by Jimmy Stephens w/ Vincent

In this video, Emerson Green tries to define subjective morality. He has this to say:

“Subjective indicates some kind of dependence on a mind or minds or a person or persons. The simplest form of subjectivism states that X is good means I approve of X..“

Green plays with Heumer’s definition, saying:

“[M]oral properties are subjective in the following sense: for a thing to be good is for some individual or group to be disposed to take some attitude towards it.’ For example, ‘X is good’ means ‘I approve of X.’ Other forms of subjectivism substitute other attitudes for approval and other persons or groups for the speaker.“

A problem arises when we consider the objective-subjective distinction itself. If moral properties are simply attitudes like approval or disapproval, they cannot be inherent properties of moral propositions, behaviors, or objects of approval. For instance, my approval of chocolate ice cream is not a property of the chocolate ice cream itself, nor is it a property of any proposition, thought, or belief about chocolate ice cream.

Simultaneously, if someone’s attitudes inherently carry moral value or normativity, this implies that they constitute some form of extramental moral value or standard. However, this would contradict the notion of these moral facts being subjective, except in the trivial sense that they are mental contents.

Thus, the term “subjective” becomes vacuous in this context, rendering Green’s objective-subjective distinction arbitrary. The rest of this article will further clarify this issue and explore other related problems with Green’s perspective. Ultimately, it will demonstrate that Green’s moral classifications lack coherence due to their absence of an absolute reference point—a deficiency that Christian ethics do not suffer from.

An Analogy

To help understand the problem with Green’s objective-subjective distinction, we can draw a parallel to the challenge naturalists face in defining the terms “natural” and “supernatural.” When “natural” is defined too broadly, it fails to distinguish itself from “supernatural”; when defined too narrowly, it fails to encompass all the phenomena we typically associate with it. Moreover, regardless of the definition’s breadth, it may not pick out any meaningful referent.

Consider the following definitions:

• Natural means anything that is not supernatural. This definition is entirely dependent on the concept of the supernatural, forcing all the explanatory work on that contrast.
• Natural means matter, or what is material. Among other issues, this risks classifying things like logic, morality, and mind as supernatural, if no material account is forthcoming.

Green’s objective-subjective distinction encounters a similar issue. His definition of “subjective” fails to provide a meaningful contrast to “objective,” rendering it either vacuous or inconsistent with his broader claims.

In application, this problem looks like this:

• If “morality is subjective” means “moral facts are mental facts”, then the term “subjective” becomes vacuous and potentially confusing.
• If “morality is subjective” means morality reduces to mere attitudes like approval, then there are no moral facts, only attitudes, removing the concept of morality entirely.

Green, like many atheists, seems to conflate and confuse his objective-subjective distinction. This vacuous distinction allows him to equivocate, oscillating between moral nihilism and moral realism, without committing to either due to the lack of a clear definition.

Another way to understand this is that Green appears to want to preserve moral terminology for purely psychological matters. This brings us to our next section, where we will further explore the implications of this approach.

The Problematic Nature of Green’s Subjective-Objective Moral Distinction

Green’s attempt to retain morality-talk while altering our meta-ethical beliefs introduces significant confusion. He aims to preserve the language and conceptual framework of morality, while reinterpreting moral attributions as emotive attitudes, such as approval. However, this shift from traditional moral realism to a form of emotivism creates a fundamental disconnect.

Green’s approach suggests that morality is not what motivates our approval but is rather the approval itself. This idea implies that moral attributions are simply expressions of our emotional responses.

However, this leads to a problematic and schizophrenic subjective-objective distinction:

• If morality consists of properties inherent to things, which then motivate our approval, it is not subjective. This implies that our moral properties exist independently of our attitudes and that our approval is a response to these objective moral truths.
• If morality is merely a collection of approvals and disapprovals without any rational basis, Green is inadvertently committing to emotivism. Emotivism reduces moral statements to expressions of personal feelings or attitudes without any objective grounding.

Green’s atheist morality overlooks the crucial impetus behind our moral approvals. We do not form approvals out of nowhere; they are typically reactions to something we perceive as having objective moral value. Approval, in any morally significant sense, usually arises from beliefs or perceptions of objective moral norms. Without this objective impetus, there is no basis for distinguishing moral approval from other psychological states, like recalling a memory or feeling an itch.

Consider this introspective example:

• I don’t approve of charity merely to attribute goodness to someone.
• Instead, I approve of someone because I hold a prior belief that they possess goodness.
• Acts of charity are behaviors that I believe instantiate virtue, which is why I approve of them.

Without these prior beliefs about objective moral values, approval itself loses its moral significance. It would be akin to discussing math, minds, or dinosaurs without acknowledging the objective realities that these discussions presuppose. My dinosaur-talk cannot replace the existence of actual dinosaurs because it fails to explain why I was discussing dinosaurs in the first place.

Green’s subjective morality thus becomes nonsensical. By eliminating the talk-independent impetus that underpins moral language, he strips morality of its meaningful foundation. This leads to a vacuous and incoherent moral framework that fails to provide any substantive ethical guidance or rationale.

Ultimate Mental State and Moral Authority

Argument: The Objective-Subjective Distinction in Ethics Only Makes Sense if Christianity is True

Moral subjectivism posits that moral facts are rooted in individual mental states, raising significant issues. These mental states themselves must be evaluated as good or bad, implicitly suggesting the existence of an external standard for these evaluations. This requirement leads moral subjectivism to inadvertently collapse into moral objectivism, as it depends on an external framework for its own coherence.

Subjective moral standards require an external, objective framework to avoid infinite regress. In a materialist worldview, such a framework is absent, failing to provide the necessary grounding for moral evaluations. The infinite regress problem highlights the inherent instability in subjective ethical systems. Therefore, the necessity of an objective standard, such as one provided by a divine reference point, becomes apparent.

The distinction between objective and subjective ethics finds coherence within the framework of Christianity, where God serves as the ultimate mental state that dictates moral rules. God’s nature and character provide the foundation for objective moral truths, making ethics both universal and binding.

In the absence of God, ethical systems struggle to establish a coherent basis for objective moral truths. This results in arbitrary standards that lack universal applicability and fail to provide a stable foundation for moral judgments. The divine nature of moral authority in Christianity ensures that ethical truths are grounded in a consistent and unchanging source, unlike human-derived systems that are prone to variability and subjectivity.

I’m positing that God’s mind is the determining factor for all facts, establishing a clear distinction between divine objectivity and human subjectivity. God’s grounding of morality ensures that ethical truths are objective and independent of human opinions and cultural influences.

Critique: Distinguishing Between Agent-Subjective and Divinely Subjective

It is the case that all moral facts are subjective with respect or relative to God. So it is crucial to distinguish between creature-subjective and divinely subjective. Moral facts are subjective to God because they are determined by Him. They remain objective in the sense that they exist independent of human responses to them and are not reducible to human psychology. In this way, the subjectivity of moral facts to God ensures their objectivity to us.

In this way, Christian morality can be called objective in one sense, subjective in another, all without risking relativism or subjectivism.

Speciesism and the Moral Relevance of Consciousness:

Speciesism questions why humans are morally relevant apart from animals, and if the appeal is to consciousness, it must be shown why consciousness is morally relevant.

In his response to speciesism, Emerson Green appeals to the cognitive differences between humans and other animals to argue for the moral relevance of these distinctions. Green explains:

“The distinction between moral agents and moral patients is not a recent innovation in philosophy. It’s not a deep mystery whether there is a cognitive difference between a lion and a normal adult human, and the moral relevance of this fact is clear. Just think about a child versus an adult and the difference in rational faculties between them. We hold them to completely different standards. Even though a young child is not a moral agent—they’re not as culpable as an adult for the same action—they’re still a moral patient. Kicking a child is not the same thing as kicking a pebble or any other non-moral patient. Hitting a baseball with a baseball bat is morally neutral; hitting a dog with a baseball bat is not.“

Green appeals to the cognitive faculties and moral capacities of human consciousness, similar to arguments made by philosophers like Shelly Kagan, who debated William Lane Craig on related issues. This approach emphasizes the intrinsic differences in cognitive abilities and moral responsibilities between species, thereby addressing the speciesism objection by highlighting the unique moral status of beings capable of rational thought and moral deliberation.

Critique:

Green’s view faces two significant hurdles. First, he needs to provide an adequate theory of consciousness. Without it, his argument for the moral relevance of consciousness is weakened. Second, he must present an argument or evidence demonstrating why consciousness is relevant to moral culpability. If Green cannot offer at least a basic understanding of what consciousness is, our ability to track moral agency remains weak. Moreover, he must explain why consciousness bestows responsibility and rights. Green fails to overcome either hurdle.

In contrast, the Christian perspective does not encounter the same obstacles. For Christians, what distinguishes humans from animals, and moral agents from moral patients, is rooted in the imago Dei (the image of God). This concept explains why humans possess moral worth, responsibilities, and rights that surpass those of animals. That humans are constitutionally reflections of God’s moral agency explains why we have moral worth, responsibilities, and rights over and above animals.

Addressing the Euthyphro Dilemma with a Dual Nature of Goodness

The Euthyphro Dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma, originating from Plato’s dialogue, asks whether actions are morally good because God commands them, or if God commands them because they are inherently good. This presents a theological challenge:

1. If actions are good because God commands them, morality seems arbitrary.
2. If God commands actions because they are good, then goodness exists independently of God, challenging His sovereignty.

Green reiterates the Euthyphro dilemma with the following:

“[I]magine God standing prior to the moment of creation. He thinks to himself… ‘Torture—should I command or forbid that? Let’s see, impermissible, permissible, or obligatory?… Obviously, it seems absurd that God would choose what’s commanded or forbidden arbitrarily… He either had a reason or he didn’t have a reason.‘”

Without much argument, Green dismisses the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. He assumes it’s obvious that if God had no reason, His commands would be arbitrary. Conversely, if God had a reason, that reason would exist independently of Him. According to Green, the nature of merciless torture inherently determines its moral status:

“The nature of merciless torture, the features of the act itself, are directly responsible for its moral status.”

Green, aligning with Michael Huemer, claims that objective morality does not require theism. He argues that atheism allows for various meta-ethical views, not just nihilism, and expresses frustration at being labeled inconsistent for being an atheist who believes in morality without God. For Green, God is irrelevant to the foundation of objective morality.

Dual Nature of Goodness

First, for Christians, there are two kinds of goodness. God possesses original goodness – unchanging, absolute, and eternal. God’s original goodness is not subject to any external standards; He is good because He is who He is.

Creatures, on the other hand, do not possess this original goodness. Instead, humans reflect God’s original goodness. This reflective goodness is what we typically refer to in ethical discussions, such as when we say murder is wrong, someone was charitable, or a politician should be elected.

Reflective goodness is inherently contingent on God’s character and law. There is no reflection without the original. Since humans are good only to the extent that they reflect God’s character and law, relativism and subjectivism are avoided.

Resolving the Dilemma

With these two observations, we can see how God is neither arbitrary nor is morality independent of Him. Because God’s commands stem from His unchanging and intrinsically good nature, they are not arbitrary. Additionally, since moral truths are a reflection of God’s character, morality is entirely contingent on a Creator God.

Emerson Green was correct in saying God needs a reason. However, he was mistaken in assuming the reason must be outside of God’s character.

Critique of William Lane Craig’s View

1. Craig’s Error:

• Creature-like Essence: William Lane Craig and other similar thinkers often assume that God’s essence is creature-like, meaning God follows the same logical rules about predicates as humans. This assumption mistakenly applies human predicate logic to God’s nature, sustaining the core issue of the Euthyphro dilemma by not fully acknowledging the unique divine essence.

2. Redirecting Koons’ Rebuttal:

• Logical Priority: Robert Koons critiques Craig’s response, pointing out that it retains the dilemma’s core issue. By questioning why God or His attributes must possess logical priority, it becomes evident that God Himself embodies the attributes necessary for grounding human moral concern, offering a coherent and divine-centric solution.

Support from Neo-Reformed Thinkers

Prominent neo-Reformed thinkers like Cornelius Van Til, John Frame, and K. Scott Oliphint argue that God’s nature and His revelation to humanity provide the necessary framework for understanding and adhering to moral truths.

1. Reflective Commands:

• God’s Commands as Reflections: God’s commands and moral laws reflect His intrinsic goodness, offering humans a way to comprehend and emulate divine moral standards.

2. No Need for Reformulation:

• Consistent Standards: Grounded in God’s unchanging nature, moral truths do not require reformulation. The consistency of God’s character ensures that moral standards are stable, reliable, and timeless.

The Necessity of God’s Nature

Craig’s Position

Craig asserts that God’s nature is necessarily good, meaning that goodness is an essential attribute of God. This view seeks to avoid the arbitrariness of divine command theory, where moral values depend on God’s will and could theoretically be otherwise. By grounding moral values in God’s unchanging nature, Craig aims to uphold the objectivity and consistency of moral truths.

Critique of Craig’s Position

While Craig’s approach has its merits, it raises a fundamental question: Why is God’s nature necessarily good and not different? This query does not eliminate the dilemma of arbitrariness but merely defers it. If God’s nature is necessarily good, we must still explain why this is the case, potentially suggesting that there is a standard of goodness independent of God to which His nature conforms. This implication challenges the notion of God as the ultimate source of all values.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

Craig’s View on Moral Values

Craig argues that moral values are intrinsic to God’s nature. However, if these values are dependent on God’s nature, they can be seen as extrinsically grounded, contingent upon the divine nature rather than being truly objective and independent.

A More Consistent Approach

To maintain the objectivity of moral values, we must consider an alternative framework. I propose that God created modality, and this is the only world He would create because it uniquely reflects His nature. In this view, moral values are necessary expressions of God’s nature in the created order. While contingent on God’s nature, these values are necessarily manifested in creation, preserving their objectivity and intrinsic worth.

Theistic View of Modality

God and Creation

Unlike Craig’s perspective, I hold that God created modality itself. This implies that God, in His freedom, chose to create this specific world because it perfectly aligns with His nature. God’s act of creation is not arbitrary but is a deliberate reflection of His character.

God’s Freedom

This view upholds the freedom of God in creation. God could have chosen not to create, yet in choosing to create, He necessarily created this world, which is the only one that truly reflects His nature. This understanding aligns with a classical theistic view, emphasizing God’s sovereignty and the necessary expression of His attributes through creation.

Robust Aseity

Craig’s Understanding

Craig’s approach may suggest that God’s nature includes a set of necessary properties, such as goodness, upon which He depends. This perspective could imply that God is reliant on these properties, challenging the classical notion of divine aseity.

A More Robust Form of Aseity

I advocate for a more robust form of aseity, where God is entirely self-contained and does not depend on any independent properties. God’s nature and attributes are not external standards to which He conforms but are inherently and essentially what He is. This view maintains that God is the ultimate source of all values and realities, underscoring His complete independence and self-sufficiency.

Explanation of Robust Aseity

Aseity refers to the concept that God is self-existent and self-sufficient, not dependent on anything outside Himself. A more robust form of aseity means:

1. Self-Containment: God does not depend on any external properties or standards. His nature and attributes are intrinsic to His being, not derived from or contingent upon anything else.
2. Ultimate Source: God is the origin of all values, realities, and truths. There is no higher standard or external measure to which God must conform. Instead, everything that exists and has value is grounded in His nature.
3. Independence and Self-Sufficiency: God’s existence and attributes are entirely independent of the created order. He does not require anything from creation to be complete or fulfilled. This underscores His absolute sovereignty and ultimate authority.

This robust form of aseity emphasizes that God’s nature is not a collection of properties He conforms to, but rather that His very essence defines and grounds these properties. This view upholds the classical theistic understanding of God as wholly independent, self-sufficient, and the ultimate foundation for all existence and value.

Conclusion

This approach effectively addresses the Euthyphro dilemma by distinguishing between God’s intrinsic goodness and human reflective goodness. Supported by neo-Reformed thinkers, it provides a coherent and stable moral framework that avoids the pitfalls of arbitrariness and independence from God. By maintaining that moral truths are grounded in God’s nature, it ensures that morality is both objective and reflective of divine character. This model not only resolves the classical formulation of the Euthyphro dilemma but also addresses reformulated versions, maintaining the coherence of theistic moral realism.

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Further Analysis of Divine and Human Goodness

1. Epistemic Reflection:

• Knowledge of Telos: Human beings, created in God’s image, are imbued with an understanding of their purpose (telos). This imbued knowledge means that humans have an inherent ability to recognize and align with their moral purpose, reflecting God’s intrinsic goodness.

2. Logical Priority and Divine Attributes:

• God’s Attributes: The assumption that God’s attributes must have logical priority, as critiqued by Koons, is redirected to emphasize that God’s attributes themselves are the grounding for moral concern. This approach acknowledges that God’s nature and attributes are the foundation for all moral values, transcending human logic and categories.

Distinguishing Human and Divine Virtue

1. Uniqueness of Divine Virtue:

• God’s Moral Perfection: The moral perfection of God is not defined by creation or by a shared category between God and creation. Instead, there is a fundamental distinction between divine and human virtues, recognizing the unique nature of God’s moral attributes.

2. Creaturely Reflection:

• Human Moral Agency: Human virtues reflect divine virtues but are inherently derivative. This reflection ensures that while human moral actions can emulate divine goodness, they do so in a way that acknowledges their source in God’s nature.

Addressing Modern Critiques

1. Neo-Reformed Defense:

• Van Til and Frame’s Perspective: Van Til, Frame, and Oliphint argue that moral truths grounded in God’s nature provide a robust framework for understanding morality. Their perspectives reinforce that divine commands are reflective of God’s unchanging goodness, providing a stable and coherent moral order.

2. Balancing Normativity, Value, and Agency:

• Triperspectivalism: A more fully developed triperspectivalism, which incorporates normativity, value, and agency, offers a balanced approach. This view respects God’s intrinsic trinitarian agency and grounds moral law in the historical particulars of God’s covenant-moral law.

Resolving the Euthyphro Dilemma

1. Disambiguation of Goodness:

• Divine and Creational Good: The dilemma univocally applies the concept of goodness to both God and creation. By recognizing that divine goodness and creational goodness are fundamentally different, the dilemma is disambiguated and resolved.

2. Coherence of Theistic Moral Realism:

• Unified Moral Framework: By grounding moral truths in God’s unchanging nature, this approach offers a coherent and stable moral framework. It ensures that morality is both objective and reflective of divine character, maintaining the coherence of theistic moral realism and providing a comprehensive response to the Euthyphro dilemma.

Christian apologists often fail to adequately engage with the full range of metaethical theories present in contemporary philosophy. Green criticizes this shortfall, noting that many apologists are “stunningly ignorant of the basics,” particularly when it comes to secular theories like moral non-naturalism and moral naturalism. While some Christian philosophers do engage meaningfully with these complex theories, this is not common among popular apologists. Instead, they frequently present a simplified, dichotomous view that overlooks the robustness of secular moral realism. As Green points out, “popular apologetics is seriously out of sync with metaethics,” with many apologists rarely addressing or refuting theories like moral naturalism or moral non-naturalism in detail.

A significant challenge in ethics is bridging the gap between abstract principles and human motivations, making ethical systems both practical and actionable. Philosophical debates, such as Hume’s is-ought problem, highlight the difficulty of deriving moral obligations from purely descriptive statements. Effective ethical systems must connect moral duties with human psychology and motivations to guide behavior meaningfully. Abstract values, like those found in Platonic ethics, often fail to engage human emotions and motivations, rendering them impractical for everyday moral guidance. Moral behavior is closely tied to emotional engagement and personal relevance, and ethical systems that rely solely on abstract principles lack the necessary connection to motivate real-world actions.

In contrast, personalistic approaches in moral frameworks are more effective because they align with human social nature, involving relational and emotional connections. These approaches ensure that moral truths are not only known but also felt and lived. The Christian understanding of God as a personal being uniquely aligns moral, motivational, and epistemic aspects in a cohesive manner. Christianity offers a relational God who engages with humanity, making moral values understandable and applicable in a way that abstract principles cannot achieve on their own.

This personal engagement is reinforced by the concrete and universal nature of God, who serves as the ultimate moral authority. God’s omnipresence and omnipotence make Him relevant to all aspects of human life, ensuring that moral values are not merely abstract but grounded in a personal being who interacts with creation. God’s covenant with humanity provides a clear structure of moral obligations and benefits that resonate with our social nature. Biblical covenants, such as those with Noah, Abraham, and through Jesus, establish a relational framework where obligations and benefits are clearly defined, enhancing the practical relevance of moral teachings.

Revelation also plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between abstract principles and practical human understanding. Divine revelation, as documented in the Bible, offers direct guidance from God, making moral values accessible and understandable. This revelation connects abstract principles with practical human experiences, providing a concrete basis for moral understanding. The life and teachings of Jesus, documented in the Gospels, serve as a perfect moral exemplar, offering a tangible model for moral behavior. This exemplar is not merely a theoretical ideal but a practical guide that Christians can follow, making ethical teachings relatable and actionable.

The Trinitarian nature of God further solidifies the coherence of the Christian moral framework. The relational dynamics within the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—offer a model for relational ethics, grounding moral values in social and interactive contexts. This Trinitarian model ensures that moral values are consistent and align with human experiences of relationships and community. This stands in contrast to ethical systems like Unitarianism and Platonism, which struggle to explain relational moral values and therefore lack the comprehensive approach necessary to fully address the complexities of moral behavior.

Christianity’s integrated approach to revelation, history, and moral exemplars provides a superior framework for understanding and practicing morality. By integrating these elements, Christianity offers a comprehensive and coherent moral framework that effectively bridges the gap between abstract principles and practical human motivations. The ability of Christianity to provide a personal God, public revelation, and historical continuity makes it more effective in guiding ethical behavior compared to systems that rely on abstract values or subjective experiences.

Competing ethical views face significant challenges in explaining the intrinsic value of moral states without reducing them to abstract universals or brain states. Ethical systems must provide a clear ontological and epistemological basis for intrinsic values. Christianity addresses this challenge by offering a personal God who grounds moral values in His nature, providing a robust and coherent explanation for intrinsic moral worth. Attempts to mimic Christian moral frameworks without adopting the full theological context often fall short. These approaches lack the foundational basis for moral values that Christianity provides. Without the theological context of a personal God and revelation, they fail to replicate the depth, coherence, and motivational power of the Christian moral framework.

In conclusion, while Christian apologists may sometimes overlook the complexities of secular metaethics, Christianity itself offers a robust and coherent moral framework that effectively bridges the gap between abstract principles and practical human motivations. This ensures that moral values are not only understood but lived, grounded in the relational nature of a personal God who interacts with creation.

Ethical Non-Naturalism

Overview: Ethical non-naturalism posits that moral truths are fundamental and irreducible to natural facts, akin to mathematical truths. Defenders: Philosophers like Michael Huemer and Russ Shafer-Landau. Example: The wrongness of torture is a basic moral truth, self-evidently wrong without relying on other facts.

Critiques:

• Ontological Objections:
  • Lack of a Unifying Moral Ground: Ethical non-naturalism fails to provide a unifying foundation for moral values, treating them as isolated truths without a broader metaphysical grounding. Without a unifying principle, such as the nature of a transcendent source, these moral truths appear arbitrary and lack coherence.
  • Inadequacy of Ethical Non-Naturalism: By positing moral facts as fundamental without further grounding, ethical non-naturalism leaves these facts hanging without a substantial ontological basis. Grounding moral truths in the character of a transcendent source provides a coherent and non-arbitrary foundation for their existence.
  • Problem of Normative Authority: Non-theistic moral realism struggles to establish why moral norms should hold normative authority over individuals. Without a transcendent source, there is no compelling reason for why individuals should adhere to these moral norms. Grounding moral norms in the commands and nature of a transcendent source ensures that they have the necessary authority and binding force.
• Epistemological Objections:
  • Reliability of Moral Intuitions: The reliability of moral intuitions is questionable under naturalism, especially considering evolutionary influences on moral beliefs. Evolutionary processes prioritize survival over truth, making it uncertain whether moral intuitions accurately reflect objective moral truths. Aligning moral intuitions with a transcendent moral truth offers a more reliable basis for moral knowledge.
  • Third Factor Problem: Bridging moral facts and human beliefs through a third factor, such as cognitive faculties, without divine grounding is insufficient. Cognitive faculties alone cannot guarantee the truth of moral beliefs unless they are ultimately grounded in a transcendent design. This grounding ensures that cognitive faculties are reliable and that moral beliefs align with objective moral truths.
  • Epistemic Justification and Intrinsic Justification: Ethical non-naturalism struggles to provide intrinsic justification for moral beliefs. Positing moral beliefs as self-evident and intrinsically justified without a foundation leads to subjectivism and relativism. Grounding moral beliefs in a transcendent source’s nature and commands provides a coherent and objective basis for moral knowledge, avoiding infinite regress and subjective arbitrariness.

Ethical Naturalism

Overview: Ethical naturalism holds that moral truths are based on natural facts about the world. Moral properties are reducible to natural properties. Defenders: Philosophers such as Peter Railton and Richard Boyd argue that moral facts are based on human well-being and flourishing. Example: Causing unnecessary suffering is wrong because it diminishes overall well-being.

Critiques:

• Normative Insufficiency: While natural facts can inform what contributes to well-being, they do not inherently provide moral obligations. The transition from descriptive facts to normative claims is not straightforward.
• Subjectivity in Well-Being: Different cultures and individuals may have varied perceptions of well-being, leading to moral relativism. Grounding moral truths in a transcendent source provides the normative authority needed for moral obligations and ensures objectivity beyond individual or cultural perceptions.

Constructivism

Overview: Constructivism asserts that moral truths are constructed through rational deliberation and agreement among individuals. Defenders: John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard. Example: Principles of justice determined by rational agents behind a “veil of ignorance.”

Critiques:

• Relativism: Rational agreement varies, leading to moral relativism. Without an objective reference, consensus does not guarantee moral truth.
• Lack of Binding Authority: Rational agreement alone lacks the authority to compel adherence to moral principles. Grounding moral truths in a transcendent source ensures they are universally binding and not subject to human consensus alone.

Ethical Intuitionism

Overview: Ethical intuitionism asserts that moral truths are known through direct, intuitive insight, similar to our knowledge of mathematical or logical truths. Defenders: Philosophers like G.E. Moore and Michael Huemer. Example: The wrongness of lying is known directly through moral intuition without needing further justification.

Critiques:

• Subjectivity and Reliability: Ethical intuitionism struggles with the subjectivity and reliability of intuitions. Without an objective standard, intuitions can vary widely among individuals, leading to conflicting moral beliefs.
• Epistemic Justification: Ethical non-naturalism posits moral beliefs as self-evident and intrinsically justified without a foundation, leading to subjectivism and relativism. Grounding moral beliefs in a transcendent source’s nature and commands provides a coherent and objective basis for moral knowledge.

Groundless Morals and Divine Command

Critique of Groundless Morals: Groundless morals, often proposed by ethical non-naturalists and moral subjectivists, lack a stable foundation, making moral truths appear arbitrary and subjective. Without an objective grounding, such as the divine nature posited by Christian theistic moral realism, moral values and duties become contingent upon individual or cultural preferences. This relativism undermines the universality and coherence necessary for a robust moral framework. By grounding moral truths in God’s unchanging and perfect nature, theistic moral realism avoids these pitfalls, ensuring that moral values are consistent, authoritative, and universally binding.

Issue with Evolutionary Ethics

What is Evolutionary Ethics?

Definition:

• Evolutionary ethics is a naturalistic approach to ethics, positing that moral behaviors and norms have developed through the process of evolution.
• This framework suggests that moral behaviors evolved because they were advantageous for the survival and reproduction of human beings.

Problematic Nature of Evolved Behaviors

• Evolutionary ethics often struggle with the implication that all behaviors, moral or immoral, are products of evolution.
• Since evolution selects for survival rather than moral truth, there is no inherent reason to distinguish between psychopathic and altruistic behaviors.
• Both moral and immoral actions can be seen as evolutionary products, leading to a lack of clear moral guidance.
• Evolutionary processes do not inherently favor moral actions over immoral ones, undermining the basis for ethical judgments within this framework.

The Is-Ought Problem in Evolutionary Ethics

• Evolutionary ethics encounters the is-ought problem, which highlights the difficulty of deriving prescriptive moral norms from descriptive evolutionary facts.
• Evolution explains how behaviors have developed to enhance survival and reproduction, but it does not provide a basis for determining how individuals ought to behave.
• The fact that certain behaviors have evolved does not imply that they are morally right or wrong.
• This gap between descriptive statements (what is) and prescriptive statements (what ought to be) poses a significant challenge for evolutionary ethics, as it lacks the means to justify moral obligations or prohibitions based solely on evolutionary processes.

Normative Authority and Moral Responsibility

• Evolutionary ethics struggle to establish the normative authority of moral principles.
• Without a transcendent source, there is no compelling reason why individuals should adhere to evolved moral norms.
• The lack of an objective standard for moral responsibility makes it difficult to hold individuals accountable for their actions within an evolutionary framework.

Subjectivity and Cultural Relativism

• Evolutionary ethics can lead to subjectivity and cultural relativism, as different societies may evolve different moral norms.
• Moral norms based on evolution may vary widely across cultures, leading to a lack of universal moral principles.
• This variability undermines the ability to make cross-cultural moral judgments and can result in moral relativism, where no action can be deemed universally right or wrong.

Reliability of Moral Intuitions

• The reliability of moral intuitions is questionable under evolutionary ethics, especially considering evolutionary influences on moral beliefs.
• Evolutionary processes prioritize survival over truth, making it uncertain whether moral intuitions accurately reflect objective moral truths.
• This uncertainty challenges the trustworthiness of moral intuitions as a basis for ethical decision-making within an evolutionary framework.

Why We Should Obey God: The necessity of obeying God arises from His role as the ultimate source and sustainer of moral truth. God’s commands are not arbitrary but are grounded in His inherently good nature. Obedience to God aligns human behavior with the ultimate moral standard, providing a coherent and stable framework for ethics. Furthermore, divine command theory posits that moral obligations derive their authority from God’s sovereign will, making them binding and obligatory for all humans. This grounding in divine authority ensures that moral truths are not subject to individual or cultural variability, maintaining their universal applicability and normative force.

Why We Should Obey God

Emerson Green raises the question of why we should listen to God, which can be interpreted in two ways:

1. Why is it a moral fact that God is worthy of our listening?
2. What motivates human listening to God?

Green’s argument suggests that even if God exists and issues moral commands, this does not inherently answer why those commands are morally authoritative. He critiques the idea that divine command alone suffices for moral obligations, proposing instead that moral truths are self-evident and not contingent upon divine decree.

Misunderstanding the Nature of Moral Commands

Green’s critique assumes a false dichotomy in the Euthyphro dilemma, missing the nuance of divine command theory. Theists argue that God’s nature is inherently good, and His commands flow from this perfect nature. Therefore, the commands are neither arbitrary nor independent but are an expression of His intrinsic goodness.

Grounding Moral Facts

Green’s argument about intrinsic moral facts lacks a clear grounding without God. From a theistic perspective, moral facts are grounded in God’s immutable nature. Without a transcendent source, moral facts are left hanging without a substantial ontological basis, leading to subjectivism or relativism.

Object-Subject Distinction

Green’s reliance on intuition and reason for moral knowledge does not adequately address the object-subject distinction. Theistic morality provides an objective standard through God’s nature, whereas Green’s framework risks falling into subjective interpretations of moral truths.

Emerson Green’s Critique

Green questions why God’s commands should be considered morally authoritative. He suggests that even if God is omniscient and perfectly loving, this does not necessarily provide a compelling reason to obey God’s commands. Green argues that if moral truths are self-evident, then they exist independently of God’s commands.

Emerson Green’s Quotes:

“Why should anyone obey God’s commands? Craig and others maintain that we are obligated to act in certain ways because God commands it, but in the absence of an explanation for why anyone should obey these commands, I don’t think moral obligation has actually been explained.“

“What if we don’t want to obey God? If that seems like an annoying question, then you know how we feel when the equivalent question is posed to the atheist: what if we don’t want to be moral?“

“Here’s one bad answer to both questions: there’s punishment in store for those who violate moral obligations, whether it’s the law or some amount of suffering in the hereafter; you won’t get away with it. But this is just a naked appeal to self-interest. It’s not a moral reason to obey God or do what’s right. An appeal to prudential reasons is not the same as an appeal to moral reasons.“

Green critiques the idea that divine command alone suffices for moral obligations, proposing instead that moral truths are self-evident and not contingent upon divine decree. He further explores the issue of whether moral commands from God require independent reasons to be considered morally binding.

Theological and Moral Implications

Normativity and Objectivity

The ground motive explains why moral commands are normative and objective—they are grounded in God’s design and purpose for humanity.

Commands of Reason

These moral commands are rational and intended, reflecting the rationality and intentionality of the Creator.

Design and Intention

Just as a machine is designed to function in a specific way, humans are designed to live according to God’s moral prescriptions. The assumption of design and intention is implicit in our reasoning about moral “oughts.”

Ground Motive in Dutch Reformed Theology

John Frame, a prominent figure in Reformed theology, and others in the Dutch Reformed tradition discuss the concept of the ground motive, which is fundamentally tied to our design by God. This theological concept posits that our ultimate desire and motive are grounded in God, who created us with a purpose and an inherent moral framework.

Unpacking the Idea of Ground Motive

In Dutch Reformed theology, particularly as articulated by John Frame, our ground motive is inherently tied to our design by God. This design means our ultimate desire should be to obey Him, as our moral framework is intended to align with God’s purposes for creation. Frame and other Dutch Reformed theologians argue that:

• Creation with Purpose: Humans are created with an inherent purpose, which includes moral and ethical dimensions.
• Alignment with Divine Will: Our moral and ethical duties are aligned with God’s will, and fulfilling these duties leads to human flourishing.
• Intrinsic Desire to Obey: Because we are designed by God, our ground motive (our fundamental drive and desire) is inherently geared towards obedience to God. This is seen as part of our created nature.

Ground Motives Reflect Core Beliefs: Ground motives are the fundamental beliefs that drive all other desires and actions. They dictate what we believe reason to be.God as the Ultimate Source: In a theistic framework, the ground motive is rooted in God, reflecting our ultimate purpose and design.

Historical and Teleological Reasoning

Human motivations are deeply intertwined with goals and outcomes. For instance, consider the pursuit of a college degree: if every time you neared graduation, a force reset your progress to the beginning, you would lose all rational motivation to continue. This highlights a fundamental principle—rational motivation requires a final goal or purpose, an ultimate judgment and fulfillment that aligns with God’s design for history.

For human actions to be meaningfully motivated, God must intricately design history, the context in which humans exist, the internal state of each person, and the moral laws that guide them. This comprehensive design secures objective morality, ensuring that our actions are both meaningful and directed toward a purposeful end. However, while this design is a necessary condition for moral motivation, it is not sufficient on its own.

Purpose (telos) itself is not intrinsically motivating. For example, if God had purposed humans to be unmotivated, the mere existence of that purpose would not compel action. Purpose requires more than just being an end goal; it needs to be aligned with God’s nature and supported by the epistemic and motivational context provided by Him. Thus, while purpose is necessary for motivation, it alone cannot suffice.

Human beings, created in God’s image, are endowed with an understanding of their purpose (telos). This inherent knowledge means that humans have the capacity to recognize and align themselves with their moral purpose, reflecting God’s intrinsic goodness. Yet, even this understanding, while necessary, is not sufficient. If God had purposed humans to be morally good without providing them with inferential and deliberative knowledge of what goodness or purpose entails, the motivation would still be lacking. Moral goodness requires not just a purpose but a rational and relational understanding that is rooted in God’s nature.

Moreover, if telos were intrinsically motivating, then any purpose, including an evil one, would be equally compelling. However, only purposes aligned with God’s nature provide valid moral motivations, underscoring that while telos is a necessary condition for moral motivation, it is not sufficient. It must be connected to the intrinsic goodness of God and the design He has set for history, ensuring that moral actions are both rationally and relationally motivated.

Furthermore, rejecting the concept of divine design leads to a significant consequence: it not only undermines the very nature of what an object is but also strips it of any objective ends. Without design, there are no inherent purposes or goals, rendering any notion of objective morality impossible. If there is no design guiding human actions or the world around us, then there can be no ultimate ends toward which those actions are directed. This lack of objective ends means that moral values become arbitrary, ungrounded in any higher purpose, and thus incapable of providing a stable foundation for ethical behavior.

In essence, the rejection of divine design results in a worldview where objective morality cannot exist because there are no objective ends. Without these ends, moral actions lose their meaning and motivation, leaving a void where purposeful and morally grounded behavior should be. This underscores the necessity of acknowledging God’s design not only for the coherence of moral motivation but also for the very possibility of objective morality itself.