I’ve been trading notes with a scholastic trying to salvage “middle knowledge.” I’ll lay out his move and where it collapses. PPboy—Oz from Retrieving Reformed (formerly Protestant Perspective)—backed the other guy in that discussion.

“The foundation and means of knowledge of conditioned things is not God’s decree, or, what amounts to the same thing, the knowledge of conditioned future contingents is not founded on the decree of the divine will, such that this would be the proximate and formal reason by which a thing is future or futurizable, at least if the decree of permission and concurrence is explained. For, although this is included in the very condition from which the event is said to be conditioned, as was said, it does not follow, however, that it is immediately the proximate cause of futuribility, and, therefore, the means and foundation of the knowledge of conditioned things. Rather, the proximate and antecedent reason by which this or that free action is futurizable is this: because the will of the agent, under this or that condition, would freely determine itself to it, even though such determination intimately includes divine concurrence, and without this could not occur. For, in the sign of reason, God first knows to which part the free will, constituted in these or those circumstances, would determine itself, before He decrees to permit that determination, to concur with it, and to direct and order it to this or that end. Therefore, it cannot be said that the decree of permitting, concurring, etc. is the proximate cause of the futurity of this or that free action. But, just as this secondary cause determines itself to the exercise and species of the act, and to this determination, so to speak, concomitantly, God’s concurrence accedes, so also the proximate reason by which this or that act is future or futurizable is this: because the will will freely determine itself to it, or, given a certain condition, would determine itself.”

Is God’s infinite being capable of relating to all forms and modes of essence and existence? I affirm so, and the infinite being here I want to limit to two: omniscience and omnipresence. First, all things exist as such before the decree, for existence itself depends on a formal existent, and the formal existent depends on a being or formal essence, and these must reside in that which really is, and what really is, is God, so there is no need for a decree-the divine existence itself produces the essence and existence of created things, and here it does not follow that these are real essences and existences, for we would fall into the Scotist thesis, where created things are, to a certain unitive degree, concomitant with divine existence.

Having this in view, knowable things are such for two reasons: by formal reason of the object and by material reason of the one who contemplates the object. A fly as such exists first by reason of itself, second by reason of the one who apprehends it; thus, illustratively, objects are knowable. Having these two distinctions and rules as a basis, the first consequence is already denied, and as for the second consequence, God’s knowing certain volitions, determinations, productions of a being is not to determine or produce a decree in relation to this; rather, as we have said, divine knowledge in relation to election is most special, and it is, as the moderns say, like Loy, a limited knowledge in relation to the object, for such an object is related to Christ, therefore, it does not refer to all possibilities and actions of a being, but under a determined order, genus, and species. And this knowledge precedes the decree insofar as God knows what happens if such a decree is issued and if such a circumstance is permitted-all this occurs before the formal decree is established. God already knows what will happen, and then produces this decree; it is God seeing himself, but taking into account all organisms.

The “Middle Knowledge” Claim and Its Grounding Problem

“Middle knowledge” inserts a third logical moment between God’s natural knowledge (all possibilities/necessary truths) and His free knowledge (what will be, because He decreed it): a stock of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that are contingent yet known pre-decree. That’s the thesis.

The problem is grounding: what makes those counterfactuals true?

• If their truth is in God’s nature, they fall into natural knowledge (no contingency gained).
• If their truth is in God’s will, they fall into free knowledge (no pre-decretal status).
• If their truth is in creatures or abstracta independent of God, aseity and simplicity are compromised and the decree becomes reactive.

So there is no stable home for “middle” knowledge if God is a se, simple, and free not to create. Either it reduces to natural/free knowledge, or it becomes Molinism proper.

Prior to any decree, God “knows Himself” while conceptually considering orders of possible agents and circumstances; within that contemplation, the proximate reason why ⟨S would A under C⟩ holds is the creature’s will, which (they say) self-determines that way under those conditions. God then decides whether to permit and concur. Thus the truth is “seen in God,” yet grounded in creaturely self-determination—contingent, pre-decretal, and not “outside” God.

This simply re-labels the third option. If the truth of ⟨S would A under C⟩ is grounded by the creature’s will (or by abstracta specifying creaturely tendencies) prior to decree, then God’s knowledge is downstream of what is not God. That violates aseity and simplicity and renders the decree responsive to an order He does not first determine. Calling this “seen in God” does not change the ground; it only relocates where God views a truth still grounded other than God.

What makes ⟨S would A under C⟩ true pre-decree without appealing to God’s decree or to creatures/abstracta?
If the answer invokes nature, it is natural knowledge; if will, it is free knowledge; if creature/abstracta, aseity/simplicity are lost (there goes your retrieval attempt!).

The Concurrence Fork

Is divine concurrence sufficient (in any mode) for S’s doing A under C?

• Yes: then you have a (conditional) decree, and the “pre-decretal” status evaporates.
• No: then the decisive ground lies in the agent; the creature becomes the proximate truthmaker, and divine knowledge is derivative of what is not God.

Either horn undercuts the “middle” placement.

Simplicity Tightens the Constraint

If God’s knowledge is God (simplicity), its ground cannot be extrinsic to God. To locate pre-decree truths in creaturely acts or brute abstracta makes what is identical with God rest on a non-divine basis. Appeals to pre-decree “orders” or “essences” won’t help: there are no creatures ad extra without will; as divine ideas they specify content only as determined by God, not as an independent source that fixes truth prior to decree.

Divine Conceptualism Doesn’t Rescue a Pre-Decretal Would

If the fallback is divine conceptualism (“CCFs are grounded in God’s ideas/thoughts”), two problems immediately surface.

(1) Simplicity. If you treat a multitude of divine ideas as really distinct, you fracture simplicity. If you say they’re not really distinct but only by reason (in the human mind), then in what robust sense does this “multitude” do any grounding work?

(2) Intentionality (Aboutness). Thoughts are about something. If divine thoughts ground CCFs pre-decree, what are they about?

• If about creatures/situations ad extra, those don’t exist pre-decree. Either you’ve smuggled in the decree to make them available, or you’ve appealed to extra-divine objects/truths (aseity problem).
• If about God (archetypal ideas terminating in the divine essence), then you’ve located only what could be by God’s power—i.e., natural knowledge. You still don’t have a determinate would under condition CCC.

If you say the truth of CCFs lies in natural knowledge, you’ve either reduced them to could (mere possibility) or made them necessary truths in God—neither gives you a contingent, pre-decretal would. To have a real would, you need a determiner; if it’s God, that’s decree; if it’s not God, aseity is gone.

One might try to say the truthmaker is both God’s will and the created act. But that makes the sufficiency of God’s action depend upon a created factor, which is precisely what aseity excludes. God’s act cannot require creaturely co-grounding to be efficacious without subordinating God to what is not God. He didn’t take this route in our exchange, but if he does, it doesn’t salvage the idea.