα] were created through him [δι’ αὐτοῦ]” (Son).
Hebrews 1:2: “Through whom [δι’ οὗ] he made the ages” (Son).

Carson ties πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο to Genesis 1 (p. 119). Kruse contrasts ἐγένετο with ἦν (p. 65). Copan and Craig argue πάντα requires a personal agent (Creation Out of Nothing, p. 74).

Incarnational Context

John 1:14’s σὰρξ ἐγénετο and ἐσκήνωσεν show the Logos, eternally ἦν, became flesh, dwelling as the Shekinah, per Hays. This personal act refutes Buzzard’s impersonal “it,” as Köstenberger notes (p. 27). The narrative arc—from creation (1:3) to incarnation (1:14)—assumes personhood, per Michaels (NICNT, pp. 50–51).

Summary

Bowman, Carson, Kruse, Michaels, Hays, and Köstenberger crush Buzzard’s impersonal autou. Δι’ αὐτοῦ’s consistency, NT parallels, and 1:14’s incarnation affirm the Logos’ personhood.

Synthesis: Why McClellan’s and Buzzard’s Interpretations Fail

McClellan’s qualitative theos, Hellenistic Logos, and anachronism charge, and Buzzard’s impersonal autou, are theological rubble. Carson, Wallace, Burridge, Dunn, Ronning, Hays, Köstenberger, and Thompson prove theos denotes full divinity, λόγος aligns with dāḇār/Memra, and ἦν/ἐγένετο crushes Platonism and impersonality. The text’s mechanics—πρὸς, θεὸς, δι’ αὐτοῦ—and intertextuality (Genesis, Exodus, Wisdom) affirm the Logos’ divinity and personhood.

This analysis examines two prominent alternative interpretations of John 1:1–3 and demonstrates why they fail to account for the text’s grammatical, theological, and contextual evidence.

Dan McClellan argues in The Bible Says So that the anarthrous θεός in John 1:1c is merely qualitative, meaning “divine” rather than identifying the Logos with the God of Israel (Kindle Loc. 3382–3415). He presents the Logos as a Hellenistic intermediary figure, similar to Philo’s “second god,” and claims that Trinitarian readings are anachronistic impositions on the text.

Anthony Buzzard, in The Incarnate Christ and His Critics, contends that the pronoun αὐτοῦ in John 1:3 should be translated as “it” rather than “him,” arguing for an impersonal understanding of the Logos that denies its personal divinity (Kindle Loc. 9027–9031).

Both interpretations, however, fail to withstand careful exegetical scrutiny when examined through the lens of Greek grammar, Jewish theological categories, and the broader context of John’s Gospel.

Methodological Framework

John 1:1 contains three distinct clauses: (1) Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, asserting the Logos’ eternal preexistence; (2) καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, indicating intimate relational distinction; and (3) καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, affirming divine essence. John 1:3 establishes the Logos’ role in creation through the phrase Πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, while John 1:14 climaxes with the incarnation: ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.

J. Ramsey Michaels highlights the Genesis 1:1 echo and the chiastic structure that emerges: λόγος, λόγος, θεός, θεός, λόγος (The Gospel of John, NICNT, pp. 46–47). The crucial distinction between ἦν (imperfect, indicating eternal existence) in verses 1–2 and ἐγένετο (aorist, marking historical events) in verses 3 and 14 underscores both the Logos’ preexistence and the significance of the incarnational moment, as Colin G. Kruse observes (John, p. 65).

Response to McClellan: The Qualitative θεός

Grammatical Analysis

McClellan’s argument that the anarthrous θεός should be understood as merely qualitative (“divine”) rather than identifying the Logos with God misunderstands both Greek grammar and theological context.

While θεός in John 1:1c is indeed qualitatively significant as a predicate nominative, this does not diminish its theological weight. The pre-verbal position of θεός creates emphasis and definiteness that resists reduction to a mere adjective like “divine.” This word order (θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος) is particularly significant because it avoids both modalism (which would result from ὁ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος) and subordinationism (which McClellan’s “divine” translation implies).

Furthermore, if John intended merely qualitative force, he had other grammatical options available. He could have used θεῖος (divine) as an adjective, or constructed the sentence differently. The choice of θεός as a substantive predicate nominative carries ontological weight that McClellan’s interpretation minimizes.

Daniel B. Wallace confirms that this construction indicates the Logos possesses “all the attributes” of deity that belong to τὸν θεόν (Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, cited in The Bible Says So, Kindle Loc. 3390–3413). The clause successfully distinguishes the Logos as a person from the Father while affirming their shared divine essence.

Michaels provides a helpful comparison with John 4:24 (“God is Spirit”), where substantive predicate nominatives convey more than mere adjectival qualities. “The Word was God” carries significantly more theological weight than “the Word was divine” (NICNT, pp. 48–49).

Theological and Contextual Considerations

John 1:1 operates within the framework of Jewish monotheism as expressed in the Shema (Deuteronomy 6:4). The chiastic structure of John 1:1 carefully balances distinction (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) and identity (θεὸς ἦν) while maintaining monotheistic integrity.

Significantly, McClellan’s “divine” translation creates a theological problem: it suggests degrees of divinity, which contradicts strict monotheism. In Jewish thought, divinity is not a graduated quality—either one is God or one is not. The phrase “the Word was divine” implies a category of beings who possess divinity without being God, which would be foreign to John’s Jewish theological framework.

The connection to Genesis 1:1 through Ἐν ἀρχῇ situates the Logos as the divine Creator, not a subordinate intermediary. This temporal reference points to absolute beginning, not merely the beginning of creation, which reinforces the Logos’ eternal preexistence and divine status.

Craig S. Keener notes that John’s Jewish audience would have rejected Hellenistic intermediary concepts that compromised monotheism (The Gospel of John: A Commentary, 1:367). The Wisdom literature that informs John’s Logos concept (particularly Wisdom of Solomon 7:25–26) describes Wisdom as God’s “breath” and “image,” not as a separate deity, as Andreas J. Köstenberger observes (John, BECNT, p. 29).

Response to McClellan: The Hellenistic Logos Theory

Jewish vs. Hellenistic Background

McClellan’s characterization of the Logos as a Hellenistic intermediary figure misunderstands John’s theological sources and context.

The λόγος concept connects primarily to the Hebrew dāḇār (God’s creative and redemptional word) in texts like Genesis 1:3ff., Isaiah 55:11, and Psalm 107:20. This Hebrew background emphasizes God’s direct, powerful action rather than philosophical mediation.

The targumic Memra provides a more relevant parallel than Philo’s Logos. The Memra functions as a circumlocution for God’s direct presence and activity, not as a separate intermediary being. In Targum Onkelos, Genesis 3:8’s reference to “the Lord God walking” becomes “the Memra of the Lord God,” demonstrating that “the Word” served as a designation of divine presence, not philosophical speculation about intermediary beings.

McClellan’s synthesis of Hellenistic and Ancient Near Eastern categories is methodologically problematic. ANE cosmologies typically feature immanent divine action within the material world, while Hellenistic philosophy emphasizes transcendent separation from matter. John’s Logos theology aligns more closely with the ANE/Jewish pattern of direct divine involvement in creation and history.

The Anti-Platonic Thrust of the Incarnation

The incarnation described in John 1:14 (σὰρξ ἐγένετο) directly contradicts the Platonic worldview that McClellan associates with John’s Logos concept. Platonism maintains a rigid spirit-flesh dualism that would make divine embodiment impossible, as Ronning notes (p. 259).

The contrast between ἦν (eternal existence) in verses 1–2 and ἐγένετο (historical becoming) in verses 3 and 14 is theologically crucial. The Logos, who eternally existed in divine essence, “became” flesh in a historical act that assumed human nature without ceasing to be divine, as Köstenberger explains (p. 27). This anti-Platonic affirmation of matter’s goodness echoes Genesis 1:31’s declaration that creation is “very good.”

Old Testament Parallels

The Pentateuchal framework provides the primary interpretive key for John 1:1–3. The parallels with Genesis 1 include:

Temporal marker: Ἐν ἀρχῇ mirrors בְּרֵאשִׁית (Genesis 1:1, LXX)
Divine Creator: The Logos parallels God in Genesis 1:1
Divine Speech: The repeated “And God said” (Genesis 1:3, 6, 9) finds personification in λόγος
Light and Life: John 1:4–5 echoes Genesis 1:3–5 and the life-giving aspects of creation

John 1:14’s use of ἐσκήνωσεν (“tabernacled”) alludes to the Shekinah presence in Exodus 40:34–35, reinforcing the theme of God’s immanent presence rather than philosophical intermediation.

Response to McClellan: The Anachronism Charge

Proto-Trinitarian Elements

McClellan’s claim that Trinitarian readings are anachronistic fails to account for the proto-Trinitarian elements embedded in John’s grammatical and theological structure.

The syntax of John 1:1—particularly the balance between πρὸς τὸν θεόν (relational distinction) and θεὸς ἦν (essential identity)—anticipates later Trinitarian formulations, as Richard A. Burridge argues (The Lectionary Commentary, p. 473). D.A. Carson notes that John’s careful syntax distinguishes persons within one divine essence (The Gospel According to John, p. 117).

Supporting passages within John’s Gospel, such as 1:14’s μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός (“only Son from the Father”) and 10:30 (“I and the Father are one”), reinforce this proto-Trinitarian framework.

Historical Influence

The historical record demonstrates that John 1:1–3 significantly shaped early Christian theological development. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig document how these verses influenced formulations of divine creative action (Creation Out of Nothing, p. 74). Early Christian writers like Irenaeus (c. 180 CE) cited John 1:1 in support of Christ’s divinity, as Köstenberger notes (p. 30).

Response to Buzzard: The Personal vs. Impersonal Logos

Grammatical Evidence for Personhood

Buzzard’s argument that αὐτοῦ in John 1:3 should be translated as “it” rather than “him” fundamentally misunderstands both Greek grammar and John’s theological purpose.

The pronoun δι’ αὐτοῦ consistently denotes personal agency throughout John 1. In verse 7, John the Baptist enables belief “through him” (δι’ αὐτοῦ). In verse 10, “the world was made through him” clearly connects to the personal Jesus Christ mentioned in verses 14 and 17.

While Greek pronouns must match their antecedent’s gender, contextual factors determine whether the referent is personal or impersonal. Buzzard’s focus on grammatical gender ignores semantic considerations. The broader context of John 1, particularly the incarnation in verse 14, confirms that αὐτοῦ refers to a personal being, since only a person can “become” flesh.

Additionally, the verb γίνομαι (ἐγένετο) when used with διά + genitive in creation contexts typically implies personal agency. Abstract concepts or impersonal forces don’t “make” things in the active sense that John 1:3 describes. The creative act requires personal will and intention, which John attributes to the Logos through this construction.

New Testament Parallels

The personal interpretation of δι’ αὐτοῦ finds strong support in parallel New Testament passages:

1 Corinthians 8:6: “Through whom [δι’ οὗ] are all things” (referring to Jesus Christ)
Colossians 1:16: “All things [τὰ πάντα] were created through him [δι’ αὐτοῦ]” (referring to the Son)
Hebrews 1:2: “Through whom [δι’ οὗ] he made the ages” (referring to the Son)

These parallels consistently present Christ as the personal agent of creation, supporting the personal interpretation of αὐτοῦ in John 1:3.

The Incarnational Context

John 1:14’s declaration that σὰρξ ἐγένετο (“the Word became flesh”) and ἐσκήνωσεν (“dwelt/tabernacled among us”) presupposes the Logos’ personhood. The narrative arc from creation (1:3) to incarnation (1:14) assumes personal agency throughout, as the same being who created all things subsequently assumes human nature.

This personal dimension refutes Buzzard’s impersonal interpretation, since abstract concepts or divine attributes cannot undergo incarnation. Only a personal divine being can “become” flesh while retaining divine nature, as Köstenberger emphasizes (p. 27).

Additional Considerations

The Semantic Range of θεός in John’s Gospel

John’s usage of θεός throughout his Gospel provides important context for interpreting 1:1c. When John uses θεός with the article (ὁ θεός), he typically refers to the Father specifically. When he uses the anarthrous θεός, he emphasizes divine nature or essence. This pattern supports understanding θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος as attributing divine essence to the Logos while maintaining personal distinction from the Father.

Notably, in John 20:28, Thomas addresses Jesus as ὁ θεός μου (“my God”), using the definite article. This demonstrates that John is capable of identifying Jesus with “the God” when context demands it, but chooses the anarthrous construction in 1:1c for theological precision.

The Inclusio Structure of John 1

John 1 forms an inclusio, beginning with the Logos’ divinity (1:1) and ending with Jesus as the “only God” who reveals the Father (1:18, in many manuscripts: μονογενὴς θεὸς). This literary structure reinforces the identification between the Logos of verse 1 and the incarnate Jesus, supporting both the personal and divine interpretation that McClellan and Buzzard challenge.

Lexical Considerations for λόγος

The choice of λόγος rather than other possible terms (such as σοφία for Wisdom, or δύναμις for Power) is theologically significant. Λόγος carries connotations of rationality, communication, and revelation that suit John’s purpose of presenting the Logos as God’s self-expression. This choice supports the personal interpretation, as abstract divine attributes would not communicate or reveal in the way John describes.

Synthesis: The Failure of Alternative Interpretations

Both McClellan’s and Buzzard’s interpretations fail because they inadequately account for John’s careful grammatical construction, theological context, and intertextual relationships.

McClellan’s reduction of θεός to merely “divine” ignores the weight of predicate nominatives and the monotheistic framework within which John operates. His Hellenistic interpretation conflicts with the text’s Jewish theological categories and the anti-Platonic implications of the incarnation.

Buzzard’s impersonal reading of αὐτοῦ contradicts the consistent pattern of personal agency throughout John 1 and the incarnational theology that defines the Gospel’s Christology.

The textual evidence—including the precise grammatical constructions (πρὸς, θεός, δι’ αὐτοῦ), intertextual connections (Genesis, Exodus, Wisdom literature), and the crucial ἦν/ἐγένετο distinction—supports the traditional understanding of the Logos as both fully divine and personally distinct.

Proto-Trinitarian Elements

McClellan’s claim that Trinitarian readings are anachronistic fails to account for the proto-Trinitarian elements embedded in John’s grammatical and theological structure.

Addressing John 17:3

McClellan frequently cites John 17:3 (“And this is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”) to argue that Jesus is distinguished from “the only true God,” thereby supporting his subordinationist interpretation of John 1:1.

However, this citation fails to account for the incarnational context of John 17:3. The prayer occurs within Jesus’ earthly ministry, where he speaks as the incarnate Son addressing the Father. The distinction drawn here is not ontological but functional and incarnational—Jesus speaks as the sent Son in his human nature, not as a denial of his divine essence established in John 1:1.

Furthermore, John 17:3 must be read within the broader context of John’s Gospel, which repeatedly affirms Jesus’ divine identity. The same Gospel that records “the only true God” in 17:3 also records Thomas’s confession “My Lord and my God” in 20:28, Jesus’ claim that “before Abraham was, I am” in 8:58 (using the divine name), and the prologue’s declaration that “the Word was God” in 1:1. Interpreting 17:3 as a denial of Christ’s divinity creates an irreconcilable contradiction within John’s theology.

The phrase “the only true God” (τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν) in 17:3 affirms monotheism against pagan polytheism, not subordinationism within the Godhead. Jesus, as the incarnate Logos, can refer to the Father as “the only true God” without denying his own participation in that unique divine identity, just as he can pray to the Father without implying ontological inferiority. The incarnational framework allows for such functional distinctions while maintaining essential unity.

Conclusion

John 1:1–3, culminating in verse 14, presents a coherent theology of the Logos as the eternal, divine Word who serves as the agent of creation and subsequently becomes incarnate. This interpretation rests on solid grammatical, contextual, and theological foundations that McClellan’s and Buzzard’s alternative readings fail to address adequately.

The Logos emerges from John’s text not as a Hellenistic intermediary or an impersonal divine attribute, but as the personal, divine Son who shares fully in God’s essence while maintaining relational distinction from the Father. The incarnation represents not a philosophical compromise between spirit and matter, but the ultimate expression of God’s commitment to creation and redemption.

Through careful attention to Greek grammar, Jewish theological categories, and the broader canonical context, the traditional interpretation of John 1:1–3 demonstrates its exegetical superiority over alternative proposals that fail to account for the text’s linguistic precision and theological depth.

John 1:1–3, with 1:14, is a monotheistic juggernaut, proclaiming the Logos’ eternal divinity (ἦν) and incarnational act (ἐγένετο), rooted in Genesis, Exodus, and the Memra. Carson, Burridge, Kruse, Dunn, Bowman, Copan, Ronning, Hays, Köstenberger, Thompson, and Keener shred McClellan’s and Buzzard’s distortions. The Logos is God’s Self, creator and incarnate Son, tabernacling among us. Their interpretations are exegetical ashes, crushed by John’s vision.

Response to Dan McClellan on “All Things” and Creation ex Nihilo

In The Bible Says So, Dan McClellan dismisses the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by arguing that New Testament statements about God creating “all things” (τὰ πάντα) are rhetorical rather than metaphysical in scope. He writes:

“Additionally, the New Testament authors frequently use the phrase ‘all things’ (panta) hyperbolically when they clearly don’t mean to refer to literally all things. For instance, after Jesus finishes speaking with the woman at the well, she goes back to her town and tells the people there, ‘Come see a man who told me all things that I have done’ (John 4:29). Did Jesus really recount to the woman all things that she had ever done? … ‘All things’ is rhetorical and its scope is limited by the rhetorical context.” (Kindle Locations 751–757)

McClellan concludes:

“None of the statements about God creating ‘all things’ occurs within a context that plausibly extends the temporal scope to include absolutely any unformed primordial matter that would have ceased to exist upon the creation of the heavens and the earth. The Bible nowhere makes any statement that could plausibly be argued to be a conscious declaration of the doctrine of creation out of nothing.” (Kindle Locations 760–761)

This line of reasoning, however, commits several critical errors that undermine his conclusion.

1. Category Error: Conflating Human Hyperbole with Divine Cosmology

McClellan’s central mistake lies in equivocating between informal hyperbolic speech and formal doctrinal statements. The examples he cites—such as the Samaritan woman’s declaration in John 4:29—represent spontaneous human testimony in narrative contexts. By contrast, passages like John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16 constitute careful apostolic declarations about God’s creative action, employing precise theological language.

Consider John 1:3:

“All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made.”
(πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν)

This is not hyperbolic rhetoric but a universal affirmation reinforced by emphatic negation. The doubling construction—”all things… and not one thing”—serves to exclude any possible exceptions rather than accommodate them. This rhetorical device strengthens rather than weakens the universal claim.

Similarly, Colossians 1:16 states:

“For by him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible…”

The text explicitly defines the scope of “all things” through four comprehensive categories: heavenly, earthly, visible, and invisible. This systematic enumeration indicates cosmic totality rather than literary flourish. The passage continues by specifying that this includes “thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities”—emphasizing that even the highest orders of created beings fall within this universal scope.

2. Lexical Error: Misinterpreting “All Things” in Context

McClellan argues that the most natural understanding of God creating “all things” refers only to “all things that currently exist,” which would exclude primordial matter (Kindle Location 745). This interpretation, however, contradicts both the grammatical evidence and broader biblical testimony.

Hebrews 11:3 directly challenges McClellan’s position:

“By faith we understand that the universe was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things that are visible.”
(τὸ βλεπόμενον οὐκ ἐκ φαινομένων γεγονέναι)

This passage explicitly denies that visible creation emerged from preexisting visible materials. The phrase “not made out of things that are visible” (οὐκ ἐκ φαινομένων) points beyond mere rearrangement of matter to creation from no prior material substrate.

Romans 4:17 reinforces this understanding by describing:

“God who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist”
(καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα)

The parallel between resurrection and creation is instructive: just as God brings life from death, He brings being from non-being. This is not formation from “stuff” but genuine ontological creation.

3. Canonical and Historical Context Support Creatio ex Nihilo

McClellan’s claim that “the Bible nowhere” teaches creation from nothing overlooks significant textual evidence from both canonical and contemporary Jewish sources.

Intertestamental Evidence:
2 Maccabees 7:28, reflecting Jewish theological understanding contemporary with the New Testament, states:

“I beg you, my child, to look at the heaven and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize that God did not make them out of things that existed.”

This demonstrates that the concept of creation from nothing was already present in Jewish thought and provides crucial context for interpreting New Testament passages.

Canonical Evidence:
Genesis 1:1, particularly when read as an absolute construction (“In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth”), presents creation as God’s inaugural act rather than the organization of preexisting materials.

Hebrews 1:2 extends this concept temporally, stating that through the Son, God “created the ages” (τοὺς αἰῶνας)—indicating the creation of time itself, not merely objects within time.

These passages form a coherent pattern: God’s creative activity encompasses all reality, both material and temporal, visible and invisible.

4. Theological Necessity of Creatio ex Nihilo

McClellan’s alternative—creation from preexistent matter—creates more theological problems than it solves. If primordial matter existed independently of God’s creative act, then:

Monotheistic compromise: Something exists alongside God that He did not create, undermining the fundamental biblical claim that God alone is uncreated.
Divine sovereignty: God becomes dependent on preexisting materials, limiting His absolute sovereignty over creation.
Creator-creature distinction: The clear biblical differentiation between Creator and creation becomes blurred if some aspect of reality exists independently of God’s creative will.

As commentators like G.K. Beale have noted, the language of πάντα in passages like Colossians 1:16 encompasses not merely the material cosmos but the entire created order—spiritual and physical, temporal and eternal—under Christ’s creative authority.

The biblical evidence consistently points toward divine creation of all reality from nothing. While human speech often employs hyperbole, the careful theological formulations in passages like John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, and Hebrews 11:3 represent precise doctrinal statements about God’s creative action. McClellan’s attempt to reduce these to mere rhetoric fails to account for their grammatical precision, canonical context, and theological coherence.

The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo emerges not from philosophical speculation imposed on Scripture, but from the biblical text’s own insistence that God alone is uncreated and that all reality depends entirely on His creative word. To deny this is to compromise the very foundation of biblical monotheism.